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ABSTRACT 
Through offering thoughtful readings of this, 
or any work, we are engaging in an effort which continues 
formulating the relationship between philosophy and 
sociology in such a way that our version of social actions 
(whether our own actions or the actions of others) is 
developing dialectically. Developing such that, for 
instance, any seeming lack of resemblance between the 
title of this work and the work itself does not restrain 
us and prevent us from hearing how it is only by risking 
engaging in work, which may be heard by some, even by many, 
as eccentric, that genuine social research can proceed. 
As composers of our readings of this, or any 
work, we might having read it, say that the conception of 
the relationship between these two disciplines; the con- 
ception of each of the disciplines; and indeed the way 
of conceptualizing each of ourselves and other selves, 
with which we had set out, has developed through our 
relationship to our work with this piece of writing. We 
say we "might" say this, for each of our readings displays 
each of our response -ability, i.e. each of our decisions. 
I, as writer, look forward to working with your 
response, for my desire in offering this work for your 
attention is to pursue or instigate our conversation, and 
not to commit selves to solitary confinement. 
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I trust that my recent silence has not been 
presumed by you to display indifference or displeasure at 
receiving your response to my last paper. And I think I 
am right in presuming that even although my manner of 
proceeding could be surprising you will respond to it as 
you have to my previous speeches. And yet, it occurs to 
me to say that I am happy to be proceeding in this way, 
indeed that proceeding in this way makes me happy for I 
have decided that though this manner of proceeding could 
appear dangerous to some, as it does to me in my weaker 
moments, I shall not allow my resolve to shrink by treating 
apparent dangers as something to avoid. For I know well 
enough that a good listener will always be seeking virtue/ 
thoughtfulness through this or any speech, and so I can 
only do myself good when I engage in dialogue. 
What I want to say here is that your response 
to that last paper has helped me to feel ashamed that a 
piece of writing so dangerous could come from my hand. 
And yet, it would be disgraceful if after all our con- 
versations/work I preferred to remain silent now, when the 
blindness to which you refer continues to be cracked by a 
glimmer of the thoughtful life to which we continue to 
aspire. There is much to be done, and though I shall 
make mistakes and take wrong turns, we will not be 
surprised /... 
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surprised at that. But I will proceed, for I want and 
need our inquiry to continue for I am entirely lost out- 
side it: indeed I cannot be myself outside of it. 
One further brief remark before I explain the 
place of this letter which perhaps you are wondering about. 
Thank you for helping to bring to my attention the irony 
of Socrates' speech to the effect that being persuaded by 
one's accusers could ever be one's problem. This has 
reminded me that our own personal conversation seemed at 
the time to begin only when I was persuaded by what I 
took to be your accusation that I was a worrier.* But 
appearances need not deceive for whilst that could have 
been allowed to mark the beginning of the end of a con- 
versation it has become a part of our collaborative attempt 
to pursue our examination of the place of self: to continue 
reconstituting ourselves through further inquiry, through 
further thought /speech. When we have been talking about 
worry we haven't been talking about me, but about an 
activity which itself displays, as all speeches display, 
our place as speakers. We use our time well when we 
engage in thoughtful conversation, and I'm writing now for 
I think our work bears that out. 
However, enough of these remarks, and I'll risk 
the 'enough' even though as we will see later when we turn 
to the work of Nietzsche it (i.e. 'enough') can display a 
failure /... 
* Fortunately, this personal conversation, like all 
conversations can have something to say to any who 
choose to listen. 
- 3 - 
failure to resist the inclination to stop speaking when the 
speech needs to proceed. Here it makes reference to my 
desire to continue getting on with the work that I need to 
do, for the material we have to work with was organised by 
a version of self that I am no longer pretending to be; 
and that material is now desperately being thought through 
in such a way as to display our continuing resistance to 
the temptation to remain or become what we merely seem to 
be. I will be and am showing how past work is helping me 
to develop, how it is not baggage that becomes a burden to 
one who carries it only for later use, but how it provides 
me with the strength to work now. 
It is time to say how I am using this letter, 
for it is certainly not the extent of my response; that 
would have been a grave insult. And yet, at the same time, 
by saying that my response extends beyond the confines of 
this letter, the letter does make reference to my commitment 
to continue. This letter is being written for whilst I 
could remain silent I choose not to, but the decision to 
respond in this particular way shows my awareness that I 
cannot respond in a seemingly neat and tidy way, and I know 
that that is not what you would want of me. 
So here is the surprise, which I now think you 
may well have anticipated, this letter is to be used as the 
introduction to a larger work which will itself provide 
material for our continuing dialogue, the larger work will 
in effect be my response. I'm taking this step not because 
I'm /... 
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I'm well prepared, but in order to continue doing the work 
of paring away that which detracts from my character and 
instructing and improving that which is essential to it. 
Any response that was less than that which this work will 
seek to become would not be becoming for it would not have 
displayed my true character. It would have done justice 
to no one. I only do myself justice by remembering that 
I will always have more to do if I am to do other justice, 
for we only do ourselves justice by acknowledging that we 
haven't yet done each other justice, i.e. by seeing that 
we have more to do. 
Well, I've broken the pause in our conversation 
and by doing so increase both its jaggedness and its extent, 
but as this letter does also provide the introduction to a 
less private conversation we are breaking a wider silence. 
As this work has become less private our task must be to 
display how both our desire to break that silence, and our 
manner of breaking it, can allow for the recollection of 
the pieces into a thoughtful conversation. We must illus- 
trate how that which could have appeared as an intrusion 
is rather part of an inquiry in which all are already 
necessarily involved. 
I'm not requesting a reply to this letter, though 
should you choose to respond to it by writing I will incor- 
porate your reply in the body of the work as it proceeds. 
Whilst this may or may not seem a reasonable way to proceed, 
and it will of course come as no surprise to you that I 
have /... 
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have many doubts about it, on balance it is the route out 
of the many I've tried in the last few months, which appeals 
to me, and you also know that that may be reason enough. 
I know that you and any thoughtful reader will not be dis- 
tracted by fears about conventionality and acceptability 
though I don't deny that I also have to contend with them: 
I admit that by mentioning them. 
I want to enjoy writing this work as I'm enjoying 
writing this letter for I think there is something in what 
Werther in Goethe's "The Sorrows of Young Werther" says when 
he says: 
"Ill humour (for us worry) is like indolence, 
because it is a form of indolence. Our natures 
tend towards it. But if we can muster the 
strength to pull ourselves together, work can 
be made easy and we can find true pleasure in 
activity." (1) 
But is there bitter irony here? For it seems 
that Goethe didn't hear the words he put into Werther's 
mouth for Goethe's work appears to have tended towards 
nature, perhaps he has been misunderstood and we do him an 
injustice. If not, he misunderstands himself, and does 
himself an injustice. But no matter for the moment, for 
there will be more of specific speakers in the main body 
of this work. What we are saying is that those who are 
indolent i.e. those who allow themselves to fall prey to 
that tendency towards nature, must deeply be ill humoured/ 
worried; for our true strength can only lie in our ability 
and willingness to improve our natures/ our selves through 
speech /... 
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speech /thought. True pleasure is always produced in 
thoughtful, hence social, activity and not, as Goethe and 
others like him accidentally tempt us to believe, in nature, 
that is, if nature is formulated as unthoughtful, presocial. 
When Socrates says to Phaedrus that he (Socrates) 
was a lover of knowledge and that the men who dwelt in the 
city were his teachers not the trees or the country; he 
chooses as all men and women must choose. 
But am I rambling now, as if in the country? I 
must own up to the fact that I do not know, and consequently 
I have good reason to invite those who imagine they know 
to join me for they perhaps can show me how to proceed. 
And yet, I would be surprised beyond belief if you joined 
me for that reason, rather I strongly expect that you will 
join with me in my efforts, as you have done so frequently 
in the past, not because you think of yourself as knowing, 
but because you own up to your own ignorance (as I am now 
owning up to mine), and seek through conversation /inquiry 
to become more thoughtful about what thoughtful men /women 
do do. 
Here then is where this letter draws to a close, 
though of course the work continues, and will continue 
beyond the limits of the work of which this letter forms 
a part. For, given that our intent is to breathe thought- 
fulness into a form of life that if left as it is strangles 
both self and other, we have no interest in bringing our 
work /... 
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work to a close. 
I suggested earlier in this letter that I was not 
requesting a reply and I think I should have the courage of 
my convictions here and ask you more firmly not to reply, 
for I know that it was my hand that wrote so dangerously, 
and it must be my head that frees it if my speech is to 
illustrate the good of our inquiry. I must be showing 
through my writing that even the hands of the speech that 
strangles (i.e. worry) can be turned to the work of sustain- 
ing a thoughtful life by their user. I will do what I 
think is right, as I know you will, and that will ensure 
that our conversations continue to be worthwhile. But I 
have not Alcibiades' confidence, for I remember how fre- 
quently, with the help of the questions you've raised and 
I've heard, I've become aware of the gulf between my thoughts 
and the actions I've become engaged in. And yet, whilst 
this letter no doubt provides yet another example, it also 
illustrates that I am continuing to make the effort of pulling 
them together for I'm glad to have been offered and accepted 
the opportunity to do so. 
But even here I'm almost forgetting the reason I 
had for writing, and there is humour in that, for my reason 
for writing was and is related to my increasing awareness 
of my forgetfulness: of my tendency to act as if I know 
that what I am doing is worth doing when I do not know. 
Your comments on my last paper have helped remind me how 
forgetful I am of what I've previously been reminded of, 
both in and by our previous conversations. And it is for 
this /... 
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this reason that as a response to your request that I display 
my willingness and ability to respond to your detailed com- 
ments I am, and will be, doing everything I can at this 
stage and will leave out nothing that requires to be said. 
So now to the detailed work which I hope you will 
detect from this letter is already underway. 
But wait: I shall resist that temptation, i.e. 
to hear your silence (if indeed you choose to remain silent) 
as approval, by reminding myself that as the work has been, 
and is, for the good I can approve of it myself, for if I 
have come to approve of myself /my work as seeking to be 
thoughtful I don't need or want to wait for others' approval. 
I no longer seek your approval, though when I've 
written all I can I will most certainly want you to join 
with me in raising further issues worthy of thought, and in 
this way continuing our inquiry. I don't know how the work 
will proceed from here, but I do know that even that fact 
can help make for a thoughtful, lively and honest inquiry, 
and we'll both enjoy that. 
It is time I spoke for myself and whilst this whole 
work could be construed as a defence, that construction 
would prevent the depths of its moral commitment from reach- 
ing that surface that can join speaker and listener. I'm 
beginning in this way for I'm reminded there is much for all 
to give and gain through thoughtful conversation and nothing 




By proceeding to re -form worry, an activity which 
may appear to make even the calmest situation trying, in 
such a way as to re -place it on a path of action which dis- 
plays a philosophical attitude of calmness in even apparently 
the most trying circumstances, we set ourselves a task that3 
though seemingly stern, is a necessary test for this and 
any thoughtful conversation. 
Whilst we recognize that that statement is no more 
than a slogan (and is perhaps not even a good slogan) it can 
convey a hint of the task in which this work plays a part. 
But, the work and the worker are not external to the task 
as tools or observers may appear to be; they are not apart 
but a part. Indeed the very fact that we set out on this 
attempt at all displays a commitment which worry would begin 
by trying to deny itself. 
Perhaps if we mention two characters and situ- 
ations from literature the nature of our task will be made 
more available. On the one side we have the story of 
Ivan Illyich Pralinsky the 'hero' of Dostoyevsky's 'A Nasty 
Story', whose story ends with him sinking helplessly into 
his chair saying to himself that he wasn't able to stand 
it. On the other side we have the speech of Socrates, 
and in this work specific weight is likely to be laid upon 
his speech in the 'Apology', though, given his consistency 
we /... 
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we could draw from elsewhere equally well. 
We have begun by talking of one side and another, 
of one character and another, but our task is to relate these 
two sides, to show how Ivan, had he been more thoughtful, 
more honest with himself and others, would have become 
Socrates. We relate to both Ivan and Socrates as social 
developments, and by doing so make the desirable speech of 
Socrates a real possibility for us. We do not begin by 
invoking and relying upon notions such as natural genius, 
or whatever, in such a way as to diminish our responsibilities. 
Socrates is social whether he is conceived of as an historical 
character or as a product of Plato's thought, and so, most 
importantly, are we. Our decision to relate to Socrates as 
one of us is what this work is about for we cannot take 
Nietzsche at his word when he says in 'The Twilight of 
Idols' that "The dialectician devitalizes his opponent's 
intellect ".(3) We choose to think of the intellect as 
dialectical, as not producing other as opponent but as 
collaborator. Nietzsche's fight with Socrates would have 
required Socrates' collaboration to become more than shadow 
boxing, for the collaboration of an opponent is necessary 
for wrestling to take place. Whilst we do not take 
Nietzsche at his word we seek to revitalize his speech, and 
the speeches of others including ourselves, not to devitalize. 
Since writing the letter reproduced in Section 1 
I have decided that what I will do is to question, and take 
issue with this work as it proceeds, or better, to use this 
work /... 
work to raise questions and issues as it proceeds, in the 
same manner that they would be raised by any thoughtful 
colleague. I must ask questions, and take up issues, on 
behalf of this thoughtful colleague, for by doing so I will 
be acting both on your behalf and mine, for we need and 
want to relate to others and to ourselves as would those 
who, by asking thoughtful questions, act with profound moral 
intent. Though these questions stretch us we need not heed 
any inclination to shrink away from them for we have been 
being reminded through our work that that would do no good; 
that we could not choose to do that. 
That paragraph begins to remind us how although 
this work may have appeared to have begun in a very personal 
manner that does not make it private. On the contrary what 
it helps us to uncover is that as we become more true to 
our characters so we also have less need for privacy. 
Still, some readers may be choosing to feel like 
newcomers to an on -going conversation, for references have 
been made to particulars (e.g. that dangerous piece of writ- 
ing) about which they have as yet no knowledge. If this 
situation is not comfortable for them, that will very 
likely not be altered by us reminding them that we have all 
experienced finding ourselves at a loss in situations of 
this kind. Neither would it alter matters if we suggested 
that perhaps this is one way of making reference to the 
place of all men and women as speakers /thinkers. 
What /... 
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What we can question is an orientation which 
produces being a newcomer to an ongoing conversation as a 
disadvantage, for perhaps a thoughtful colleague is one who 
always tries to proceed as a newcomer. As we think this 
is so, we ask these readers to try to approach this material 
as newcomers for by so doing they are not at a disadvantage, 
rather we are the same, for it is only through our efforts 
to re- achieve this newness that we can make good use of this 
material, or better make use of any material in such a way 
that we continue directing our conversations by considering 
issues worthy of our thought. It is only if we genuinely 
recognize and own up to the fact that we are at a loss that 
our inquiry can be worthwhile. 
What we discern here is that a problem that this 
transitional section could have been delayed by i.e. that 
of how to write in such a way as to engage both new and old 
interlocutors would not have been worthy of our attention. 
For we have come to remember that a thoughtful interlocutor, 
whether speaking or listening /writing or reading, tries to 
remain a newcomer. That a thoughtful interlocutor resists 
the temptation to begin or end by stipulating that he or 
she knows what is best, i.e. what is for the good; for 
isn't it stipulations that pre -empt dialogue or thought, 
and make for empty speech? 
We are saying that thoughtful colleagues, or good 
friends, are those who would relate to others and to their 
own pasts etc. in such a way as to collaborate in conver- 
sations/... 
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sations which increased the worth of these relationships. 
This work represents on one level our continuing effort to 
befriend ourselves, on another our relationship with others 
who act as thoughtful colleagues or good friends towards 
us, and our attempt to do the same for them; and on a 
third level it represents the relationship between social, 
thoughtful action and inaction. What it represents to you 
the reader that we do not yet know will depend upon what 
you conceive yourself to be, but we choose to proceed by 
relating to you as we would with any thoughtful interlocutor. 
The question we choose to orient to here is how 
can we relate to our past conversations? How would one 
who wanted to act thoughtfully relate to what he and others 
had previously said and heard? How,more deeply, does one 
who wants to act thoughtfully relate to anything? Perhaps 
we could begin by saying that the thoughtful character tends 
to relate through rather than to things i.e. her topics: 
the things about which she speaks are made by her into 
valuable resources both for herself and others. The topic 
becomes part of the collaborative effort, for it is worked 
with in such a way as to re- achieve through conversation/ 
thought a more worthy understanding of those relationships, 
and enables them to continue in a more thoughtful manner. 
We need to use what we come into contact with whatever it 
may be to remind ourselves - to exhort ourselves - to act 
more thoughtfully. By producing that which we corne into 
contact with, that which we think about,as analogous to 
reminders /... 
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reminders, we provide strong reasons for preserving that 
with which we have dealt and deal. As anything can be used 
by a thoughtful interlocutor to continue directing attention 
towards issues worthy of concern, we see how by being 
thoughtful we need not relate to past speeches, or others' 
speeches as 'things' to abandon. This is not though, a 
recipe for a collection of random objects, but for recollection 
for we are not concerned simply to regurgitate what we have 
previously heard or said, rather we display how we can be 
reminded to be ourselves by the way we relate to that with 
which we deal. We are active and, if we are to act thought- 
fully we need to keep in mind how even what might appear 
to some as innocuous passive activities, for instance read- 
ing, or for that matter collecting, or remaining silent, or 
choosing examples, call for thoughtful effort if we are truly 
to be engaged in them. 
However, even having said this I'm still tempted 
to prefer what I, for reasons as yet unclear to me, perceive 
as the security of my current internal conversation to the 
insecurity of dealing with past conversations. (Perhaps 
this preference could help account for bad memory ?) But, 
the raising of this issue encourages me to ask in what way 
the internal conversation in which I begin by perceiving 
myself to be engaged is mine? This assumes that I am what 
I appear to myself to be, when if, or rather by being honest, 
I have to admit that I cannot be sure about this. What we 
are saying is that if we approach our selves as topics to 
think /... 
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think about, we can change our minds in the strong sense 
of change i.e. become more thoughtful about what we are. 
We don't have to remain as what we may appear to be, and 
that in itself provides a good reason to continue thinking, 
conversing about what we do, what we are, what we want. 
However,,by noticing the way we spoke there of 'that in it- 
self' we remind ourselves that it is we that provide good 
reasons they are not provided for us. 
I begin to doubt that this work is worthy of you, 
but I remind myself to continue for that doubt is no reason 
to stop, but is reason to continue; it should provide a 
spur for our continued efforts. And yet we see that I 
doubted it was worthy of you because I doubted it was worthy 
of me, for now each paragraph seems to exude more loudly 
the hollow ring of the speech of one who moves away from, 
rather than into that material with which he /she works. 
But I know the material I have stares me in the face whilst 
the clock does tick in my ears, for I also know that it is 
now I must deal with the inclination to remain as I appear 
to be i.e. the inclination to do nothing. But we might 
ask, to whom would doing nothing appear the most reasonable 
course of action? For course of action is what it is. 
Already we make progress for the very fact that I considered 
entering into doing nothing, without thinking about what 
sort of character would pursue that course of action, itself 
displays the accidentalness of that version of doing nothing. 
However, doing nothing could be the action of one who was 
not /... 
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not prepared to act too soon i.e. before he /she decided 
what was a good thing to do, but of course he /she should 
realize that they perceive doing nothing as a good thing 
to do. When we act thoughtfully we act as we think one 
who acted or acts thoughtfully would act; and do not need 
to follow our actions by asking what sort of person would 
have acted in that way. 
So now we come to formulate a good friend or 
thoughtful colleague as one whose actions display his effort 
to act as one who thinks about what it is good to do. But 
we must also bear in mind that thinking does not precede 
action in the way that stops precede starts, or absence 
precedes presence. Thinking is part of action, we do not 
separate them in such a way that thinking needs to stop to 
allow action to proceed, for that reduces action to accident. 
So, we move into the materials with which we deal thought- 
fully, but not as if we began to act after we finished 
thinking. Our manner of dealing with the materials around 
us displays our efforts to continue thinking as we do. We 
are not finished objects, we change as we read and write, 
we forget and we remember, and we imagine you might be the 
same, and will do well, as will we, to . bear this in mind 
whilst proceeding. However, even the idea of bearing in 
mind is too static, much too static, perhaps the idea of 
baring our minds, of revealing to ourselves and others what 
we can be is more productive? It is by not being finished 
objects that we can always thoughtfully change ourselves 
for /... 
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for the better: that we can choose to read in productive 
ways: that we can need and want, and most importantly 
maintain social relationships: that we can give and take 
in dialectical relationships. I said in the letter that 
I wanted to enjoy writing this work and at present I am, 
and by realizing that we can always improve ourselves we 
resist the temptation to defend ourselves as we seem to be, 
but by doing so we recognize we always have work to do. 
We know, of course, that the fact I'm enjoying this work 
does not detract from its seriousness, on the contrary the 
very fact that work and pleasure seem so frequently to be 
separated in certain 'societies' makes reference to the 
separation of thought from action in the dealings of those 
'societies' members. 
But I suggested above that I preferred what I 
perceived as the security of dealing with my current internal 
conversation rather than with the insecurity of dealing with 
past conversations. It occurs to us now that this dis- 
tinction is bogus, for our current internal conversations 
are our ways of dealing with past conversations, so what 
follows for us are our internal conversations. How else 
can we who are thinking proceed? When I wrote earlier of 
the material that had to be dealt with staring me in the 
face, I relied upon the same sort of thoughtless distinction 
between speaker /thinker and what he /she has to work with, 
that we seem to be relying on now, if we separate our selves 
from that earlier work. Yet now it is you, the thoughtful 
reader /... 
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reader who I see staring at me, but I can take heart, for 
we know that you must recognize at least a bit of yourself 
in what you see. We also suggested earlier that we began 
by talking of one side and the other, and what we propose 
to do now is to relate the views of one who considered her- 
self to be worried, in this instance by what she has so far 
read of this work. You may or may not consider yourself 
to be worried, that is of little concern for we are adopt- 
ing this strategy if such it can be called, as a way to step 
away from, or distance ourselves from an activity in which 
we could have become engaged. 
What then might one who considered herself to be 
worried be saying to herself about what she had so far read, 
and we say - saying to herself - for we doubt that the one 
who acts worried feels close enough to others to say it to 
them. 
That reader's response:- 
"Immediate problem for me is to write or speak 
about what has been said so far in this work 
given that the same uneasiness exists about 
writing /speaking about this as exists about 
writing /speaking about anything else. To put 
this another way, work is needed to maintain 
an interest in it and I can't see why I should 
be interested in this rather than anything else. 
Even if I was to try to maintain an interest in 
it I might be doing no more than trying to stop 
myself being bored. But I have to admit to 
myself that I'm rarely bored for there is so 
much to think about, so many problems, so many 
pitfalls and dangers. 
One big problem if I was to have been forced 
to write or speak about what I've read arises 
because I have to admit I haven't really read 
it, at least not closely, and I suppose this 
is /... 
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is because it is obvious that its author is 
trying to save his own skin i.e. it sounds 
like a forced confession, and I suspect that 
if pressed its author would say quite the 
opposite if he thought that would help him. 
Given that I haven't read it closely, and that 
I can't really see why I should it isn't sur- 
prising that I can't bring myself to deal with 
the details. 
However, given the specific circumstances 
surrounding my reading of this work I'm almost 
certain to be asked about it and I'll have to 
say something intelligent in order to keep face; 
so what should I do? What shall I say? ,that 
comes to mind? Well, its author certainly 
seems enthusiastic, but then so are numerous 
others e.g. academics, 'Lets study this, lets 
study that, perhaps we'll get a grant etc.' 
And yet I suppose this author's apparent 
enthusiasm is less surprising given the pressure 
he is under. 
Oh, even these thoughts on it don't seem worth 
having, but I will admit it seems a strange way 
to begin a thesis: 
I guess I'll have to hope for the best and wait 
and see what happens, with a bit of luck, now 
I think about it, I won't have to say anything 
much because no -one else will take it seriously 
or read it closely anyway." (4) 
Now the first remark we can make is that if any 
readers, not you of course, did have thoughts that ran some- 
where along these lines and they also are thinking that with 
luck they won't have to reveal this, we know that the work 
that follows could help them to become less reliant upon 
chance. For if one relies upon chance i.e. upon what may 
happen there is always plenty of space for worry and little 
room for any other activity. For instance, I could have 
sat here and hoped that the next sentence would come to me, 
when in fact I need to remember that I must and will be 
producing it. If I had treated the sentences as merely 
coming /... 
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coming to me I would have been reducing my person to the 
status of my pencil, and whilst things can and do happen 
to pencils, pencils cannot choose to act. If I treat 
myself as a pencil that is my choice and I must be making 
it because I prefer being a thing to being a thinker: one 
who admits to himself that he can and does choose what he 
wants to do, to be. 
In the same way that the distinction between current 
and past conversations came to be bogus so now does the 
strategy of differentiating between us and them, or between 
worry and thoughtfulness in the manner which would have been 
necessary to continue writing as if the dialogue were between 
disparate individuals. For it is modes of speech that we 
are using and referring through and these do not separate out 
in such a way as to allow us to proceed with two entirely 
different characters. Indeed if the characters were entirely 
different no dialogue could take place. As speakers /thinkers 
we are in a manner of speaking always in the middle and we 
do well if we realize our place and act in it or through it. 
So we'll spend no more time on strategies but will use the 
time available to us at this stage to discuss the material 
at hand in the light of how this conversation proceeds. 
If this is not to your liking then it is yourselves or at 
least what you produce us to be, that you must think about 
and instruct, for we in no way disown our work or separate 
ourselves from it. Like all work it is not merely some- 
thing that has been done, but it displays the author's 
characters /... 
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characters, it displays what we are. 
As always the question arises of how to proceed 
from here? And yet to speak of questions arising is an 
instance of what we are continually improving upon for we 
asked that question, we do the questioning, it doesn't 
simply happen to us. We play a part in the production of 
questions and need to take responsibility for them by show- 
ing how they are specific responses to the way the situation 
has been formulated which could have been otherwise. That 
is, we don't have to begin with a question, or at least not 
with this question, and not by treating questions as if they 
arise from nowhere. So we need to think about why we did 
begin this paragraph in the way we did. For instance, I 
could have stopped at the end of the previous paragraph, or 
I could have asked how you or another might proceed. This 
resonates with earlier ideas and may be more productive, for 
what sort of character begins with questions? This reminds 
us of the beginning of that reader's response i.e. "Immediate 
problem for me ... etc." and it also reminds us of Socrates' 
response to what he was told of the Oracle's remark i.e. 
"When I heard the answer, I said to myself what can the God 
mean ? "(5) Both speeches begin with questions, so perhaps 
the immediate desire to question is an aspect of our dia- 
lectical character. This desire to question can make 
writing seem far too static, for questions are produced before 
sentences are finished, and yet this can be good as it 
enables us to move through those early sentences. Frequently 
when we leave situations we wish we'd said or done something 
else /... 
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else, something better, but what we need to remember about 
this is that it doesn't provide a reason to regret having 
done what we did, but rather can help us remember our 
ability to be improving upon what we do by thinking. We 
should not stifle questions or thoughts and hold them back, 
and this we dare to say is very common in a 'society' such 
as the one in which we have lived. All too frequently 
people have avoided asking questions of themselves, and 
others, and they have done this merely to maintain relation- 
ships at a level at which they know they were not making as 
much as they could out of them. 
(A remark to my supervisor, when I look at past 
work I see how frequently I refused to say I didn't under- 
stand what you were saying simply because I did not want 
to appear inadequate. It is clear that by not asking thought- 
ful questions I revealed my inadequacy. 
But, by making reference to my inadequacy I reveal 
several other inadequacies e.g. a failure to resist the in- 
clination to dwell upon what I have imagined is myself, and 
upon what I have imagined are my bad points. But, is it 
really bad to dwell on them? Perhaps it is only bad if 
nothing is done about them i.e. it is good to get to notice 
them, but noticing must be noticed to be not enough, we 
must do something about them. We are not simply trying 
to bring matters to our attention, but to attend to them 
by writing /thinking about them.) 
However /... 
- 23 - 
However we are learning that good intentions, 
such as these seem to be, are by no means enough, for the 
naive can and do have good intentions, and it is these that 
end in tragedy. We are reminded of Ivan Illyich Pralinsky 
but also of the following stanza:- 
"Then Old Age and Experience, hand in hand 
Lead him to death, and make him understand, 
After a search so painful and long, 
That all his life he has been in the wrong." (6) 
What we are saying is that naivety is not the 
newness or freshness that it might seem to be, for those 
conventionally recognized as naive are those who have been 
previously persuaded that they know what it is good to do. 
Perhaps naivety is a product of being too ready to listen 
to others' recommendations uncritically, unthoughtfully. 
Throughout this work we are trying to retrieve newness but 
not in a naive way. Perhaps the writer of the above stanza 
did continue to wait for Old Age and Experience to make him 
understand, but should we be made to understand? Do we 
want to be made to understand? What room would this leave 
for our thoughtful good intentions? We think that the fact 
that the writer wrote those lines displays his /her refusal 
to wait for Old Age and Experience to lead him /her. The 
stanza displays for us that we choose to act now even though 
we do not and cannot know whether our actions are right or 
wrong and our actions are all the better for that. Realiz- 
ing that we do not begin, or end by knowing what is right 
or wrong /good or bad enables us to continue thoughtfully 
producing our social relationships and to allow ourselves not 
to /... 
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to be reduced to subjects that have to be told what is right 
or wrong. Where would the morality be in that? And who 
would do the telling? 
Naivety has listened to, in the manner of having 
been leaned upon. We have no desire to lean upon others 
with our writing i.e. to force others to hear what is said 
in a certain way for we need others' collaboration, not 
their submissive agreement. We don't begin speaking by 
knowing what it is to speak honestly, but we seek to relate 
honestly through our continuing efforts to speak. Each 
sentence, and each word requires further thought, and we 
know that they always will. But, we also know that it is 
sentences and words that enable us to further our efforts, 
and we don't seek effortless lives but seek to free our 
efforts, our lives, from current constraints through our 
use of the very sentences and words that can bind us and 
blind us. Let us work in some detail now with that reader's 
response:- 
The first sentence was as follows:_ 
"Immediate problem for me is to write or speak 
about what has been said so far in this work 
given that the same uneasiness exists about 
writing /speaking about this as exists about 
writing /speaking about anything else. ..." 
Let us proceed by saying that this first sentence 
of the 'worrier's' response might have been our last if we 
could have allowed ourselves to be ruled by the usage of 
worry; for we, like worry are uneasy about what we write. 
Yet /... 
- 25 - - 
Yet we are remembering that this uneasiness is a feature 
of all speech, it is a feature of speech that issues forth 
from the speaker's intermediate position. 
However, worry appears to go so far as to own up 
here to feeling uneasy about speaking or writing to other 
and by doing so seems to produce a difference between self 
and other, such that its speech isn't good enough for other 
to hear but is good enough for itself. We are reminded 
by this that we also feel uneasy talking to ourselves. 
What we are saying is that worry seems to be being allowed 
to conceal from that sentence's speaker the fact that the 
speaker /thinker is not one: that when we converse with 
ourselves, when we think, we ought to treat ourselves with 
the same respect that we treat other. We are being reminded 
that as thoughtful interlocutors, we value the uneasiness 
of the speaker's position, for through it is maintained the 
source of, and for, lively, thoughtful, moral, social 
activity. 
We are concerned to remind ourselves that if we 
were convinced by the usage of worry to wait for uneasiness 
to go before we begin to speak, we would be waiting for ever. 
Deeply we all know this, and this is why worry's speech can 
only almost convince us. What we are expressing here is 
that we doubt that anyone actually ever is wholly committed 
to worry i.e. we are committed to displaying that worry is 
impossible as a course of action. 
However /... 
- 26 a 
However, if we are to respond to other as a 
thoughtful interlocutor we cannot set out by 'accepting' 
that other i.e. the writer of that sentence, begins with a 
distinction between speaking /writing and thinking (i.e. 
talking with one's self), for how could we know other does 
this? So whilst we could have read "Immediate problem for 
me is to write or speak about ... etc." as indicating an 
erroneous omission of thought, i.e. whilst we could have 
said it would have been better if what had been written 
had been "Immediate problem for me is to write, or speak, 
or think about ... etc." we choose to read the clause as 
indicating its author's awareness that thought is writing/ 
speaking, that to have included it would have been to treat 
us like dummies who need to be told the obvious. Further- 
more, by saying "Immediate problem for me ... etc." this 
speaker displays her commitment not to leave her 'problems' 
for others to solve and we must do the same. We, like she 
do not delegate our work to others for we know that the 
"Immediate problem ..." is for us in the strong sense of 
good for us. The "Immediate problem ..." enables us to 
proceed, as it enables that speaker to proceed. It is 
'for' her /us in the sense of with her /us, as in - are you 
for or against us - and not in the weak sense of indicat- 
ing potential ownership i.e. that is mine not yours. 
Through making the choice to read that clause in 
that way we are reminded that we always do choose how we 
read 'things' that our readings are our responses, that we 
produce /... 
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produce or present ourselves through them. That we always 
choose is another way of referring to immediacy, for we do 
not separate ourselves from our choices by screening our- 
selves from them; by placing something between us and 
them, for whether we act or don't act, act in this way or 
in that, as thinkers /speakers choosing is what we do. 
But what of beginning with a problem? Our read- 
ing need not be slovenly, for whilst if we were lazy we 
might rely upon a version of problems as analogous to 
blemishes, i.e. as something we wished to be without, we 
know that for the thinker saying she has a problem is 
emblemizing her place, for a pro -blem is like a mark on 
her behalf. The thinker plays a part in producing the 
problem. This notion of problem could seem contrived, but 
what that helps us to remember is that conventional usage 
is no less contrived and we are seeking to achieve more 
thoughtful conventions. 
The notion of immediacy also requires work for 
it need not mean urgent, or without delay, especially if 
thought is seen to delay, rather it makes reference to the 
place of self as being in mediacy, as neither god nor beast. 
Recognition of our immediacy is recognition of our place 
as intermediate. So, whilst the immediate "Immediate" 
could have misled us into seeing its author as wanting to 
treat beginnings as not following and preceeding: as not 
intermediate, we show that a more thoughtful reading was 
and is possible. Had that author begun with the less 
thoughtful/... 
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thoughtful version of beginnings as immediate i.e. as not 
intermediate, we can understand how beginning would have 
been beyond her. A beginning would have had to have been 
like a miracle for she would have feared that writing about 
something would have been intermediate, for she wouldn't 
have acknowledged that this - uneasiness about - makes 
uneasiness intermediate. That author would have forgotten 
that being uneasy about writing or speaking was contingent 
upon the specific versions of writing /speaking and begin- 
ning that were being relied upon. Neither would that 
author have remembered that her uneasiness with uneasiness 
was the same as her uneasiness with intermediacy; that is 
that uneasiness is intermediacy. 
But as we have said, we are concerned to preserve 
the author's thoughtfulness not to proceed by differentiat- 
ing as if we knew she was different from us. For how could 
we know that, and how could we work at understanding her 
speech if that was what we claimed? 
So, the author of that sentence is working even 
although she has participated in producing the formulation 
of writing /speaking /thinking /working as always being 
enveloped in uneasiness (i.e. uneasiness about). That 
author can refer to this uneasiness as given, for she is, 
by so doing, making reference to the fact that she chose 
to provide or give this honest speech about speaking, rather 
than to dishonestly remain silent on the issue of the 
uneasiness /... 
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uneasiness that does accompany all thoughtful speeches. 
And can an unthoughtful speech even be called a speech? 
Speeches are utterances alright but they are by no means 
complete or total in the sense that utter could denote if 
it were forgetfully used in this context in the manner it 
is used when, for instance, we might speak of "utter" 
dejection. 
The 'worrier' continued as follows: 
"... To put this another way work is needed 
to maintain an interest in it, and I can't 
see why I should be interested in this rather 
than anything else ..." 
What is going on here? Well, we read how that 
author treats her own speech as also something to be uneasy 
about; this is why she chooses to try to put what she was 
saying in another way. To want to put something in another 
way is to not be contented with impulse or convention, it 
is to want to improve upon what has been said. But we 
must not forget that the 'worrier' was speaking to herself 
so this sentence can also remind us that we always have to 
offer speeches which we don't completely understand our- 
selves, to say this another way our intermediate place as 
speakers is such that we do not completely understand our- 
selves, though we seek understanding. 
Furthermore, through the author's remark that 
... work is needed to maintain an interest in it" we see 
displayed her decision that topics do not generate interest 
by themselves, that interest is a product of the choices, 
the!... 
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the preferences of the speaker /thinker. That author is 
deeply aware that by generating a notion of topics such that 
they cannot generate interest by themselves we leave space, 
or make space, for our own active participation. So, when 
she says she can't see why she should be interested in this 
rather than anything else, that author reminds us that by 
producing ourselves as merely seeing or observing things 
we would be leaving ourselves without reason to be interested 
in those things. We would be 'leaving ourselves' in the 
deeper sense of abandoning ourselves. In other words, if 
we had chosen to blind ourselves to our participation in 
the production of the 'things' we observe we should not then 
be surprised that we cannot retain or regain an interest 
in them. We do play a major part in producing what we are 
in, and by continuing to direct our productions we give our- 
selves less to worry about and more to think about. 
Through reminding ourselves in this way that we 
are all responsible for the direction of our own productions 
we bring ourselves to ask whether we consider the manner 
in which we have been proceeding pedantic. Whether we 
consider ourselves to have been simply following the 
'worrier's' response step by step rather than risking catch- 
ing up with her and entering more fully into a lively and 
productive dialogue. And yet, given that we have committed 
ourselves to responding to other as we would to a thoughtful 
interlocutor perhaps we do well, at the outset, to lay 
behind a little and to try to get the measure of her and 
ourselves /... 
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ourselves before we decide to approach. We console our- 
selves here by remembering that to ask whether we are pro- 
ceeding pedantically or not is one way of expressing that 
we are not satisfied with, or by what we have done, but 
this is good for we seek to sustain, and be sustained by 
our work, not to finish or be finished by it. So we will 
risk turning yet again to read the 'worrier's' response:- 
"... Even if I was to try to maintain an 
interest in it I might be doing no more 
than trying to stop myself being bored. 
But, I have to admit to myself that I'm 
rarely bored for there is so much to think 
about, so many problems, so many pitfalls 
and dangers." 
We are mildly amused now for whilst we were only 
a moment ago commenting upon the fact that we were not 
satisfied with what we've done we see now that the 'worrier' 
also was expressing her desire to do more than simply any- 
thing: her desire to stretch herself further than the 
entertainment /boredom continuum allows. For she, like we, 
knows that entertainments, attractions, are like side shows, 
and whilst side shows do deserve a place they do not readily 
call forth the committed responses that we as thinkers/ 
speakers do not stifle. And yet, the 'worrier's' sentence 
also expresses her awareness of her own ignorance for her 
'might' is her way of telling herself and us that she does 
not and cannot know whether by trying to maintain an interest 
she is doing any more, or no more than trying to stop her- 
self being bored. Similarly we did not know if our manner 
of proceeding was pedantic, as if some external measure 
exists /... 
- 32 - 
exists: we, by proposing that we are not, and cannot be, 
committed to standards as if they are external, i.e. as if 
we had not created them, produce our freedom to proceed in 
the manner that pleases us, in a thoughtful, moral and 
social manner. 
However, as we read on we hear that the 'worrier' 
was rarely bored and that she was prepared to offer herself 
a reason for this; but we must work to enable ourselves 
to speak here, as elsewhere, for one of the pitfalls and 
dangers to which the 'worrier' here refers might be that 
of beginning by assuming we know what other means. For 
if we had done this we would have felt no need to inquire 
in such a way as to discover what was meant. We have, as 
will be remembered, committed ourselves to orienting to other, 
in this instance the author of the 'worrier's' response, as 
we would to any thoughtful interlocutor, and by doing this 
we have come to remember that by so many pitfalls and dangers 
she must be referring to the fact that we could have been 
persuaded to treat pitfalls and dangers as something to 
avoid and not as something to think about, i.e. to show our 
willingness and ability to face up to. So, whilst the 
honourable character will treat acting dishonourably as the 
danger or pitfall, the dishonourable see dangers to lie in 
what might happen to them rather than in what they do. 
What of the second paragraph? 
"One big problem if I was to have been forced 
to write or speak about what I've read arises 
because /... 
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because I have to admit I haven't really 
read it, at least not closely and I suppose 
this is because it is obvious that its 
author is trying to save his own skin i.e. 
it sounds like a forced confession, and I 
suspect that if pressed its author would 
say quite the opposite if he thought that 
would help him. Given that I haven't read 
it closely, and that I can't really see why 
I should it isn't surprising that I can't 
bring myself to deal with the details." 
We will proceed here by saying that by referring 
to surface features we make reference to the relationship 
between reader and author, so we formulate surface as in- 
terface, and by so doing remind ourselves that we are relat- 
ing to, and through it. Now which features are surface 
features, and which, so to speaks must be retrieved by ex- 
peditions beneath the surface depend in a very real way upon 
the place the reader has, from which he /she relates to that 
author's speech, or any speech. We see the surface of that 
paragraph as strewn with ironic reflectors and profound 
insights. For, is its author joking with herself? She 
refers to the speech she has been reading as being akin to 
a forced confession, but seems only prepared to say this 
when she reflects upon what she would say if she were forced 
to speak. That is, when she seems to force herself to speak 
under threat of being revealed at a later time. However, 
we must overcome any urge to jump to conclusions, for the 
author of that speech does say 'if' and we ought not to be 
too ready to assume that she could be forced to write or 
speak about what she has read, for our readiness would perhaps 
indicate our untrustworthiness. 
here /... 
However, what we are saying 
34 - 
here is that whether she did succumb to force or not, she 
would still be doing more or less than writing or speaking 
about what she had read, for the nature of speech is such 
that it always says more about the speaker than the topic 
about which he /she speaks. She then goes on to say that 
she hasn't really read it, at least not closely, and what 
we are saying is that to read something closely would be 
to read it closedly i.e. it would be to be constrained by 
it. Using our place as thinkers /speakers we know that 
option is neither desirable nor available to us for we 
always read and write openly, i.e. we always read in such 
a way as to reveal the interface to which we have previously 
referred. 
The author proceeds to offer a reason for why 
she did not read closely /closedly i.e. "I suppose this is 
because it is obvious that its author is trying to save his 
own skin ... ". What is obvious to us here is that she 
could not have meant skin in the sense of skin on one's 
bones, for she is a thoughtful speaker and must be using 
skin as a metaphor for integrity; for how else could her 
speech be referring to a moral, social actor? The idea 
of the author trying to save his own skin makes reference 
to the thinker's /speaker's efforts to maintain his inte- 
gration and not to be reduced to parts. 
"... It sounds like a forced confession, and I 
suspect that if pressed its author would say quite the 
opposite /... 
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opposite if he thought that would help him." By saying 
"It sounds like ..." the author warns us to remember our 
place in producing our hearings, and by doing so we can 
remember that to "... say quite the opposite if he thought 
that would help him ", whether pressed or not, would be a 
good thing for a thinker /speaker to do. For the thinker 
conceives of what would help him as being to act in a social, 
moral way, and so helping himself would be helping others. 
By saying the opposite of what he said before he would be 
developing rather than degenerating. Any who begin or end 
by relying upon an opposition, a distinction, between helping 
themselves and helping others can never do the work of in- 
tegrating s of acting with integrity. However, fortunately, 
we can only choose to work at integrating and do so through 
conversation. 
"Given that I haven't read it closely, and 
that I can't really see why I should it isn't 
surprising that I can't bring myself to deal 
with the details." 
Not too much news here, for though this could have 
been read as a speech that doesn't hear what it itself says, 
i.e. "I haven't read it too closely" could have meant I 
haven't brought myself to deal with the details: that is, 
if it is read as circular; we choose to read it as pointing 
to a prior thoughtful decision not to be taken in by the 
persuasive nature of some talk i.e. as an effort to retain 
a degree of autonomy by not dealing with details but with 
how they were and are produced. 
By/... 
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By formulating the speaker who speaks with in- 
tegrity as one who is working at integrating we provide for 
our own efforts; which are enabling us to continue involv- 
ing ourselves with the 'worrier's' response; and by so 
doing we have been helping ourselves to remember our place 
as speakers. Whilst we still have the choice of whether 
to stay with the worrier's response or to break away we 
exercise this choice by staying with the 'worrier's' response 
for we can only involve ourselves through worry by working 
with the usage it provides for us. 
The third paragraph ran as follows:- 
"However, given the specific circumstances 
surrounding my reading of this work I'm almost 
certain to be asked about it and I'll have to 
say something intelligent in order to keep face; 
so what should I do? What should I say? What 
comes to mind? Well, its author certainly seems 
enthusiastic, but then so are numerous others 
e.g. academics. "Let's study this, let's study 
that, perhaps we'll get a grant etc. etc." And 
yet I suppose this author's apparent enthusiasm 
is less surprising given the pressure he's under." 
What would specific circumstances be that would 
surround a thoughtful interlocutor's reading such that she 
would be almost certain to be asked about her reading? 
Could it be that she knows that the choice is between attempt- 
ing to respond as a thoughtful interlocutor and /or being 
tempted to turn away, to ignore what she is thinking? So 
the specific circumstances are not specific to this particular 
situation but to the situation of speakers /thinkers in the 
world. Even if no other asked that author to speak upon 
the /... 
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the matter of what she read, she has to speak /think about 
the issues it raises if she is to respect herself i.e. to 
keep face. We speak of keeping face here but we must 
remind ourselves that keeping face frequently involves 
losing face (in the sense of sur- face) , for by keeping face 
we do not mean hiding behind appearances, but allowing our 
true faces to appear in what we do. We need not be sur- 
prised that the author sees saying something intelligent 
as necessary to keep face, for our version of keeping face 
is speaking intelligently /thoughtfully: that is what we 
mean by face. 
Furthermore when that author says she will 'have 
to' say something we do not take this to mean it is difficult 
for her i.e. to mean she has to be forced, for having to 
speak thoughtfully is no hardship for one who recognizes her 
place as a thoughtful actor. On the contrary she would 
not choose to act otherwise. 
Then come the questions, and we notice that she 
doesn't rest content with the first question but tries to 
improve upon it. Indeed the rest of the paragraph takes 
on the form of a question for us when she suggests that the 
author certainly seems enthusiastic; it is as if she calls 
out for our help in reaching a decision about enthusiasm. 
That is, she owns up to the fact that she isn't sure whether 
other is enthusiastic and then she proceeds, through the 
example she uses, to show the good of enthusiasm for she 
takes/. 
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takes for granted that enthusiasm is related to pressure. 
And there is much in what she says provided we remember 
that the pressure to which she refers does not push down 
but draws up. 
It occurs to me to say that we are moving at a 
fairly breakneck pace but perhaps that can be illustrative 
of our enthusiasm to get on with what we are doing, and not 
to be paralyzed by fear for our necks. Let us continue 
for we have the momentum to stay with the 'worrier's' res- 
ponse, for all that remains is the concluding section:- 
"Oh, even these thoughts on it don't seem 
worth having, but I will admit it seems a 
strange way to begin a thesis! 
I guess I'll have to hope for the best, and 
wait and see what happens, with a bit of luck, 
now I think about it, I won't have to say any- 
thing much because no-one else will take it 
seriously, or read it closely anyway." 
When the speaker says that even these thoughts 
on it don't seem worth having she reminds us that thoughts 
aren't worth having, if by having is meant possessing as 
property; and private property at that. They, thoughts 
do provide the way for conversation to progress, but to 
relate to our thoughts as we would to commodities makes 
them worthless. Thinking is worth doing, thoughts aren't 
worth having. If we did forgetfully treat our thoughts 
as worth having in the sense of possessing, not doing, we 
would be allowing ourselves to be possessed by facts the 
value or virtue of which we had not inquired about. 
So/... 
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So by bringing into question her own thoughts 
the 'worrier' helps us to make the progress that could not 
be made by non -reflexive members, and of course, we do not 
accept non -reflexive members as a human possibility. 
But what could that author be suggesting by admit- 
ting that it is a strange way to begin a thesis, for, as a 
matter of fact, it is a very ordinary piece of writing? 
What this leads us to say is that perhaps we should be more 
ready to bring into question, to look at, the value of 
Ph.D.'s that are not so ordinary (perhaps the majority), 
i.e. Ph.D.'s, and any works or speeches for that matter, 
that lay claim to be based upon beginnings the value of 
which does not require to be questioned. They could, and 
can be good, of course, but we need to think about them if 
we are to relate to them as more than mindless exercises. 
Now in the final paragraph, by saying she is 
guessing that author makes reference to the fact that she 
takes a risk, makes a choice, even although the knowledge 
upon which it is based is inadequate. It is an informed 
guess, but informed by her thoughtful good intention rather 
than by a complete array of facts. And so, 'hoping for 
the best' is not an expression of hopelessness, i.e. of 
throwing up one's arms, for this thoughtful character knows 
that the best isn't what happens to her but what she does, 
and hoping isn't hopeless as a result. Rather it is an 
expression of faith in her own potential. So, now the 
... and wait and see', becomes 'whilst waiting to see', 
for /.., 
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for though she doesn't fantasize that she can do everything, 
i.e. things will happen that she cannot control, waiting 
is no longer conceived of as a passive activity. 
But, what do we make of the final section? Here 
the 'worrier' says that when she thinks about what will /may 
happen she assumes that others will not respond to the work 
in a closed way, that others will not take it seriously in 
the sense of being brought down by it. For if they are 
thoughtful about it they will have plenty to speak about, 
plenty of issues to raise, and so, whilst she will be happy 
to play a part in this conversation /inquiry she will not 
have to say anything much, in the sense of give a lengthy 
speech to others who have nothing to say. 
We are not now going to be drawn into summing up 
what has been said so far, for to have done that could have 
been to forget what we have been saying about proceeding 
by thinking, and not orienting to our thoughts as possessions. 
We cannot, and do not desire to set them out neatly like a 
museum display, but what we can do is to display our effort 
to listen thoughtfully to what we have been, and are saying 
as we continue writing. 
We acknowledge that the reading so far offered 
of that response is not the only reading that could have 
been given, but what we are proposing is that this reading 
is possible and, that it in no way reduces the speaker to 
the status of one not worth conversing with. 
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SECTION 3 
But the speaker persisted in arguing by claiming 
that we were moving too quickly here, and that she hadn't 
been given space to offer a speech on her own account. 
Rather than join with us in our attempts to produce an 
engaging and lively reading of her speech we expected that 
she would at this stage disclaim responsibility for that 
speech. She did disclaim responsibility, as we will show, 
by saying that she didn't know her speech was going to 
provide subject matter for our analysis, and that she could 
have offered a much fuller self portrait provided she could 
trust us. Furthermore, she asked for the opportunity to 
offer this self portrait, and requested that we did not in- 
terrupt her until she had said all she could say. We 
anticipated that this would delay us, but whilst we were 
impatient, for we suspected we would be required to respond 
to it in a lengthy manner (i.e. in a manner to which we are 
not accustomed) we decided to allow her to proceed. But 
we said to ourselves that we did not take kindly to our 
speech being referred to as interruption, and also resolved 
not to allow the worrier space to make any further lengthy 
speeches. For whilst we will continue to listen to worry, 
our manner of listening calls upon us to speak and raise 
questions as our conversation proceeds. Furthermore, 
whilst we have included this self portrait, for we have 
placed /... 
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placed it complete in an appendix, we can say here that we 
know that the very idea of a self portrait betrays the con- 
ceit of knowledge that we are intent upon revealing. The 
speaker's portrayal of herself acts as a betrayal of worry 
as it is, but not as it could be, and not of its speaker. 
By working with her upon her speech we can be productive, 
we can remind ourselves of how we can choose to act more 
thoughtfully. We have been fortunate in succeeding in 
cajoling the speaker to offer the portrait of worry, even 
although it is a lengthier speech than we would have liked, 
for through it we provide ourselves with more material with 
which we continue reconstituting ourselves as actors who 
seek to act thoughtfully, who actively seek society. 
However, before we work with the transcript of 
her speech we can make a few remarks about our reworking of 
it. We began by acceding to the speaker's request and 
allowing her to say all she could, but by doing so we reduced 
ourselves to the status of observers, or rather tried to; 
for only in this way could we try to observe our idea of 
her speech's notion of itself as a self-portrait, i.e. as 
an instance of 'realism'; only in this way could we try 
to restrict ourselves to its usage. By allowing that speech 
to continue unquestioned we necessarily prevented ourselves 
offering formulations that would enrich and enliven. No 
doubt the speaker might, for a moment or two, have been 
pleased by our passivity, for she came to us, as she is 
as worrier, as she comes to everyone, i.e. seeking shelter 
from /... 
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from her storm, but in this section our reworking of her 
speech will offer her what might appear a rude, but what is 
a necessary awakening. We do not need to emphasize to you 
i.e. to thoughtful readers, that restricting ourselves to 
the usage of worry will not come easily to us, but we pro- 
ceed in this manner, for we assumed that the worrier was 
likely to begin by viewing our formulations as doing 
violence to her speech, to her self. And yet we also 
assumed that she was likely to begin by resisting remember- 
ing that her speech and her self were not the same; that it 
is her speech that does violence to herself. We think of 
thoughtful speakers as those who are willing and able to 
reflect upon their speech in a manner that is not possible 
to non -reflexive members, and that our reflections, our 
thoughts, can make possible, and need to make possible, more 
than mere impitation. 
Well, as soon as, or almost as soon as, she began 
to speak we began to doubt the wisdom of our decision to 
allow her to say all she could, but we did as we said we 
would, and we did not 'interrupt' even although each and 
every word, when taken as worry would have itself taken, 
impinged upon us and delayed us. But what now? How shall 
we proceed? For, as we have said we are unaccustomed to 
making and hearing lengthy speeches. And yet, we must 
proceed thoughtfully here, as elsewhere, for whilst we want 
to leave ourselves in no doubt about the damaging though 
persuasive nature of worry's speech, if it is taken as it 
would /... 
- 44 
would have itself taken, we also want to draw out its rich 
potential. 
We have included that speech in the appendix, not 
because we approve of it as it is, but in order that we can 
show our ability and willingness to respond to it; not by 
ignoring it, but by working with it in such a way as to show 
not only that it needs to be changed, and can be changed, 
but also that it is we who can change it, and be changed by 
our work with it. We are determined to drive home, in this 
section, the need for, and the good of our work by revealing 
what we could have been reduced to if we had chosen not to 
continue thinking about what we can be. 
In effect, we have chosen not to orient to that 
speech as a portrait of self, but as an effort to portray 
worry, i.e. as a still picture of an activity which we 
might have allowed to interrupt our productive work. We 
produce this seemingly still picture as startling us, and 
as encouraging us to continue engaging in our productive 
work with even more resolve. In the remainder of this 
section we keep ourselves moving, developing, by working 
with that speech in the only way we can. And whilst we 
offer no excuses for our manner of proceeding, for why 
should we excuse the manner which we think is for the best; 
what we will say is that we have presented the lengthy 
speech as a whole in appendix (a) in order that you are 
able to read it without interruptions, questionsyas the 
speaker requested. Perhaps you want to read the portrait 
of worry in order that you can work with us, with it, and 
for this reason we have placed the appendix here. 
Para.l 
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APPENDIX A 
"Your manner of proceeding has surprised me 
for I never expected my earlier views to be 
taken up in that way. So whilst I offer 
this self portrait, I admit that I am often 
distracted by topics which appear attractive, 
although at this moment I can say that when 
I am distracted I do forget what I wanted, 
i.e. I forget what I am. So much is this 
the case that I am beginning to see that all 
of my work, if it is not merely to provide 
either a distraction, or drudgery for my 
reader, must express this struggle, and by 
doing so must help to remind the reader that 
I am not the only one who is involved in a 
struggle of this kind. My struggle can be 
considered, to begin with, to be with a 
version of myself as a worrier, and you who 
are reading will be well advised to keep the 
idea of struggle in mind for all too often, 
I fear that I shall succumb, and shall write 
as a worrier rather than (loosely) as a human 
about the worrier. Now lest you should judge 
this to be a strangely self centred and hence 
unworthy enterprise, I would ask you firstly 
to consider why you wish to charge me in this 
way, and secondly if you do still wish to 
charge me, that you at least delay your judge- 
ment until you have some evidence upon which 
to base it, i.e. until you have heard what I 
want to say. Already you should see worry 
at work here i.e. I'm worried about the fact 
that you may choose to read no further and I 
try to forestall this eventuality by pleading 
with you rather than by offering a different 
(perhaps more attractive) beginning. It is 
as if I know that there is nothing I can do 
to prevent this, i.e. your choosing not to 
read on, and this version of the relationship 
between me and you is, in itself, a good 
example of how I produce the situation as 
beyond my control, i.e. as one to worry about." 
Para.2. "My struggle will be well illustrated by the 
problems which you may see to arise concerning 
the person(s) in which this work is written, 
for at times, the worrier will appear as a 
distant and perhaps distinct person, whilst 
at the same time it must also be apparent that 
I only know the worrier so well or intimately 
because at times I am her. What I am suggest- 
ing here is that what may appear to be a 
technical /... 
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technical problem of rhetoric, for example should 
I write a dialogue or a monologue, is illustrative 
in a weak way of the struggle in which I am in- 
volved, and perhaps involved is a good word for it 
To put this another way the problem of the person 
in which I write i.e. first person, second person 
or third person, is illustrative of the complex 
nature of my relationship to myself, and of how 
my version of myself relates to my version of 
others etc. When I say, for example, that - 
what I think I want may not be what I want - 
and then look for ways to deal with this statement 
or state of affairs, this is not a matter of 
marginal or peripheral interest, and it is only 
when its centrality is felt that I feel involved 
in the struggle I am commending. This can be 
further illustrated (and again the illustration 
seems weak) by the fact that the very sentences 
which I write, including this one, have only been 
written if they have in some way attracted me. 
The illustration is weak because some 'things' 
are difficult to illustrate or describe, and a 
good example of this might be our senses, i.e. 
the fact that they can be treated as mediating 
between 'our- selves' and 'the world' doesn't 
make them any easier to describe. For the 
moment then it might be useful to think of 
worry as mediating in this manner between the 
worrier's self and the world. However, I was 
speaking about the fact that the sentences 
which I write must have attracted me, but I 
can already see how even this sentence draws 
my, and perhaps your, attention away from that 
which is attracted, i.e. their subject, me, 
which as I have already indicated, is the 
crucial problem area, at present. What I am 
trying to say here is that it is versions of 
the self that are attracted by things. For 
example, only the worrier would be attracted 
by the doubts raised by this version of 
attraction. More deeply it is the version 
of myself as a worrier that attracts me, for 
it, as will become apparent, offers one way 
in which I allow myself to imagine I make 
things easier for myself. So, by generating 
a version of what attracts me I shall be 
generating a version of the me that is 
attracted, and may as a consequence be better 
equipped to struggle with the version of my- 
self which I can all too easily become. The 
inference I draw from this is that I must 
produce an analysis of worry if I am to see 
how what I think I want relates to what I 
want. Authenticity then is by no means 
tranquil,... 
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tranquil or easy, for it will only be in 
this struggle that I can show or be what 
I am." 
Para.3. "I am trying to throw some light upon one of 
my problems of action i.e. upon how what I 
think I want relates to what I want and it 
may help to hear again the words attraction, 
distraction and action. How do I, as the 
worrier, think about attraction ?" 
Para.4. "When something attracts me it promises to 
give me something I think I want, in effect I 
am induced to take what I think I want by what 
I see or hear etc. Attraction works quickly 
then, for it leads me to forget to ask myself 
why I might think I want what I think I want, 
i.e. it leads me to forget to think about 
whether I know what I want. The attractive 
encourages me to take what it promises. (How 
quickly I rush on here away from the question 
which asks me to think about whether I know 
what I want, for perhaps what I want will 
prove to be to give not to take; Yet in my 
rush I think I will reveal why I rush so I 
will go on:) 
Para. 5 It may help you to understand my idea of 
attraction, and hence action, if you begin by 
considering giving, for if you cannot under- 
stand what it is to give something it is 
highly unlikely that you will be able to under- 
stand what it is to promise to give something 
(C.F. idea of attraction above) i.e. for me to 
find something attractive. Furthermore you 
cannot understand giving until you draw it into 
a relation with taking, and for the moment, the 
relationship to which I refer is not simply that 
something needs to be given to be taken, on the 
contrary, it is that something needs to be taken 
if it is to be given, and there are different 
ways of taking. My point here then is that we 
need to acquire things if we are to divest our- 
selves of them. We need to generate things if 
we are to be generous with them. The philan- 
thropist, as gift giver, if such he is, would 
begin to come more clearly into focus, and 
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Now this could alert both of us to the fact 
that I began the last paragraph by offering 
you my help in the form of my understanding 
of attraction, in effect then I was acting 
as a philanthropist, and so you should demand 
from me an explanation of how I have achieved 
or taken this understanding and from where, 
and furthermore, why I think it will help you. 
At first sight my apparent unwillingness or 
inability to answer your demands may seem strange, 
but as we continue, the philanthropist's silence 
will begin to emerge as a necessary result of 
his version of himself and his relations to 
others i.e. as a natural rather than an un- 
natural (strange) consequence of his own self 
conception (which may indeed prove to be un- 
natural;)" 
"We can see by now that initially I have limited 
the attractive to the gift i.e. that which is 
given, and have then gone on to transform gifts 
into pieces of evidence, and perhaps this can 
account for my reticence about receiving them 
for (a) if I accept and consume the gifts I will 
in effect be destroying the evidence and (b) if 
I accept and do not consume the gifts I could 
reduce my desire to testify by viewing myself 
as a receiver of stolen goods or bribes. If 
then I view those who offer me gifts as phil- 
anthropists I will do my best not to accept 
what they are offering. If you listened to 
me then, and treated this speech so far as a 
gift you would reject it for the reasons I 
have so far offered, and yet I will show that 
you could have refused merely to listen to me 
without rejecting my offer. I am making 
reference here to the fact that I could, and 
later I will, make substitutions and initially 
replace the philanthropist with the teacher 
and the poor with the student, but later we 
will replace the philanthropist with the 
student and the poor with the teacher:" 
Para.8 "By transforming the gift in the way that I 
have, I raise the question of acceptance as 
the problem that the gift presents to i t s 
possible recipient. For it seems that I 
should refuse all gifts if by being gifts 
they transform their givers into philanthropists. 




accept or not? In this way I see a problem 
i.e. that of the decision coming to mediate 
between me and the gift, perhaps the world. 
I then proceed by trying to argue the case 
for acceptance or non -acceptance, taking or 
leaving, as a way to reach a decision. The 
fact that I do this persuades me that I am 
not merely impulsive /animalistic and that I 
have some commitment to reason. And yet 
you can see that my commitment to reason 
here is only skin deep, for I only use 
reason as one means to fulfill my impulses 
i.e. what I think I want, and I do not, as 
I have said think (reason) about that My 
impulsiveness is shown by the fact that I 
treat the problem of decision as something 
which faces me, rather than as something 
which I have produced, or at least had a 
part in producing. I forget that I am the 
one who is treating decisions as having a 
gift -like nature, and most importantly as 
being problems as a result. I am forever 
forgetting that whilst the fact that we can 
do the right thing or the wrong thing in any 
situation can be construed as a problem or a 
blight this is the wrong thing to do, for 
were it not possible for us to do the right 
thing or the wrong thing, good intentions 
would not be possible. That is, the worrier 
has a tendency to transform blessings into 
blights: Furthermore, it is worth pointing 
out that by using this version of myself as 
someone who is forever forgetting, or losing 
sight of things, I produce a version of myself 
as not being the sort of person to make 
decisions. But, you should be able to see 
what an easy way out this might seem to be 
by noticing how I also choose to ignore the 
fact that I must have known or seen things 
in order to forget or lose sight of them. 
This is further evidence of a misconceived 
attempt to free myself of what I allow myself 
to think oppresses me. The ability to know 
that I forget and lose sight of things how- 
ever, could go some way to raising me above 
the animalistic:" 
"I must slow down now if I am not to lose 
sight of other matters, for I was arguing 
with myself about whether or not I should 
accept or take a gift, and the point here 
is that I wanted the argument to relieve 
me /... 
Para.10 
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me of the need to decide in this case, as I 
often do in others. I tend then to treat 
decisions as something I would be better off 
without, for I find myself treating decisions 
as cutting off possibilities, i.e. as reducing 
my freedom. But when I do this I must be 
forgetting that the freedom I ought to sustain 
must be the freedom to make decisions. I 
ought to acknowledge that not making decisions, 
(perhaps not changing my mind) is deciding not 
to make them (or change it) i.e. that this can 
also be a method for cutting off possibilities 
i.e. of reducing my freedom. In effect, I 
allow myself to act as if I treat decisions as 
essentially arbitrary when I know that if this 
were so I would have no reason to make this 
decision. However, by my inaction i.e. the 
action of treating decisions as something to 
avoid I indicate both to you and to myself 
that I do think it matters what I do, that 
I do think I can make bad decisions, and 
hence that I am not as convinced by the idea 
of arbitrariness as I sometimes allow myself 
to think, or perhaps want you to think. I 
am trying tentatively to suggest here that 
worry, perhaps like other things, can never 
act as a successful mediator between self and 
the world i.e. that because of its nature it 
can never totally subjugate its subject, and 
that whilst this could be treated as something 
to worry about we ought to see it as a virtue." 
"But, what is it that I as worrier, prefer to 
think of myself as, even if I can never quite 
do it? I think I want to think of myself as 
not being responsible for anything that goes 
wrong, and to this end as being prepared to 
pay the price of never being responsible for 
anything, even that which goes right, as a 
way of minimizing that risk. My idea of me 
doing good then is limited to that of not 
doing harm i.e. I produce paradoxically a 
version of myself as unproductive. I prefer 
to think I prefer being mastered by the 
situation rather than being the situation's 
master. When, as we will see, this turns 
out to be my way of mastering the situation 
which isn't to say it is a good thing for 
as we will discover worry has a misconceived 
notion of mastery. To say this another way, 
I act when I worry as if I find possibility 
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than necessity, and this is because I con- 
ceive of necessity as relieving me of res- 
ponsibility for what goes wrong." 
"The notion of responsibility begins to hang 
very heavily over this part of the discussion 
for I am beginning to feel how actively I, as 
worrier, try to avoid facing up to, or better 
grasping, the fact that I have the gift of 
decision making i.e. the one gift which, as 
we shall see, the philanthropist would not or 
could not offer. Furthermore, the fact is 
that I must accept this gift because of my 
nature, I can no more be the worrier than I 
can be any other version of myself. For 
though I may act like a worrier, when I do 
so it is always by accident i.e. unintentionally. 
Goodness; the worrier does seem to be a 
slippery character for now I feel that it is 
he who is saying that when he does act it is 
not his fault because it is an accident i.e. 
because it is unintentional." 
Para.13 "By now you, as reader, may be beginning to 
wonder what happened to the struggle, for it 
seems that worry is not even lifting a 
finger in opposition to what is being said 
i.e. it seems it has nothing to say. Yet 
whilst in one sense I think this is true, in 
another I think that we have been listening 
to nothing but worry so far, for by unin- 
tentionally resorting to a device of treating 
worry as a version of myself and referring to 
the distance between this version and myself, 
I have in effect been treating it as another 
person (C.F. original problem of style of 
writing). I have been, in effect, relieving 
myself of responsibility for its action or 
inaction, when I know all too well that this 
is simply me succumbing yet again to a version 
of myself as someone with something to worry 
about i.e. I have allowed the struggle I was 
initially engaged in to become yet another 
instance of worry. What I am saying here is 
that if you are to see any suffering, and hence 
any struggle, in this speech I must show you 
not how distant and distinct I am from this 
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have become in most of my speech constrained 
and limited by its rules:" 
"Even if for the moment we allow the separation 
of myself from the version of myself as a 
worrier, which the preceding paragraph brings 
into much doubt, I still feel that the worrier's 
apparent lack of resistance is by no means un- 
characteristic, for I do tend to accept the 
bad reading of myself as a worrier, i.e. as 
trying to shirk my responsibilities by saying 
in effect that I am not response -able; by 
accepting that I am not authentic. Yet 
strangely it is by accepting this reading that 
I allow myself to think that I gain a sense of 
relief; for I allow myself to feel even more 
convinced that I am not the sort of person who 
should be making decisions. Furthermore I 
ought to point out that 'decision' is being 
treated throughout this speech as a pre- 
requisite for action and so we can see that 
a much stronger (or weaker;) claim is being 
made. For in effect, the acceptance of the 
idea that the worrier is not the type of 
person to make decisions is an acceptance of 
the worrier as inactive. That is, it is a 
version of worries as something to be got out 
of the way before you can begin to act. Now 
it should be plain how this analysis has a 
bearing on the problem of action mentioned at 
the outset, for if we can begin to see how 
relief from worry comes to be integrated with 
action we can see how I as the worrier produce 
an even greater distance between worry /thought 
and action. The point is then that I 
formulate myself as non -actor, for I reduce 
my own actions to the status of inaction by 
treating them as merely reactions to, for 
example, dangers or exigencies. So we can 
begin to see now how I produced attraction 
as inducement for this placed me in an 
essentially passive inactive role: (By 
treating myself as being attracted to the 
version of myself as a worrier I am exemplify- 
ing this form of passivity:)" 
"(As an example of how I as a worrier produce 
a distance between action and worry I would 
refer to my own writing, for whenever I re- 
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as inauthentic, i.e. as not really expressing 
how I feel i.e. as the product of lack of con- 
cern, and whilst you may view this as mildly 
crazy I'm sure you can imagine that it does 
not appear to aid productivity!)" 
"By now you might expect that I, the worrier, 
would be feeling pretty bad, and in a way you 
would be right, but, perhaps not too surprisingly 
it is now that I, as the worrier, start to take 
the offensive. For as if this wasn't bad 
enough, I go on to treat all action, including 
the supposed criticism of me as the worrier, 
as being the result of a lack of concern 
because of the distance between worry and 
action, or conversely, because of the inte- 
gration of lack of concern with action. 
That is, I produce others, in this instance 
my supposed critic, as icons of myself. It 
is this that helps me to feel just in my state 
of inaction for by allowing the argument to 
persuade me that action is always the result 
of a lack of concern its consequences whether 
apparently good or bad are treated as accidents. 
That is I reduce others to the status of the 
mechanical, the unintentional or the unthinking, 
the inauthentic." 
"Perhaps I could clear the air here by returning 
to the idea of the gift, for if we treat gift 
giving as accidental i.e. as being the result 
of a lack of concern, we can begin to see why 
I would be suspicious of the giver's motives, 
for by producing the gift as an accident I 
treat myself, its possible receiver, as un- 
deserving. It is just a matter of chance 
that I am offered it. As a receiver (or 
possible receiver) of a gift from a phil- 
anthropist I am not deserving in the strong 
sense, but merely lucky, for I have not earnt 
what I get, I am simply lucky to meet or know 
a rich and generous man: This could be why 
I am reticent about receiving gifts i.e. 
because I think I haven't earnt them I fear 
that they may be taken away as soon as either 
my undeserving character, or a more deserving 
character is brought to light. By treating 
myself as undeserving i.e. by treating myself 
as an accidental receiver, i.e. a receiver of 






process, I act as if I am relaxing. For when 
we relax we just let things happen i.e. we 
produce the situation as being one in which 
accidents (bad accidents) are certainly ex- 
cluded, and the result is that the most we 
could expect to receive would be pleasant 
surprises; gifts. I think I remove the 
possibility of a bad accident by producing 
myself as unproductive, for, as I have said, 
what I, as the worrier, think I fear is being 
responsible for something that goes wrong. 
Hence my version of a bad accident is something 
I am responsible for, and so I go on to allow 
myself to think that if I am unproductive i.e. 
if I produce nothing, I cannot be responsible 
for anything bad. I forget that I still con- 
sume and hence that even if I produce nothing 
else I produce needs!" 
"But isn't something worrying happening here 
for at first glance worrying and relaxing 
would seem to be very different social forms? 
After raising this question doubts immediately 
arise however, for it is apparent that worrying 
and relaxing do share one important characteristic, 
both are conceived of as making it difficult to 
proceed with your work. 
This problem is raised by relaxation in the 
form of the Monday morning feeling. For like 
a surprise relaxation cannot last, and it cannot 
last because it relies upon a version of work as 
something which has to be done but which would 
be better avoided. When work is seen as 
drudgery relaxation becomes important, and also 
the problem it creates (C.F. the Monday morning 
feeling) becomes heightened. (This suggests 
that as we proceed our attention should not 
merely be directed to the worry, in this in- 
stance the Monday morning feeling, but to that 
which creates it, in this instance the creation 
of drudgery.) However, in ordinary usage 
relaxation has to stop if we are to start work. 
Similarly our ordinary usage of worry is as 
of something which has to stop before we can 
start work, e.g. "Stop worrying and get on 
with it ". But we can see here how work is 
treated as drudgery, and we will come to see 
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is what I am involved in when I worry, if I 
really conceive of myself as not being res- 
ponsible for anything i.e. as not being 
productive;" 
"But, aren't I at least responsible for 
pointing to the obstructions and hence in a 
sense responsible for their removal, i.e. 
isn't this the sort of work in which worry 
is involved? So whilst not being directly 
involved in the production of anything, 
perhaps I am indirectly involved, for by 
pointing to problems, I allow production to 
continue to run smoothly. Yet this is even 
worse than being unproductive, for now I 
appear as a member of the Human Relations 
Movement whose only interest is in continued 
production, i.e. it seems that I relax when 
the real questions are asked; 
But this is too malicious, for I know that it 
is I who would begrudge myself even this moment 
of relaxation by worrying about why I was no 
longer worrying i.e. by thinking that I was, 
or had been, acting irresponsibly, for as we 
have seen I tend to see all actions as irres- 
ponsible especially my own: In this way, I 
transform solutions into problems, and smooth 
running into uneasiness. That is I can only 
work or feel I am working, when I am vexed or 
troubled." 
Para.23 "So I do think I work after all; Yes, but 
I never manage to produce anything, and hence 
am always dissatisfied. I t is because of this 
feeling of lack of productivity that I can see 
myself as being involved in merely a difficult 
form of relaxation My point here is that 
when I think I am working I am involved (C.F. 
paragraph 2) but it is a weak involvement, for 
whilst I do have a version of work as investing 
myself, I restrict this idea of investing myself 
to that of investigating. 
Para.24 This, like much else, isn't too clear to me, 
but I think I think of the work of worry as 
investigating i.e. as looking into; which is 
in fact only a special case of looking at, or 
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Whilst relaxing is analogous to spectating, 
worrying is analogous to inspecting or in- 
vestigating and this begins to suggest that 
whilst worrying appears to be work because 
it isn't easy, it now seems more like a 
difficult form of relaxing. The point being 
that the difficulty for worry is the energy 
expended in trying to remain separate i.e. 
in trying not to be responsible for anything 
i.e. in not getting involved. 
"This idea of separation is a powerful one 
and underlies paragraph 15, which refers to 
my problem with re- reading, for so strongly 
do I want to refuse to accept responsibility 
that I even forget how I write what I write, 
and then treat it as an accident i.e. as in- 
authentic. So now my dissatisfaction with 
my own work comes to be a source of ease not 
of unease. That is, this is the means by 
which I remove myself from this productive 
process. 
Goodness, this is getting complicated for 
earlier, i.e. in a previous draft of this 
speech I wrote that: 
"The worrier is dissatisfied with 
her work because she doesn't see 
it as producing rewards, satis- 
faction, and yet she teaches us 
by her dissatisfaction with gifts 
that she knows that satisfaction 
or ease is the problem rather than 
work. The danger for the worrier 
is that she can become satisfied 
with her work (i.e. that she can 
feel delighted when she points 
out problems) when becoming satis- 
fied is leaving herself no more 
work to do. She needs to keep in 
mind that relieving her own frus- 
tration or hunger, i.e. killing 
those sensations isn't enough to 
produce a good human life, and 
hence isn't enough to deal with 
worry, indeed it may not be 
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Now it seems that dissatisfaction is her (my) 
problem, for it is the source from which I 
relieve my own frustration or hunger. Perhaps 
we get a hint here of the fact that I seem to 
require myself to be involved in a specific 
type of social situation. A desperate one 
at that, for on the one side I don't think 
I can produce anything because I worry, whilst 
on the other side I see products to be the 
result of a lack of concern. It is this 
version of myself as unproductive which leaves 
me dependent upon the philanthropist for my 
sustenance, and given the chance nature of 
philanthropy, which I have already referred 
to, it is no wonder that I worry; Indeed 
to construe a situation as desperate is to 
construe it as having to stop if danger is 
to be removed, for it holds no hope. Des- 
peration then, like relaxation and worry 
relies upon an idea of having to stop i.e. 
they all treat possibility as lying outside 
of them i.e. beyond their grasp. So as a 
worrier, the only solution I can see to my 
own situation lies outside it i.e. my only 
future is seen to lie in my changing from 
something I am to something I am not. (There 
is no sense of movement it is simply one thing 
or the other!)" 
"One way in which I tend to produce the 
situation as desperate is by treating raising 
problems as raising the stakes, and it is worth 
remembering that raising problems is about all 
the worrier can do with her 'yes but'. In 
this way I reduce the situation to one of 
desperation i.e. of decision in its worst 
sense, and if we can think about a decision 
in these circumstances we can understand why 
earlier I thought of decisions as arbitrary, 
i.e. you jump or you don't jump: But once 
I treat the situation in this way the most I 
can do is save my own skin even if I have 
raised the stakes in the process, and as a 
consequence all of my actions do take on the 
character of self defence i.e. I do only react 
and then think as a result I need not feel 
responsible. I forget very easily that I am 
responsible for what I don't do i.e. that not 
responding is my response. 
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sense of desperation as a way of reducing my 
responsibility, for I come to consider survival 
as the goal, and then if I do survive, I treat 
my survival as what I have profited from the 
situation. I am pleased to have got through 
but still treat this outcome as fortuitous, 
i.e. not as anything I have produced. 
This can perhaps help explain why as a worrier, 
I find writing so difficult; it is because I 
think I am totally dependent upon my reader's 
reaction, and I tend to see this reaction as 
a product of arbitrary considerations, e.g. 
his work load etc: I tend to see my reader's 
reaction as a product of arbitrary consider- 
ations but not of my speech, (C.F. the idea of 
treating other as inauthentic paragraph 16.) 
The worrier in me seems to have a one track 
mind though, for she could have used the same 
view of the situation to produce writing as 
easy for me, for if it doesn't matter what I 
say I could surely say anything: But of 
course even that isn't an easy situation for 
the worrier as it involves choosing. 
This note raises the problem of distancing 
again, for whilst I do tend to react in this 
way I also feel that I could not say I did 
unless I treat it as a tendency, i.e. as some- 
thing I slip into rather than am. The point 
is though that I do react this way, although 
when I think, I think I ought not to:" 
Para.32 We have seen here how I tend to produce the 
situation as desperate and to move from this 
to a concern for safety, i.e. a concern to avoid 
accidents (memories of relaxation again), but 
we can also see that the only sure way of 
avoiding the risk that attends writing for 
example, is to not write; but, as you can see 
I do write. However, as a worrier, I even 
construe my writing as being a way to avoid 
the risk attached to not writing, and its 
possible painful consequences, and by doing 
this I again feel myself relieved of some 
of the responsibility for what I write. 
By producing a version of my own work as 
analogous to a forced confession I can 
begin to see how I would feel that I do not 
deserve any approval or reward for this 
product /... 
- 59 - 
product. (For me a product is transformed 
into a prod -uct:) Yet as we've also seen 
it is precisely as a result of my view of 
myself as unproductive that I need even more 
the approval or reward which does sustain me, 
for as I am unable to give it to myself (or 
produce it myself) I become totally dependent 
upon other. 
Para.33 Whilst on the one hand then I have been trying 
to show how an orientation towards gifts of mere 
acceptance must lead to dissatisfaction I, at 
the same time, show that it is I, because of my 
view of myself as unproductive, who needs to 
accept them to stay alive. 
Para.34 
Para.35 
By now, the fact that I saw the attractive as 
something to take, rather than as something to 
give to, begins to sound more plausible, but 
its increased plausibility is apparently being 
gained at my increased cost. 
By writing then, I see myself as escaping the 
dangers of not writing (N.B. perhaps this helps 
account for the rush mentioned in paragraph 4), 
but am immediately plunged into another worriesome 
situation for now I must look on whilst you read 
what I write. Thus I have changed nothing, my 
work is still the same in the way that drudgery 
is the same. All I can do, as a worrier, is 
worry whilst I wait. I f we think of stopping 
temporarily just beyond the danger mark we can 
feel how precarious the worrier's life is, but, 
obviously if we just look on, i.e. if we just 
observe him, we will be in an equally dangerous 
situation, and can feel how we are no safer 
than he is. One way of proceeding here will 
be to ask myself why I am tempted to stop here, 
why I don't want to go any further, why I limit 
myself to reacting to dangers and in a way 
produce them by failing to address how they are 
produced. This will be to ask why I have a 
problem giving as well as taking /accepting, i.e. 
it will be to begin the scrutiny of the phil- 
anthropist which earlier I intimated would 
follow. This scrutiny must however take a 
more active form i.e. it must be more than 
simply looking on yet again; it must involve 
a response, or be a response to the social 
situation which treats it as what it is, i.e. 
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himself and the philanthropist, and this response 
must by its very nature begin to change the 
relationship." 
"One way of accounting for my failure to move 
any further than just beyond the danger mark 
is by seeing that, as yet, it has only been 
danger and fear that has moved me, i.e. once 
this is removed I stop moving. This fact 
can help us to understand the philanthropist 
as soon as we see that he is worried too; 
He only gives enough to alleviate his fears, 
whether these fears be of his own sense of 
guilt or perhaps more forcibly of the dis- 
content of the poor. More dramatically I 
can deepen my understanding here by realizing 
that it isn't only that I don't want to go 
any further, but that I don't want, i.e. I 
am moved by fears, and not by desires." 
"Perhaps we begin to see now why I didn't and 
don't willingly accept gifts, or better why the 
only gifts I think I can accept are generous 
ones, i.e. ones given out of charity: It is 
because I don't know what I want, I only think 
I know what I don't want. This may become 
clearer as we remember the earlier remarks about 
giving being dependent upon taking, for from 
these we can see that the philanthropist was 
only a euphemism for the benevolent despot, 
and he in turn for the master in the master/ 
slave relationship and it is from this relation- 
ship that we must move if we are to proceed." 
Para.38 "How have I reacted then to being called, and in 
a sense being a slave? For a slave is surely 
one who is dominated by fear to such an extent 
that he forgets he had desires. My reaction 
has indeed been a slavish one, for after in 
some sense feeling some surprise that I of all 
people should be seen as a slave, I react by 
mumbling to myself that at least I am free to 
think as I please, and that this is better than 
acting unintentionally, which is what my accuser 
or master must be doing. For, by his action 
of accusation he shows me that he isn't thinking, 
i.e. that he is unintentional. I humour him 
then, but don't help him. My reaction is the 
same, i.e. again it is a "Yes but." 
Para. 39 
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"If we think of what has been said so far we 
will remember that a constant theme has been 
my failure to accept responsibilities, fre- 
quently by simply accepting that I am not a 
responsible type i.e. that I don't have the 
ability to respond. So successfully do I 
do this, that I produce a version of myself 
as not being the kind of person to make 
decisions. (Worse than the deferential voter 
I become the deferential non -voter;) In 
effect I persuade myself that I am suited to 
be a slave. I allow myself to be mastered 
by the idea that I would find the freedom 
involved in making decisions oppressive. 
I said above that I, as worrier, am moved 
by fears and not by desires, and now we can 
remember that whereas fear is a reaction, 
i.e. it is impulsive, desires are responses, 
i.e. they do involve self in a way that 
impulses do not." 
Para.40 "What work does a slave do then? I pursue 
my master's business which, because (a) it is 
a result of the master's nature i.e. thought- 
lessness, and (b) because it is not my own 
business (concern), becomes drudgery; and the 
thing about drudgery is that it does, or can, 
provide a strong sense of knowing where you 
are, in the sense of knowing you aren't there. 
(With this writing, however, my struggle is 
that I'm unsure where I am in it and con- 
sequently it is anything but drudgery though 
this has not prevented it hurting.) My point 
here is that when I'm involved in drudgery I 
find a home in my thoughts, worries, and see 
these as separating me from, and raising me 
above, the unworried i.e. he who I think of 
as my master. (This is how I conceived of 
myself as being master of the situation 
paragraph 10.)" 
Para.41 "I become the proud silent type then, but need 
to wake up to the fact that this reaction gives 
the master just what he wants as a master i.e. 
compliance, subservience, but certainly not 
what he needs. This silence in turn allows 
the master to remain silent about the fact 
that decisions don't come easily to him either, 
that mastery and ease need not and do not go 
hand in hand. (I think that because I find 
work /... 
Para.42 
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work difficult I haven't mastered it, but the 
only sort of easy work there is is drudgery;) 
Why do I refuse to admit that the master might 
not be relaxing? Why, because I, as slave, 
rely upon my idea of my private life, my 
thoughts, my worries, as being free in order 
to generate a version of mastery as freedom. 
I think that thinking is easy, and this is 
why I want to think that I want what I think 
I want, this is why I cannot answer if I am 
asked to discipline myself by deciding what 
I want. I transform this into a question 
that asks me whether I know what I want." 
"When I worry then I treat my thinking as a 
form of relaxation for I do not commit myself 
to any course of action, I treat my thinking 
as free for it seems to be the only thing 
that cannot be taken from me, i.e. my thoughts 
are free of others demands. As a worrier, I 
think of my thinking as just looking on and 
as not participating, and I go on to transpose 
this idea of freedom onto the master, for I 
see the master as making demands but as having 
none made on him. 
Para.43 So now we can see how I, as a slave, treat my 
own thoughts or worries as all I own and as the 
symbol of my freedom, but I need to keep con- 
stantly in mind how this is just a reaction for 
it fails to address the question of the social 
and in this case unnatural nature of this set 
of social relationships. For, far from symboliz- 
ing my freedom, my worries merely point to my 
oppressor: they need to show me that it is my 
i.e. the slave's version of my freedom as my 
worries which contributes to, and sustains the 
presence of my oppression." 
Para.44 "But again I must slow down for whilst I may 
be making some progress here I would certainly 
not have made enough if I thought that this 
supposedly new knowledge would be enough, or 
ought to make me a master. But even whilst 
I write I know that my excitement must show, 
and that the danger that this could occur is 
ever present. So now I need to clear the 
air for myself and perhaps one way of doing 
this will be to return to the question of 
substitutions /... 
Para.45 
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substitutions mentioned in paragraph 7, 
i.e. firstly the philanthropist by the 
teacher and the poor by the student and 
latterly the philanthropist by the student 
and the poor by the teacher. What can 
this mean? 
The first substitution need not delay us 
very long for we should see by now that the 
sort of gifts offered by the philanthropist 
do little if anything to teach the poor, in 
fact they hinder the learning of the poor, 
and leave the philanthropist in a blissful 
state of ignorance to boot. I am not com- 
mending that the philanthropist gives less 
here, far from it, I am demanding that the 
worrier, in this instance the philanthropist, 
begins to give i.e. that the philanthropist 
gives much more. 
Para.46 On to the second, what have the poor to teach 
the philanthropist? They need to teach him 
that his gift, though it may appear generous, 
is only a bribe, and that whilst both he and 
they refuse to speak to each other it will 
remain so. I t is the refusal of both the 
philanthropist and the poor to address the 
social nature of their relationship which 
makes room for bribery and hence corruption." 
Para.47 "But now I must remember that it isn't simply 
a question of slowing down for I am not in- 
volved in a public debate i.e. my clarity of 
diction is not the issue. What I must remember 
is that I am these characters, I am involved in 
bribery and corruption for I, as worrier, help 
to produce it. By thinking of my thoughts as 
free and my actions /speech as unfree I make 
reference to the fact that I think I need to 
be induced to speak, and it is in this way 
that I come to produce everything I react to 
as an inducement, as an attempt to silence 
my thought. Every call to action becomes a 
threat or a bribe, and as a result when I do 
act or write, I begin by seeing my action or 
writing as at best irresponsible and at worst 
as the corrupt silence of the receiver of a 
bribe. I see then that worry begins and 
sticks with a conception of social relation- 
ships as corrupt, i.e. that worry produces 
corruption /... 
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corruption. (In fact worry is always a 
producer of bribes for they are seen to 
remove a danger, or risk, at least 
temporarily:)" 
Para.48 "I begin to remember then, as a result of this 
speech how deeply my mode of thinking and of 
acting, and hence of thinking about the relation- 
ship between the two, is imbued by the grammar 
of worry, but this should remind me that I will 
not free myself of it in the way I might discard 
an empty ballpoint pen. Rather, I must remember 
that social relationships are not static, and 
that it is only by using and working with what 
I have got, i.e. what I am, that I can produce 
something better. My task then, as my struggle 
continues, must be to make these words less 
empty," 
- 65 - 
Having read the speech, and tried in a variety of 
ways to come to grips with it, we begin to see how arrogant 
our approach to it was. For in the same way that we only 
began to learn /remember in the latter part of section 2 
when we suspended our tendency to imagine we understood 
the speech before we worked upon it, so also now do we 
remember that it is ourselves who need to do the work, for 
this speech, like all speeches, requires us to stretch our- 
selves if we are even to begin to do it, and ourselves 
justice. We will work with it paragraph by paragraph, for 
only in this way can we begin to get to grips with our- 
selves through it. 
But before we do, we want to draw attention to 
the similarity between our naive but arrogant manner at 
the beginning of this section, and the speech of Ivan 
Illyich Pralinsky who, in his drunken ramblings, comes out 
with the following:- 
"The main thing is that I'm convinced, 
convinced with all my heart. Humanity... 
love for mankind. Restoring a man to 
himself ... reviving his self respect and 
then ... set to work with finished materials. 
It seems clear enough; Yes, Sir: Allow 
me, Your Excellency, to take the syllogism: 
we meet, for example, a government clerk, a 
poor downtrodden government clerk. All 
right, a clerk; next: what sort of a clerk 
are you? answer: this or that sort of 
clerk. Are you employed? Yes, I am! 
Do you want to be happy? Yes. What is 
necessary for your happiness? This and 
that. Why? because ... And the man 
understands me, you see, at a word: the 
man is caught, so to speak, in my snare, 
and I can do anything I want with him, 
for /... 
- 6 6 - 
for his own good, I mean. "(7 ) 
Ivan's failure to be reminded by this that it was 
himself he should have questioned, was paralleled by our 
failure at the beginning of this section to treat the 
speech with sufficient respect. For, as soon as we do 
this, and not before, we begin to grasp how it can help us 
to help ourselves much more perhaps than we ever imagined. 
ANALYSIS OF LENGTHY SPEECH: 
Analysis of paragraph 1 
We need to read carefully, for as always with 
thoughtful effort we can uncover a great deal which will be 
of mutual benefit. 
"Your manner of proceeding has surprised me 
for I never expected my earlier views to be 
taken up in that way. So whilst I offer 
this self portrait, I admit that I am often 
distracted by topics which appear attractive, 
although at this moment I can say that when 
I am distracted I do forget what I wanted, 
i.e. I forget what I am. So much is this 
the case that I am beginning to see that all 
of my work, if it is not merely to provide 
either a distraction or drudgery for my 
reader, must express this struggle, and by 
doing so must help to remind the reader that 
I am not the only one who is involved in a 
struggle of this kind. My struggle can be 
considered, to begin with, to be with a 
version of myself as a worrier, and you who 
are reading will be well advised to keep the 
idea of struggle in mind for all too often, 
I fear that I shall succumb, and shall write 
as a worrier rather than (loosely) as a human 
about the worrier. Now lest you should 
judge this to be a strangely self centred 
and hence unworthy enterprise, I would ask 
you firstly to consider why you wish to 
charge /... 
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charge me in this way, and secondly if you 
do still wish to charge me, that you at 
least delay your judgement until you have 
some evidence upon which to base it, i.e. 
until you have heard what I want to say. 
Already you should see worry at work here 
i.e. I'm worried about the fact that you 
may choose to read no further and I try 
to forestall this eventuality by pleading 
with you rather than by offering a different 
(perhaps more attractive) beginning. It 
is as if I know that there is nothing I can 
do to prevent this i.e. your choosing not to 
read on, and this version of the relationship 
between me and you is, in itself, a good 
example of how I produce the situation as 
beyond my control, i.e. as one to worry about." 
Response: 
The speaker begins in a manner that we overlook 
at our peril, for as soon as she has said that she will offer 
a self portrait she goes on to say that she is often dis- 
tracted and forgets what she is. In effect she warns us 
here to take care, for what she portrays may not be herself. 
We are reminded by this that we are not prepared to speak 
of ourselves as 'I's for by doing so we could be led to 
conceive of ourselves as one, when we know full well, that 
our place as thinkers /speakers makes it necessary for us to 
remain aware of our dialectical characters. Furthermore 
the temptation to speak of our selves as 'I's could also 
lead us to imagine we know what we are, what our 'I' is 
but we consider that the thoughtful social actor is always 
prepared to bring this in to question, and not to rely upon 
it. When that speaker spoke of forgetting what she is, 
she was referring to situations when she acts as if she 
knows what her 'I' is. 
We/... 
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We must either work at removing 'I' from our 
discourse, or commit ourselves to continually formulating 
'I' as representing self as that which does not know what 
it is. When we speak in this work we will opt for the 
former, when we listen we will hear the usage of 'I' as 
alerting us to the speakers continuing attempt to re-con- 
stitute self. 
But, to return to the speech, she says she is 
often distracted by topics which appear attractive, and by 
saying this she reminds us how easily we could have been 
drawn to reduce all attractions to distractions. How 
easily we can fetishize attraction and see it as standing 
outside of ourselves i.e. as appearing as appearance, when 
we know that our dialectical, productive characters enable 
us to decide to produce what attracts us. And, what really 
attracts us are attractive acts, thoughtful social acts, not 
things; for attractive acts encourage us to work at improv- 
ing ourselves. 
So now we remember that we produce all of our work, 
our thoughtful lives, as part of our quest to continue re- 
constituting and re- enlivening our dialectical characters, 
and by producing our work as our work, i.e. as for us, we 
enable ourselves not to be distracted, not to engage in 
drudgery, in effect we ennoble our work by reminding our- 
selves that we choose what we do. 
But we must discipline ourselves and keep working 
with /... 
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with the speech at hand, for as we have said, there is 
much we can teach ourselves with its help. We already 
know that the speaker isn't sure who, or what, she is 
talking about when she talks about 'I', so we must not be 
too ready to assume that the 'I' in her speech is speaking 
as non -worrier, for as she goes on to tell us this is not 
always the case. So what she draws out of us is the fact 
that simply because a speech is about worry, it does not 
follow that it is not another instance of worry. It may 
or may not be. We are reminded by this that we must think 
about how we are writing /speaking, listening and not imagine 
that our speech is in some miraculous way separate and 
beyond, or above, the grammatical constraints of the speech 
we study. If our speech is different, it will be so by 
our thoughtful efforts to make it so. 
This work is difficult, but whether it is difficult 
or not we need to do it, and we know that our work asks no 
more from others than it asks from ourselves. So, when in 
the above paragraph the speaker says that she must express 
this struggle and by doing so must help remind the reader... 
etc., we know that she is herself a reader, and that she is 
expressing her awareness that others share her place with 
her. The struggle is of course to express ourselves, and 
so she is not speaking like a recruiting officer who, by 
occupying himself in this fashion at home avoids being on 
the front. She expresses the struggle by choosing to 
engage in it, by setting a good example. How else can we 
show /... 
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show the depth of our commitments? By showing us in her 
speech what could happen if we chose to worry, that writer 
risks being misunderstood. But by struggling for our- 
selves through this work we hear how it reminds us of the 
irrationality of settling for a version of ourselves, or 
others, as worried. Speakers' speeches are always mis- 
understood if they are assumed by other or self to be 
easily understood; we have to, and want to, work to under- 
stand each other better. 
We read on and find again that the worrier issues 
a warning to the reader, but we know when she does this she 
is warning herself, in effect she is saying to herself that 
unless she keeps the idea of struggle in mind she will 
succumb, she indicates that she realizes we worry if we 
aren't thoughtful enough about what we are, not when we are 
thoughtful. 
At this stage she moves on to taunt herself in 
the name of other as charging her speech with being self 
centred and hence unworthy. Again she stretches us, for 
she reminds us that we know that our work is not self - 
centred, if by 'self-centred', is meant oriented to the 
interests of an already known self. For, we do not know 
ourselves. But, if 'self- centred' means work oriented to 
achieving more thoughtful selves, we do not deny our work 
is self centred, why should we? Also, if we produce our 
work as self- centred in the latter sense, we certainly have 
no /... 
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no reason to judge it to be an unworthy enterprise, indeed 
if we knew of any more worthy enterprise we would be 
engaged in it. Furthermore, once we treat work as an 
orientation to achieve, to improve i.e. to change, we see 
the limitations of judging /charging, for these only have 
relevance when the possibility for change has been for- 
gotten. 
In section 2 (P.35) we produced the notion that 
those who rely upon an opposition between their own in- 
terests and others interests could not act with integrity; 
what we are saying here is that those, if any, who conceive 
of an interest in self as unworthy, are operating with 
versions of self that are unworthy of them, and we ask them 
to join us in our inquiry. 
But what of the notion of evidence, isn't this a 
very positivist idea, and doesn't this betray that speaker's 
unthoughtful nature? If we had assumed so, we would have 
been mistaken, for she does not treat what she says as 
evidence, but calls upon us, and herself, to make the effort 
to hear what she wants to say, not what she says. She 
reminds us that if we are drawn into judging, we should 
remember to concentrate upon intentions not appearances. 
However, now she starts to play with us for she 
says that "... Already you should see worry at work here 
etc. ", and she says this after reminding us not to attend 
to appearances. 
by/... 
So whilst we may have started i.e. begun 
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by (hence 'already') seeing worry at work, our good work is 
to move ourselves beyond this production of ourselves as 
observers, or for that matter worriers. She reminds us 
how to move on by (a) describing what we would have seen 
if we left ourselves and observed worry, and (b) by remind- 
ing us that we could not leave ourselves in this way. We 
have no need to worry about the fact that certain 'readers' 
may choose to read no further, for we write for ourselves 
as well as for others. Even if no others read what we are 
writing, by writing /thinking in this manner we are improving 
ourselves. Furthermore, unlike those who worry, we do not 
begin with a conception of our reader as untrustworthy i.e. 
as liable to stop. We are reminded by that speaker that 
we have no need to plead with you, for we know that we write 
both to help and be helped by you as well as to help our- 
selves. That is, we orient to you as one of ourselves, and 
given this, why would you stop? 
We do not then conceive of our relationship with 
you as something to worry about, but as that which we are 
enhancing by trying better to get to be ourselves. Neither 
are we relating to the speech of worry as something to worry 
about. 
Before we move on to the second paragraph a couple 
of further reminders have helped us (a) the speaker starts 
the final sentence "It is as if I know..." this is taken by 
us as indicating her playful attitude with us, for it warns 
us not to proceed by assuming she thinks she does know this, 
but /... 
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but by producing her as not knowing but as speaking about 
what would have happened if she had known. So whilst we 
began by finding her usage of 'good example' misleading, 
(for how could such a weak failure to resist worry be a 
good example ?) we propose that what she is saying is a good 
example is what she says, i.e. that she produced the situ- 
ation as such and such. For by grasping how we, like she, 
are producers we show, as she shows, how our productions 
need not be externalized in such a way as to subordinate 
our selves. 
Reading and working in a productive and thoughtful 
way, as we are doing here, is so much more enjoyable and so 
much better for us and others than is reading as consumption, 
but let us ensure in this work that we respect our partner 
in this dialogue, i.e. the speaker who tries to capture the 
nature of worry for us. 
Analysis of Paragraph 2 
"My struggle will be well illustrated by the 
problems which you may see to arise concerning 
the person(s) in which this work is written, 
for at times, the worrier will appear as a 
distant and perhaps distinct person, whilst 
at the same time it must also be apparent 
that I only know the worrier so well or in- 
timately because at times I am her. What 
I am suggesting here is that what may appear 
to be a technical problem of rhetoric, for 
example should I write a dialogue or a mono- 
logue, is illustrative in a weak way of the 
struggle in which I am involved, and perhaps 
involved is a good word for it To put 
this another way the problem of the person 
in which I write i.e. first person, second 
person /... 
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person or third person, is illustrative of 
the complex nature of my relationship to 
myself, and of how my version of myself 
relates to my version of others etc. When 
I say for example, that - what I think I 
want may not be what I want - and then look 
for ways to deal with this statement or 
state of affairs, this is not a matter of 
marginal or peripheral interest, and it is 
only when its centrality is felt that I 
feel involved in the struggle I am com- 
mending. This can be further illustrated 
(and again the illustration seems weak) by 
the fact that the very sentences which I 
write, including this one, have only been 
written if they have in some way attracted 
me. The illustration is weak because some 
'things' are difficult to illustrate or 
describe, and a good example of this might 
be our senses, i.e. the fact that they can 
be treated as mediating between 'our -selves' 
and 'the world' doesn't make them any easier 
to describe. For the moment then it might 
be useful to think of worry as mediating in 
this manner between the worrier's self and 
the world. However, I was speaking about 
the fact that the sentences which I write 
must have attracted me, but I can already 
see how even this sentence draws my, and 
perhaps your, attention away from that 
which is attracted, i.e. their subject, 
me, which as I have already indicated, is 
the crucial problem area, at present. 
What I am trying to say here is that it is 
versions of the self that are attracted by 
things. For example, only the worrier 
would be attracted by the doubts raised by 
this version of attraction. More deeply 
it is the version of myself as a worrier 
that attracts me, for it, as will become 
apparent, offers one way in which I allow 
myself to imagine I make things easier 
for myself. So, by generating a version 
of what attracts me I shall be generating 
a version of the me that is attracted, 
and may as a consequence be better equipped 
to struggle with the version of myself which 
I can all too easily become. The inference 
I draw from this is that I must produce an 
analysis of worry if I am to see how what 
I think I want relates to what I want. 
Authenticity then is by no means tranquil 
or easy, for it will only be in this 
struggle that I can show or be what I am." 
Response /... 
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Response: 
The speaker has already alerted us to the fact 
that we need not see problems as arising for us, but that 
we raise the problems, and so her 'may see' tells us that 
she does not force us to read productively. She allows us 
to choose to read productively. That is, we choose not to 
see the struggle as hers as we may have done,but to take 
our place in the struggle. For our struggle is well 
illustrated for us by the problems we produce concerning 
the person(s) in which all works are written and read. For 
example, in the worrier's self portrait the worrier seems 
distant and distinct, and yet close and indistinct, and 
this illustrates for us the perplexities that are produced 
by, and for, speakers who are ruled by conceit of know- 
ledge. For when she says that "... it must be apparent 
that I only know the worrier so well or intimately because 
at times I am her" she reminds us not to concern ourselves 
with the apparent, for we think of that which we are as 
being what we do not and cannot know, but that which we 
decide to become. 
What we are suggesting is that if we were asked 
how we would approach a seemingly technical problem of 
rhetoric i.e. should we write dialogues or monologues, our 
answer i.e. that monologues are not a human possibility, 
illustrates in a strong way our commitment to the struggle 
in which we choose to be involved. 
word /... 
'Involved' is a good 
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word, if it means involvement /commitment but not if it is 
read as enmeshment. We do not produce writing dialogue as 
problematic (in the bad sense), on the contrary we see 
writing or speaking in the first person, as we have said 
above, as unnecessarily complicating our relationships with 
ourselves and others. 
Ourselves become complex if we have become perplexed 
by imagined differences between self and other, and between 
different others i.e. our lives become more complicated the 
more we hide what we are in common with others from our- 
selves and each other. 
What can the speaker be referring us to by her 
example i.e. "When I say, for example, that - what I think 
I want may not be what I want..." Again we must stretch 
ourselves so as to reach a better reading, for whilst the 
lazy, effortless reading, i.e. that of the reader that 
doesn't want to think, would have read this as asking how 
to move from what she thinks she wants, to what she wants, 
we begin by reversing this direction. That is by showing 
the movement desired to be from unthoughtful wants (i.e. 
impulses) to thoughtful wants (i.e. socially and morally 
desirable choices). Indeed we show that the thoughtful 
character is one who wants what she thinks she wants, and 
of course nothing could be more worthy of effort i.e. more 
central. 
We will say this once more, we are not concerned 
to/... 
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to transform what we think we want into what we want, and 
we view any who set themselves this task as having matters 
backwards, not least because we do not begin by knowing 
what we think we want. To suggest that we do, would be 
to reduce thought to impulse, it would be to reduce con- 
versation, dialectical development, thought, to a waste of 
time. Whilst the speaker says she looks for ways to deal 
with her state of affairs we know that she and we are doing 
the work of thinking about what we want, rather than look- 
ing for ways, as if we might find them ready laid out. 
That would be to lay ourselves out. To imagine we desire 
to move from what we think we want to what we want is self 
destructive and why would any thoughtful character join 
that struggle? 
What of the speaker's illustration regarding the 
sentences she writes? Of course they have only been written 
because they attract, this is what speech or discourse is 
for i.e. trying to improve our selves, and whilst she 
suggests the illustration is weak, by doing so she encourages 
us to offer a strong reading of it. 
But what now, for the next section is demanding, 
for we know that our senses do not mediate between ourselves 
and the world for we produce ourselves as social i.e. as 
thoughtful, and by so doing produce our thoughts as mediat- 
ing and moderating our senses. By doing so we resist 
sliding in an unthoughtful manner by subordinating self to 
unthoughtful /... 
unthoughtful feelings and then modelling thoughts, perhaps 
worry, in that mould, i.e. as impulsive. We reveal, with 
the help of this speech, the moving pathway to irrationalism 
that we refuse to place ourselves upon. By revealing this 
damaging impulse to rest with a view of ourselves as merely 
sensual, we provide for our thoughtful efforts to produce 
social sensuality. The speaker states that 'For the 
moment then it might be useful to think of worry as mediat- 
ing in this manner between the worrier's self and the world'. 
The speaker hints here at the irrational nature of worry which 
is frequently in conventional usage treated as a feeling, 
but also when she says "for the moment" she shows the 
impulsiveness or unthoughtfulness of that sentence for to 
think of worry as mediating etc. is self contradictory, for 
by thinking it we show worry doesn't mediate in the manner 
suggested. That she begins the next sentence with 
'However - ' and returns to the question of what attracts, 
further indicates that she chose not to think of worry as 
mediating in that way for more than a moment. 
We are tempted to censure the speaker here for 
making things too difficult for us, but we resist this 
impulse by (a) acknowledging the effort she is making 
(b) remembering that by stretching ourselves we do improve 
ourselves, and (c) by remembering that it is we who choose 
to stretch our selves; she is not forcing us. 
The speaker helps us more than a little in the 
next /... 
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next section by saying she "... was speaking about the fact 
that ..." for we are reminded by this that thinkers /social 
producers are not constrained by the facts, rather we produce 
facts as artifacts and by so doing remind ourselves of our 
potential not to relate to our histories as determining 
facts. The speaker shows her effort to encourage us to do 
more than stick with or in the so called facts by saying 
"What I am trying to say ..." she wants us to join her in 
making the effort to say what she isn't yet saying, but is 
trying to say, and we need to make this effort for if we 
don't we do her speech violence. For instance, we must 
work to produce the irony and profundity of her remark that 
"More deeply it is the version of myself as a worrier that 
attracts me for it, as will become apparent, offers one way 
in which I allow myself to imagine I can make things easier 
for myself ". The irony is that this will only be apparent 
to those who want to make things easier for themselves 
before thinking about whether ease is necessarily good. A 
stronger reading recognizes that the speaker is describing 
what need not happen, what she will not let happen, for 
being a thoughtful interlocutor she would never opt to allow 
herself to make things easy for herself in this unthoughtful 
way. For this would not be easy for her, thinkers /speakers 
do not find thoughtlessness easy. 
What we are reminded of by reading this speech is 
that it is versions of self that are attracted by things, 
but we do not orient to versions of self as attractions: 
at/... 
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at least not whilst attractions are being produced as 
acting upon us, for we think of our versions of ourselves 
as what we produce, as products of our thoughtful actions. 
This may not make things easier for ourselves in the manner 
that some may pretend they want, but as we are thoughtful 
actors we want to be at ease in our activity not pursuing 
activities in order to put ourselves at ease, for that is 
intellectual suicide. 
At first sight the speaker may appear to produce 
her work as generating a version of what attracts her in 
order to generate a version of the self that is attracted, 
in order to know better what she is struggling against. 
But we know her better, for we know she is helping us to 
grasp that that is not the activity we would engage in, if 
indeed it can be called an engagement. What we are engaged 
in is the generation of that which attracts us i.e. more 
thoughtful selves, not that which distracts us. So whilst 
the speaker says that she produces the analysis of worry as 
being necessary for her to see how what she thinks she 
wants relates to what she wants, we know that what she 
means is that she is doing the analysis for we do not produce 
analysis as something we need but aren't yet doing, (perhaps 
an unthoughtful worrier would have worried that she would 
never produce an analysis:) . We produce our work as 
analytic and as what we are doing not what we are waiting 
for. 
When /... 
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When the speaker concludes this paragraph she says 
'Authenticity then is ... "and we must be careful not to 
forget the 'then' for this indicates that this version of 
authenticity is the version that would be drawn from the 
easy reading of that which preceded it. It could seem 
that the speaker is expressing surprise that authenticity 
is not easy or tranquil. However, we know that it is 
tranquil and easy but, not still, it is continually sur- 
prising ourselves, reminding ourselves that we do not know 
what we are, and by so doing, startling ourselves, and 
moving ourselves into thoughtful action. 
Analysis of Paragraph 3 
"I am trying to throw some light upon one 
of my problems of action i.e. upon how what 
I think I want relates to what I want and 
it may help to hear again the words attraction, 
distraction and action. How do I, as the 
worrier, think about attraction ?" 
Response: 
When the speaker says she is trying to throw light 
upon her problems we know that she is not saying she is 
doing so in order to gain sympathy, her 'trying to' should 
not be read as an appeal to us, as if she even needs help 
to gain our sympathy. She is saying she is trying i.e. 
that she at least is working at thinking with problems 
common to each and all of us, and that she is becoming more 
not less social, more not less thoughtful through her work. 
She decides to take a real risk here and to speak as she 
imagines a worrier would speak, this is a risk because she 
does not really know what worry is, but also because she 
may /... 
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may get enmeshed in and persuaded by the grammar of worry 
in such a way that she cannot get out. However, we see the 
wisdom of her action, for by thinking about, i.e. really get- 
ting inside worry, she does diminish the likelihood of engag- 
ing in the activity unintentionally. The brevity of this 
paragraph suggests to us that it is analogous to setting the 
scene for a new act in a play. She will be adopting a new 
role, and has prepared us for it. Perhaps also she, like 
we, needed to rest a while at the end of a demanding first 
act. 
Analysis of Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 
When something attracts me it promises to give 
me something I think I want, in effect I am in- 
duced to take what I think I want by what I see 
or hear etc. Attraction works quickly then, for 
it leads me to forget to ask myself why I might 
think I want what I think I want, i.e. it leads 
me to forget to think about whether I know what 
I want, The attractive encourages me to take 
what it promises. (How quickly I rush on here 
away from the question which asks me to think 
about whether I know what I want, for perhaps 
what I want will prove to be to give not to 
take: Yet in my rush I think I will reveal 
why I rush so I will go on:) 
It may help you to understand my idea of attraction, 
and hence action, if you begin by considering 
giving, for if you cannot understand what it is 
to give something it is highly unlikely that you 
will be able to understand what it is to promise 
to give something (C.F. idea of attraction above) 
i.e. for me to find something attractive. Further- 
more you cannot understand giving until you draw 
it into a relation with taking, and for the 
moment, the relationship to which I refer is 
not simply that something needs to be given to 
be taken, on the contrary, it is that something 
needs to be taken if it is to be given, and there 
are different ways of taking. My point here 
then is that we need to acquire things if we are 
to divest ourselves of them. We need to 
generate things if we are to be generous with 
them. The philanthropist, as gift giver, if 
such he is, would begin to come more clearly 
into /... 
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into focus, and consequent scrutiny, beside 
his gift. 
Now this could alert both of us to the fact 
that I began the last paragraph by offering 
you my help in the form of my understanding 
of attraction, in effect then I was acting 
as a philanthropist, and so you should demand 
from me an explanation of how I have achieved 
or taken this understanding and from where, 
and furthermore, why I think it will help you. 
At first sight my apparent unwillingness or 
inability to answer your demands may seem 
strange, but as we continue, the philanthropist's 
silence will begin to emerge as a necessary 
result of his version of himself and his rel- 
ations to others i.e, as a natural rather than 
an unnatural (strange) consequence of his own 
self conception (which may indeed prove to be 
unnatural;)" 
Response: 
We have been warned that the speech we are now hear- 
ing is the speaker's version of the speech of worry, and we 
need to remind ourselves that the speaker has settled to offer 
a speech that reveals worry as she imagines it is convention- 
ally heard. We want in the remainder of the section, with 
the assistance of the speaker's version of conventional worry, 
to display how both we and that speaker would differentiate 
ourselves from the speech of worry as we imagine it is con- 
ventionally understood, but we could not do this adequately 
without thinking about it, getting inside it; we have to work 
through it and not ignore it. de will not offer enlivening 
formulations as we have been doing so far, instead we will 
tend to offer an alternative speech on the same themes, that 
is a product of our work with that speech. So whilst we are 
grateful to the speaker for the account she offers, we do her 
the service of not recognizing it as an honest account of 
herself, i.e. we do not forget that she is speaking as if 
she /,., 
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she were a worrier, which she is not. She leads us through 
this detailed account in a skillful manner not to mislead us, 
but to collaborate with us in our desire through our work to 
take the risk of being more honest, and by so doing coming to 
understand that being honest is no real risk at all, but it 
isn't easy for the dishonest to realize this. Those, if any, 
who remain worried would lose everything for nothing, but we 
cannot show them this they will have to show themselves. 
What attracts us are thoughtful social actions for 
these encourage us to do what we think is good to do. At- 
tractive actions do work quickly for they startle us, 
encourage us, and remind us to ask ourselves to think about 
what we want to do. They help us to remember to think about, 
and decide even although we do not and cannot know. At- 
tractive actions are those that display their author's com- 
mitment to producing a more thoughtful society. They are 
those that are engaged in by those who do not rush away from 
the question which they ask themselves about what a thoughtful 
character would want to do. They do not leave it to chance 
in the manner that this speech suggests worry would. Worry 
leaves everything for other to do, other must search /work 
while it rushes on. 
We do not need to help each other to understand 
our idea of attraction for it is ours. By saying this we 
acknowledge that the most our writing can do is remind us of 
what we already know we do not, and cannot, know. 
The version of attraction that worry produces in 
paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 relies upon differences between givers 
and /.., 
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and takers, have nots and haves, self and other. Hence its 
reduction of the student /teacher relationship to that of the 
philanthropist /poor. But we know that this version of 
attraction is unattractive because of its refusal to reach 
beyond differences. Giving and taking are different sides 
of the same activity, and a dialectical involvement, as is 
a social relationship, requires an understanding of what we 
share, through which can be generated less static relation- 
ships between self and other. To reduce social relation- 
ships to giving or taking in the manner that the speech of 
worry does is to refuse to remember that truly social rel- 
ationships are give and taken, not give or take. 
As the speech of worry continues we read that it 
views helping other to understand as philanthropy, (memories 
of Ivan I l lyich Pralinsky!) . Such a weak notion of the 
relationship between teaching and learning could only be pro- 
posed by worry which has not yet grasped that good teaching, 
good teachers, is that, and are those, that learn from their 
own activities. This is why their words, unlike the words 
of worry as conventionally understood, sound empty neither 
to others nor to themselves. But, this is not to say that 
others will always choose to join the inquiry i.e. to instruct 
themselves, for they may well prematurely decide that learning 
is too dangerous, and active an activity for them. But if 
they do they are not only digging their own graves but also, 
and more importantly, they are helping to dig the grave of 
the society they live in And, they are doing so when they 
could be using their efforts to thoughtfully enliven both. 
Whilst/... 
- 86 - 
Whilst worry is in reality necessarily incapable 
of meeting our demands for an explanation of why it acts as 
it does, it irrationally prefers to continue worrying, and 
pretends that its necessary incapability is at worst un- 
willingness, or an inability of the type that at some later 
time will be overcome. It persuades those it subjects that 
they are not yet ready to act. It produces this necessary 
incapability as its subjects unwillingness and inability to 
meet their own demands, but it could and should have reminded 
them to proceed more honestly and thoughtfully by stopping 
worrying because they had no reason to continue. Which is 
not, of course, to say they should have stopped thinking, or 
inquiring into how to act more thoughtfully for, on the con- 
trary, until worry can teach its subjects that they are stop- 
ping short in an anti social /self destructive way, they will 
not bring themselves to think about how they are already 
engaged in our inquiry. 
Analysis of Paragraph 7 
"We can see by now that initially I have 
limited the attractive to the gift i.e. 
that which is given, and have then gone 
on to transform gifts into pieces of 
evidence, and perhaps this can account 
for my reticence about receiving them 
for (a) if I accept and consume the gifts 
I will in effect be destroying the 
evidence and (b) if I accept and do not 
consume the gifts I could reduce my 
desire to testify by viewing myself as 
a receiver of stolen goods or bribes. 
If then I view those who offer me gifts 
as philanthropists I will do my best not 
to /... 
- 87 - 
to accept what they are offering. If you 
listened to me then, and treated this speech 
so far as a gift you would reject it for the 
reasons I have so far offered, and yet I will 
show that you could have refused merely to 
listen to me without rejecting my offer. I 
am making reference here to the fact that I 
could, and later I will, make substitutions 
and initially replace the philanthropist 
with the teacher and the poor with the 
student, but later we will replace the 
philanthropist with the student and the 
poor with the teacher;" 
Response: 
The speaker does well to convey worry's unruliness 
here as the speech moves lackadaisically from the giver, in 
its terms the philanthropist, to the gift, and similarly con- 
veys the irrationality of worry, as conventionally understood, 
by allowing worry to proceed by limiting gifts to evidence 
of bribery and corruption, for anyone who blindly accepts 
this view of gifts and givers would indeed have something 
to worry about, if that is, he or she wanted social relation- 
ships. But, of course all of this is irrational, for why 
on earth should we transform the attractive (a) into gifts 
and then gifts into bribes? Worry offers no reasons. 
Worry is not only dragging itself down, but others also, 
and we see this as a product of its too ready acceptance of 
its own speech. We produce its speech as no more than a 
rationalization for its unthoughtful refusal to accept what 
it refers to as gifts. I t allows itself to be persuaded 
not to engage in further thoughtful inquiry into why it 
does not want to accept. 
about /... 
But we know that its reticence 
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about receiving is a product of its awareness that in its 
version of the past it has been encouraged to accept 
passively what it did not want. It persuaded those it 
subjected that they were not, and are not, strong enough, 
perhaps like children, to stand up against their parents 
and teachers and to challenge them when they acted as if 
they knew the virtue /value of what they were doing, when 
always they did not. Had the children been encouraged to 
let others know what they thought, they could have much 
more quickly uncovered either with or without others' will- 
ing help that the others did not know, and at best decided 
to act even though they did not know, or at worst did not 
know that they did not know. 
We begin to uncover how worry is produced and how 
it prevents those it subjects from getting to produce better 
versions of themselves and from getting closer to other. 
It is a product of and a producer of resentful silence on 
the part of students and lazy dishonest speech on the part 
of teachers. The speech of worry is helping us here, but 
it would help itself if it also would choose to recognize 
how the version of the gift that it relies upon is a product 
of this kind of lazy authoritarian relationship: that it 
can do, and needs to do something about wórking, in fact it 
needs to recognize that it is already doing something, and 
by doing so will realize it can do much more. 
It chooses to advise the reader about what they 
can do rather than to do it itself; while it asks other to 
act /... 
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act i.e. to refuse to merely listen to its speech, it 
persuades itself that by speaking it is doing enough. It 
recognizes that as it speaks it reveals what it is but 
foolishly considers that what it is is good enough. Through- 
out its speech we find it strangling and restraining its 
speaker when it could be improving itself by deciding to 
listen to its own speech in a productive way. It does not 
do what it commends we ought to do. It thinks it is tell- 
ing others something they do not know, but it knows, and yet 
whilst its speech does remind us of important issues it 
resists remembering these through its conceit, its satis- 
faction with what it perceives as its knowledge of itself. 
The good of our work is to remind ourselves that we can 
produce versions of ourselves which are better than this, 
better than we seem at present to be. 
Analysis of Paragraph 8 
"By transforming the gift in the way that I 
have, I raise the question of acceptance as 
the problem that the gift presents to its 
possible recipient. For it seems that I 
should refuse all gifts if by being gifts 
they transform their givers into philan- 
thropists. That is, I am faced with a 
decision 'should I accept or not ?' In this 
way I see a problem i.e. that of the decision 
coming to mediate between me and the gift, 
perhaps the world. I then proceed by trying 
to argue the case for acceptance or non- 
acceptance, taking or leaving, as a way to 
reach a decision. The fact that I do this 
persuades me that I am not merely impulsive/ 
animalistic and that I have some commitment 
to reason. And yet you can see that my 
commitment to reason here is only skin deep, 
for I only use reason as one means to fulfill 
my impulses i.e. what I think I want, and I 
do /... 
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do not, as I have said think (reason) about 
that My impulsiveness is shown by the fact 
that I treat the problem of decision as some- 
thing which faces me, rather than as something 
which I have produced, or at least had a part 
in producing. I forget that I am the one who 
is treating decisions as having a gift -like 
nature, and most importantly as being problems 
as a result. I am forever forgetting that 
whilst the fact that we can do the right thing 
or the wrong thing in any situation can be con- 
strued as a problem or a blight this is the 
wrong thing to do, for were it not possible 
for us to do the right thing or the wrong thing, 
good intentions would not be possible. That is, 
the worrier has a tendency to transform blessings 
into blights: Furthermore, it is worth pointing 
out that by using this version of myself as some- 
one who is forever forgetting, or losing sight 
of things, I produce a version of myself as not 
being the sort of person to make decisions. 
But, you should be able to see what an easy 
way out this might seem to be by noticing how 
I also choose to ignore the fact that I must 
have known or seen things in order to forget 
or lose sight of them. This is further 
evidence of a misconceived attempt to free 
myself of what I allow myself to think 
oppresses me. The ability to know that I 
forget and lose sight of things however could 
go some way to raising me above the animalistic;" 
Response: 
After seemingly already having convinced itself 
that gifts are bribes or stolen goods, it now decides to 
raise the question of acceptance of gifts as the problem 
that gifts present, but of course if gifts were bribes or 
stolen goods we have reason enough to accept none: i.e. 
there is no problem for the incorrupt character. But worry 
is aware that there is something wrong, but it doesn't 
think about what it is, and so let us see how it runs from 
this rather than dealing with it. 
- 91 - 
It begins by producing the decision of whether to 
accept or not as a problem (and we restrict it to its 
ordinary usage here i.e. problems as something to be rid of), 
rather than as expressing its subjects place as a thoughtful 
actor: that is one who is able to make decisions for the 
good. But, by placing an argument, or rather what it it- 
self refers to as an inadequate argument between itself and 
the decision, it produces its subject as moving a step 
further back from response -ability. And then it has the 
affrontary to admit to us that it should be clear that its 
commitment is only skin deep for it is subordinated to its 
impulses. It does as we imagined it would, for it reduces 
thought to impulse. It acts as if it believes being 
impulsive is what it must be, when we know that it need not 
be and must not be if it is to become social. It has to 
decide for itself to treat decisions as its products and 
not as problems in the weak sense, for by doing so it can 
come to befriend itself and be worth talking with. 
Unlike it, we are forever remembering that the 
fact we can choose to decide for the good makes our thought- 
ful good intentions possible. Thoughtful /social actors 
realize that whatever the situation by their response they 
are able to make it an occasion for social activity. 
Unlike the speech of worry we remember that by 
referring to a version of self as forever remembering, we 
produce ourselves as being able to make decisions. We do 
not /... 
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not limit ourselves to pointing, as it did in that paragraph, 
we do not take what worry refers to as the easy way out, for 
how could we? 
More importantly we do not produce a version of 
the worrier as one who is suffering from a misconceived attempt 
to free herself from what she allows herself to think 
oppresses her: we produce her as failing to resist the 
temptation to hide from herself behind rationalizations of 
a blatantly irrational nature. We don't see it as better 
than the animalistic for the animal has no choice, it is 
either the same as the animal or worse, for it turns its 
back upon its ability to decide. It allows its speech to 
oppress its subjects and it is not deserving of sympathy. 
Analysis of Paragraph 9 
"I must slow down now if I am not to lose 
sight of other matters, for I was arguing 
with myself about whether or not I should 
accept or take a gift, and the point here 
is that I wanted the argument to relieve 
me of the need to decide in this case, as 
I often do in others. I tend then to 
treat decisions as something I would be 
better off without, for I find myself 
treating decisions as cutting off possi- 
bilities, i.e. as reducing my freedom. 
But when I do this I must be forgetting 
that the freedom I ought to sustain must 
be the freedom to make decisions. I 
ought to acknowledge that not making 
decisions, (perhaps not changing my mind) 
is deciding not to make them (or change it) 
i.e. that this can also be a method for 
cutting off possibilities i.e. of reducing 
my freedom. In effect, I allow myself to 
act as if I treat decisions as essentially 
arbitrary when I know that if this were so 
I would have no reason to make this decision. 
However /... 
- 93 - 
However, by my inaction i.e. the action of 
treating decisions as something to avoid I 
indicate both to you and to myself that I 
do think it matters what I do, that I do 
think I can make bad decisions, and hence 
that I am not as convinced by the idea of 
arbitrariness as I sometimes allow myself 
to think, or perhaps want you to think. 
I am trying tentatively to suggest here 
that worry, perhaps like other things, 
can never act as a successful mediator 
between self and the world i.e. that 
because of its nature it can never 
totally subjugate its subject, and that 
whilst this could be treated as something 
to worry about we ought to see it as a 
virtue." 
Response: 
This paragraph is depressingly weak, for after 
having shown us, and itself, that it knows it has potential 
it chooses to turn its back upon the possibilities it opens 
up. Indeed when at the end of this paragraph it says it 
is "Trying tentatively to suggest ... etc." it shows us 
that it is worse than the animal for it does know it could 
act in a virtuous manner but doesn't, even although it can 
offer no reason why it should not. Its speech tells us 
that it would prefer it if it was totally subjugated and 
had no choice; it is worrying about the fact that worry 
doesn't totally subjugate it and by so doing it is sub- 
jugating itself to worry when it need not. 
Analysis of Paragraph 10 
"But, what is it that I, as worrier, prefer to 
think of myself as, even if I can never quite 
do it? I think I want to think of myself as 
not /... 
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not being responsible for anything that goes 
wrong, and to this end as being prepared to 
pay the price of never being responsible for 
anything, even that which goes right, as a 
way of minimizing that risk. My idea of 
me doing good then is limited to that of 
not doing harm i.e. I produce paradoxically 
a version of myself as unproductive. I 
prefer to think I prefer being mastered by 
the situation rather than being the situation's 
master. When, as we will see, this turns 
out to be my way of mastering the situation 
which isn't to say it is a good thing for as 
we will discover worry has a misconceived 
notion of mastery. To say this another 
way, I act when I worry as if I find possi- 
bility (C.F. the making of decisions) more 
worrying than necessity and this is because 
I conceive of necessity as relieving me of 
responsibility for what goes wrong." 
Response: 
We have to admire the speaker's skills here for 
she continues to express so well in these transitions from 
one topic to another the way worry refuses to "see" reason. 
How could anyone prefer to think of themselves as never 
being responsible for anything; The speech of worry revels 
in submission as if submission were its mission, and we are 
pleased to be engaged in subversion i.e. in subverting sub- 
missiveness. This paragraph is crucial to our understand- 
ing of worry as conventionally understood, as an activity 
that strangles self and other, for by submitting to what 
it conceives of as necessity, worry does produce the con- 
tinuance of corruption, and its reasoning is so weak, for 
it is its conception of necessity. Worry forgets that it 
produces the possibility of what it conceives of as necessary, 
whilst /.... 
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whilst we are showing the necessity for humans of our 
possibility. Worry sees its potential, but by refusing 
to seize it throws it all away. 
Analysis of Paragraphs 11, 12 
"The notion of responsibility begins to hang 
very heavily over this part of the discussion 
for I am beginning to feel how actively I, as 
worrier, try to avoid facing up to, or better 
grasping, the fact that I have the gift of 
decision making i.e. the one gift which, as 
we shall see, the philanthropist would not or 
could not offer. Furthermore, the fact is 
that I must accept this gift because of my 
nature, I can no more be the worrier than I 
can be any other version of myself. For 
though I may act like a worrier, when I do 
so it is always by accident i.e. unintentionally. 
Goodness: the worrier does seem to be a 
slippery character for now I feel that it is 
he who is saying that when he does act it is 
not his fault because it is an accident i.e. 
because it is unintentional." 
Response: 
Responsibility as pressing down on the speech here 
is the way pressure for good is subverted, for the desire 
for response - ability raises our heads. We seek to be 
more response - able through our conversations, our lives. 
We do not accept worry's irrational notion that we can no 
more be worriers than we can be other versions of ourselves, 
for that is unnecessarily hopeless. We can be other versions 
of ourselves for we produce our willingness and ability to 
seek to make thoughtful decisions as a version of ourselves 
that /... 
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that is a possible course of action where worry is not. 
We do not wish to hide behind accident, unintentionality, 
in the way that worry commends, for we have no desire to 
display slipperiness in the manner that the speech of 
worry does for that could never be becoming. 
Analysis of Paragraph 13 
"By now you, as reader, may be beginning to 
wonder what happened to the struggle, for it 
seems that worry is not even lifting a finger 
in opposition to what is being said i.e. it 
seems it has nothing to say. Yet whilst in 
one sense I think this is true, in another 
I think that we have been listening to 
nothing but the worry so far, for, by unin- 
tentionally resorting to a device of treating 
worry as a version of myself and referring to 
the distance between this version and myself, 
I have in effect been treating it as another 
person. (C.F. original problem of style of 
writing) I have been, in effect, relieving 
myself of responsibility for its action or 
inaction, when I know all too well that this 
is simply me succumbing yet again to a version 
of myself as someone with something to worry 
about i.e. I have allowed the struggle I was 
initially engaged in to become yet another 
instance of worry. What I am saying here 
is that if you are to see any suffering and 
hence any struggle in this speech I must 
show you not how distant and distinct I am 
from this version of myself as the worrier, 
but, how I have become in most of my speech 
constrained and limited by its rules:" 
Response 
But we are startled and re-awakened here for we 
are reminded that the speaker was intending to contend with, 
struggle against worry, and that her speech has, as a result 
of its commitment to the usage of a weak notion of 'I', 
become /... 
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become confused. For she says here that it seems that worry 
is not even lifting a finger in opposition, but we remember 
that at the end of paragraph 3 she decided to speak 'as if' 
she was the worrier. We know that it was not worry that 
weakened but herself, and now it is clear to us that it has 
been for this reason that we could no longer maintain our 
commitment to enriching and enlivening her speech in this 
section. She has become so enmeshed in the usage of worry, 
as we hinted she might, that we decided to demonstrate how 
differently she could have spoken by differentiating our- 
selves and her from the speech she offers, rather than 
offering formulations of it. We have intended to demon- 
strate in our analysis of these paragraphs i.e. from the 
end of paragraph 3 how we /she are much stronger than her 
speech suggests. 
For example in this paragraph (i.e. 13) she is 
persuaded to produce the device of treating the worrier as 
a version of herself and then distancing herself from it as 
unintentional, and as relieving her of responsibility; when 
we would produce her attempt to distance herself from worry 
as her morally courageous effort to take hold of her response - 
ability for her actions. She draws the burden of worry 
upon herself in order to display how she can contend with 
it, and with the help of reasonable arguments, conversations, 
moderates worry and puts it in its place. She, like we, 
is showing how by engaging with ourselves, by bringing 
versions of ourselves into our inquiry, we are able to 
continue /.., 
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continue to stretch the rules of forms of speech /life that 
could, if we settled with consuming them, have limited and 
constrained us. 
But whilst in this section of our work we have 
been demonstrating our distance from worry, and that we do 
need to do, we know that this is not enough for we are dis- 
satisfied with the way our discourse has tended to appear 
as the speech of one against the other. We want to remind 
ourselves at this juncture that we would have reason to 
worry if one against the other came to represent one 
speaker against another rather than reasoned argument, 
dialogue against silence, i.e. the decision not to make the 
effort to think any more about our speech, our lives. So 
let us not forget that whilst in this section we are con- 
cerned in the main with differentiation, this is in order 
to make reparation rather than continued separation possible. 
We are not choosing to relieve ourselves of response -ability. 
Analysis of Paragraph 14 
"Even if for the moment we allow the separation 
of myself from the version of myself as a 
worrier, which the preceding paragraph brings 
into much doubt, I still feel that the worrier's 
apparent lack of resistance is by no means 
uncharacteristic, for I do tend to accept 
the bad reading of myself as a worrier, i.e. 
as trying to shirk my responsibilities by 
saying in effect that I am not response - 
able; by accepting that I am not authentic. 
Yet strangely it is by accepting this reading 
that I allow myself to think that I gain a 
sense of relief, for I allow myself to feel 
even more convinced that I am not the sort 
of person who should be making decisions. 
Furthermore!... 
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Furthermore I ought to point out that 'decision' 
is being treated throughout this speech as a 
prerequisite for action and so we can see that 
a much stronger (or weaker) claim is being 
made. For in effect, the acceptance of the 
idea that the worrier is not the type of 
person to make decisions is an acceptance of 
the worrier as inactive. That is, it is a 
version of worries as something to be got out 
of the way before you can begin to act. Now 
it should be plain how this analysis has a 
bearing on the problem of action mentioned at 
the outset, for if we can begin to see how 
relief from worry comes to be integrated with 
action we can see how I as the worrier produce 
an even greater distance between worry /thought 
and action. The point is then that I formulate 
myself as non -actor, for I reduce my own actions 
to the status of inaction by treating them as 
merely reactions to for example, dangers or 
exigencies. So we can begin to see now how 
I produced attraction as inducement for this 
placed me in an essentially passive inactive 
role; (By treating myself as being attracted 
to the version of myself as a worrier I am 
exemplifying this form of passivity:)" 
Response: 
The speaker through this paragraph helps remind 
us of how separation is not good enough, and we can begin 
to grasp this by more diligently producing the 'I' as a 
problem as we earlier proposed we would. What we are 
saying is that any who conceive of themselves as 'I's have 
chosen to remain with worry; that the author of this self 
portrait of worry, being herself a thoughtful social actor, 
could not intend her self when she speaks of 'I' but is 
speaking of ' I' s i.e. of that which we are not. 
She begins by stating that she has started to have 
doubts about separation and we read this paragraph as an 
argument /... 
argument against treating ourselves as 'I's (in the weak 
sense) for an 'I' would very likely act as she says, for 
an 'I' has no ability to relate, to learn or act thought- 
fully. We read the paragraph as continuing in the follow- 
ing manner: ... an 'I' would still feel that the worrier's 
apparent lack of resistance is by no means uncharacteristic 
of it, for an 'I' by being an 'I' is tending to produce 
and accept a bad reading of itself as a worrier, i.e. as 
trying to shirk the response -ability of being social /thought- 
ful by saying in effect that 'I's are not response -able; 
by producing 'I's as acknowledging their inauthenticity. 
(Of course by their speaking we produce them as revealing 
their non 'I' ness:) Whilst 'I's, because in fact they are 
not ' I' s, find it difficult to accept this reading of them- 
selves, they still pretend that it is something they accept, 
not produce, so as to allow themselves to pretend they are 
convinced; content with versions of their selves as not 
the sort of persons to make decisions, to think. That 
they are not content with this condition is revealed by 
their difficulty making their decision appear to themselves 
as a non -decision, that is why they say it is strange. 
Furthermore an 'I' would say that it ought to point out (as 
if pointing was enough!. This is fact -fetishism i.e. sub- 
ordinating self to appearances.) that decision is being 
treated throughout as a pre- requisite for social /thoughtful 
action. Here the speaker reminds us of the anti -social 
nature of all 'I' talk, for how could a thoughtful social 
character /... 
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character want to lead the dead life that deformulating 
self as inactive must produce If 'I' talk is to be 
preserved we must produce a thoughtful formulation of 
We do have to get worry out of our way before 
we act, but we do this by becoming more thoughtful, more 
social. Relief from worry as we imagine it (worry) is con- 
ventionally conceived, is not thoughtlessness but is thought- 
fulness, social activity, but an 'I' cannot grasp this 
because it has no need or desire for action, An 'I' if it 
were possible, which fortunately for us it is not, would 
have nothing to say. An 'I' really does become merely a 
pawn in the game. By helping remind us of this the author of 
the speech of worry helps us to proceed to work through this 
essentially passive, inactive, irrational role. 
Analysis of Paragraph 15 
"(As an example of how I as a worrier produce 
a distance between action and worry I would 
refer to my own writing, for whenever I re- 
read what I have written I tend to see it as 
inauthentic, i.e. as not really expressing 
how I feel i.e. as the product of lack of 
concern, and whilst you may view this as 
mildly crazy I'm sure you can imagine that 
it does not appear to aid productivity;)" 
Response: 
Again the author produces very well here the 
spirit of worry, for if we viewed writing as needing to 
express what we feel in order to be authentic, we would all 
merely /,.. 
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merely gabble. However, we are concerned to change our- 
selves for the better through our thoughtful, inquiring 
writing /speech and not merely to express what we feel. 
Feelings, as impulses alone, could provide no incentive 
for the reader, or writer, and this is why diary writing, 
if it is formulated as simply recording feelings, is such 
a bore. Of course we do not view the 'worrier's' position 
as mildly crazy we produce it, as it is, as downright de- 
generate, and we are pleased if it does not aid its pro- 
ductivity, if its products are inauthentic, as it says, for 
what need have we of them? 
Analysis of Paragraph 16 
"By now you might expect that I, the worrier, 
would be feeling pretty bad, and in a way you 
would be right, but, perhaps not too surprisingly 
it is now that I, as the worrier, start to take 
the offensive. For as if this wasn't bad 
enough, I go on to treat all action, including 
the supposed criticism of me as the worrier, as 
being the result of a lack of concern because 
of the distance between worry and action, or 
conversely, because of the integration of lack 
of concern with action. That is, I produce 
others, in this instance my supposed critic, 
as icons of myself. It is this that helps 
me to feel just in my state of inaction for 
by allowing the argument to persuade me that 
action is always the result of a lack of 
concern its consequences whether apparently 
good or bad are treated as accidents. That 
is I reduce others to the status of the 
mechanical, the unintentional or the unthink- 
ing, the inauthentic." 
Response: 
Speaking about self makes worry feel bad for it 
decides /... 
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decides not to notice how speech can provide means for 
improving self. So instead of moving from bad to better, 
which a thoughtful, social character would have tried to 
do, and by trying have done, the 'I' as worrier does 
surprise us, for it moves from bad to worse. Rather than 
decide to work with itself upon itself, it directs its 
attention, and tries to direct ours, towards others by 
producing the worst version of other's actions, and by so 
doing considers it raises itself in comparison. Others 
actions are produced as the unconcerned criticism that 
issues forth from unthoughtful others who fail to consider 
how the criticism applies to themselves. 
This helps us to remember howree could never reduce 
others to the status of the mechanical, the unintentional 
etc., for by so doing we would be reducing ourselves. By 
producing versions of actions /speeches as thoughtful /social, 
we provide reminders for ourselves of how our actions are 
integrated with concern /thought. Our intent is not to 
criticize those who worry, not to reduce them, but to work 
with them and their speech to show how we can make more of 
it by stretching ourselves. Healthy criticism is always 
from the inside, it always calls upon self as well as other 
to improve, but ironically if it was to be read by 'I's, 
that is those who reduce self and other to the status of 
the mechanical etc., its profound social and moral character 
is missed. However, we know what we are saying is that we 
are not and cannot be 'I's and it is by calling ourselves 
to /... 
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to work at achieving thoughtful /social readings of speeches 
that we are reminding ourselves that we will only achieve 
a society with our own thoughtful efforts. 
Analysis of Paragraph 17 
"Perhaps I could clear the air here by return- 
ing to the idea of the gift, for if we treat 
gift giving as accidental i.e. as being the 
result of a lack of concern, we can begin to 
see why I would be suspicious of the giver's 
motives, for by producing the gift as an 
accident I treat myself, its possible 
receiver, as undeserving. It is just a 
matter of chance that I am offered it. 
As a receiver (or possible receiver) of a 
gift from a philanthropist I am not deserving 
in the strong sense, but merely lucky, for I 
have not earnt what I get, I am simply lucky 
to meet or know a rich and generous man! 
This could be why I am reticent about receiv- 
ing gifts i.e. because I think I haven't earnt 
them I fear that they may be taken away as soon 
as either my undeserving character, or a more 
deserving character is brought to light. By 
treating myself as undeserving i.e. by treating 
myself as an accidental receiver, i.e. a 
receiver of charity, I remove myself from the 
productive process, I act as if I am relaxing. 
For when we relax we just let things happen 
i.e. we produce the situation as being one 
in which accidents (bad accidents) are certainly 
excluded, and the result is that the most we 
could expect to receive would be pleasant 
surprises: gifts. I think I remove the 
possibility of a bad accident by producing 
myself as unproductive, for, as I have said, 
what I, as the worrier, think I fear is being 
responsible for something that goes wrong. 
Hence my version of a bad accident is something 
I am responsible for, and so I go on to allow 
myself to think that if I am unproductive i.e. 
if I produce nothing, I cannot be responsible 
for anything bad. I forget that I still 
consume and hence that even if I produce 
nothing else I produce needs:" 
Response: 
Worry /... 
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Worry spoke of reducing other to the mechanical 
etc. and now rather than stopping doing this says it will 
occupy itself with clearing the air. Its survival orien- 
tation surfaces all too quickly, for after stating how it 
corrupts and reduces, it turns its attention to fumigation 
rather than re- forming itself. 
It tells us what would happen if we treat gift 
giving as accidental, but we produce this treatment of gift 
giving as accidental for if gift giving had been produced 
as intentional the following paragraph would have been 
possible:- 
... by treating gift giving as intentional i.e. as 
being the result of concern, we can begin to produce why we 
would not be suspicious of the giver's motives for, by pro- 
ducing gifts as non -accidental we treat ourselves, their 
possible givers and receivers, as deserving. It is not 
simply a matter of chance if we are offered them. As 
receivers, or possible receivers of gifts from thoughtful 
characters we produce ourselves as deserving in the strong 
sense, and not merely lucky, for we must have related to 
others in such a way as to deserve their friendship. We 
are not then reticent about accepting gifts from thoughtful 
others, for we know we must have earnt them. Furthermore, 
we know that they will not be drawn back by their givers 
for their givers, in their giving, give to themselves also. 
By treating ourselves as deserving, i.e. by treating our- 
selves as earning what we get, we place ourselves in the 
productive /... 
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productive process and prevent ourselves being dependent 
upon charity. We do this by becoming producers. By 
being productive we have something to give and because our 
productions are for others as well as self we can relax in 
our work, i.e. we do have nothing to fear from it. Are 
relax when we are acting thoughtfully /socially, when we are 
working, for we produce social situations as being those 
occasions in which intentions are displayed and happenings 
are responded to in a thoughtful way. By being intent upon 
our intentions, rather than by observing what happens to us, 
we pleasantly surprise ourselves with how much we can make 
happen. We remove bad accidents from the realm of possi- 
bility by producing ourselves as the thoughtful producers 
of good and bad. Our version of a bad accident is what 
would happen if we chose not to thoughtfully work at pro- 
ducing what we do. But an 'I' by producing itself as un- 
able or unwilling to respond socially /thoughtfully has 
'reasons' to imagine it is better for it to be unproductive 
for it is aware that its productions are, because of its 
nature, irresponsible and bound to cause things to go wrong. 
We are reminding ourselves that we do not consume in an un- 
productive, lazy manner for we produce that which we work 
with including ourselves, as enhanced by our work, our in- 
teraction. 
The final sentence of this paragraph reminds us 
why worry is corrupt, for it accepts what it has con- 
ceptualized as bribes or stolen goods to meet its needs, 
but /... 
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but it refuses to ask itself whether its needs i.e. the 
'I's needs, ought really to be met. It assumes itself 
is good and subordinates other to serving it, and in this 
way refuses to be reminded that a more attractive version 
of self isn't self as good but self as for good. 
Analysis of Paragraphs 18L 19 and 20 
"But isn't something worrying happening here 
for at first glance worrying and relaxing 
would seem to be very different social forms? 
After raising this question doubts immediately 
arise however, for it is apparent that worry- 
ing and relaxing do share one important 
characteristic, both are conceived of as 
making it difficult to proceed with your work. 
This problem is raised by relaxation in the 
form of the Monday morning feeling. For 
like a surprise relaxation cannot last, and 
it cannot last because it relies upon a 
version of work as something which has to be 
done but which would be better avoided. When 
work is seen as drudgery relaxation becomes 
important, and also, the problem it creates 
(C.F. the Monday morning feeling) becomes 
heightened. (This suggests that as we 
proceed our attention should not merely be 
directed to the worry, in this instance the 
Monday morning feeling, but to that which 
creates it, in this instance the creation 
of drudgery.) However, in ordinary usage 
relaxation has to stop if we are to start 
work. 
Similarly our ordinary usage of worry is as 
of something which has to stop before we can 
start work, e.g. "Stop worrying and get on 
with it." But we can see here how work is 
treated as drudgery, and we will come to see 
how drudgery is a form of relaxation, for it 
is what I am involved in when I worry, if I 
really conceive of myself as not being 
responsible for anything i.e. as not being 
productive;" 
Response /... 
- 108 - 
Response: 
"But isn't something worrying happening here ... 
etc." we are better able to read this for as we have said 
it is happenings that worry, but only when both worry and 
happenings are not well placed, are not thought about. At 
first glance, worry takes the appearances of worrying and 
relaxing as things, and does not mention or think about how 
they are its products, how if they seem the same or dif- 
ferent, this is through what it makes them be. We raise 
doubts about the thoughtfulness, trustworthiness of a speech 
that refuses to think about itself, that assumes that what 
is 'apparent' to it is apparent to others. 
The whole discussion of the relations between work, 
relaxation and worry here is confined to, and by, what worry 
conceives of as conventional usage, i.e. its usage, without 
those confines being brought into question. We would say 
that usage, lazily consumed as it seems it is in those 
paragraphs, has to be stopped before we can relax in our 
work. Imagine a society that creates a version of 
relaxation /enjoyment as that which is limited to when its 
members are too tired to be engaged in drudgery. We are 
reminded by our reading that that kind of society (or better 
anti - society) could not last because we have the ability to 
reflect upon, think about speech, through speech, and to 
move beyond mere imitation of what worry conceives of as 
ordinary usage. If the ordinary usage of worry is as of 
something /... 
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something which has to stop before work can start, we must 
work in an unworried way to move beyond that usage. 
Of course relaxing, if conceived of in an un- 
thoughtful fashion, may stop work but we can get a grip 
on ourselves and act response -ably by producing work as 
that which does not threaten us, our active efforts to do 
this begin to remove drudgery from the realms of human 
possibility. 
Analysis of Paragraphs 21, 22 
"But aren't I at least responsible for 
pointing to the obstructions and hence 
in a sense responsible for their removal, 
i.e. isn't this the sort of work in which 
worry is involved? So whilst not being 
directly involved in the production of 
anything, perhaps I am indirectly involved, 
for by pointing to problems, I allow pro- 
duction to continue to run smoothly. Yet 
this is even worse than being unproductive, 
for now I appear as a member of the Human 
Relations Movement whose only interest is 
in continued production, i.e. it seems that 
I relax when the real questions are asked; 
But this is too malicious, for I know that 
it is I who would begrudge myself even this 
moment of relaxation by worrying about why I 
was no longer worrying i.e. by thinking that 
I was, or had been, acting irresponsibly, 
for as we have seen I tend to see all actions 
as irresponsible especially my own: In this 
way, I transform solutions into problems, and 
smooth running into uneasiness. That is I 
can only work or feel I am working, when I 
am vexed or troubled." 
Response: 
In the transition from paragraphs 20 to 21 the 
corrupt /... 
- 110 - 
corrupt nature of worry, as it is, is revealed yet again, 
for having made itself aware of what it produces (not we) 
as its lack of production, it deeply realizes that by 
telling us, it is endangering itself. That is, if we 
realize it contributes nothing, as it imagines, we may 
decide to stop bothering with or for it, and so instead of 
trying to change and become productive it begins to claim 
that it does contribute and hence does deserve a place as 
it is i.e. that it does not need to change. But how could 
pointing to obstructions remove them? Pointing can itself 
be obstructive if it persuades its subject that it is 
enough, for pointing can lack involvement /commitment. 
We are reminded at this stage that it is by lack- 
ing involvement that worry refuses to come to grips with 
the deeper problem of production which it recognizes but 
refuses to ask. Worry shows its awareness of the fact 
that so much so called production in certain 'societies' is 
destructive of human self by refusing to join in. But its 
subjects should join in the destruction of corrupt systems 
that produce limited selves of that type. Why would any 
thoughtful character relax when the real questions are 
asked? We are able to see that this is in fact the only 
place for real relaxation, for real work, but worry's 
'seems' suggests it hasn't grasped that. 
Once again (and that it is once again, shows us 
how worry holds itself back) we produce worry as hiding 
behind /... 
behind its own screen of feigned irresponsibility for it 
is aware that it is acting irresponsibly and is able to do 
something about that, but by not doing so chooses to act 
irresponsibly. To transform solutions into problems, and 
smooth running into uneasiness could be good, if the solutions 
and smooth running were mere surface and concealed corruption 
and conflict, but worry does not risk saying this. Our work 
takes the trouble to deal with vexation, for vexation is 
the product of malicious speech, and we want none of that, 
not even a little. To speak strongly against corruption 
is not malicious, but not to do so is. 
Analysis of Paragraphs 23, 24 
"So I do think I work after all! Yes, but 
I never manage to produce anything, and hence 
am always dissatisfied. It is because of 
this feeling of lack of productivity that I 
can see myself as being involved in merely a 
difficult form of relaxation: My point here 
is that when I think I am working I am in- 
volved (C.F. paragraph 2) but it is a weak 
involvement, for whilst I do have a version 
of work as investing myself, I restrict this 
idea of investing myself to that of investigating. 
This, like much else, isn't too clear to me, 
but I think I think of the work of worry as 
investigating i.e. as looking into; which 
is in fact only a special case of looking at, 
or on; which is in turn what relaxation does. 
Whilst relaxing is analogous to spectating, 
worrying is analogous to inspecting or in- 
vestigating and this begins to suggest that 
whilst worrying appears to be work because 
it isn't easy, it now seems more like a dif- 
ficult form of relaxing. The point being that 
the difficulty for worry is the energy expended 
in trying to remain separate i.e. in trying not 
to be responsible for anything i.e. in not 
getting involved. 
Response /... 
- 112 - 
Response: 
At last it seems that worry recognizes that it 
does act, but then impulsively it wraps itself up in what 
it mistakenly considers the protective clothing of its 
ordinary usage, for it says it is dissatisfied because it 
never produces any things. However we know that it has 
this backwards, for producing any things is a good reason 
not to be satisfied. We sustain ourselves by producing 
thoughtful social relationships not any things, for it is 
when anythings are produced that their producers have 
"reason" to worry. Worry views itself as involved in 
merely a difficult form of relaxation, but we can relax in 
our work for we know it is worthwhile. Worry's idea of 
investing itself as investigating could have been good yet 
it chooses to treat it as restrictive, constraining, weak, 
by refusing to produce the good of investigating, inquiry, 
thoughtful production. 
Worry continues in the next paragraph to remind 
us that clarity is not something we can wait for, it is 
produced by continuing conversation. We produce our 
thoughtful lives as inquiry, as investigating how we can 
be more thoughtful, more social, and whilst we produce this 
activity as good for us we do not rely upon a conventional 
notion of what is good for us as being leisure i.e. non - 
work. Our work may or may not be easy, but it is not a 
difficult form of relaxing, for we, unlike worry, are 
concerned to integrate, to take on response -ability. 
temptation /... 
Arorry' s 
- 113 - 
temptation to relieve itself of response -ability is analogous 
to pissing into the wind and its consequences are far more 
tragic. 
Analysis of Paragraph 25, 26, 27 
"This idea of separation is a powerful one 
and underlies paragraph 15, which refers to 
my problem with re- reading, for so strongly 
do I want to refuse to accept responsibility 
that I even forget how I write what I write, 
and then treat it as an accident i.e. as 
inauthentic. So now my dissatisfaction with 
my own work comes to be a source of ease not 
of unease. That is, this is the means by 
which I remove myself from this productive 
process. 
Goodness, this is getting complicated for 
earlier, i.e. in a previous draft of this 
speech I wrote that: 
"The worrier is dissatisfied with 
her work because she doesn't see it 
as producing rewards, satisfaction, 
and yet she teaches us by her dis- 
satisfaction with gifts that she 
knows that satisfaction or ease is 
the problem rather than work. The 
danger for the worrier is that she 
can become satisfied with her work 
(i.e. that she can feel delighted 
when she points out problems) when 
becoming satisfied is leaving her- 
self no more work to do. She needs 
to keep in mind that relieving her 
own frustration or hunger, i.e. 
killing those sensations isn't 
enough to produce a good human 
life, and hence isn't enough to 
deal with worry, indeed it may 
not be enough to introduce it." 
Now it seems that dissatisfaction is her (my) 
problem, for it is the source from which I 
relieve my own frustration or hunger. Per- 
haps we get a hint here of the fact that I 
seem to require myself to be involved in a 
specific /... 
- 114 
specific type of social situation. A 
desperate one at that, for on the one side 
I don't think I can produce anything because 
I worry, whilst on the other side I see 
products to be the result of a lack of 
concern. It is this version of myself as 
unproductive which leaves me dependent upon 
the philanthropist for my sustenance, and 
given the chance nature of philanthropy, 
which I have already referred to, it is no 
wonder that I worry: Indeed to construe 
a situation as desperate is to construe it 
as having to stop if danger is to be removed, 
for it holds no hope. Desperation then, 
like relaxation and worry relies upon an idea 
of having to stop i.e. they all treat possi- 
bility as lying outside of them i.e. beyond 
their grasp. So as a worrier, the only 
solution I can see to my own situation lies 
outside it i.e. my only future is seen to lie 
in my changing from something I am to something 
I am not. (There is no sense of movement it 
is simply one thing or the other;)" 
Response: 
The issue of re- reading that is raised by worry 
here reminds us that re- reading is work, but that only by 
it can we remind ourselves of how we write i.e. of what 
forms of speech acted as grounds for our writing. We 
produce re- reading as continuing to thoughtfully search for 
greater authenticity, and we are making the effort to display 
how our speech was and is becoming more thoughtful through 
our work with it. 
But worry provides us with a useful corrective 
here, for if we related to our previous speeches as it does 
to its earlier draft, we would come to produce our work as 
accidental. By including a paragraph from an earlier draft 
worry /... 
- 115 - 
worry shows that it can change its mind, that it is com- 
plicated, but it does not do the hard work of displaying 
how what was previously written could have been written. 
By not taking on response- ability for what it said or says 
it shows us worry's lack of discipline, lack of direction, 
it is as if worry mistakes being complicated, clever and 
intricate for being good, when we know that cleverness all 
too often can merely be a sign of protectiveness. Whilst 
we take heed of worry's advice and remember that our work 
does sustain us, but not satisfy us, worry produces no 
middle way, and then goes on to produce dissatisfaction as 
a way of gaining relief i.e. satisfaction. No doubt it 
may be being factually correct about what it does, but we 
want to sustain our thoughtful conversation and we will not 
sustain it by deformulating it as either satisfying or dis- 
satisfying, unless we produce versions of either that provide 
reasons for continuing and not finishing or leaving the 
conversation. Worry's speech reminds us that all social 
situations are desperate, that we are always in an inter- 
mediate position, but we produce this as bounded on the one 
side by the thoughtless, lazy production of any things and 
being opened up on the other by our efforts to seek to 
achieve, to seek to produce thoughtful social actions. 
However, worry then refers back to its version 
of the relationship between the philanthropist and the 
poor as if this was a secure datum, and then moves from it 
to explain why this relationship makes it desperate. But 
yet /... 
- 116 - 
yet again, it uses its 'formulations' to restrict its sub- 
jects efforts. Instead of producing a desperate situation 
as one in which action is called for it produces a desperate 
situation as hopeless, it places possibility out of reach. 
It makes possibility impossible in order to save itself 
effort when it has no reason to do so, when it has every 
reason not to do so. Worry sees solutions as lying outside 
problems, it refuses to produce problems as containing but 
also as possibly exposing solutions (solutions as improvements 
not conclusions). It has no notion of movement as it in- 
deed recognizes, but we know this is a product of its un- 
dialectical mode of speech i.e. one thing or the other, and 
we also know, as we are displaying through our work, that 
what worry recognizes as itself is not the speaker's self 
at all. By refusing to orient to ourselves as 'I's we are 
able to move and improve and in this way to show that 
improvement is possible for us. We want to help ourselves 
and that speaker to move from something we are not i.e. 
worry towards what we produce ourselves as becoming. 
Analysis of Paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31 
"One way in which I tend to produce the 
situation as desperate is by treating 
raising problems as raising the stakes, 
and it is worth remembering that raising 
problems is about all the worrier can do 
with her 'yes but'. In this way I reduce 
the situation to one of desperation i.e. 
of decision in its worst sense, and if we 
can think about a decision in these cir- 
cumstances we can understand why earlier 
I thought of decisions as arbitrary, i.e. 
you jump or you don't jump: But once I 
treat /... 
- 117 - 
treat the situation in this way the most 
I can do is save my own skin even if I 
have raised the stakes in the process, 
and as a consequence all of my actions 
do take on the character of self defence, 
i.e. I do only react and then think as a 
result I need not feel responsible. I 
forget very easily that I am responsible 
for what I don't do, i.e. that not respond- 
ing is my response. 
It is in this way that I, as worrier, use 
a sense of desperation as a way of reducing 
my responsibility, for I come to consider 
survival as the goal, and then if I do 
survive I treat my survival as what I have 
profited from the situation. I am pleased 
to have got through but still treat this out- 
come as fortuitous, i.e. not as anything I 
have produced. 
This can perhaps help explain why as a 
worrier, I find writing so difficult, it is 
because I think I am totally dependent upon 
my reader's reaction, and I tend to see this 
reaction as a product of arbitrary consider- 
ations e.g. his work load etc. I tend to 
see my reader's reactions as a product of 
arbitrary considerations but not of my speech, 
(C.F. the idea of treating other as inauthentic 
paragraph 16). The worrier in me seems to 
have a one track mind though, for she could 
have used the same view of the situation to 
produce writing as easy for me, for if it 
doesn't matter what I say I could surely say 
anything; But of course even that isn't an 
easy situation for the worrier as it involves 
choosing. 
This note raises the problems of distancing 
again, for whilst I do tend to react in this 
way I also feel that I could not say I did 
unless I treat it as a tendency, i.e. as some- 
thing I slip into rather than am. The point 
is though that I do react this way, although 
when I think, I think I ought not to:" 
Response: 
Unlike /... 
- 118 - 
Unlike worry the one way we choose to produce 
situations as desperate is by raising the issue for our- 
selves of whether we are responding in a thoughtful, moral, 
social manner. We know that not raising questions, not 
responding to the speech of others and ourselves about which 
we have doubts with the question 'Yes, but what is the good 
of that ?' is to fail to produce the situations social possi- 
bility for thoughtful conversation. It is to arbitrarily 
oppress ourselves and others. 
By asking profound and searching questions of our 
selves we make the situation desperate in the best sense of 
making the choice between thinking /conversing about what it 
is good to do, and not thinking possible for ourselves. By 
producing social occasions in this way we refuse to become 
engaged in the irrational convolutions of worry, as con- 
ventionally understood by those who worry, who on the one 
hand want not to be response -able for any thing, but who also 
want, at the same time to save their skins. If they really 
believed they were unproductive, if they were totally con- 
vinced by worry's arguments, they would have to admit that 
saving their skins was not worth their effort. 
The speech of worry reminds us that we choose to 
act response -ably by reminding ourselves that self defence 
might not always be a good response. Indeed worry's com- 
mitment to protecting itself, as it is, prevents those it 
subjects from developing. It prevents them from remembering 
that /... 
- 119 - 
that we are all always response -able for our actions and 
our inactions; that self defence is not necessarily 
thoughtful. Indeed frequently as we are discovering it is 
worry's commitment to ill considered self defence which 
constrains its subjects to produce other as attacking or 
accusing rather than perhaps as encouraging or befriending. 
Worry is committed to the survival of an 'I' that 
has not yet even considered what it is, what it can be for, 
and it shows this by even reducing its success at surviving 
to being a product of chance. Which, though perhaps 
factually correct given worry's reduction of thought to 
impulse, reveals its irrational commitment to an irrational 
notion of self. But self can be, and is, produced as other 
than impulsive by thoughtful interlocutors, by social actors. 
Having reduced its survival to a matter of chance 
worry proceeds to offer an example to strengthen its case, 
but by so doing merely reveals the weakness of a commitment 
to a notion of example as correct representation, rather than 
as something to seek to achieve. Worry refuses to acknow- 
ledge that the original argument, irrational though it was, 
was at least its own production, and that by using the 
example worry simply forces the irrationality it introduced 
further into its actions. For why does worry begin by 
assuming that it is totally dependent upon its reader? 
Why does it produce its reader as merely reacting to arbitrary 
considerations? We can remember that this is a result of 
worry's /... 
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worry's unthoughtful commitment to the removal of itself, 
which, tragically, its subjects come to believe is the 
same as stopping thinking. Whereas, as we have it, stop- 
ping worrying, as it is, is necessary for us to continue 
thinking, indeed it is continuing to think. 
Now our decision to allow worry to speak at 
length can better be understood, for by allowing it to 
speak, and then showing our efforts to take it on i.e. to 
continue thinking about it, struggling with it, we make the 
situation desperate for those who might otherwise be sub- 
jugated by an activity they had chosen not to think about. 
And you are no doubt aware by now who they are - i.e. that 
they are us: who else? If it was not us, how could we 
have commented upon the speaker's skills at conveying worry 
as it is? 
But we will not back off now, for though the 
speech of worry starts to plead for sympathy again in para- 
graph 31 we know that we must extend ourselves, that unlike 
worry, we cannot opt to react in an unthoughtful way for 
that would be to contradict our version of ourselves as 
thinkers, as social, and worry can provide us with no 
reasons to do that. In factworry is not an option that 
is open to us, we cannot choose to worry without denying our 
characters, as those that are free to choose how they 
respond. 
Analysis of Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35 
- 121 - 
"We have seen here how I tend to produce 
the situation as desperate and to move 
from this to a concern for safety i.e. a 
concern to avoid accidents (memories of 
relaxation again). But we can also see 
that the only sure way of avoiding the 
risk that attends writing for example, is 
to not write; but, as you can see I do 
write. However, as a worrier, I even 
construe my writing as being a way to 
avoid the risk attached to not writing, 
and its possible painful consequences, 
and by doing this I again feel myself 
relieved of some of the responsibility 
for what I write. By producing a version 
of my own work as analogous to a forced 
confession I can begin to see how I would 
feel that I do not deserve any approval or 
reward for this product. (For me a product 
is transformed into a prod -uct,) Yet as 
we've also seen it is precisely as a result 
of my view of myself as unproductive that 
I need even more the approval or reward 
which does sustain me, for as I am unable 
to give it to myself (or produce it myself) 
I become totally dependent upon other. 
Whilst on the one hand then I have been trying 
to show how an orientation towards gifts of 
mere acceptance must lead to dissatisfaction 
I, at the same time, show that it is I, because 
of my view of myself as unproductive, who needs 
to accept them to stay alive. 
By now the fact that I saw the attractive as 
something to take, rather than as something 
to give to, begins to sound more plausible, 
but its increased plausibility is apparently 
being gained at my increased cost. 
By writing then, I see myself as escaping the 
dangers of not writing (N.B. perhaps this helps 
account for the rush mentioned in paragraph 4), 
but am immediately plunged into another worri- 
some situation for now I must look on whilst 
you read what I write. Thus I have changed 
nothing, my work is still the same in the way 
that drudgery is the same. All I can do, as 
a worrier, is worry whilst I wait. If we 
think of stopping temporarily just beyond the 
danger mark we can feel how precarious the 
worrier's /... 
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worrier's life is, but, obviously if we just 
look on, i.e. if we just observe him, we will 
be in an equally dangerous situation, and can 
feel how we are no safer than he is. One 
way of proceeding here will be to ask myself 
why I am tempted to stop here, why I don't 
want to go any further, why I limit myself 
to reacting to dangers and in a way produce 
them by failing to address how they are pro- 
duced. This will be to ask why I have a 
problem giving as well as taking /accepting, 
i.e. it will be to begin the scrutiny of the 
philanthropist which earlier I intimated would 
follow. This scrutiny must however take a 
more active form i.e. it must be more than 
simply looking on yet again; it must involve 
a response, or be a response to the social 
situation which treats it as what it is, i.e. 
as a situation within which the worrier places 
himself and the philanthropist, and this res- 
ponse must by its very nature begin to change 
the relationship. 
Response: 
Having unthoughtfully produced a desperate situation 
as one in which self orients to self defence, worry turns 
yet again to the issue of writing and instead of producing 
a version of its subject's decision to write about worry as 
a thoughtful and courageous effort to do something about it, 
it construes its subject's writing as merely a means of 
avoiding the painful consequences which it assumes are 
associated with not writing. Worry reduces courage to 
cowardice, and by doing so tries to persuade those it sub- 
jects not to courageously work to change it. We do not 
relieve ourselves of response- ability for our own speech 
by pretending it is forced for we know it is not. We know 
that worry is afraid to speak /write because it fears that 
its /... 
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its mistakes will be revealed: this is what it chooses to 
consider as painful consequences. But we know that a 
thoughtful interlocutor, i.e. a social actor, is one who is 
committed in such a way that he can improve, and will be 
grateful to those who risk collaborating with him by think- 
ing about his speech. 
Worry's notion of forced confession is weak for 
confession has no notion of process, change as movement, 
but restricts change or non change to salvation or damnation, 
one thing or the other. Our work isn't forced confession 
it is movement, it is the thoughtful production of ourselves 
as never needing to be forced to do what we decide is good 
to do. 
Worry's deformed notion of product as prod -uct 
shows worry, as it understands itself, as thoroughly 
irresponsible for it jokes about its baseness as if it 
could hide its baseness from us behind a joke. Ironically 
by pretending that the joke is a fact, worry produces itself 
as a finished product that can never do anything freely for 
itself or other. Having shown us how its notion of itself 
as unproductive is contingent upon its version of desperation 
it moves on to forgetfully treat its need of approval or 
reward as simply there. It refuses to say that not only 
has it produced its inability to meet its needs, but that 
ït also produced those needs, for approval and reward aren't 
necessarily good. 
We/... 
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We are reminded that earlier when we produced the 
movement we seek as being from wants to thoughtful wants, 
we did not stress that even the initial wants are products 
of thought, society, but less thought; and that it is by 
their being such that we can change them. We are not 
trying to overcome or constrain "natural" impulses but to 
show that our impulses can never be natural: that we are 
speakers /thinkers and produce our own natures, and that this 
is good, whereas nature as impulse is neither good nor bad. 
Worry's speech about dependence could sound like 
repetition but we are reminded by it that worry is, in its 
work, seeking to deceive other, for it seeks the approval 
it imagines it needs for work which it itself considers 
valueless /virtueless. To receive reward /approval it must 
sell the product it itself produces as a non product to 
other. By producing the relationship between self and 
other in this way it displays to us that by producing other 
as that which it is dependent upon it does not raise other 
i.e. respect other, but reduces other to the status of a 
commodity necessary for its survival: other becomes that 
which needs to be consumed. 
Having made itself more aware of the contradictory 
nature of its production of its relationship to other, worry 
proceeds by reifying the argument, for 'sounds like' for 
worry means 'comes from outside', must be listened to, in 
a submissive way. So, if worry sticks with appearances 
it /... 
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it treats the argument as making gains at its subject's 
expense, when it could have displayed how, by producing 
the argument, its subject is gaining, improving. 
In paragraph 35 worry speaks of being 'immediately 
plunged ...' not of immediately plunging, and we can almost 
see the hand of force pushing its subject under, and yet 
we know it is her own hand. She forces herself down and 
appeals to us for sympathy but why should we approve of 
her act? Worry has to look on whilst we read because it 
never considered us in its writings, it imagines that it 
has offered us nothing and waits to see if we notice that. 
By admitting it has changed nothing it tells us its speech 
isn't worth hearing, that it is drudgery for us, if we leave 
it as it would have itself left. 
But we do not read what it writes, we write what 
we read: how we read displays ourselves as other than mere 
consumers and whilst worry for a moment raised our hopes at 
the beginning of this paragraph, for it suggests that it will 
do something other than observe worry, and whilst we also 
recognize how quickly it dashed its own hopes, by our 
productive reading we know we don't have to rely upon what 
we are presented with. Worry dashed its own hopes by 
speaking not about possibility i.e. how it could change for 
the better, but by sticking with what it perceives to be 
the case. Instead of asking how it could improve it asks 
why it stops where it does. It speaks of how it produces 
the /... 
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the dangers by refusing to address how they are produced, 
but it is only words, it does nothing, and this is because 
it imagines it is what it appears to itself to be, when we 
know that what self can be is not what it is, but what it 
thinks it could be. 
But, in this paragraph worry chose to continue 
speaking, i.e. it chose to do more, or less, than simply 
wait; whilst it waits, it does worry, for it starts to 
offer the reader advice which it does not itself take. It 
argues that for the reader looking on, observing, isn't good 
enough, and it is right, but having said this it turns its 
back once more and chooses to speak about how it is as worry, 
when it could, and should, have stopped. It is as if it 
thinks we will lose interest in it if it stops: when we 
know the reverse is the case, or rather we know it can only 
be interested in itself when it stops. 
Worry's discussion of the facts of why it doesn't 
go any further is limited to questions which it raises and 
then chooses not to make the effort of answering, thinking 
about. It recognizes what it does but stops there, it 
shows us the weakness of reflection as imitation. 
Worry claims that its scrutiny of the philan- 
thropist, i.e. its scrutiny of itself, must take a more 
active form, but by saying it 'must' it reveals to us that 
it does not take this form. By saying 'more active form' 
worry suggests that looking on is action though not very 
active /... 
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active. In this context we choose to produce looking on 
as inaction of the worst kind, and we further propose that 
through its manner of setting up the parameters of that 
which it chooses to scrutinize worry prevents itself from 
changing. Worry speaks of "the situation within which" 
when we know that we can only produce better relationships 
by understanding our active role in the production of the 
situation. Our inquiries produce our responses as our 
ways of situating ourselves. 
Analysis of Paragraph 36 
"One way of accounting for my failure to move 
any further than just beyond the danger mark 
is by seeing that, as yet, it has only been 
danger and fear that has moved me, i.e. once 
this is removed I stop moving. This fact 
can help us to understand the philanthropist 
as soon as we see that he is worried too: 
He only gives enough to alleviate his fears, 
whether these fears be of his own sense of 
guilt or perhaps more forcibly of the out- 
come of the discontent of the poor. More 
dramatically I can deepen my understanding 
here by realizing that it isn't only that 
I don't want to go any further, but that I 
don't want, i.e. I am moved by fears, and 
not by desires." 
Response: 
We would not account for failure by merely recount- 
ing it, for that is to fail again, we settle our account 
for past failures by not doing them again, by accounting 
for them in such a way that we change. By displaying how 
dangers and fears no longer move us we start moving in a 
thoughtful /... 
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thoughtful manner and re -move dangers and fears to their 
rightful place as matters for us to respond to in a thought- 
ful manner, for why should we be ruled by fears we haven't 
even thought about? 
Worry goes on to produce the philanthropist as 
an icon of itself, i.e. as worried, and by doing so reduces 
his actions to products of fear. Again factually in some 
instances worry may be correct but why reduce philanthropy 
in this way? Perhaps it could be preserved and improved, 
i.e. made more thoughtful rather than abandoned in favour 
of doing nothing which is what worry, as it conceives of 
itself, does. However philanthropy is really neither here 
nor there in this discussion as worry is speaking about 
itself. It proceeds to claim that it deepens its under- 
standing of itself by realizing (in the weak sense of seeing) 
that it is moved by fears not desires. But we are showing 
how real deepening of understanding can only be achieved 
through desire, that worry stays in the shallows here, as 
elsewhere, because it fears the deep, i.e. what it doesn't 
know. When, precisely because it doesn't know the deep, 
it has no reason to fear it. It reifies understanding by 
treating it as drama, as happening out there and by doing 
so suppresses its desire to join in. 
Analysis of Paragraph 37 
"Perhaps we begin to see now why I didn't and 
don't willingly accept gifts, or better why 
the only gifts I think I can accept are 
generous /... 
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generous ones, i.e. ones given out of 
charity; It is because I don't know 
what I want, I only think I know what I 
don't want. This may become clearer as 
we remember the earlier remarks about 
giving being dependent upon taking, for 
from these we can see that the philan- 
thropist was only a euphemism for the 
benevolent despot, and he in turn for the 
master in the master /slave relationship 
and it is from this relationship that we 
must move if we are to proceed." 
Response: 
Having become aware in our response to the previous 
paragraph of worry's choice to remain in the shallows - to 
remain shallow, we can say that by continually harping back 
to what it can see, to appearances, to what it imagines it 
knows, worry continually returns to what it does and reveals 
that in the shallows there is no direction only avoidance, 
i.e. only the effort to avoid the deep. Worry does not 
know what it wants but imagines it knows what it doesn't 
want, and instead of seeing its not knowing as a reason for 
inquiring about what it wants, it chooses to view not 
knowing as something to hide from. 
"This may become clearer" = the worrier dragging 
deep, profound issues into the shallows and treating them 
in a shallow manner rather than risking going into the deep 
and by so doing deepening and strengthening itself. Worry 
can speak about the master /slave relationship in this cool 
dispassionate fashion because it is not aware of the depths 
of speech. 
Analysis /... 
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Analysis of Paragraph 38 
"How have I reacted then to being called, and 
in a sense being a slave? For a slave is 
surely one who is dominated by fear to such 
an extent that he forgets he had desires. 
My reaction has indeed been a slavish one, 
for after in some sense feeling some surprise 
that I of all people should be seen as a slave, 
I react by mumbling to myself that at least I 
am free to think as I please, and that this is 
better than acting unintentionally, which is 
what my accuser or master must be doing. For, 
by his action of accusation he shows me that 
he isn't thinking, i.e. that he is unintentional. 
I humour him then, but don't help him. My 
reaction is the same i.e. again it is a "Yes, but "." 
Response: 
Having helped to bring a deep issue to the surface 
worry then reduces it to a matter of its personal self 
defence. It raises questions and then produces the questions' 
call as accusation rather than as encouragement to improve. 
The version of the slave worry produces is a slur upon those 
who are enslaved, for it produces them as forgetful, when 
we know the slave is far better produced as the one who 
remembers his desires and will work to overthrow that which 
he is enslaved by. The thoughtful slave is educated by 
speech that refuses to be silenced by domination, he does 
not forgetfully turn away from it and try to defend himself 
as he is (appears), he does not choose to remain the same. 
The thoughtful slave would not respond to encouragement in 
a slavish manner, though he might well be surprised to 
receive it. 
Whilst /... 
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Whilst worry mumbles about its freedom to think 
as it pleases, we are showing in this work how unfree, 
unthoughtful speech can invade our thinking. How producing 
speech as constrained when compared with thought is an un- 
thoughtful production for it refuses to be reminded that 
our speech can rule our thought, and does so as soon as we 
choose not to speak any more about how we think. Worry's 
reaction to what it produces as an accusation is a 'Yes but', 
that relies upon a version of freedom as arbitrary, as 
doing anything, as thinking wildly, randomly. Whereas we 
produce our freedom as our ability to think about what we 
do, what pleases us, and to improve ourselves by doing so, 
to become more social by doing so. 
Worry is too ready to produce other as accusing, 
because by always refusing to engage in conversations with 
others worry silently accuses others of not being worth 
talking to, and then views others actions as products of 
the same refusal. 
Analysis of Paragraph 39 
"If we think of what has been said so far 
we will remember that a constant theme has 
been my failure to accept responsibilities, 
frequently by simply accepting that I am not 
a responsible type, i.e. that I do not have the 
ability to respond. So successfully do I do 
this, that I produce a version of myself as 
not being the kind of person to make decisions. 
(Worse than the deferential voter I become the 
deferential non -voter,) In effect I persuade 
myself that I am suited to be a slave. I allow 
myself to be mastered by the idea that I would 
find /... 
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find the freedom involved in making decisions 
oppressive. I said above that I, as worrier, 
am moved by fears and not by desires, and now 
we can remember that whereas fear is a reaction, 
i.e. it is impulsive, desires are responses, 
i.e. they do involve self in a way that impulses 
do not." 
Response: 
"If we think of what has been said so far ..." 
here we produce worry as subordinating itself to prior 
speech, i.e. speech first then thoughts about it, we choose 
to think through and assist what was said before rather than 
perceive of ourselves simply as receiving its assistance. 
Worry produces reminding as saying what we were, not what 
we can possibly be. And once again worry's joke is tragic 
for worry is happy to say how bad it is and not to do any- 
thing about it. Imagine persuading ourselves to be slaves: 
Imagine producing a version of freedom as a problem, free- 
dom as that which oppresses when we know that oppression is 
lack of freedom, lack of thought, lack of conversation. 
Worry goes on to justify itself by arguing that 
fears, i.e. that which move it, are impulsive, but we know 
that this means it thinks they aren't free, i.e. that when 
it reacts fearfully it isn't responsible. And yet we know 
that fears are as much our response -ability as are desires, 
or lack of desires. Fears are no more impulsive, and 
that is why we need not, and ought not, to enslave our- 
selves to and by them. 
we/... 
We must have thoughtful fears as 
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we must have thoughtful desires, if we are to be achieving 
a society. 
Worry produces desires as involving self but it- 
self as not having desires and this reveals to us the 
weakness of its notion of the self it seeks irrationally to 
protect. By revealing worry's weak version of self we 
display our commitment not to settle for weak versions of 
ourselves. 
Analysis of Paragraph 40 
"What work does a slave do then? I pursue 
my master's business which, because (a) it is 
a result of the master's nature i.e. thought- 
lessness, and (b) because it is not my own 
business (concern), becomes drudgery; and 
the thing about drudgery is that it does, or 
can, provide a strong sense of knowing where 
you are, in the sense of knowing you aren't 
there. (With this writing, however, my 
struggle is that I'm unsure where I am in it, 
and consequently it is anything but drudgery 
though this has not prevented it hurting.) 
My point here is that when I am involved in 
drudgery I find a home in my thoughts, worries 
and see these as separating me from, and 
raising me above, the unworried i.e. he who 
I think of as my master. (This is how I 
conceived of myself as being master of the 
situation paragraph 10.)" 
Response: 
After wandering thoughtlessly into the slavery 
topic worry chooses to concentrate on what the slave does, 
on convention, on the master's usage of the slave, when it 
could and should have directed its efforts to what is to be 
done /... 
done. 
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By doing so worry produces the slave as pursuing 
his master's business and not as rebelling. So we rebel 
against worry's usage, for what kind of home would we have 
in our own thoughts? Whilst for worry home is randomness, 
survival, no need to be afraid, no need or reliance upon 
other; we know that we could not be at home there. We 
know that to have no need of other, and to be of no use to 
other, is to have lost a sense of our dialectical selves, 
it would be to reveal a wish for separation and comparison 
with other rather than a desire for the form of collaboration 
with other which raises both by deepening the relationship, 
by producing a less shallow society: a less shallow Socio- 
logy. The restriction to undialectical oppositions slave/ 
master, slave becoming master and enslaving past master etc. 
reduces thought either to the drudgery of being a master 
with nothing to think about, or to being a slave and being 
unable to do anything. 
When worry points out for the reader that its 
writing is hurting it, we know it asks for sympathy yet 
again, that it is trying to protect itself by pointing to 
its wounds. But we know they are only superficial wounds 
and that if worry was truly involved in work that was not 
drudgery it would not be hurt at all, for thoughtful work 
whether difficult or easy is good for other and self. 
Worry informs other that its work hurts itself but shows in 
this remark its total lack of interest in other, for if it 
had /... 
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had been interested in other it would have been concerned 
not about its own aches and pains but about what its writing 
was inflicting upon other i.e. upon all of us, and by con- 
cerning itself with this it would have come to understand 
why it could not expect sympathy. 
Analysis of Paragraph 41 
"I become the proud silent type then, but 
need to wake up to the fact that this reaction 
gives the master just what he wants as a 
master i.e. compliance, subservience, but 
certainly not what he needs. This silence 
in turn allows the master to remain silent 
about the fact that decisions don't come 
easily to him either, that mastery and ease 
need not and do not go hand in hand. (I 
think that because I find work difficult I 
haven't mastered it, but the only sort of 
easy work there is is drudgery!) Why do I 
refuse to admit that the master might not be 
relaxing? Why, because I, as slave, rely 
upon my idea of my private life, my thoughts, 
my worries, as being free in order to generate 
a version of mastery as freedom. I think 
that thinking is easy, and this is why I want 
to think that I want what I think I want, 
this is why I cannot answer if I am asked to 
discipline myself by deciding what I want. 
I transform this into a question that asks 
me whether I know what I want." 
Response: 
Whilst worry produces a version of itself as the 
proud silent type that needs to wake up etc., by so doing 
it reveals to us how it continues to sleep, for we produce 
it as being submissive, self satisfied, anti social sub- 
ordination to appearances, to what it perceives the situ- 
ation to be. Whilst worry imagines that it recognizes what 
it /... 
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it needs it doesn't even work to achieve it. It is not 
that the master remains silent about the fact that decisions 
don't come easily to him, it is that worry cannot hear 
other's speech because it is so proud of itself. It 
doesn't know that it needs to listen, that it isn't com- 
plete. Worry notices that mastery and ease do not go hand 
in hand but shows its lack of depth by wondering whether 
the master might not be relaxing; when it should have 
worked to produce a version of thoughtful, social man as a 
character who relaxes in difficulty, who makes himself at 
home in intermediacy, through deciding and doing what he 
thinks is for the good. 
Worry imagines in its lazy way that thinking is 
easy, impulsive rather than something that takes effort. 
We produce thought as argument, development, progress through 
effort, which may or may not be easy but which is necessary 
for us. Worry remains undisciplined by clinging to its 
version of thinking as impulsive and does not realize how 
we, by producing thought as a process, discipline ourselves 
in the strong, good sense of freeing ourselves from randomness, 
from unthoughtful impulse. 
Analysis of Para eraph 42. 43 
"When I worry then I treat my thinking as a 
form of relaxation for I do not commit myself 
to any course of action, I treat my thinking 
as free for it seems to be the only thing that 
cannot be taken from me, i.e. my thoughts are 
free of others demands. As a worrier I think 
of my thinking as just looking on and as not 
participating /... 
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participating, and I go on to transpose 
this idea of freedom onto the master, for 
I see the master as making demands but as 
having none made on him. 
So now we can see how I, as a slave, treat 
my own thoughts or worries as all I own and 
as the symbol of my freedom, but I need to 
keep constantly in mind how this is just a 
reaction for it fails to address the question 
of the social and in this case unnatural nature 
of this set of social relationships. For, far 
from symbolizing my freedom, my worries merely 
point to may oppressor: they need to show me 
that it is my, i.e. the slave's version of my 
freedom as my worries which contributes to, and 
sustains the presence of my oppression." 
Response: 
How possessive worry is here, i.e. it wants its 
thoughts to be left free of others' questions, for it sees 
others' questions as demands, but we know that this is the 
way that worry subjugates its subjects, for by being per- 
suaded to treat their thoughts as valuable personal pos- 
sessions they become cagey about what they think, but do 
not notice how it is they that are encaged by worry. 
Wanting to be free of others' questions is wanting to remain 
impulsive, encaged, static etc, it is deciding not to grow 
any more. By reducing its subjects to looking on, worry 
reduces thinkers /speakers /producers to receivers who imagine 
they have nothing to contribute. But by responding 
thoughtfully to others' questions we can work at freeing 
our thoughts from unthoughtful, merely conventional formu- 
lations. 
However /... 
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However, worry assumes that other, like itself, 
only asks shallow questions i.e. questions which it knows 
the answer to. But we know that a thoughtful other is 
one that is prepared to ask himself and /or other stretching 
questions, but they are not demands, for they are not backed 
by force. By conceiving of them as demands worry deforms 
them in such a way that it can no longer understand their 
liberating potential. 
Worry conceives of not committing itself to any 
course of action as relaxing, for it imagines that in this 
way it will avoid questions. Worry has been passive until 
this last ditch stand because it isn't sure whether it wants 
any of the things its subject previously had, for it can see 
disadvantages to all of them including for example its 
subject's freedom. But worry's efforts to avoid questions 
go further, for by reducing its own thoughts to impulse it 
can hurriedly try to forget any seemingly awkward questions 
that occur to it rather than to inquire into them. But 
we do not want to protect thoughts from others' questions 
in this manner for we want to become more thoughtful. 
Worry continues by saying how it treats its worries 
as all it owns, and then correlates what it owns with 
symbols of freedom, by so doing, it reveals its possessiveness, 
but we would rather treat the disowning of possessions as a 
symbol of freedom for it is thoughtless possessions whether 
of, or by, objects or ideas, that create unnecessary 
limitations upon social progress by turning some away from 
what we have in common, what we share. 
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However, even although worry's speech seems to be 
beginning to recognize this, its subject still persists in 
not grasping that an active role must be taken, for she 
calls upon her worries to show her that it is worry's 
version of self etc. i.e. she even leaves it to her worries 
to do the work of showing. Our skillful speaker reveals 
very cunningly how those who worry would have a long while 
to wait for their worries could never do their own work for 
them. 
Analysis of Paragraph 44, 45, 46 
"But again I must slow down for whilst I may 
be making some progress here I would certainly 
not have made enough if I thought that this 
supposedly new knowledge would be enough, or 
ought to make me a master. But even whilst 
I write I know that my excitement must show, 
and that the danger that this could occur is 
ever present. So now I need to clear the 
air for myself and perhaps one way of doing 
this will be to return to the question of 
substitutions mentioned in paragraph 7, i.e. 
firstly the philanthropist by the teacher and 
the poor by the student, and latterly the 
philanthropist by the student and the poor by 
the teacher. What can this mean? 
The first substitution need not delay us very 
long for we should see by now that the sort of 
gifts offered by the philanthropist do little 
if anything to teach the poor, in fact they 
hinder the learning of the poor, and leave 
the philanthropist in a blissful state of 
ignorance to boot. I am not commending that 
the philanthropist give less here, far from 
it, I am demanding that the worrier, in this 
instance the philanthropist, begins to give 
i.e. that the philanthropist gives much more. 
On to the second, what have the poor to teach 
the philanthropist? They need to teach him 
that /... 
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that his gift, though it may appear generous, 
is only a bribe, and that whilst both he and 
they refuse to speak to each other it will 
remain so. It is the refusal of both the 
philanthropist and the poor to address the 
social nature of their relationship which 
makes room for bribery and hence corruption." 
Response: 
Now worry wants to slow down, but not because it 
might be endangering other, there is no thought of other 
here, only of itself, and what of the 'reason' it offers 
for slowing down. We can read between the lines and notice 
that it was excited because it did think that this new know- 
ledge would be enough, and ought to make it master, but it 
didn't want to say that for it feared that other might reveal 
that it was mistaken. By orienting to its fears in this 
way it shows us how knowledge, as something received, can 
never remove worry. Worry slows down here by treating its 
argument as knowledge that makes its subject aware. Again 
it separates its subjects from their productions by externaliz- 
ing those productions and starting to worry about them; 
rather than making the effort to display the good of those 
productions. 
Clearing the air for itself is making it safe to 
stay where it is rather than moving, rather than doing some- 
thing. Imagine restricting ourselves to clearing the air 
for each of ourselves in a gas chamber when we could be 
helping each other out through the door we are opening. 
Whilst /... 
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Whilst worry wants to correct previous work 
rather than to show how it is through what the previous 
work opens up that we can move on, our desire is not to 
correct and complete, but to open up and to thoughtfully 
stretch ourselves and others, and by so doing to seek to 
achieve more profound relationships. We are prepared to 
risk making mistakes rather than making the bigger mistake 
of waiting until we are sure we are not mistaken before we 
contribute anything. 
What of these substitutions? Philanthropy as 
teaching :we know already that good work teaches /reminds 
self as well as other, and that the reduction of teaching 
to giving gifts shows us the weakness of worry's commendation. 
But, we are reminded here that in fact worry does foolishly 
conceive of ignorance as a 'blissful state' i.e. it con- 
ceived of others, i.e. the unworried as ignorant and envies 
them, seeks to be like them, hence its movement towards 
mindless activities e.g. drunkenness etc. But we are dis- 
playing how by becoming conscious of our ignorance we pro- 
vide ourselves with reasons to continue inquiring /thinking 
and not to stay as we seem to be. To seek mindless 
activities is to reveal conceit of knowledge about what is 
good rather than to think about the good of thoughtful social 
actions. 
When we turn to the second substitution we continue 
to hear something in what worry says, but what we hear is 
the /... 
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the poverty of worry's version of philanthropy as bribes, 
for worry needs not only to speak to other, but to listen 
in a productive way to its own speech. 
Addressing the social nature of their relationship 
must be formulated not as looking from the outside but as 
getting inside and subverting what is going on. It is not 
a question of making room for ourselves beside corruption, 
i.e. of accommodating corruption, but, of making our society, 
our speech what we can live in and through. We have to get 
inside corrupt social practices in order to reconstruct them. 
We cannot settle for observation from the outside for we 
know we are already in, we cannot do the impossible. But, 
by not settling for observation we are beginning to construct 
more thoughtful practices. 
Analysis of Paragraph 47 
"But now I must remember that it isn't simply 
a question of slowing down for I am not involved 
in a public debate i.e, my clarity of diction is 
not the issue. What I must remember is that I 
am these characters, I am involved in bribery and 
corruption for I, as worrier, help to produce it. 
By thinking of my thoughts as free and my actions/ 
speech as unfree I make reference to the fact that 
I think I need to be induced to speak, and it is 
in this way that I come to produce everything I 
react to as an inducement, as an attempt to 
silence my thought. Every call to action be- 
comes a threat or a bribe, and as a result when I 
do act, or write, I begin by seeing my action or 
writing as at best irresponsible and at worst as 
the corrupt silence of the receiver of a bribe. 
I see then that worry begins and sticks with a 
conception of social relationships as corrupt, 
i.e. that worry produces corruption. (In fact 
worry is always a producer of bribes for they 
are seen to remove a danger, or risk, at least 
temporarily;)" 
- 143 - 
Response: 
Worry says clarity of diction is not the issue, 
when in fact, because of its refusal to take hold of its 
possibilities it can do no more than make clarity of diction 
the issue, for it acts as if it has no idea what the issue 
is. We are reminded by its speech that what we must rem- 
ember is that we are not corrupt, and that by involving 
ourselves, committing ourselves to producing more thoughtful 
conventions rather than silently accepting conventions, usage, 
we become less complicated. By speaking /writing and question- 
ing when we have doubts we free our speech and discipline 
our thoughts, that otherwise, i.e. if they remain private, 
do not have the advantage of others' collaboration. We 
produce our responses as inducing ourselves to do the work 
of saying what we think and being instructed by the conver- 
sations that develop from our questions. Every time we 
bring our thoughts into the conversation we produce speech 
that works to display the irrationality of a corrupt relation 
to convention. We do not produce our social relationships 
as corrupt, but draw upon our social relationships with our- 
selves and others and by doing so work against corruption. 
By calling ourselves to act thoughtfully we produce our 
writing, our speech as our response and not as irresponsible 
or corrupt. 
Analysis of Paragraph 48 
"I begin to remember then, as a result of this 
speech how deeply my mode of thinking and of 
acting /... 
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acting and hence of thinking about the relation- 
ship between the two, is imbued by the grammar 
of worry, but this should remind me that I will 
not free myself of it in the way I might discard 
an empty ballpoint pen. Rather, I must remember 
that social relationships are not static and 
that it is only by using and working with what 
I have got, i.e. what I am, that I can produce 
something better. My task then, as my struggle 
continues, must be to make these words less 
empty." 
Response: 
We do not remember as a result of our work how 
deeply our mode of thinking and of acting is imbued by the 
grammar of worry, but how by thinking more deeply about our- 
selves, by producing less shallow selves, we display why we 
need not worry. Unlike worry we are not limited to an in- 
terest in me i.e. the 'I', but are concerned for ourselves, 
for our society as a thoughtful production, in effect as a 
going concern. By remembering how social relationships are 
not static we work with what we can be so as to improve what 
we at first sight might seem to be. Through our work, even 
with this portrait of worry, we are displaying how words are 
never empty for us. Worry, as it understands itself, 
produces words as empty to save itself the effort of think- 
ing about what it says, but it cannot explain why it does 
this. 
- 145 - 
SECTION 4 
Our original speaker interrupts: 
"How eager you are to speak of worry as you 
also imagine it is 
But you would have done better if you had not 
been so ready to separate me from my speech, 
if you had thought more, and chosen not to do 
so. By trying to reduce worry to an 'it', 
i.e. to an unreflexive activity, as you were 
doing, you revealed your own shallowness. 
By reducing worry to an 'it' you imagined you 
could relieve yourselves of responsibility 
for 'it', and you did this whilst claiming to 
take on response -ability; 
How can you, who have committed yourselves to 
producing selves as thinkers /speakers, at the 
same time commit yourselves to separating a 
speaker from her speech? How could you 
imagine you were respecting me by separating 
me from my speech? I thank you for your good 
intention, but ask you to be less hasty, less 
naive. 
I did produce a version of worry as I imagined 
ordinary usage would have it, that is true, but 
my intention in doing so was to provide usage 
through which we could work together to show 
how worry could be a way of doing good, and I 
had expected that you would join with me in an 
inquiry into how to deepen the shallow version 
of worry I imagined ordinary usage would have 
produced. It was not worry that was shallow, 
as you suggest, but the version of worry that 
I produced, and that you were so ready to 
accept, only in order then to reject. 
You imagined that by distancing yourselves from 
worry you could gain a clearer picture of 'it', 
and /.... 
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and that then 'it' would be nothing for you 
to fear, nothing for you to worry about. 
You imagined you had distanced yourselves 
from 'it', and by so doing had yourselves 
become better than 'it'. That is, through 
your work you sought social distance; 
superiority and were tempted to think you 
had achieved it: that you were deeper than 
worry, and no longer had any real reason to 
listen to 'it'; you imagined you were no 
longer likely to be endangered by it. 
So now it is you who need reminding of your 
shallowness: of the superficiality of your 
separation: of your manipulation, which was 
no more than sleight of hand. For how could 
you, who apparently imagined yourselves to be 
acting thoughtfully, believe that that 
separation could aid reparation? 
But don't misunderstand me, I'm not suggesting 
that there was nothing of value in your res- 
ponses. What I am suggesting is that I will 
not orient to your speech as something which 
I can extract certain elements from and then 
discard. I will not orient to your speech as 
you appeared to want to orient to the speech 
of worry. 
I imagine that it is you who are now surprised, 
but we all have work to do so let's spend no 
more of our efforts speaking one against the 
other; when we can proceed by thinking about 
how worry could be a way to do good." 
Response: 
We were surprised by your interruption, and for a 
while it stopped us in our tracks, but given your stated 
commitment to thinking about how worry could be a way to 
do good we assume that you will not be so ready to accuse 
us/,.. 
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us of speaking against you, when we remind you, and our- 
selves, of what was said earlier. For in your haste to 
defend your person, i.e. what you imagine yourself to be, 
you do yourself an injustice. 
We were not separating you from your speech, but 
trying to help you remind yourself how that speech was not 
you, i.e. was not yours; you were only speaking as if you 
were a worrier. We are committed, as you rightly point 
out, to producing selves as thinkers /speakers, but our com- 
mitment involves us in producing thoughtful, moral, social 
speakers, and not irresponsible careless talk. Would we 
be respecting you if we allowed ourselves to hear you as 
proceeding talking in a careless fashion? 
However, your reminder about the shallowness of 
the version of worry we have so far considered is well 
taken, and we will try, as you suggest, to achieve a deeper 
version, but perhaps we will be stretching usage too far: 
if we think this is so we will do better to refer to this 
more moral, more thoughtful, more social activity by some 
term other than worry. 
As to social distance, we do think our commitment 
is more thoughtful than worry's commitment (at least the 
shallow version), for if we did not, we would have no reason 
to work at preventing ourselves and others sliding into it. 
But we do not, and cannot transcend it, i.e. we don't get 
beyond it for we continue to have to deal with worries, we 
continue /... 
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continue to be endangered if we fail to respond thoughtfully 
to others. 
However, your interruption has helped us to 
remember an issue of more general significance, for by 
speaking of the shallow version of worry as how you /we 
imagined ordinary usage would have it, you /we have revealed 
how we were reifying, reducing ordinary usage. Response - 
ability for the weak version of worry appeared to be shared 
between ourselves and ordinary usage, and by being shared 
in this way we might have forgotten that it is we, as 
speakers and listeners, that both produce and consume 
ordinary usage. But we do remember how, by trying to be 
thoughtful interlocutors, the formulations we produce will 
be attempts to display the extra -ordinary depths of speech 
in its relation to Being, i.e. of the speaker's place. 
Much earlier (P. 27) we spoke of convention/ 
ordinary usage as contrived, but as we proceed we are dis- 
playing how it is we who do take an active part in the con- 
triving; and it was we who spoke as if we had to imagine 
what 'it' was, what 'it' /ordinary usage would produce. By 
making our relationship to our speech an issue of knowledge, 
as if of a separate object, we were erroneously separating 
ourselves from our speech, and could then, at best, only 
imagine what 'it' was. 
As our speech continues we are keeping a grip, or 
regaining /... 
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regaining a grip, upon the productions of our dialectical 
engagements as speakers /thinkers, and only by so doing, do 
we continue to free our potential. Society, speech could 
only have constrained us if we had lost our desire to grip, 
if we had forgotten that society is our continuing pro- 
duction, and that through our production of society we are 
continuing to produce ourselves. By remembering this we 
do enable ourselves, and are enabling ourselves, to proceed 
thoughtfully. 
We are committing ourselves not to proceed by 
reducing ordinary usage, and then showing ourselves to be 
superior to it by exemplifying difference through our read- 
ing: rather we are working and displaying our efforts to 
engage with ordinary usage in a friendly manner i.e. to 
think or theorize with, and for it in such a way as to 
collaborate socially, as would those seeking thoughtful 
social relations. 
Perhaps you grasp now why we acknowledge that we 
do need to remember the shallowness of our beginnings but 
we do not hear this as an accusation, though perhaps you 
imagined you wanted it to be one; we hear it as calling us 
to continue working upon how to act more thoughtfully. 
Perhaps also our manipulation now seems less like sleight 
of hand. 
Oh: you, as worrier, are surprised we say we are 
engaged in manipulating. We anticipated that this would 
be /... 
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be the case for we have come to expect that you, as worrier, 
begin with a version of other as manipulator, and manipulation 
as bad. So this is an issue we should now confront. (N.B. 
Unless we state otherwise, as this work proceeds we will 
refer to the worrier as you, but we remember we do not in- 
tend by this any specific self, or indeed any self at all.) 
What do we mean then by our suggestion that you 
begin with a version of other (e.g. us) as manipulator? 
We expect that initially you see yourself as not acting, and 
want to see inaction as good, whilst seeing all actions as 
bad, i.e. as manipulation. For this 'reason' you might 
have asked us why we chose to raise the issue of worry, as 
if you would have accepted no action on our part as immediately 
just. You were puzzled as to why we should have raised this 
issue, as you did not conceive of it as our fault. Here 
your idea of forced confession comes to mind again, for your 
usage of responsibility is a way of producing speech as the 
acceptance of blame for a prior action, it must always be 
blame for as we have said you do see all action as bad. 
Consequently you would view us as acting irresponsibly by 
raising this topic: you imagine it would be better left 
alone. Perhaps you would prefer to forget about it, put 
it out of your mind? In this manner, you produce speech 
as a response that is limited to reaction, rather than being 
possibly active, and by so doing you commend inaction. But 
it has become clear to us that by ostensibly avoiding 
manipulative behaviour, ironically you also are engaged in 
manipulative behaviour, that worry is a form of manipulation. 
For /... 
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For your inaction is not without consequence, and it is 
chosen, hence in these regards it is analytically the same 
as action. We had instances often enough in Section 3 of 
the consequences of the worrier's inaction. 
Very likely you will be angry at our suggestion 
that you are manipulating, but unlike those you view as 
manipulative you will not express your anger. You imagine 
it is unwise to express anger, for, given that you already 
hold a view of environment /other /manipulator as hostile, 
you imagine that expressing your anger would only be adding 
fuel to the fire. So whereas you view manipulative types 
as those who manipulate /channel their feelings, you choose 
to refuse to see how, by holding yourself back, you also 
manipulate. You imagine that the manipulative types be- 
come angry when the tide runs against them because when 
this occurs this threatens not only the manipulator's person, 
but also the activity to which he has committed himself. 
You imagine that the manipulative type wants other to be 
within his control, that the manipulative type seeks the 
comfort of a position of power from which he cannot be 
attacked or surprised. So you see the manipulative type 
as seeking ease, laziness. 
The picture of the manipulative type you rely upon 
is as of one who seeks the calm that follows or precedes a 
storm. You imagine the manipulator sees the calm as his 
haven, for here chance is eliminated or controlled, for 
whilst /... 
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whilst anger or the storm is undesirable it will blow over 
and anyway is out of his hands. The manipulative type 
needs to control chance to keep his temper in check. Whilst 
you, on the other hand, imagine that it is when you feel 
happy -go -lucky that you need not worry, i.e. you see luck 
to be your companion, and imagine that it can be good or 
bad, but you place yourself in your companion's hands, you 
do not think of yourself as response -able for your own 
happiness, your own future. So, whilst you treat chance 
as your only possible friend, you also imagine that the 
manipulator treats chance as his sole enemy. You imagine 
that the manipulative type shares your view of all actions 
as bad, but that whilst you see this as a reason not to act, 
you imagine he proceeds to act anyway. By producing your 
lack of action as displaying your lack of corruptibility, 
i.e. by trying not to act in order to prevent your action 
being acted upon: by trying to constrain constraints by 
being constrained, you are showing a commitment not to act 
badly, and that could be praiseworthy, but in the process 
you have lost sight of the fact that it is bad not to act, 
or rather you forget that you are already acting. Whilst 
you imagine you are staying face to face with the problem, 
and that you suffer in silence, you also imagine that the 
manipulator tries to silence other i.e. to make other suffer 
before it by chance makes him suffer. So, whilst worry 
calls upon chance for assistance (i.e. whilst worry waits 
for miracles) it imagines that manipulation calls chance 
out /... 
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out in order to annihilate it, or control it, (i.e. worry 
imagines manipulation tries to produce miracles not to wait 
for them). 
But we must proceed thoughtfully here for we 
know that we can neither produce miracles nor settle for 
waiting for miracles, and, that at the same time, we have 
need of efforts of miraculous proportions, for whilst we 
thought racism and sexism were bad this form of differentiation 
between self and other could have been much much worse for 
it goes deeper, and it could have isolated each individual 
from all others. And yet, even this most pervasive and 
vicious form of speech /life is, as we have said, a product 
of good intention, and by being so helps us to grasp why we 
need to converse more with each other rather than less. 
Whilst you imagine you have good 'reason' to 
maintain social distance, and not to collaborate with other 
because of other's manipulative character; for you formulate 
manipulation as sleight of hand; we would rather display 
our formulation of how man -ipulation is what man, men and 
women do do. Man -ipulation, for us, means the activity 
of thoughtful, moral, social actors and not merely sleight 
of hand, deception, appearance. So now when we say that 
worry is a form of man -ipulation you need have no reason 
to be angry for we are speaking of its humanness, i.e. of 
what it shares with us. We choose to collaborate with 
you (worry), to converse with you, for through this con- 
versation our understanding of our 'place' is deepened. 
What /... 
- 154 - 
What can we learn from your current orientation towards 
other? 
Perhaps we can begin to learn by formulating 
other as 'other than human' as 'other than intentional'. 
So now you collect all human actions and counterpose them 
to mere sleight of hand, to manipulation in the weak sense. 
When you say you are not acting you must mean that you are 
intending not pretending. Inaction must be read not as 
doing nothing but as being in action, i.e. involved in action 
and not as being an uninvolved actor. All actions, if and 
when viewed (i.e. from the outside) are mere manipulation 
i.e. sleight of hand, so you were right to ask why raise 
the issue of worry, but perhaps you were wrong to ask us 
and not yourself, for it is an issue for you as well as us, 
and this is why our actions could not and indeed cannot do 
your work for you, but at most can stimulate you to help 
yourself. 
By placing man within an environment which is 
other than man i.e. nature; which is unintentional; mere 
sleight of hand; unthoughtful; you show us why forced con- 
fession i.e. the acceptance of blame for prior action is our 
effort to be becoming response -able, to begin to take on 
responsibility for that which we did not do, and by doing 
so to begin to interact more response -ably. If we merely 
raised the topic of worry and did no more, it would have 
been better left alone for it would have been vulgarized, 
and /... 
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and you would be right to put it out of your mind. Rais- 
ing the topic of worry and doing no more could provide a 
very picturesque instance of sleight of hand. However, we 
know that your speech is, like all speeches, an intentional 
action, i.e. an instance of man -ipulation, and that by ironiz- 
ing manipulation, by speaking of it as something to avoid, 
hide from, (perhaps with your hands as in sleight of hand) 
you are asking us to engage thoughtfully with it. The 
conjuror also has intentions which we must not forget, if 
we are to preserve a human relationship with him, if we are 
not to treat him as a thing. 
So now we appreciate that your anger would have 
been justifiable if by saying you were being manipulative 
we had meant in the weak sense. However our efforts to 
achieve a stronger, a more profound version of manipulation 
should allay your suspicions. As to your decision not to 
express your anger, we notice that your formulation of other 
as hostile leads you to begin with a version of both fire 
and tide as dangerous, but couldn't both fire and tide be 
resources if they are thought about. But, perhaps again 
it is we, not you, who are too hasty to imagine we under- 
stand what you intend, for perhaps we could formulate hostile 
as host -ile, i.e. as hospitable, host like, as welcoming, 
rather than as an enemy. So now not expressing your anger 
is read as not rushing, i.e. as not burning all your fuel at 
once, but as conserving energy. Holding yourself back is 
being reserved; thinking about how to act rather than being 
merely /... 
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merely impulsive. Our formulation of man -ipulation is as 
a committed thoughtful activity, not as an activity to 
which we commit ourselves. How could we find a position 
in which we could not be attacked or surprised comfortable? 
To speak of surprises and attacks as similar in this regard 
is to betray defensiveness and a lack of adventure. It is 
to appear content with staying in the fort and surviving 
apparently safely behind its walls, rather than risking 
engaging with what lies outside its confines. Questions, 
like surprises, are deformed if they are reformulated as 
attacks. We choose to hear questions, and to ask questions, 
and by so doing to surprise ourselves. We choose to resist 
any inclination to treat questions /doubts as undesirable. 
Your version of nature as manipulation in the 
weak sense is clearly presented by your usage of the storm 
analogy, and conventional usage does speak of the angry 
person as stormy. But, as we have said, our desire is to 
extend ourselves, our usage, to think about what we want 
to be becoming, and how we can continue working at becoming 
rather than to imagine we are such and such, and then find- 
ing ourselves with selves which we pretend we need to, but 
cannot control. 
Whilst we do not fantasize that we can control 
chance, we do not rely upon versions of ourselves as 
resting completely in the hands of chance for we display 
our characters by responding thoughtfully, socially to what 
happens/... 
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happens to us, and by doing so we extend the range of our 
intentions, of what we can think about and do something 
about. We treat chance as neither friend nor enemy for 
it is unintentional, and we do better by resisting such 
anthropomorphisms, for by doing so we rediscover our potential 
to work with our environment. We are responsible for what 
we do, for what we do displays our ability to respond, but 
we can also console ourselves by limiting the effort we 
expend upon what we decide we are not, and cannot be, res- 
ponsible for. By concentrating upon our intentions we 
detect that the distinction between action and inaction 
could have misled, for both action and inaction can be in- 
tentional or unintentional, and our intentional effort is 
to be moving from the unintentional to the intentional for 
as thinkers /speakers we could not desire to eliminate or 
reduce thought /conversation. 
Whilst as we said you imagine you are staying face 
to face with the problem, and that you suffer in silence, 
we would say that this action reduces suffering to putting 
up with, enduring, and that true suffering is a part of 
risking conversation, risking not remaining silent, for 
staying face to face with each other is what we are achiev- 
ing by refusing to settle for modes of speech that rely upon 
imagined differences, barriers between self and other selves. 
We are involved in man -ipulation /conversation, but our in- 
tention is to work to hear what you have to say, and to 
instruct /... 
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instruct ourselves through it, not to reduce you to silence. 
Worry would need to wait for miracles for as long as it 
resists acknowledging that it has placed itself in the 
hands of chance. By raising chance to the status of only 
possible friend it shows its anti -social nature, for it 
concomitantly reduces others, i.e. other speakers, to never 
achieving sufficient distinction from the rest of the 
environment to be specially treasured. 
You imagine that actors have to know that their 
actions are good before and whilst they act, and that given 
your awareness that you do not have this knowledge, and your 
suspicion that others also do not have it, you formulate 
their actions as weak dishonest moves to avoid facing up 
to their ignorance. But by remembering that we cannot know 
that our actions are good, but that we can do what we have 
decided, what we have thought through as being for the good, 
and more deeply that this is what we all always do, we 
respect others actions as displays of their commitment. 
And we do distinguish them, as achievements, from the un- 
thoughtful, unintentional environments out of which they 
have been drawn. 
The man -ipulator offers formulations of others as 
having plans which are informed by good intention, but which 
are not complete, where that which is unplanned i.e. exigency, 
is not surprising, but where surprises are products of good 
intentions not of nature. Nature is pre -dictable in the 
sense /... 
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sense of coming before speech. The man- ipulator's mode of 
interacting, with others, whom he formulates as acting with 
good intentions, is to question, to try to understand others' 
intentions. Ironically if others choose to remain silent 
when questioned, if others produce questions as unplanned 
for attacks, the man -ipulators effort to engage in instructive 
social interaction, i.e. to act in a friendly manner, will 
have been deformed by others into acts of aggression, of 
manipulation in the bad sense. 
However the man -ipulator, the thoughtful inter- 
locutor, encourages others to speak, i.e. the thoughtful 
interlocutor's speech intends to remind self and others of 
our ability to respond in such a way that we deepen our 
understanding of our intentions. We are pleased when we 
formulate other's speech as encouraging and requesting us 
to continue responding thoughtfully, socially, and whilst 
speech could have been used as a weapon to silence other, 
to force other to submit, we choose to speak in such a way 
as to draw ourselves, and others, out of submissiveness; 
we do not relate to other's speeches as commands for we are 
committed to deepening, strengthening our social relation- 
ships by no longer trying not to learn /remember what we can 
be,or better are. 
The man -ipulator's usage of surprise encourages 
us to inquire into what we are; it stimulates us to stop 
hiding from ourselves by showing how revealing self's 
potential /.., 
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potential for inquiry enables self and other to work to- 
gether to remember what they share. Whilst the manipulator 
wants to be able to predict but not to be predictable; 
wants to expose other and to continue posing himself, the 
man -ipulator has no need to pose for he remembers that he 
can only improve through exposure /conversation. The man- 
ipulator's actions may surprise, for by maintaining con- 
versation they effectively risk keeping social interaction 
open indefinitely. The man -ipulator /thoughtful interlocutor 
does not settle for silence, but works to maintain thoughtful 
social relations. He uses his speech to display and maintain 
the social proximity which both he and others need if they 
are to continue engaging in man -ipulation, thoughtful con- 
versation. The man -ipulator is not interested in what he 
or other is, i.e. in a conventional notion of social status, 
but is interested in conversing in such a way as to raise 
in stature. By recognising how stature is possibility not 
actuality, choice not nature, he keeps open social inter- 
actions that respect both self and other. Only in this way 
can the temptation to treat other or self with contempt be 
resisted. 
By generating self as the possibility that we are 
response -able for, man- ipulators, speakers, thoughtful inter- 
locutors refuse to succumb to a conception of self as limited 
in such a way as to be completely beyond our control and as 
such as diminishing our responsibility. As speakers we are 
able to choose how we respond, and we do continue stretching 
and /... 
- 161 - 
and extending our limits by engaging in thoughtful conver- 
sations. 
And yet you (worrier not thoughtful reader) could 
have felt constrained to argue that the version we previously 
proposed you would have offered of other's actions as man- 
ipulation, i.e. sleight of hand, had not conveyed sufficiently 
well how threatening others' speeches (including ours) seem 
to you. Perhaps you would have spoken to yourself about 
the manipulator's speech in the following manner: 
"The manipulator sees other's plans as a 
threat but he knows that plans have limits 
i.e. are not complete, and that which is 
unplanned is exigency, chance, or perhaps 
surprise. His method of dealing with an- 
other who he suspects has plans (and he 
suspects all others of this) is to deal out 
surprises which prevent other from carrying 
out his plan. Ironically then the man- 
ipulator silences other by acting in a way 
that other could not have planned for. The 
manipulator's speech leaves other speechless 
i.e. his speech is designed to destroy other's 
ability to respond, the result being that 
the manipulator can now proceed to disregard 
other's plans. His fear is that other's 
speech will silence him, hence his need to 
speak first. 
The manipulator's version of speech is as a 
weapon which can be used to silence other. 
He must control other's speech if he is to 
continue issuing commands. His version of 
listening is as submission, and the result 
is his desire not to listen, if he does have 
to listen he will be disappointed with his 
own actions; he will consider himself to 
have made a mistake which has allowed other 
not to conform to his plan; which has allowed 
other to take command of him. 
The /... 
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The manipulator's usage of surprise gives 
us insight into why we are often forced to 
ask ourselves what the manipulator feels. 
The insight is that he, the manipulator 
hides in order that he can surprise, i.e. 
he doesn't want other to know his next 
move. He wants to be able to predict 
but not to be predictable. He doesn't 
want to be exposed and for this reason 
he appears stealthy but at times bold. 
However, his surprising (bold) actions 
which initially could appear adventurous 
now appear more defensive for by stopping 
conversation they effectively close the 
door on risk. Having closed the door the 
manipulator feels contempt for other whom 
he sees as having failed to secure his 
objective, i.e. his actions are necessarily 
a slight on other's character. He uses his 
speech to maintain social distance which he 
needs to do his manipulating. Now he sees 
and treats other as lacking in stature, i.e. 
with contempt." 
However, it was through our relationship with your 
version of the manipulator's speech that we were able to 
achieve the deeper version of man -ipulative speech that 
immediately preceded it. And through this effort to be 
reminded by your speech we have displayed how to listen in 
a manner which is not submissive. Thoughtful listening is 
neither mere consumption, i.e. acceptance, agreement, nor is 
it rejection, disagreement, i.e. refusal to consume; it is 
productive consumption; working thoughtfully with other's 
speech. 
The man -ipulator, the thoughtful interlocutor, 
chooses a sense of adventure /of inquiry rather than choosing 
to /... 
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to give primacy to survival activities, for to opt for the 
latter is to restrict oneself to living on the surface, it 
is to restrict oneself to the shallows and to choose to 
have nothing to say. To give primacy to survival activities 
is to choose to ignore our social, moral character, it is 
to choose to ignore the fact that for speakers /thinkers 
survival has to be chosen. An orientation which gives 
primacy to survival generates a life as something to be con- 
sumed in the service of that which dies. Whereas the man- 
ipulator's choice of inquiry creates a relationship between 
self and other selves which makes productive living possible, 
the irony of survival activities, i.e. of running from death, 
is that their lack of -a sense of direction towards- invites 
tragedy. 
For instance, you would tend to feel responsible 
for further speech in social situations, for you imagine 
silences are dangerous, however whilst feeling responsible 
you do not feel response -able. But, rather than inquiring 
into what would be a thoughtful response, you produce the 
difference between responsible and response -able as provid- 
ing a reason to say anything; you treat other and the con- 
versation contemptuously by failing to recognize other's 
response -ability, and by failing to see the good of con- 
versation, inquiry. However we show here how even your 
response, which displays your version of yourself as lacking 
the ability to respond, could be used by the thoughtful in- 
terlocutor to stimulate inquiry. 
The /... 
- 164 - 
The virtue of speech is that we can provide, 
through it, good thoughtful intentions for speakers, and we 
can in this manner risk speaking response -ably, rather than 
simply from a feeling of responsibility which was itself 
mere personal protectiveness, i.e. fears of fantasized con- 
sequences of being blamed for the silence. By succumbing 
to these fears you would stop possible starts. You would 
stop the inquiry, the questions which could have enlivened 
yourself and others. You view the manipulator as consum- 
ing other, and imagine that you appear to consume yourself. 
It is by producing yourself as a consumer (by concentrating 
on the bad) rather than choosing to remember how you have 
produced other (the manipulator) that you are subjugated by 
your version of other, i.e. by forgetting you also are pro- 
ductive. The man -ipulator, the thoughtful interlocutor 
relates with other as a collaborator and works with other. 
We are working with you for our desire is not to reject you, 
or to succumb to your speech, but to deepen ourselves, and 
to achieve a less shallow reading of your speech through 
this conversation. 
We want to continue being what we are, i.e. char- 
acters that can choose to continue freeing ourselves by 
engaging in thoughtful conversations with others. Whereas 
you want to stop being what you imagine you are, i.e. a threat 
to yourself, a brake, and you imagine the manipulator wants 
to stop others being what they are in order that he can stay 
as he is. We man -ipulators refuse to be dominated by 
images /... 
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images of our selves as worse than we can be. Whereas 
you are dominated by an imaginary version of yourself as 
having some utopian image of the self you ought to be, which, 
you then imagine yourself as not surprisingly failing to 
match up to. You do not work for better conditions, you 
want (merely wish you had) a self that could deal with any 
conditions. Secretly you wish you were the manipulator. 
But man -ipulators by focusing upon the fact that we do 
respond thoughtfully /intentionally, produce a relationship 
to any conditions which enables those conditions to help 
stimulate the desire for knowledge, the desire to live 
thoughtfully. 
We choose to orient to other speakers in such a 
way as to work to display our essential sameness with them 
as speakers. The shallow worrier, 'you' in this work is a 
heuristic construct which reflects the limits of our current 
efforts to speak more thoughtfully, it does not display us 
pointing from a superior position at others e.g. readers. 
By working to display our essential sameness with other 
speakers we are working to show how, if we concentrate upon 
intentions, we do not limit ourselves to a conflict view of 
social relations, e.g. manipulator versus manipulated. 
Perhaps the manipulator would see the conflict view of 
social relations as providing a 'reason' to escalate the 
violence, maintain the social distance, and the worrier 
would use it as a 'reason' for not acting, and similarly 
maintaining the social distance, but we think about these 
different /... 
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different responses by showing how each is related to in- 
tention and a conception of what is good. Both are thought- 
ful achievements, but both seem thoughtlessly to try to 
deny or forget their achieved character. To 'have' a con- 
flict view of social relations is to have been engaged in 
a dialogue, a thoughtful conversation which theorized about 
social relations and chose to rest with a formulation of 
conflict as struggle against, but to rest with that is to 
give up on struggle. Perhaps we do better to formulate 
con -flict as striking with others, collaborating with others, 
to think through what we could have misconceived as our 
beginnings. We could not reach a conflict view of social 
relations without having entered into social relations, and 
this displays the socially achieved nature of our conceptions, 
i.e. our dialectical characters. And, by doing so, reminds 
us to think about, work with, our concepts rather than be 
ruled by them. 
We could also have felt contempt for our own 
feelings if we began to 'view' them, i.e. to externalize 
them, as being like everything else i.e. as being a matter 
of chance. In this way we would not have needed to accept 
responsibility for them, for we would have been opting to 
forget that our feelings are our responses, or are part of 
them, and that they display our choices, our decisions, and 
that whilst we could leave ourselves with nothing to do but 
worry, we can also choose to think of our feelings as our 
thoughtful products i.e. as social achievements, and by 
doing /... 
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doing so we can become engaged in them rather than subject 
to them. We can deliberate and respond thoughtfully, 
rather than hiding behind the pretence that we are neces- 
sarily impulsive. 
But taking on responsibility for our own feelings 
is not the same as concentrating on protecting them; per- 
haps this is the manipulative type's notion of responsibilities 
as possessions which call for protection, defensiveness. We 
own up to our feelings, rather than protect them, for by 
so doing, by submitting them for thoughtful attention, con- 
versation, we can develop and change with them. We need 
not be contemptuous of that which we produce and can develop. 
We are working with other selves, and by doing 
so display a commitment to social inquiry which recreates a 
social relationship between self and other selves which 
could have been lost if priority had been given either to 
the protection of feelings, or to contempt for feelings. 
The notion of commitment to social inquiry involves placing 
feelings in the service of thoughtful conversation. je 
need not be surprised when we remember that we do not need 
to defend our persons, but to offer our persons in defence 
of what we decide is for the good. Self defence could be 
good if self had been thought about, but if not it is 
thoughtless and does self a disservice for it displays 
lack of character. 
What we are saying is that going to a lot of 
trouble /... 
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trouble, i.e. making an effort for someone, whether self or 
other, or something, is what we are all always doing, and 
that given this is so we can all as easily direct our 
efforts to more thoughtful social enterprises. Indeed once 
this is grasped it becomes impossible to choose to place 
our own efforts in the service of seemingly thoughtless 
activities. But, perhaps you formulate a lot of trouble/ 
making an effort as painful, and refuse to grasp that engag- 
ing in painful activities could be admirable provided the 
engagement was thoughtful; was freely chosen. We could 
only choose to go to a lot of trouble for others if we had 
decided that their actions were products of good intentions. 
We do not choose to take pains with others in order to 
relieve others of pain, but we take pains with others, and 
our selves to improve ourselves (where ourselves includes 
other selves), for we are not becoming more thoughtful with- 
out effort. 
The thoughtful interlocutor, e.g. Socrates, is 
one who leads a full life, for by taking pains with himself 
and other selves, by thinking about how he can respond more 
thoughtfully, by producing self as intentional rather than 
as subject, as choosing to take pains i.e. to make an effort, 
rather than as effortlessly submitting to pain, he and we 
are attempting to display the profound depths and morality 
of thoughtful life, of social interaction. 
But you need to show that you are taking pains 
with /.. 
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with /from other, like showing you are still breathing to 
prevent yourself being buried alive - and the result of 
this could be that some others see you as wallowing and 
this causes you further distress. You imagine you take 
pains with others to prevent yourself being buried alive, 
but by formulating your own actions in this way you diminish 
their worth. For if you were fully committed to the view 
that life was painful, where pain is something to be relieved 
of you would do better to relieve others and yourself of 
life. 
Perhaps you would 'view' actions of this sort as 
beyond you; as requiring a level of commitment you do not 
possess. But you only succeed in doing this by a committed 
and constant refusal to face up to and think about your own 
commitment, your own speech. That is, whether or not it 
does any good, or how it could be doing good. You treat 
your person, the way you imagine you are, as your 'nature', 
and by doing so refuse to think about and deepen your own 
actions by acknowledging that you choose them. You reveal 
your 'commitment' to a lack of commitment. 
But still we must take care for our speech could 
persuade us that the work is for you to do, and not for us. 
We have contrasted the thoughtful interlocutor, whether 
writer or reader, over against the 'shallow worrier' in 
such a way that a reader, perhaps even ourselves, might have 
been led to believe that this work was doing us (the writer 
Of/000 
- 170 - 
of the responses) no good. That we are merely engaged in 
lecturing you, and that if you went away the issue we are 
conversing about would do also. But, if this were so, and 
if we were being honest when we referred to our reader as 
a thoughtful interlocutor we would be offering him no reason 
to listen; for if it is doing us (the writer of the res- 
ponses) no good, similarly it will do him (the thoughtful 
reader) no good. But we know ourselves better than this, 
for we have only been able to construct you (the shallow 
worrier) as one way of continuing to work at improving our 
version of self by thinking about what we could have been 
if we had allowed our inquiry to end at that point) and we 
write in the knowledge that our readers will be engaging in 
similar enterprises, and will not be put off by any clum- 
siness of style, but will perceive that the project though 
difficult, is necessary, and that even clumsy efforts may 
provide some assistance; that clumsy efforts are better 
than no effort. The shallow worrier is someone we could 
each of us pretend we are if we cut off our inquiry. How- 
ever we are continuing to provide reasons for ourselves and 
other selves to do more than worry in the shallow sense, that 
is we are providing reasons to engage in thoughtful conver- 
sations through our continuing inquiry. 
By suggesting that you, 'the shallow worrier' 
revealed your commitment to a lack of commitment, we meant 
to display our commitment to encouraging our selves, and 
other selves, to think about what we do. 
commitment /... 
For your 
- 171 - 
commitment to lack of commitment was not obvious in the 
manner of a revelation that is there for all to see without 
thinking. We choose to work at continuing to ensure that 
the obvious, the apparent, is not that which is taken to 
obviate the need for thought. Rather, by expressing to 
others what we find obvious, we continue displaying how 
thoughtfully or thoughtlessly we look at and hear what we 
respond to. We engage in conversations through which we 
can be changing ourselves for the better, rather than merely 
confirming over and over again what we could otherwise have 
come to conceive of ourselves as, and portray ourselves to 
be. 
Original Speaker: 
"Earlier you spoke of how you were un- 
accustomed to hearing and giving lengthy 
speeches, and by trying to listen thought- 
fully to what you have said after my earlier 
interruption I imagine that now I understand 
better your dislike for lengthy speeches. 
Yet, at the same time, I am tempted to 
apologise for my previous interruption, and 
in this way to put our conversation at ease. 
But, I'm not very good at apologizing, so 
what I will do is say what comes into my 
head in the hope that you can make something 
of it, for I'm certainly impressed by what 
you have had to say so far, although the 
difference between you and me makes me feel 
very inadequate. 
I think it is tempting both to offer and to 
accept apologies for they do provide a way 
for finishing conversations in order that 
other things can be done. An apology seems 
to me to be one way of relieving oneself of 
responsibility, it is designed to produce 
calm and provided the apology is not rejected 
its /... 
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its user can breath a sigh of relief, for 
by silencing other he no longer needs to 
respond to others questions. 
But I have to admit that I don't like accepting 
apologies, (though I do accept them rather than 
say that!). My problem with apologies is that 
I hear them as couched in terms which lessen 
their giver's responsibility e.g. I didn't 
realize my actions might affect others: I 
didn't mean it, I was angry etc. You see 
I don't understand how anyone can apologize 
for something which is claimed not to be his/ 
her fault. I can only see apology as being 
used to manipulate other. So perhaps my wish 
not to manipulate accounts for my reticence 
about apologizing. 
But, perhaps this goes deeper, for I see actions 
which have to be apologized for, as products of 
temptation's power to overcome our efforts at 
resistance, so the fault, i.e. the temptation 
in this way isn't the responsibility of the 
one apologizing. I see temptation as provid- 
ing time for activities which will later possibly 
require apologies. I treat my own actions, or 
rather inaction, as analogous to walking into 
the wilderness where temptation is at its 
strongest, for I see courage to lie in the 
resistance to temptation but not in its removal, 
for its removal would also remove the place for 
courage. 
I treat abstention from involvement with other, 
i.e. from speaking or writing as my form of 
resistance, perhaps like the tea -totaller, for 
I see my own actions as being submissions to 
temptation i.e. like the non -smoker who just 
has one. 
But I sense that you all (i.e. writer and readers) 
already have much to say, so maybe we should 
come to some arrangement, for though we will 
be able to converse more thoughtfully as our 
conversation progresses I cannot do everything 
at once. But I have heard enough to know 
that it is better to try to do something now 
than /.,.. 
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than to pretend to be doing nothing. What 
I propose is that you speak whenever you have 
something to say, and that if I fail to take 
account of all you say directly as I proceed, 
you do not walk away, but stay to continue 
this conversation, for I am depending upon 
you." 
Response: 
You are right to notice that we already have much 
to say, though that you noticed this suggests you also had 
more to say: We agree that we need to come to some arrange- 
ment and further accept your proposal i.e. that we speak 
whenever we have something to say, and yet we know this 
means there are shocks in store. We begin by reminding you, 
and ourselves, that it is only through our work with your 
speech that we can act more thoughtfully with regard to this 
issue, so we have no incentive to walk away, on the contrary, 
we want to encourage you to continue choosing to walk, talk 
with us, for we hear your speech as reminding us of our 
response-ability. We will proceed by offering some thoughts 
on what we heard you to be trying to say a moment ago. By 
doing so we will be keeping open lines of thought that your 
speech helps us to re-open, and we display how we choose, 
and how you can choose, not to depend upon others. We want 
to display how you were proceeding yourself by inquiring 
into the grounds of the speech you could have made, i.e. 
into apology as excuse. Perhaps we could continue by 
risking formulating excusing as talking ourselves away from 
irresponsible actions towards response -able actions, i.e. 
excuses /... 
- 174 - 
excuses could be good if they are intended as active efforts 
to move beyond weak versions of self. 
By saying that you were not very good at apologiz- 
ing you must intend to remind us, and yourself, not that we 
are different from you, for how could you know that? Rather 
you remind us that the version of apology we initially relied 
upon asked both too much and too little of apologizers. We 
share your lack of understanding about apology for it rests 
restlessly in the relationship between unintentional and in- 
tentional acts: in the uneasiness that both is the speaker's 
place, and that displays the profundity, and the morality of 
social life. You remind us that we take on response -ability 
for our acts by inquiring into how we did not know what we 
were, who were doing; when we previously acted. For instance, 
if we excused ourselves by saying we were angry, we would 
be raising to the surface the question of how we relate to 
ourselves as being angry, i.e. as being something. Con- 
ventionally if we had been angry we would also very likely 
say we were not ourselves. And we were not, for we are such 
that we do not and cannot know what we are, but are becoming 
what we are choosing to become. The existentialist notion 
* 
of bad faith, e.g. Sartre's waiter is relevant here for the 
waiter represents for us, not only one who mistakes what he 
isn't for what he is, but more deeply it represents one 
instance of resting too soon with a conception of oneself 
i.e. imagining that we know what we are, when to have done 
this would be to be binding ourselves in a speech by forget- 
ting our place as speakers. 
that /... 
To act either in the 'knowledge' 
* N.B. How ironic that he chooses a waiter, i.e. one who 
waits: 
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that one is worried or that one is not worried is similarly 
to pretend to know too much. For we are not already this 
or that, and this is why speeches which stipulate that their 
authors already know what they are always contradict them- 
selves. 
We would not have said that we were impressed by 
what another had said, for by doing so we would be dif- 
ferentiating between ourselves and others, and could lead 
ourselves to forget how we necessarily played a part in 
formulating the reading we were impressed with. By offer- 
ing impressive readings of others' speeches we make demands 
upon ourselves, and display how we desire to be better than 
we imagined we were. That is, we make the difference between 
other's speech and ourselves, so that difference cannot make 
us feel inadequate, but it can help us to recognize the 
potential we have to liberate ourselves. If we chose to 
apologize, we would formulate ourselves as taking on response - 
ability for our prior lack of response -ability, and by doing 
so directing attention towards how more thoughtful, more 
social actors would have chosen to act. And we dare say 
that thoughtful interlocutors decide to display their com- 
mitment never to relieve themselves of response -ability by 
externalizing the production of temptation. As if temptation 
could provide time for! As if things provide for thinkers: 
As if we played no part in the production of that formulation 
of temptation: By continuing our inquiry we choose not to 
accept the situation as we imagine one who worries might 
formulate /... 
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formulate it; for your speech has reminded us that we could 
only have submitted to temptation if we had previously chosen 
to externalize its production, and to forget the part we 
are playing in the conversations which produce the versions 
we use of good and evil. 
We choose to formulate apology as defence, as a 
political act: as a defence of man as a thinker/ speaker 
i.e. as one who need not be told what is right or wrong, but 
who converses about, and decides what thoughtful men and 
women would want to do. All men and women are the same in 
as much as they are thinkers /speakers, and by drawing out 
as best we can what it is to be a speaker we raise the 
possibility of a dialectical politics i.e. a politics of 
doubt not dogma, where dogma is the error of hiding from 
doubt; is the error of not facing ourselves as thinkers, 
i.e. as those who do not know what is good but who choose 
to decide. We are concerned to produce political thought, 
and not to restrict ourselves by limiting ourselves to con- 
sumption; to digesting ideologies, including that of the 
apathetic /the apolitical, without showing how we must chew 
them over, think about them, if we are to gain any real 
sustenance from them. But we still have much more to do 
in our conversation with worry for this itself is a political 
act. Through this conversation we are helping those (in- 
cluding ourselves) who might otherwise have emaciated them- 
selves to choose to emancipate themselves. We choose to 
work at making ourselves, our society, and cannot choose to 
leave /... 
- 177 - 
leave that to chance, so let us return to our work with 
worry's speech. 
By remembering how we play a part in the conver- 
sations that produce the version of temptation we hold, we 
do not have to restrict ourselves to resisting temptation. 
If we had done so, we would have restricted ourselves in 
the deep sense (i.e. strangled ourselves) quite unnecessarily 
by settling for a version of self as merely subject to 
temptation. That would have been lazy for that would have 
been accepting the situation as we imagined it was, rather 
than trying to situate, ground our imaginings. That is we 
would have been forgetting that we would not choose to walk 
into the wilderness, but out. Indeed worry's idea of the 
wilderness and isolation is very revealing for it reminds 
us not to conceive of self's crucial relationship as being 
with other than selves, but to formulate selves as speakers 
whose crucial relationships are necessarily with other selves 
through conversation. We are reminded by your speech that 
the wilderness and unintentionality could have been much 
closer to home, and could have resided in any talk which 
obstinately refuses to allow its depths to surface by 
listening in such a way as not to hear its own desire to be 
more profound, more social, more thoughtful. We do not 
imagine that being alone would be the wilderness for thought- 
ful interlocutors for we do not rely upon a version of our- 
selves as lacking control, as wild. We take the risk in- 
volved in our own actions, e.g. possible errors, but by so 
doing no longer need to prefer to be tortured, i.e. controlled 
by/... 
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by other, for by doing what we want we can make a real con- 
tribution and collaborate with others. By reminding our- 
selves that we are not controlled by others we show what we 
are in what we do, whereas shallow worriers, we imagine, 
are more afraid of freedom from others control than they 
are of others control, for the latter allows them to carry 
on worrying /complaining to themselves. Furthermore you 
remind us not to abstain from involvement with other selves 
for we can only be achieving more thoughtful characters 
through conversations, but conversation is a deeper involve- 
ment and involves a deeper commitment than dependency upon 
other, for it involves grasping what speakers share and not 
settling for differences. We should not prostrate our- 
selves in front of others; we should not idolize others, 
but converse with them honestly so as to try to raise our- 
selves, bring ourselves back up. We think that restricting 
ourselves to not making errors, and in this way ostensibly 
not harming by not getting involved, can and frequently does 
harm. We dare say that the vestiges of a form of religious 
thought where god as observer and judge is omnipresent is 
very clear on the surface of worry's speech. And by taking 
this risk, we show how we do not need to wait for miracles, 
for we deepen the version of the environment as always con- 
taining both temptation and judgement by showing how it was 
itself a product of a shallow version of speech as at best 
imperfect consumption. 
We dare say that if you had carried on talking 
you would have rested content with an ostensible description 
of /... 
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of what you are rather than thinking about what you could 
be. By risking offering a formulation of you, the worrier, 
as shallow, as one who holds onto a version of yourself as 
unalterably and essentially bad, we demand more of ourselves, 
in effect we remind ourselves that worry isn't good enough, 
that it doesn't portray or display social action as achieve- 
ment. By risking arguing that you restrict yourself by 
reifying yourself; that you stopped inquiring any further 
about yourself when you imagined that you were your own 
worst enemy; that it was you that prevents your relation- 
ships with others becoming anything other than pretence; 
we provide reasons why you choose not to think about your- 
self, for you treat enemies as something to avoid. You 
cannot be befriending yourself, and this is how your con- 
versation with yourself comes to appear to you as an alter- 
cation that does not progress, that leaves you unable to 
produce, to improve -ize, that leaves you with weak 'perhaps' 
and 'yes-buts'. 
Your version of yourself as your own worst enemy 
can also help us to remember why you see your relationship 
with others to be problematic, for you see yourself as 
possibly their worst enemy too. No wonder you get embarrassed 
when pointed at, for you allow the pointing to confirm what 
you already imagined was the case, and then you can at the 
most only ignore the pointing or gloss it over, for you 
have forgotten that it is only you that can do something 
about yourself by displaying your potential, your response - 
ability. Your version of other as observer and accuser 
rather /... 
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rather than as collaborator and friend, shows us why you 
treat listening to others as painful i.e. as something to 
be endured. No wonder you head away from conversation into 
the wilderness, and refuse to work with others, with whom 
you could have risked learning and remembering. 
By refusing to think about yourself you refuse to 
think about how you think, and this is sheer obstinacy, for 
if we wanted to improve the performance of a car for instance, 
or even to maintain its current performance, we need to 
think about how it works. Why then, given that we live 
through our thoughts should some choose to orient to their 
thinking /speaking as the one 'thing' they do not want to 
think about? What conception of a good life could elicit 
that response? Could it be nature as good, and thinking 
as unnatural i.e. man as worse than nature owing to this 
liability he has of having to think, of not fitting easily? 
We choose to commit ourselves to making the effort to show 
the good of thought /speech to rest in the uneasiness, the 
freedom through which we raise ourselves above the unin- 
tentional. We are not condemned to be free, but are free 
to condemn ourselves or to choose to think about /decide 
what we want to be becoming. By allowing your speech to 
stimulate our thoughts, by collaborating with it, in a 
productive relationship, we are displaying our choice to 
continue speaking /thinking about how we speak /think. 
But we anticipate that you as worrier would not 
be satisfied with what we are saying for we propose that 
you /... 
- 181 - 
you equate satisfying with satiating, that you treat selves 
as receptacle -like i.e. you concentrate on limitations and 
boundaries and imagine that your actions will fail to satiate 
other i.e. you need to see other completely bowled over by 
your actions before you feel satisfied, and you do not 
accept other's word but need to see it. In this manner 
you see satiation as leaving no room for doubt, you try to 
push temptation outside the limit, and in this way to excuse 
yourself. But we allow the possibility of doubt as always 
being present as leaving room for desire, for thought, as 
ruling out satiation as a human possibility, and in this 
way our efforts are directed towards pulling temptation 
back in, in order to think how we produced it /in order to 
deal with it. We are not trying to push worry out but to 
pull it in with our questions in such a way that we can learn 
from it and not be subject to it. 
Whilst you imagine that the manipulative type 
gets satisfaction from submission, and that he forces him- 
self/his worries into submission and stops his conversation 
with himself, and by so doing produces the calm he pretends 
he is easy with. Whilst you imagine that other isn't 
worried because he isn't thinking, and that this is why 
manipulation could never work for you; that manipulation 
is oriented to making things easier, but fails to see that 
easier and better are not necessarily the same. We want 
to say that your failing is that you tend to see more difficult 
and better as the same. If being in difficulty and virtue 
were equivalent worry would be admirable, however we need 
brain /... 
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brain as well as brawn, pleasure as well as pain, i.e. 
wisdom as well as stamina; otherwise we would merely be 
persistent; like the fly trying to fly out of the half 
closed part of a half opened window. 
Original Speaker: 
"Now I am in a complete whirl, I no longer 
know what I am doing or what I will do next, 
ando e 
Response: 
Stop there; You will not object to me interrupt- 
ing for you remember our agreement, and what you are saying 
may indicate that we are now moving. However, we would 
rather not say 'I no longer know' for this suggests that 
previously you did know when, as we imagine, you really mean 
that you no longer imagine you know what you now admit you 
did not know. If this version of what you are now saying 
does better represent your thoughts we are beginning, and 
will be better able to inquire more thoughtfully into what 
we are doing. But we have to admit that we interrupted 
for we feared you would go on to give a bad reading of your 
condition, i.e. that you would go on to say that not knowing 
what you are doing worries you. However, we remember that 
it is only when we choose to be conscious that we do not 
know what we are doing that we can continue to inquire 
thoughtfully about it. To have said that not knowing 
what you are doing worries you would have been to have 
missed the point, for it would have revealed that you did 
imagine you knew what you were doing i.e. that you imagined 
you /... 
you were worrying. 
- 183 - 
And yet not knowing what you were 
doing is not a reason to worry for it is how we provide our 
impulse to proceed with active inquiry. 
Original Speaker: 
"But you did not know what I was going to 
go on to say, for how could you have known 
that? Yet still you interrupted in a 
manner that could be read as suggesting 
that you apparently choose to think more 
about what other is doing or going to do, 
than about what you are doing yourself. 
And this seems to be your way of not 
thinking about what you really want to go 
on to do. You used your energy speculating 
about what I was going to do in such a way 
that you could prepare for other's, in this 
instance my, speech by using other's, i.e. 
my, plan of action as something you could 
get a bearing from to make your present 
navigatable. But, by drifting away from 
a consideration of your own intentions you 
produce yourself as superfluous as at best 
merely orienting to, or from, other's needs. 
However, you and I know that as long as this 
is the case, as long as we rely upon a dif- 
ference between worry, and we will now risk 
saying it,philosophy, which we do not continue 
inquiring about, we cannot be doing philosophy 
for we remain worried. 
By orienting to other's plans, as you were 
doing, and producing yourself as superfluous 
you treat yourself as like driftwood, where 
you would formulate driftwood as causing no 
harm except when, if ever, it gets involved 
in, or collides with other's plans. In this 
manner your inclination towards separation is 
revealed. Still, our conversation ranges 
between collisions and collusion /collaboration, 
or better displays how collisions need not be 
catastrophies in the context of friendly 
relations, but play a part in the continuing 
production of the stimulation necessary for 
collaboration. 
You, thoughtful interlocutors (i.e. writer 
and readers) will remember that I, the shallow 
worrier /... 
- 184 - 
worrier, was spoken about earlier as an 
heuristic tool. That you are making use 
of me, but perhaps now it is time, and 
perhaps it always has been time, for you to 
think more diligently about why you want to 
talk about me rather than to inquire more 
deeply about yourselves, and in that way 
to be displaying your potential; Could it 
be that you want to talk about what you imagine 
you already know rather than to risk thinking 
about, deciding what you want ?" 
(Note to reader: This could seem comical for only a short 
while ago (i.e. on P. 179) we were hearing how the worrier's 
conversation with herself appears like an altercation, and 
yet here we have the heuristic tool that we ourselves have 
constructed apparently attacking us, i.e. using its speech 
as a weapon every time it is introduced. However all is 
not as it could seem for this appearance of altercation leads 
us to become increasingly aware of the problem the mode of 
discourse we have chosen allows us to bring to the surface, 
for I /you talk, or we /you talk could be how an altercation 
is represented. Incidentally our talk there of appearance, 
i.e. of the apparent can be deepened if we formulate the 
apparent as a- parent for we can grasp better how we could 
have been misled about our relationship to products of our 
thought i.e. to the apparent /the obvious, for the apparent, 
i.e. the a- parent does not father or mother us, rather we 
play a large role in the production of what we consider 
apparent. So now we grasp that if we continued to form- 
ulate we /you talk as an altercation, as a fight or dispute, 
as talk between two different ' I' s or collections of ' I' s 
we would be displaying our failure to grasp how self and 
other selves are intertwined in a manner that is necessary 
for /... 
- 185 - 
for their continuing production of themselves. 
I must own up to the fact that I have been delayed 
for a long while at this stage of my writing, though nothing 
like as long as before I risked beginning, but this current 
delay has been related to my continuing uneasiness about how 
this work is being written. I want to be showing how one 
form of speech /life is drawn out of, through another through 
a friendly relationship between the two, and yet to write 
in terms of now and then could fail to display how the choice 
between the two is always now. I have used we /you talk, 
but the limitations of this mode of talk rest in the con- 
tinuing tendency for it to be heard as a dispute. However 
if we formulate a dispute as a continuing reckoning between 
characters who will not, and cannot, settle for silence, for 
thoughtless lives we can better understand and display how 
friends never restrict or hold back their discourse, but 
through their discourse provide for continuing honest 
endeavour: where endeavour is formulated as the devouring 
of ends; where endeavour is the refusal to allow shallow 
talk to subject us. We abuse concepts, i.e. the ways we 
could have conceived, in such a way as to bring forth improved 
selves, an improving society. We do not orient to our 
concepts as limitations that we cannot stretch, for if we 
did we would be involved in self abuse, alienation. So 
we will return to the dialogue we have been producing/ 
hearing, and not restrict ourselves to dismissing it, but 
make the effort to continue engaging with it 
Response 
: /... 
- 186 - 
Response: 
Your reference to friendly relations reminds us 
that we, you and us, must be formulating our collisions as 
stimulating collaboration. By doing so we formulate your 
decision in your next sentence to ask us to talk about our- 
selves, as displaying your friendliness; though we could 
have read it as indicating your unwillingness to continue; 
as indicating your decision to try to give your person a 
rest. But you could not have intended the latter for you 
know full well that the truth of the matter is that we are 
all always already talking about ourselves, and what we 
share, about our manner of theorizing, even when we choose 
to remain silent. We might have offered a reading of you 
as being too ready to come up with objections that stifle 
we had done so we would 
have been displaying the weakness of our own persons for 
how could your questions be objections? Your questions 
encourage us to think about our own speech and provide for 
it, they encourage us to seek true character. If we are 
not merely to worry about worry we must display how our work 
provides for worry as a providential act, as intentional, 
and to do so we cannot rest with surface evidence, we must 
formulate intentions, and this does involve mutilating 
shallow personas. We cannot rest with a version of worry 
as debilitating but must be reforming it as making space 
for deliberation. When you spoke of a difference between 
worry and philosophy you could not have meant that the dif- 
ference was there, as if you knew what philosophy is, what 
worry /..o 
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worry is, as if they were things. Your speech reminds us 
that we do not rely upon that difference, and that by con- 
tinuing our inquiry we do not remain worried, in any shallow 
sense. To ask ourselves whether we are doing philosophy 
or not could be a question worth asking, and perhaps it is 
what all speakers are always doing. If it is, we are no 
exception. Perhaps we could risk saying this: that by 
making the effort to hear others' speeches, and our own, as 
the speeches of philosophers we are less likely to treat 
selves with disrespect. We return now to our theorizing 
upon the speech of worry, and perhaps we can make our return 
by saying that we are less interested in which mouth a 
particular speech comes from, i.e. whether it be yours or 
ours, and more interested in the virtue of the speech in 
question. You pointed out that we had settled for a version 
of ourselves as superfluous, we could have reminded you that 
that was your construction not ours, but instead we will 
think about how the notion of superfluousness might be used 
by a thoughtful interlocutor, i.e. a philosopher, and we 
reach for our conceptions through the speech of worry. We 
will continue to refer to the worrier as you, for we can 
see the good of this given our new formulation of alter- 
cation. 
Your production of yourself as superfluous ties 
in with your version of yourself as not harming, but you 
have to go a step further for deeply you are aware that this 
could not be good enough for you. You take another step 
and produce not harming as being steadfast, not budging, 
as /.., 
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as being incorruptible, and, in this way, you formulate your- 
self as caring for others. 
You do not do anything because you are never sure 
whether you mean it (C.F. weak altercation notion accounts 
for indecision. But also you treat 'means it' as 'knowing 
what you are doing' rather than as 'intending whilst not 
knowing'). You imagine you are sure that it is not good 
to do things you do not mean. For instance, you imagine 
it would be better not to write a work like this, because 
you would not be sure that you knew what you were doing. 
This work itself shows to our readers why that would have 
been a far worse mistake. You are the sort of writer who 
would never have left the street you were born in unless 
you were forced. You want to consume and use theories and 
ideologies to shield your person in the same manner that 
some imagine others want the strength of the insurance com- 
panies around them, for you have forgotten to choose to make 
the effort to display how your unsureness was your asset. 
How fortunate that you are not our reader. 
Your version of not harming as caring for is only 
an adequate version when nothing is required, but unfortunately 
for you, and fortunately for us, the only time nothing is 
required is likely to be in death, if that can be called a 
time at all. We offer the following caricature of you as 
dressed in the garb of a doctor who doesn' t diagnose or 
prescribe anything as that way you feel you can do no harm. 
That doctor does not grasp that he could and must do much 
more /... 
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more, and so must we. 
Your version of yourself as superfluous also leads 
you to end up talking to yourself for you imagine that you 
contribute nothing, you undervalue your own actions. In- 
deed even if you have a 'success' you would very quickly 
reduce it to being a matter of chance. You see yourself 
as wasting other's time, for you imagine that other could 
have no need for you, for you have not yet grasped how you 
need other. 
But we draw out many lessons or reminders for our- 
selves through your speech for we would choose to formulate 
our superfluousness as displaying not that we are not needed, 
but that we are needed if we are to do any better than treat- 
ing nature as good enough, and we produce the worrier's 
version of her own superfluousness as related to her forget- 
ful version of her relationship to nature. By engaging in 
caricature we do what nature cannot do, we try to encourage 
those who might have worried (to say it once more ourselves) 
that pretending to be natural is not good enough for us. 
Those who choose to view themselves as natural 
produce a version of speech /thought as a waste of time, they 
imagine they were better off before they learned to talk, 
but they are forgetting that they learnt that. An education 
that tries to teach us to be natural forgets its own social 
nature, if Kafka was referring to an education of this sort 
in his diaries he was very right when he said his education 
never did him any good. 
(8) 
Whilst /... 
- 190 - 
Whilst we are speaking of education we remember 
that for us a strong version of educating is educing, i.e. 
bringing out potential, we are wanting to reform views of 
education that are modelled on notions of imposing duties, 
for if we engage in imposing duties we would be fostering 
posers, i.e. actors who would not take on response -ability 
for their actions. Indeed the actions they dutifully 
perform would not be theirs. 
The formulation of superfluousness we have offered 
also reminds us why we would not relate to conventional usage 
as being that which provides us with an easy way, for that 
would be to lean towards treating our conventions as natural 
and subjecting ourselves to them. de must be providing our- 
selves with thoughtful conventions for we do provide out 
usage, our conventions and if they are thoughtless that 
our fault. We imagine that the worrier, that you, will 
try to hold on to a version of providing for that does not 
take response -ability to heart, for whereas your version of 
temptation revealed how you had forgotten that you were in- 
volved in its production, your version of responsibilities 
is as of duties in the weak sense mentioned above. You 
try to provide for things e.g. temptations, duties as if 
you have not had a part in providing them, and you fail to 
provide for them and for yourself as a result. 
You imagine that providing for things is prepar- 
ing for things, thinking about what might happen, and given 
that you concentrate upon seeing what you imagine is bad 
about things you tend to reduce preparing to various methods 
Of/000 
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of avoiding. We are not concerned to provide for things, 
but to provide for ways of thinking in order that we do 
act more response -ably, and not allow our lives to be 
reduced to avoidance, perhaps dancing in the void. As we 
said much much earlier in this work preparing for us in- 
volves paring away that which detracts from our character 
i.e. shallowness, superficiality, and these efforts to work 
with the speech of worry are providing one instance of the 
level of our involvement /commitment. 
- 192 - 
SECTION 5 
Original Speaker: 
"In one breath you were speaking of caricature 
and yet in another you were speaking of paring 
away that which detracts from our characters, 
i.e. shallowness: As you yourself said, you 
are mutilating personas, for shallowness would 
test the best caricaturist, for it requires him 
to draw the featureless aspects out, in such a 
way that they dominate. And yet I see now how 
this does need to be done if they are to be 
pared away: 
However, the issue of caricature helps me to 
raise much broader questions for whilst I do not 
deny that your speech displays inventiveness and 
the consummate ease of the accomplished artist, 
I reckon myself amongst those who are short in 
these qualities. And yet, more deeply, I have 
doubts about whether these are qualities at all. 
I would like to go on to explain myself more 
clearly here, but each of the above issues 
suggests to me that it would be better if I did not, 
for (a) my uninventiveness suggests that I will 
not say anything you do not know already, (b) my 
lack of consummate ease suggests that you will say 
whatever I was going to say more skillfully anyway, 
and (c) my doubts about whether these characteristics 
of the artist are qualities or not suggest that to 
engage in artistic work i.e. in trying to produce 
an account could in any case be self contradictory." 
Response: 
Come on Time and time again we have been saying 
it is time for you to contradict what you imagine is your 
self After all we have been saying can you still want to 
remain silent; to let shallowness be the feature we must 
remember you by? Why not take this opportunity to converse 
about these issues in such a way that we can be deepening 
ourselves /... 
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ourselves through our speech? Perhaps you are afraid that 
if your shallowness were removed nothing would remain: 
And perhaps you are right, but it could be that by making 
the effort to work at removing our shallowness we will be 
rebuilding the character you have irrationally come to fear 
you lack. And, by doing so, we will be remembering that 
we have never needed to fear other selves as being those 
who would merely reveal our shallowness only then to revel 
in it. 
A few moments ago you said that you saw how, if 
we are to pare away that which detracts from our character 
it must be brought to the surface i.e. that you saw how it 
must feature in our conversation. Could not this help us 
to characterise a friendly conversation as that through 
which each interlocutor tries to draw the best out of other? 
Could anything less than this be friendship? We are at 
ease with our friends not because they ask nothing of us, 
or themselves, on the contrary, we are at ease in our 
friendly relationships for through them we continue to ask 
ourselves and other selves to improve. 
Original Speaker: 
"Excuse my surprise, but of late I have con- 
sidered my friends to be those with whom I 
have felt at ease where ease involved no 
questions being asked. And yet now I can 
understand how that involved something more 
akin to unconditional acceptance of my person 
with all my faults, i.e. that version of 
friendship does not draw the best out of its 
members but allows them to degenerate, for it 
persuades them that no effort is needed to 
maintain the friendship. Friends of that 
sort would be our worst enemies. Furthermore 
this can remind us of one of the issues that 
We/000 
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we set out with i.e. that of the worrier's 
inability to befriend herself. Here we are 
showing that we were then relying upon an 
unexplicated notion of friendship as an easy 
silence. And yet by not settling for that 
silence we are showing that the worrier could 
have been beginning to befriend herself, and, 
more importantly, other selves all along by 
her questioning. Through our inquiry we are 
displaying how befriending ourselves could not 
mean merely resting content with ourselves, 
rather it means working together to draw the 
best out of each other. So now we grasp that 
we cannot expect to maintain friendships unless 
we are working at paring away our faulty per- 
sonas, and by doing so are helping others to 
do the same." 
Response: 
Whilst much that you say here is praiseworthy we 
are concerned lest your manner of speaking could deter rather 
than encourage others and yourself, for at this stage, i.e. 
whilst you choose to dwell upon the dangers that could arise 
for those who choose to remain content with themselves as 
they seem to be, you do not yet display how enjoyable work- 
ing to raise ourselves above thoughtless limitations can be. 
We will work in what follows of this section in such a way 
as to help ourselves to display how acting more thoughtfully, 
i.e. improving our -selves, our relations with others, is no 
hardship, and that the hardship lies in not doing this. 
But, perhaps we should say before we go any further, that 
we do not consider our work to be inventive, on the contrary, 
as we will be showing, it is you who invent, and are then 
trapped in the 'inventions' you forget you have produced. 
Neither do we consider ourselves to be accomplished artists, 
but this returns us to where this section began and provides 
an /.., 
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an opportunity for you to offer more material which we can 
work together upon in such a way that we continue to deepen 
our speech, to make our speech more thoughtful, more social, 
more moral. 
Original Speaker: 
"Alright, let us get on for time and space are 
limited, and perhaps with your help we can pro- 
vide material which we can use in our efforts to 
continue coming to grips with ourselves ..." 
(N.B. However original speaker lapses into silence here.) 
Response: 
Now we could have appeared to assist you here by 
intervening, and speaking on your behalf, for we imagine 
that you have lapsed into silence as a result of your notion 
of yourself as uninventive. And yet we choose to ask you 
to speak, for by doing so you may help reveal to yourself 
and us how your decision to lapse into silence was a product 
of your inventiveness not your uninventiveness. 
Perhaps you will be more prepared to proceed if 
we mention that through this inquiry we are leading ourselves 
to recall that through our formulations of educating as educ- 
ing, and of friendship as drawing the best out of self and 
other selves, we are displaying how the worrier could,by 
choosing not to rest with, or be redirected by, lazy con- 
ventional usage, prove to be a good friend after all. But 
once again we ask you to proceed, for if you remain silent 
this could suggest that you are thoroughly persuaded by your 
own view of the situation, by your invention. That is, 
your /... 
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your silence could illustrate how it is you that are the 
accomplished artist, and how your persuasive art acts as 
your accomplice in the contemptuous deception of yourself 
and other selves in which you are unwittingly engaged. 
Original Speaker: 
"But this is a monstrous situation; No, I 
will not say 'is' for that would be to fail 
to consider how it is I that envisage the 
situation to be such; that would be to refuse 
to think about what I am doing. Indeed, per- 
haps if I always formulate seeing or viewing 
as envisaging I will be reminded of how I am 
actively engaged in the production of what I 
begin by imagining I merely see. 
So, by formulating seeing as envisaging we 
display how the appearances that perhaps we 
imagined we began with, are connected with 
what has previously occurred to us, but by 
working harder upon this mode of connection 
we display how it can shock us, and fragment 
any easy, persuasive, togetherness of what we 
had previously imagined to be the initial 
occurrence. A thoughtful response is not 
like a miracle then i.e. it does not wish to 
be good whilst denying its connectedness. 
Rather, by being a spontaneous reply (re- 
sponse), it displays that a thoughtfully 
connected act is an instance of productive 
consumption, it progresses, makes more out 
of initial images, by displaying what the 
initials stand for. 
When I began to speak a moment ago my speech 
displayed many of the features of anger i.e. 
it was impatient, rushed, unthought about, 
and full of excuses, I imagine it has always 
been this way for I conceive of myself as 
only producing, speaking, under duress, i.e. 
when I am forced. I only begin when the 
alternative is to end, i.e. when what I 
imagine is a worse evil confronts me; 
hence my silence earlier. I connect with 
the past, or what I am in, in such a way as 
to conceive of myself as squeezed by it. 
I always want to pull my speech back, hence 
my 'yes - buts', because my version of begin- 
ning prevents me from having any resources 
for /... 
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for renewed beginnings. 
Perhaps I rely upon a version of production 
as invention, where invention is analogous 
to creation ex nihilo i.e. the immaculate 
conception. How strange; for any impetus 
to rest within the confines of a language 
game, or form of life, is analogous to 
treating concepts as perfectly pure, i.e. 
as unable to be improved upon. But, this 
version of production is contingent upon the 
version of beginnings as the limit, i.e. of 
beginning as that before which there was 
nothing. So whilst I imagine that the 
manipulative type wants things easy, i.e. 
wants rewards without effort, i.e. wants 
something for nothing, I have relied upon 
a version of myself as wanting something 
from nothing. 
Given this version of production as miracle, 
I am not surprisingly suspicious of all that 
purports to be production, and see my work to 
lie in showing that those creations were not 
from nothing, i.e. in showing the producers 
to be fakes. Perhaps it has been for this 
very reason that I have not wanted to be a 
producer, i.e. the fear of being shown to be 
a fake has prevented me from grasping that 
that fear was itself fake if it was mistakenly 
treated as original. So, if I had been 
reading this work prior to our conversation 
I would very likely have tried to show that 
it was not original, that it was like the 
work of so and so. I imagined that the 
only relationship of self to tradition was 
that of sheep to their leader. I would 
have tried to drag this work, and any work, 
down to what I imagined was my level, rather 
than risking allowing it to help me grow." 
Response: 
So now be kind enough to tell us how you might have 
spoken about inventiveness etc. in order that we can con- 
tinue actively contemplating, thinking about, drawing the 
best out of, rather than merely recounting or reflecting, 
or for that matter ignoring or rejecting, the modes of 
thought /... 
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thought /speech in which you were engaged when you began by 
referring to this situation as monstrous. By doing so we 
will be stretching ourselves out of a mode of speech that 
requires us to be squeezed, strangled, before we will speak. 
And, we will be reminding ourselves that we do not, and 
cannot, create out of nothing; we do have to relate through 
our material, we are intermediaries, and we choose to squeeze 
and work upon our material i.e. the forms of speech we could 
have used, that would otherwise use us. 
Original Speaker: 
"I will proceed by telling you the worries 
I have about inventiveness, for I may as well 
admit that had you agreed with my suggestion 
that your work was inventive this was what I 
was going to do anyway." 
(Note to reader: we include a further appendix at this 
stage in order that you can if you wish work through this 
speech without our responses, but we will then, as before 
offer readings of each paragraph to try to draw the best 
out of, i.e. to offer formulations of, this speech about 
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APPENDIX B 
"So, worries about invention: firstly, it 
is this version of invention as miracle, i.e. 
as something to be waited for which reduces 
the worrier to wasting, consuming time, she 
sees there to be nothing she can do. Worries 
about this though are that it is only a worry 
if consuming time is bad. 
Secondly, and a much more dramatic worry, is 
that as yet we have failed to bring to the 
fore the inventors potential to produce monsters 
as well as, or in the place of miracles. Some 
sort of Frankenstein analogy might be appropriate 
here, i.e. whereas manipulation merely leaves 
dead bodies behind, invention is more like 
bringing to life. It is in this sense that 
the manipulator can become the tool of mani- 
pulation, i.e. manipulation can get out of hand. 
The monster is created and then consumes its 
creator, examples might be capitalism, bureau- 
cracy, speeches or hearings that have forgotten 
to continue inquiring into their speaker's or 
hearer's place. 
One point that could provide interesting work is 
why the worrier invents a monster in the sense 
of producing the environment as something which 
cannot be trusted, i.e. as something to be afraid 
of. The worrier produces the environment as a 
monster and then chooses not to accept respons- 
ibility for her production. Because she con- 
ceives of the monster as having got out of hand 
she can wash her hands of her responsibility, 
i.e. her part in its production. She can sit 
back and hope it does not devour her. A monster 
is precisely that to which you cannot be expected 
to be responsive. With both monsters and 
miracles all you can do is sit back and hope. 
Perhaps we can make more sense now of the 
worrier's distrust of others, for she views 
them as acting as though they were or are not 
productions, i.e. as if they have a life of 
their own (in the same sense as Frankenstein's 
monster), and as if their life is dependent 
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the child who relates only to parents who 
she imagines have forgotten their childhood. 
That is, who she imagines see themselves as 
complete, and hence as no longer needing to 
produce themselves, but only to consume. 
Monsters do not grow, in the strong sense 
of grow better, and in this sense they are 
complete, i.e. all they will ever be. (Con- 
vention as mere persistence now starts to 
sound like the monster;) 
Furthermore, this reminder of the inventors 
potential to create monsters as well as 
miracles reminds us that the worrier's version 
of production as invention is yet a further 
indication of the worrier's wish to remove 
herself from responsibility. For, what the 
worrier likes about invention is its lack of 
responsibility for the invention's uses, i.e. 
she merely invents things, she does not use 
them. She could work for anyone. More than 
this though the inventor is, in a deep sense 
as inactive as the worrier for she requires 
an entrepreneurial alter to do things with 
her inventions i.e. she provides things for 
others to act with. She evades the decision 
(or pretends she does) about what ought to be 
done. So now we can see why invention is not 
a strong formulation of action. 
Thus even the worrier's utopian image of 
herself is as a creator without responsibility. 
The inventor produces inventions that will not 
ask anything of her i.e. the inventor wants 
admirers (gasps) not friends, she wants to 
remain a mystery. The inventor then is one 
who tries to stop conversations by producing 
i.e. the inventor has no time for speech as 
she sees others as uninventive (as dummies). 
Her inventiveness separates her from others, 
and her tendency to mumble, and speak incom- 
prehensibly suggests a lack of need of other. 
The inventor relies upon the separation of 
her product from her resources to retain her 
respect from others. 
Inventors often seem to be uncommitted except 
to invention, and perhaps this accounts for 
why they can produce monsters or miracles. 
But, it might be that their mumbling, their 
lack of ability to converse with others 
accounts for their apparent lack of commitment 
to anything other than invention. Their lack 
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same loneliness that the worrier experiences 
as a result of her urge for separation, which 
is in turn a result of seeing connection as 
pollution. 
The worrier by producing her version of pro- 
duction as miracle also produces her version 
of dialogue as the process of yes -but, i.e. 
invention followed by worry /interrogation, 
where worry is equivalent to seeing what is 
wrong with the invention, or what could go 
wrong with the invention. The worrier relies 
upon a notion of perfection as being without 
limits, so she sees imperfection as extending 
limitlessly i.e. as far as limits go, and 
furthermore she sees imperfection as bad. 
So her version of providing for is showing 
the limited nature of, and this becomes 
equivalent to showing the bad. In this way 
she creates monsters out of the same material 
from which "miracles" could be created. 
Furthermore, this version of bad as extending 
to limitlessness also suggests why the worrier 
produces seeing the good as irresponsibly 
taking a holiday. She produces rewards as 
that which should follow work, and as she 
sees her work as limitless, she never gets 
to see the good of anything, she never gets 
a holiday. She sees imperfection as bad, 
but fails to see that imperfection also in- 
volves good, i.e. that that which is imperfect 
is not all bad. This is how she creates 
monsters. 
This version of the worrier's speech as seeing 
the bad also helps us see why she sees other's 
speech as accusation i.e. whilst her wish to 
see problems or what is bad does provide room 
for more talk, which is good, it limits talk 
to court talk, which is bad. It reduces 
dialogue to prosecution and /or defence. The 
worrier either submits and accepts that the 
invention is original, i.e. that she has 
witnessed a miracle; the only way presumably 
she would ever do this is because of lack of 
evidence to the contrary, or the worrier/ 
prosecutor forces the inventor to submit 
and the miracle is shown to be fake. 
There is little or no time or space, given 
the limits of the court, and its version of 
dialogue to see the good of anything. Also, 
the worrier (as prosecutor) successfully 
produces herself as having no part in the 
crime. The prosecutor /worrier plays the 




that of the inventor, i.e. whilst the latter 
invents but does not use, the former uses 
things (e.g. the law) but disclaims respons- 
ibility for the production of those things. 
The worrier needs new things /inventions to 
criticize in the same way that the courts 
need crimes. This is another way of saying 
why it can never get to seeing the good, or 
having a holiday, for it can always find 
plenty of its work to do." 
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Analysis of Appendix B 
Response: 
Our relationship to this speech has requested a 
great deal of work and effort from us, for whilst we might 
have begun by dismissing it as a lazy regress, perhaps in 
part induced by a misreading of our earlier intimation of 
friendship, we are finding that by working upon, and with 
it, we are better getting to grips with how our relationship 
to what we read or hear can be a relationship of productive 
consumption. What we make out of this speech, and our 
relationship to it, may well be such as to make unrecog- 
nizable material almost recognizable. We will work 
through the speech paragraph by paragraph for from, and 
through, each paragraph we draw out elements of that which 
we are producing in this section, but this methodological 
or meticulous routine will not hide from us that our form 
of examination of text does not simply require a microscope 
and a cataloguing process. Our relationship to this speech 
and to all speeches including our own has more in common 
with the artist's relationship to his materials, but as we 
will very likely be speaking about art in the near future 
we will say no more on that issue at present. So we 
proceed to work with each paragraph in turn: 
Analysis of Paragraph 1 
"So, worries about invention: firstly it is 
this version of invention as miracle i.e. as 
something to be waited for which reduces the 
worrier to wasting, consuming time, she sees 
there to be nothing she can do. Worries 
about /... 
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about this though are that it is only a worry 
if consuming time is bad." 
Response: 
This paragraph reminds us to choose to hear your 
speech as choosing not to be reduced to worrying about in- 
vention as miracle, for we hear you as saying that that is 
how the version of invention as miracle would have reduced 
those who used and relied upon it to worry. That is, we 
hear your speech as actively seeking, working to achieve, a 
better version of good speech than invention as miracle. 
You start to display this for us by saying that wasting time 
is only a worry if consuming time is bad and this prompts 
us to ask ourselves why, or whether, we might have relied 
upon a version of time as some thing we can waste. But we 
can only waste, in the sense of use up, that which we see 
to be limited, so it could be that what we are uncovering 
here, with the help of your speech, is how even time can be 
reduced to a personal possession, a commodity, by those who 
imagine they already know what it is good to do or be. 
Perhaps this notion of wasting time is related to versions 
of man's mortality as something to fear, and yet there is 
something irrational about wanting to save, in the sense of 
stock up, time. By deciding not to orient to time as a 
personal possession that needs to be preserved, in the sense 
of not wasted, for how could we save it? and what for? we 
better grasp that we are always acting intentionally, 
thoughtfully now, i.e. we grasp how our selves are in time 
but do themselves no good by worrying about the movement of 
time. If we are to act more thoughtfully we must at least 
be /... 
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be prepared to ask ourselves whether what we are doing is 
what we would decide is worth doing, and not to pretend 
we already know, i.e. that we do not need to think about 
that. 
Analysis of Paragraph 2 
"Secondly, and a much more dramatic worry, is 
that as yet we have failed to bring to the 
fore the inventor's potential to produce monsters 
as well as, or in the place of miracles. Some 
sort of Frankenstein analogy might be appropriate 
here i.e. whereas manipulation merely leaves dead 
bodies behind, invention is more like bringing 
to life. It is in this sense that the manip- 
ulator can become the tool of manipulation i.e. 
manipulation can get out of hand. The monster 
is created and then consumes its creator, 
examples might be capitalism, bureaucracy, 
speeches or hearings that have forgotten to 
continue inquiring into their speaker's or 
hearer's place." 
Response: 
So frequently your speech could have frustrated 
us, as it seems to frustrate, yourself, for couldn't you 
have said not 'we have failed', but we now succeed, or 
alternatively couldn't you have said, we have previously 
succeeded in not bringing the inventor's weakness to produce 
monsters to the fore? Of all the 'things' an inventor 
could produce, your speech chooses to concentrate on the 
monster; 
We become impatient for we want manipulation to 
get out of hand, we want man -ipulation to be thoughtful, 
ruled by heads if you like, and we want to bring back to 
life the forms of speech, i.e. like yours is at present, 
that /... 
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that could deaden the lives of their speakers and hearers. 
The analogies you use reveal the points at which you decide 
to discontinue your inquiry, but we are showing how you 
could have got the best out of your own speech by display- 
ing how it helps you to proceed with inquiry, rather than 
by imagining it brings it to a close. We do not choose 
to move from miracles to monsters, but from miracles and/ 
or monsters to continuing human achievements. We are 
reminded that we do not orient to your speech as either a 
miracle or a monster i.e. our concern is not with easy, 
thoughtless acceptance or rejection, rather, by orienting 
to your reading of your circumstances as a continuing human 
achievement we can work towards a more thoughtful understand- 
ing of what we share. But, the more profound and deeper 
issue we are raising here is that we should not differentiate 
our speech /thought in such a way as to treat it differently 
to the speech of others, and by relating to our own thoughts 
in this same manner we should work with and on our thoughts 
and not orient to our thinking as a work process which if 
successful can be terminated in easy thoughtlessness. 
Thinking which does enjoy itself, i.e. thinking which is 
social has no need to terminate itself, and we take this 
opportunity to remind ourselves that we do not separate 
thought from action in any vulgar manner. By commending 
that thinking does not terminate itself we are not commend- 
ing inaction, but we are commending an end to any urges to- 
wards thoughtless actions. 
Analysis of Paragraph 3 
"One /... 
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"One point that could provide interesting 
work is why the worrier invents a monster 
in the sense of producing the environment 
as something which cannot be trusted, i.e. 
as something to be afraid of. The worrier 
produces the environment as a monster and 
then chooses not to accept responsibility for 
her production. Because she conceives of 
the monster as having got out of hand she can 
wash her hands of her responsibility, i.e. her 
part in its production. She can sit back and 
hope it does not devour her. A monster is 
precisely that to which you cannot be expected 
to be responsive. With both monsters and 
miracles all you can do is sit back and hope." 
Response: 
(a) Regarding interesting work, we are reminded by this 
that we will always ask ourselves what it is or why it is 
that some thing or topic interests us, for by doing so we 
will encourage ourselves to think about what we are doing, 
what we are, and by doing so will choose to act in a more 
thoughtful manner. Perhaps what interests the worrier are 
ways to avoid facing up to that which she imagines she fears. 
So, when she says "one point that could provide interesting 
work ... ", we could hear her as revealing her temptation to 
conceal from herself the fact that deeply she imagines that 
she is afraid to ask herself about why she is interested in 
what she says she is interested in. She might try to laugh 
this off, but she would do better if she honestly admitted 
that she did not know what she was interested in for then 
she could work with us to produce thoughtful interests. 
We do not skate over the issue of interests, for if we did 
we would be restricting ourselves to the shallows, and 
restrictions of that sort are uninteresting to thoughtful 
social /... 
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social, characters. 
(b) She speaks of that which cannot be trusted as 
something to be afraid of, but fear is not the only res- 
ponse possible, for isn't it the stranger i.e. the one we 
do not know that we cannot yet trust. So isn't a possible 
response to that which we cannot trust inquiry, i.e. the 
effort to seek to get to know, to create a relationship of 
trust with? Furthermore the worrier claims to know too 
much for she says that the environment cannot be trusted, 
we would rather say that we do not yet know whether it can 
be trusted or not, i.e. we would not prejudge the issue. 
Also, by redirecting her attention to other, the environment, 
the worrier reveals her trust in her self as she appears to 
herself to be. We are showing that she would do better to 
orient to that which she imagines herself to be as something 
to distrust, if that distrust could stimulate her into 
thoughtful active inquiry and not fearful avoidance. 
(c) Whilst she conceives of the environment as having 
got out of hand, we conceive of our environment as that 
which has always been out of hand, but that which we have 
to work to take into our thoughtful hands. We are washing 
our hands, thinking about our methods, in order to work well 
with our materials, our environment. That is, we are doing 
this work, i.e. writing this piece, before we offer readings 
of other authors etc. in order that our hands /methods do not 
unnecessarily dirty our material. We want to be becoming 
better able to respect our materials. 
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(d) We would rather say that a monster is that to 
which you cannot choose not to respond, and in that sense 
we would not be unduly concerned if this work strikes you 
as monstrous, for if it does it will at least encourage you 
to think about how you are responding, and not to imagine 
yourself to be inactive, i.e. merely sitting and hoping, or 
perhaps judging as if from the outside; 
(e) By producing a version of the relationship between 
self and other selves as that between self and monster we 
hear you as revealing an urge to live without speech, i.e. 
an urge for you to live your personal life even at the cost 
of thought /society, for there is no place for conversation 
with a monster. Questions are avoided like the plague. 
But that would be no life at all for a thinker /speaker it 
is not a human possibility. It is to reduce thoughtful 
questioning, interrogation to in - terror - gatiorr. 
Analysis of Paragraph 4 
"Perhaps we can make more sense now of the 
worrier's distrust of others, for she views 
them as acting as though they were or are not 
productions, i.e. as if they have a life of 
their own (in the same sense as Frankenstein's 
monster), and as if their life is dependent 
solely upon consumption. The worrier is like 
the child who relates only to parents who she 
imagines have forgotten their childhood. That 
is, who she imagines see themselves as complete, 
and hence as no longer needing to produce them- 
selves, but only to consume. Monsters do not 
grow, in the strong sense of grow better, and 
in this sense they are complete, i.e. all they 
will ever be. (Convention as mere persistence 
now starts to sound like the monster;)" 
Response: 
But /... 
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But what good does it do you, or any other for 
you to rest in distrust of other? We choose not to rest 
there, i.e. not to distrust others e.g. perhaps the worrier, 
but through our conversations to relate in such a way as 
to display how by acting thoughtfully, asking questions we 
can enliven ourselves and other selves. We choose not to 
relate to the worrier as parent to child, or as child to 
parent, but as we would with collaborators, friends who do 
not consider themselves complete, and who are seeking to 
grasp the monstrous nature of any selves that choose to 
imagine they are complete. We could not have a life on 
our own for we are not one, and, if parents were to have 
been those who imagined they were complete, we would not 
choose to grow up. Furthermore parents' very desire to 
have children could be an expression of their deep awareness 
of their lives lack of completion. But, by committing our- 
selves to lasting childhood we display the child's response - 
ability, and are not treating childhood as a way to avoid 
responsibilities. The child has potential to improve and 
we are making the effort to continue to share in that. 
Analysis of Paragraph 5 
"Furthermore, this reminder of the inventor's 
potential to create monsters as well as miracles 
reminds us that the worrier's version of pro- 
duction as invention is yet a further indication 
of the worrier's wish to remove herself from 
responsibility. For, what the worrier likes 
about invention is its lack of responsibility 
for the invention's uses, i.e. she merely in- 
vents things, she does not use them. She 
could work for anyone. More than this though 
the inventor is, in a deep sense as inactive 
as the worrier for she requires an entrepreneurial 
alter to do things with her inventions i.e. she 
provides /... 
- 211 - 
provides things for others to act with. She 
evades the decision (or pretends she does) 
about what ought to be done. So now we can 
see why invention is not a strong formulation 
of action. 
Response: 
You remind us that we would rather have said that 
our potential to act with thoughtful good intentions reminds 
us that our version of production, as thoughtful response, 
is deeper than inventiveness for it indicates our desire to 
become ourselves by taking on response -abilities. For 
what we like about thoughtful responses is that they claim 
response- ability. We do not differentiate between self, 
and other selves, in such a manner that our thoughtful res- 
ponse is good for one and not the other, our responses dis- 
play our community with others. We work for ourselves, 
and with ourselves, and do not shift responsibility for our 
products on to others e.g. employers. We are active, and 
do not require others to act in a different capacity to our- 
selves, for we want others to think about, and collaborate 
in the improvement of our ways of speaking /thinking /living, 
as we are doing. We are making the effort to provide for 
ways of thinking /acting such that we decide what we ought 
to do, for there is no way we can leave that decision to 
others. So, we are working with the worrier's speech to 
formulate more thoughtful /social modes of thought /action 
and by doing so deepen ourselves. 
Analysis of Paragraph 6 
"Thus even the worrier's utopian image of 
herself is as a creator without responsibility. 
The /... 
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The inventor produces inventions that will 
not ask anything of her i.e. the inventor 
wants admirers (gasps) not friends, she wants 
to remain a mystery. The inventor then is 
one who tries to stop conversations by pro- 
ducing i.e. the inventor has no time for 
speech as she sees others as uninventive 
(as dummies). Her inventiveness separates 
her from others, and her tendency to mumble, 
and speak incomprehensibly suggests a lack 
of need of other. The inventor relies upon 
the separation of her product from her 
resources to retain her respect from others." 
Response: 
We are reminded by this paragraph that our version 
of ourselves is as response -able, thoughtful, social actors. 
We produce our actions as asking the same of ourselves as 
from other selves, for we choose to display our selves in 
order that through, and with, others collaboration we can 
demystify our actions, and get a better grip upon what we 
do. We try to start and maintain conversations with, and 
through our formulations, for we have no time outside our 
conversations /thoughts, outside our friendly relationships. 
Indeed we would become dummies if we could have chosen not 
to hear what others had to say. Our response -able actions 
collect us with others, i.e. display what we share, and if 
we have a tendency to mumble or speak incomprehensibly we 
are reminded by this of our need of other, rather than our 
lack of need. We are working to recollect how we are 
using our resources in our conversations in such a way as 
to respect other selves and our own selves. And we know 
that by differentiating in shallow ways we cannot create 
conditions in which we truly respect other selves and our 
own selves. 
Analysis/... 
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Analysis of Paragraph 7 
"Inventors often seem to be uncommitted 
except to invention, and perhaps this 
accounts for why they can produce monsters 
or miracles. But, it might be that their 
mumbling, their lack of ability to converse 
with others accounts for their apparent 
lack of commitment to anything other than 
invention. Their lack of commitment is 
a product of loneliness, the same lone- 
liness that the worrier experiences as a 
result of her urge for separation, which 
is in turn a result of seeing connection 
as pollution. 
Response: 
We want to ask what the worrier would do with in- 
ventors, or more strongly what the worrier would do with all 
of us, for she seems capable of producing bad versions of 
each and every one of us, including herself. What could 
the good of this be? Perhaps it could direct our attention 
to what we all share, i.e. our incompleteness, and by doing 
so she could be calling upon us, and herself, to raise our- 
selves above the pretence of either phoney commitments or 
phoney uncommittedness. Our commitment can only be our 
continuing engagement in the effort to be freeing ourselves 
from activities which are degrading. Freeing ourselves 
from activities which require us to deny, and /or forget, 
that we do not know what is good, and cannot know, but do 
decide through conversation. We are committed to listening 
to others and ourselves in such a way that we hear speeches 
as calling for thoughtful responses. You have spoken to 
us of the worrier's urge for separation, but the fact that 
you continue to converse with us displays either that you 
are not the worrier in which case how do you know that she 
wants /... 
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wants separation? Or that worry's, your, urge is not for 
separation from all others, but from polluted speeches that 
would degrade their speakers. So your desire is for your- 
self, and other selves to stretch speeches in such a way 
that those speeches are worth listening to, connecting with. 
Analysis of Paragraph 8 
"The worrier by producing her version of pro- 
duction as miracle also produces her version 
of dialogue as the process of yes -but, i.e. 
invention followed by worry /interrogation, 
where worry is equivalent to seeing what is 
wrong with the invention, or what could go 
wrong with the invention. The worrier relies 
upon a notion of perfection as being without 
limits, so she sees imperfection as extending 
limitlessly i.e. as far as limits go, and 
furthermore she sees imperfection as bad. 
So her version of providing for is showing 
the limited nature of, and this becomes 
equivalent to showing the bad. In this 
way she creates monsters out of the same 
material from which "miracles" could be 
created. Furthermore, this version of 
bad as extending to limitlessness also 
suggests why the worrier produces seeing 
the good as irresponsibly taking a holiday. 
She produces rewards as that which should 
follow work, and as she sees her work as 
limitless, she never gets to see the good 
of anything, she never gets a holiday. She 
sees imperfection as bad, but fails to see 
that imperfection also involves good, i.e. 
that that which is imperfect is not all bad. 
This is how she creates monsters." 
Response: 
The thinker, by producing a version of production 
as thoughtful response also produces a version of dialogue 
as a process of questioning, i.e. statements followed by 
questions where the questions are equivalent to asking what 
the good of the state of affairs suggested by the statement 
would be, or could be. We produce our notion of dialogue, 
i.e./... 
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i.e. thoughtful life as being without limit, for it does not 
rely upon specific embodied persons, so we produce dialogue 
as extending limitlessly, and furthermore we produce dial- 
ogue i.e. that which does not end, as being worthy of our 
commitment i.e. as being our expression of our thoughtful 
good intentions. So our version of providing for is show- 
ing the unlimited nature of dialogue, and this is equivalent 
to showing the good of thought as opposed to thoughtlessness. 
In this way we can continue speaking thoughtfully rather 
than settle for monstrous versions of ourselves as seeking 
thoughtlessness: i.e. an end to dialogue. Our version of 
the unlimited nature of dialogue and the good of thoughtful 
intentions reminds us why displaying the good of dialogue 
is not taking an irresponsible holiday, but is working in 
a fashion that does us good. By seeking to deepen our 
understanding of our place as speakers we are showing how 
we must be thoughtful, i.e. willing and able to reflect upon 
our own speech /action, if we are truly to enjoy doing what 
we do; if we are to be becoming engaged in what we are 
doing; if we are to be displaying our social characters. 
We have no way of conceptualizing how we could separate our 
work, i.e. thinking, from rewards, for we only engage in 
work /thought that is good for us, and as we also can con- 
ceive of no end to our work we are in a sense always on 
holiday. We show the good of imperfection to rest in the 
choice, the freedom, we offer each other through our place 
as intermediaries. By remembering that that which is 
imperfect is not all bad we make space for our thoughtful 
good intentions, and can continue to work in such a way as 
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to be improving upon otherwise monstrous versions of self. 
Analysis of Paragraph 9 
"This version of the worrier's speech as 
seeing the bad also helps us see why she sees 
other's speech as accusation, i.e. whilst her 
wish to see problems or what is bad does provide 
room for more talk, which is good, it limits 
talk to court talk, which is bad. I t reduces 
dialogue to prosecution and /or defence. The 
worrier either submits and accepts that the 
invention is original, i.e. that she has wit- 
nessed a miracle; the only way presumably she 
would ever do this is because of lack of evidence 
to the contrary, or the worrier /prosecutor forces 
the inventor to submit and the miracle is shown 
to be fake. There is little or no time or space, 
given the limits of the court, and its version of 
dialogue to see the good of anything. Also, the 
worrier (as prosecutor) successfully produces 
herself as having no part in the crime. The 
prosecutor /worrier plays the opposite trick 
regarding responsibility to that of the inventor, 
i.e. whilst the latter invents but does not use, 
the former uses things (e.g. the law) but dis- 
claims responsibility for the production of those 
things." 
Response: 
Our version of the thinker's speech as seeking to 
continue engaging in dialogue also helps us display why we 
do not choose to hear other's speech as accusation, but as 
friendly questioning which encourages us to think more 
about why we are doing what we are doing. Our desire to 
achieve greater understanding of what others understand as 
good about their actions does provide us with room for more 
conversation, and by refusing to limit our speech to court 
talk, we refuse to reduce the friendly relationship that 
is dialogue to a matter of prosecution and /or defence. 
For we speakers are working to produce thoughtful decisions 
about good and bad, not to produce evidence in order to 
support /... 
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support or reject a specific instance in respect of previously 
unquestioned but adhered to rules. 
The thinker neither submits and accepts that the 
invention is original, nor does she reject it because it 
is not original, rather, through conversations with the 
'inventor' she is reminded that the inventor is like herself, 
i.e. is also engaged in the effort of getting to think about 
the place of self. Our version of dialogue enables us to 
need no time and space for any activities other than those 
of conversing in such a way as to display our thoughtful 
social relationships, for why would we want to use our 
selves doing what we did not think it was good to do? 
Furthermore, this paragraph reminds us that we are 
choosing not to produce versions of all others as worriers 
(C.F. prosecutor as worrier, inventor as worrier etc. etc.), 
for our work is engaged in showing how all speakers are 
engaged in the activity of displaying the place of thinkers/ 
speakers /social actors. The worrier speaks in that para- 
graph of the prosecutor as playing the trick of using things, 
e.g. the law, but not being responsible for the things, and 
of the inventor as producing things, but not being responsible 
for their uses. We, however, choose to claim responsibility 
both for our productions and for the uses of our productions. 
We are responsible for both the worrier's speech in this 
work and our own, and this can remind us how, whenever we 
read or converse, i.e. all of our thoughtful lives, we are 
responsible not only for the versions of ourselves that we 
display, but also for the versions of other that we choose 
to/,,, 
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to respond to. Of course this does not lead us to be 
overwhelmed with the effort we must make, for we remember 
that we are already making that effort, and always have 
been. Now, by thinking about how we are making it, we 
can choose to waste ourselves less in shallow misunder- 
standings. 
Analysis of Paragraph 10 
"The worrier needs new things /inventions to 
criticize in the same way that the courts need 
crimes. This is another way of saying why it 
can never get to seeing the good, or having a 
holiday, for it can always find plenty of its 
work to do." 
Response: 
By formulating our relationship to ourselves and 
other selves as one of friendship, of membership in the same 
community, we always have dialogue to engage in, questions 
to ask. But this is not criticism, for criticism, as con- 
ventionally understood, involves the invocation of criteria 
that we do not claim to have access to, knowledge of. Our 
questions display our commitment to continuing dialogue; 
not the unthoughtful decision to reduce ourselves to offer- 
ing answers we cannot support. We are not on the look -out 
for crimes, and /or inventions in the manner it is suggested 
in that paragraph that the courts and the worrier are, but, 
even so we are, fortunately, never short of work to do. 
Original Speaker: 
"I wish I could feel optimistic about the 
future, i.e. about my achieving your under- 
standing, but I lean toward pessimism for 
I /... 
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I have grave doubts about my ability to do soi" 
Response: 
You speak as if both the optimist and the pessimist 
are in better situations than yourself, for you too hastily 
seek the security that you imagine their views of the future 
offer them i.e. even the pessimist need not worry for there 
is nothing he can do. You imagine yourself as being in a 
situation of greater suffering, and yet we would say that 
you are right neither to be an optimist, nor a pessimist, 
for each claims to know too much about what factually will 
happen, and, more importantly, about whether what will 
happen is good or bad. You remind us that we do not know 
the future, but we do know that it is not what happens that 
is good or bad, but how we respond, and that is why we can 
choose to act with thoughtful good intentions now. That 
is why we can affect what happens. Our security rests in 
the fact that we know that what happens cannot detract from 
our thoughtful good intentions: which is not to say we 
cannot make mistakes. We produce your doubts about your 
ability as doing you credit, and enabling you to proceed, 
i.e. ironically they display your ability. They enable you 
to raise, rather than lower, yourself, they are important, 
but not grave. However we imagine that in your eyes 
important matters are grave, serious, and by remembering 
this we can move on to speak about art as we earlier in- 
timated we would. 
We imagine that you conceive of art as a reward, 
i.e. as analogous to a sweet that follows the main course, 
i.e. /... 
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i.e. as something to be consumed after the work of sustain- 
ing has been done, and that this leads you to view art as 
being dispensible i.e. able to be done without. Yet we 
would say that in this as in so many other matters you have 
the true order of man's place backwards, for does not that 
which needs to be sustained first have to be produced? 
We all engage in thoughtful art work when we are producing 
the versions of ourselves that then need to be sustained. 
You who imagine you can sustain yourself without 
art, or before bothering with art have come to paint a 
picture of yourself as natural, and are so taken in with 
what you see that you forget you painted it. And then you 
go on to forget that you are always painting for you have 
come to imagine that you cannot paint at all. 
You make art sound like something you can leave 
behind, for you tend to want to travel light, but you for- 
get that where you decide to travel is part of your self - 
portrait. By treating art as inessential you would reduce 
your travel to mindless wandering for you want to let nature 
make up your mind for you; you want to be blown by the wind. 
So here we show how if we rested with a view of the social 
as a topic for science we would be engaged in the reduction 
of ourselves to nonselves. You might have offered a 
version of what we are saying as nonsense without noticing 
that non -sense could be good if we can show how it makes 
room for us as truly response -able, social, thoughtful, 
moral actors rather than as sensible little things. 
This /... 
- 221 - 
This writing is exciting and enjoyable and that 
is good, but we do not rest back, for we are engaged in 
instructing ourselves in how to paint, i.e. we take pains 
with ourselves to be becoming more skillful painters, for 
here is where we part company with the conventional notion 
of art. Our work is not a matter of inspiration, or natural 
genius, but of human effort, of human achievement. Our 
lack of ability to produce a perfect speech does not rest 
in our difference from others, but in our sameness, and this 
is why we are engaged in a relationship of friendship which 
is denied to speakers who hide behind social distance, who 
imagine they are, or are in the company of, accomplished 
artists. This is how we could earlier speak of ourselves 
as the same as Socrates, and can say here that you are the 
same as us. But of course, excitement and enjoyment must 
also be thought about. The former is conventionally taken 
as getting out of oneself e.g. being overcome with emotion 
or whatever, however, we produce excitement as thoughtful 
involvement. It is only those who rely upon a disinte- 
grated version of the relationship between self and other 
selves that imagine they are drawn out of themselves when 
they get involved with others. As to enjoyment, we will 
be addressing this topic throughout the remainder of this 
section, but we can say that for us enjoying is not mere 
consumption, but taking things further, adding joy to things 
by deepening, by making more thoughtful. 
The manner in which we imagine you separate con- 
sumption and production leaves you unable to remember how 
You /... 
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you are producing yourself, and if this view were generally 
adhered to it would reduce men's capacity to produce in a 
manner that could please only a misanthrope. But we 
think of selves as lovers of mankind. However, we imagine 
that you who hide from your response -ability, i.e. from the 
fact that you are a thinker, would see speech about love 
as very out of place here, for you cannot distinguish 
between pleasure and seduction. You see knowledge, for 
example Sociology, as a means to enclose and define, i.e. 
as a way to fill in the gaps, rather than as a way to 
actively seek friendly relations, i.e. as an inquiry which 
opens and liberates those engaged in it. Stripped of its 
rhetoric we find that social science could be the seducer 
that would unclothe men of their finest garments, i.e. of 
their ability to move and improve. And yet you are per- 
plexed, though you seek to hide this, for whilst you commend 
seriousness you only enjoy yourself when you are unserious. 
You see art as equivalent to alcohol and accuse 
both of being seductive i.e. of reducing men' s productive 
capacity, you would accuse us as well, but you are perhaps 
a little nervous at present. And yet there is something 
in your accusation if art is treated as for consumption, and 
for this reason we would ask you not to orient to this work 
in that way, for if you do you will be forgetting the un- 
productive, i.e. the seductive, nature of your own activity. 
We imagine you equate seduction with ternptation,and art, 
because it is moving, with seduction, you want to remain 
unmarked by what you read, on top of it, for you imagine 
that /.., 
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that seduction occurs outside work, where work is constrained, 
i.e. is an imposed duty. But we remember how we need not 
be seduced by this persuasive though enslaving notion of 
work. For we remember that seriousness fails to differentiate 
between good and bad, i.e. that a rapist could be very 
serious in the pursuit of his victim, but would that increase 
the worth of his action? 
Our speech begins to irritate:; We expected as 
much for you can only tolerate art as long as it does not 
claim to have anything to say. As soon as the artist asks 
you to answer for yourself you imagine he is being pre- 
tentious, and we would agree with you if that artist was 
raising himself on a platform in such a way as to differentiate 
between his ability and that of his audience, but this need 
not be the case. Furthermore, and of greater importance, is 
your deep awareness that whilst you charge art with pre- 
tentiousness you refuse to recognize how your usage of alcohol 
to hide from ugliness is also pretentious i.e. that hiding 
from, or not facing up tom what you claim you know is bad is 
pretending. 
You want to make or keep your routine, your life, 
tolerable and you use alcohol, acquaintances, or whatever 
else as a way to take the edge off your pain, you will try 
to slot our speech away somewhere in order to make it handle- 
able, for your interest is in getting through unscathed. 
Your irritableness could surface in an attempt to listen no 
more, for you want to charge us with speaking dishonestly, 
for you imagine that we do not know what we are talking 
about /... 
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about, and this is why you distrust others, for you always 
feel they do not really know what they are talking about. 
But, you rest content with versions of others as either 
fools or liars, and neither instils in you any trust, or 
any desire to pursue a conversation. However, you could 
have seen those who talk about what they do not know as men, 
i.e. as philosophers, who take the risk of engaging in con- 
versation, i.e. of allowing themselves to ask questions and 
to be asked questions. You imagine you want to have the 
courage to call others liars and fools, whereas we call 
ourselves to courageously join in the conversation in such 
a way that we can collaborate with other. You imagine that 
you need knowledge to speak e.g. you draw back from accusing 
other when you realize you do not yet know enough to go 
through with your accusation. Whereas we see those who 
speak, including yourself, as expressing the desire for know- 
ledge rather than the possession of knowledge. You imagine 
you are either deeper than others, i.e. not as foolish, or 
not dishonest like others, i.e. not a liar, but it is you 
who are too foolish to notice how your silence is a lie. 
By conversing openly with others we risk having our 
foolishness remarked upon, but only in this way can we pro- 
ceed to try to act more thoughtfully. We do not wish to 
allow ourselves to become settled in a foolish routine. 
Original Speaker: 
"But you must remember that you are imagining 
all of this, that I am only an imaginary speaker, 
for it is this very tendency to reify, as you 
are reifying the worrier, i.e. to speak as if 
she is there, and is not a product of your 
theorizing /... 
- 225 - 
theorizing that exemplifies the worrier's 
error with the bad. That is, worry reifies 
the bad, and yet it is aware that it does 
not know what is good, for it imagines good 
is beyond it. However, it does imagine it 
knows, that it can see, what is bad, indeed 
it imagines that its lack of ability to see 
the good is bad; How much better if it can 
come to remember the good of not being able 
to see either the good or the bad, i.e. that 
this enables us to choose, to think about, 
talk about, what is good or bad for us. 
You do not know that I, the worrier, am bad, 
you do not even know that I am, but through 
your speech you are displaying how you are 
committing yourself to act in certain ways, 
and you need to remember as you continue 
speaking that it is your intentions that 
are always worthy of analysis rather than the 
accuracy or equivalence between your speech 
about an object and the object itself, for 
the latter is no more accessible to you than 
it is to me and we need not converse about 
it. Are you giving enough thought to your 
readers? Why should they be interested in 
your imaginings? 
Response: 
Thank you for the reminder, so now it is not a 
question of whether worry is or is not, or of whether worry 
is or is not bad, but of our thoughtful decisions. We can, 
and always do, speak about, converse about possibility, and 
in this manner orient our actions rather than merely submit 
to knowledge claims which we know claim too much. We are 
not engaged in pointing at, or accusing,those who worry, 
rather, by thinking about worry as a form of life, we are 
offering ourselves pointers. As to our readers, perhaps 
they had drifted from our thoughts, but given that we do 
not differentiate between ourselves and other selves in 
terms of access to knowledge etc., and given that we have 
been enjoying our engagement in this conversation we dare 
to say that they also will be enjoying it, for we know that 
they /... 
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they will not be consumption oriented. We know that they 
do not imagine that they should not enjoy what they enjoy. 
Worriers would worry because they did not enjoy art and 
they thought they should, but our readers are not worriers 
for they are thoughtful interlocutors who do not need to 
be drunk, and in this sense unserious, before they can 
enjoy anything. They do not need to be entertained to 
pass their time, for they also are engaged in our inquiry 
and they are well aware of the foolishness of the tragedies 
that always result from lack of involvement, i.e. from try- 
ing to stay out of things /conversations. There is a deep 
irony here for if the sociologist is one who formulates his 
own place as that of observer, i.e. as outside, we see that 
as such he can never get below the surface and his speech 
will necessarily remain shallow, and if listened to would 
play a part in the reduction of man to silence. But, of 
course no character in his right mind, i.e. no thoughtful 
interlocutor, would choose to engage in such a self des- 
tructive enterprise, and we produce our version of the 
sociologist as engaging in a productive dialogue with the 
forms of life in which, and through which, he seeks to pro- 
duce more thoughtful, more social, conventions. 
We want our work to encourage you to risk being 
moved, and to move ourselves, for we do not settle with a 
version of being moved as bad i.e. as being corrupted. We 
do not succumb to fears about expressing our feelings, for 
only by expressing them can we be instructed through con- 
versations with others as to the possible society that 
could arise around them. And, as we have said, we do not 
rest /... 
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rest with a version of other as untrustworthy. Whilst 
the worrier, as disintegrated man, has, through her un- 
dialectical version of thought, come to imagine that when 
others are involved in the movement of her feelings, her 
feelings are no longer hers, we are working to display how 
both self and other are always involved in social relation- 
ships. We do not seek separate survival but to live more 
thoughtfully by increasing our involvements with others. 
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SECTION 6 
Original Speaker: 
"But if one of the elements of what you were 
doing in the last section was alerting me to 
the fact that seriousness can be seductive 
i.e. that both good and bad can be seriously 
pursued isn't the very fact that you alert 
me to it like telling me to take it seriously? 
If you want me to be more than startled surely 
you need to produce a stronger version of 
serious such that the difference between 
serious and unserious activities can help 
me to choose what I do. You need to show 
me why 'more deeply' and 'a stronger version' 
are not simply other ways of saying 'more 
seriously' or 'a more serious version', when, 
as yet, you have not shown me the difference 
between serious and unserious." 
Response: 
We think that we can be more than startled if we 
make the effort to think about what it is about seriousness 
that we could have imagined was good. Whilst you imagine 
you want us to become things that help you choose what to 
do, perhaps to reduce the choice you have i.e. to make you 
more like a thing, we want to be becoming able to help our- 
selves (including you) to choose well. And we do so by 
listening to our own speech in such a way as to display 
how we are all already always choosing. With regard to 
your request that we show you why 'more deeply' and 'a 
stronger version' are not simply other ways of saying 'more 
seriously' and 'a more serious version', if we replied that 
they could be, we would perhaps be accused of facetiousness, 
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but that is what we do reply, for until we have conversed 
about how we could have used the notion of seriousness, 
about why you for instance chose to begin by treating 'more 
deeply' as 'more serious' our conversation will not progress. 
To put this in another, perhaps more risky, fashion, 
in the last section we made reference to the fact that a 
rapist could pursue his victim seriously, as a way to 
illustrate how seriousness was not enough. And yet we used 
this example in the context of a section through which we 
came to reveal how we imagine the worried type reifies the 
bad,i.e. believes she can see what is bad. But we know 
that no thing is good or bad. That we, as social actors, 
think, converse about, and decide how we want to differentiate 
between activities, things, or whatever, in terms of good 
or bad. So, we could have chosen to formulate rape as 
good; That we do not choose to do so is not because of any 
goodness or badness which is inherent in rape, indeed it is 
not because of anything, rather it is in order to display 
our commitment to the sort of community we desire, the sort 
of characters we want to be. Forms of speech /life which 
rely upon reified versions of good or bad would have com- 
mitted rape of a much deeper order if they could have op- 
pressed us, as speakers, and deprived us of the profound 
enjoyment that speech which displays our awareness of our 
place as social actors provides. That is as those who do 
continue to collaborate in such a way as to choose how we 
want to live. 
But, as yet, you do not appear to be sharing in 
this /,.. 
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this enjoyment, perhaps you will continue to collaborate 
with us by informing us as to how you imagine a worrier 
would speak about seriousness. After hearing you speak 
we will once again relate to, and through, your speech 
paragraph by paragraph. 
(Note to reader: Again we choose to resort to usage of an 
appendix, but it occurs to us to say that the placing of 
these appendices in the body of the work displays how they 
have been, for us, an integral part of our work; how we have 
no desire to cut them out, or dismiss them, but seek to be 
deepening ourselves through our friendly relationship to 
them. You, being a thoughtful interlocutor no doubt choose 
not to orient to the speeches of others as appendices which 
give you pain and which are better removed. No doubt you 
will be orienting to others' speeches as helping you to 
provide for yourself the pains of conscience so necessary 
for thoughtful actions. We are all doing far better by 
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APPENDIX C 
"Perhaps a worrier conceives of a serious 
situation as one where worry is a reasonable 
response. Perhaps she perceives the situ- 
ation to be serious when she has some res- 
ponsibility to act in the situation which 
she imagines she may be perceived by herself 
and others to fail to fulfil. Also, the 
more the outcome is irreversible the more 
serious it appears. Thus the parents whose 
child dies in childbirth may for good or 
bad reasons tell themselves that they can 
try again later, or adopt, or whatever, and 
in this way make the outcome appear less 
final. Finality, then, can be treated as 
an important feature of seriousness. It 
is worth noting that the idea of finality 
seems to oscillate between the notion of 
limit as an idea of finiteness, and limit- 
lessness, in the sense that absolutely 
nothing can be done, hence its irreversibility 
is complete rather than incomplete. This 
idea of finality also has a bearing upon 
that of responsibility, for being responsible 
for something serious, i.e. final, is produc- 
ing something that cannot be responded to, 
(that is, if a response is seen to contribute 
to, or alter the original in some way) 
precisely because that which is final is 
that which cannot be changed. The worrier 
doesn't want to be serious because it would 
involve him in producing an outcome which 
he could not change. If a person is res- 
ponsible for a serious situation (e.g. a 
motor accident) her problem is that she 
cannot do it again and correct her mistake, 
it is final, past." 
"Somehow worries have a sense of finality 
in that they are only replaced by other 
worries, in a very real sense then the 
worrier lives in the past, where the past 
is final, i.e. persists. Finishing off, 
or finalizing now is like making something 
persist as it is. Finishing off is 
reifying, and yet the worrier treats that 
which is unfinished as something to worry 
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worrying as a means to complete that which 
is incomplete, she sees worry as complement- 
ing and complimenting (in the sense of taking 
seriously) that which she is dealing with 
i.e. worrying about. The worrier then sees 
treating something seriously as adding to it 
whereas she sees treating something unseriously 
as detracting from it. Her version of work 
then is such that she sees taking other 
seriously as meaning that other cannot give, 
for to accept from other would be to take 
away from other which is to treat other 
unseriously." 
"Now I'm thinking that this talk about 
finality is a way of passing the time, and 
nothing more, i.e. I am not too sure how it 
helps except that it is saying something. 
Now I am thinking that it is this paragraph 
that is a way of passing the time, and I am 
unsure what it would be not to be merely 
passing the time This though is providing 
another way on for perhaps being serious is 
doing more than merely passing the time i.e. 
merely passing the time is being unserious 
e.g. chatter, jokes, greetings, all of these 
are ways of getting through i.e. rather like 
ways of avoiding awkwardness or embarrassment. 
Here then we can begin to see that the serious 
and the unserious are not opposites, rather, 
whilst the unserious doesn't do any more than 
merely pass the time, somehow the serious is 
seen as doing more. The unserious merely 
passes the time in the sense that it has no 
impact upon it, i.e. it leaves things as 
they were, whereas the serious has an impact 
i.e. the serious needs to be recognized. 
The serious then, like an impact is something 
you have to face up to i.e. it cannot, or 
should not be avoided. The worrier by 
taking everything seriously sees herself as 
being stoned, in the tough sense, and only 
acts in such a way as to avoid impacts. 
She takes the proverb that people who live 
in glass houses shouldn't throw stones too 
much to heart, and sees all others as being 
those at whom the proverb points. She sees 
herself as also living in a glass house but 
not as throwing stones. She treats others 
then as dopes who fail to see the foolishness 
of their ways, and she foolishly thinks she 
can differentiate herself from them by having 
no ways." 
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Para.4 "Ways here are analogous to methods or 
routes, and this raises another aspect of 
the serious, i.e. a serious person is 
methodical where method is following rules, 
this is necessary if all you require of 
yourself is that you do not make mistakes. 
By treating the serious as the methodical 
we can do a disservice to the former and 
too great a service to the latter. For 
one result of this is that the unserious 
comes to mean haphazard, chance or randomness, 
and this does resonate with comedy, and yet 
isn't this to reduce seriousness to monotony 
and comedy to slapstick? Whereas, by treat- 
ing the methodical as serious, we fail to 
see the haphazard, chance or random nature 
of methods. The worrier wants to feel 
secure, i.e. to have a method, but in 
some way wants this method to be a miracle 
i.e. not to be haphazard, chance or random. 
Being unserious, unmethodical comes to mean 
to the worrier acting in contempt, i.e. 
randomness comes to be seen as movement, 
i.e. lack of method, and is seen to be the 
result of a failure to resist temptation. 
Being unserious could then lead to a charge 
of disorderly conduct." 
Para.5 "The point about orderly conduct, or serious 
conduct, is then that you know what will 
happen, and this comes to be one step worse 
than the worrier, for whereas the worrier 
lives in the past i.e. treats the present 
like history, the serious dope wants rules 
to be followed so that the future is known 
in the same way as he thinks he knows the 
past. The serious dope thinks whatever 
will be will be, in this way he is totally 
fatalistic and this is why he doesn't worry. 
But the worrier somehow wants fate, chance 
to intervene on her behalf. It is not then 
simply that the serious dope trusts everybody, 
and the worrier doesn't trust anybody, rather 
it is that the serious dope doesn't need trust. 
Now the worrier doesn't trust anybody, and that 
is why she needs fate to intervene on her 
behalf, and the 'reason' she doesn't trust 
others is because she thinks you could only 
trust perfection. Somehow she needs to 
remember that we can trust ourselves to 
do our best, and that this trust need not 
be seen as misplaced if success is not 
achieved. Whereas the naive person has 
a misplaced trust in himself i.e. he thinks 
he knows he will succeed, the worrier has a 
naive /... 
Para.6 
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naive version of trust as a complete 
guarantee, when she sees that guarantees 
cannot, or have not been given she sees 
this as providing room for worry. She 
treats trust as an end or reward for work 
and as a result cannot work, for trust is 
an ingredient of beginning to work. The 
worrier's version of trust as a guarantee 
of success is closely related to the 
manipulator's view that you can only trust 
that which you can control, the manipulator's 
version of trust is trussed up, tied up, 
only able to submit. Questioning is one 
tool the manipulator can use to force sub- 
mission, answering becomes answering to. 
However, whilst the worrier questions her 
ability to answer she fails to question 
other' s, i.e. the manipulator' s, right to 
ask, in this way she is submissive. The 
worrier adopts the manipulator's version 
of questioning as forcing submission but 
applies it more rigorously i.e. she in- 
cludes herself and her own ends as well, 
in this way we might wish to say that the 
worrier is more serious than the manipulator. 
Both the manipulator's and the worrier's 
versions of trust involve treating others 
as means i.e. as tools, and a trustworthy 
tool is one which does the job you use it 
for well, i.e. it does not break down, is 
not faulty. The difference between the 
manipulator and the worrier is that the 
latter applies this version of others also 
to herself and the result is that because 
she treats herself as a tool she needs to 
be submissive and told what to do. She 
treats her failure to do what she is told 
(i.e. to submit) as a further fault." 
"The idea of submission here brings out 
the forceful nature of the serious as that 
which has an impact, and reminds us that 
the serious is unlike the unserious in being 
something which can instil fear. The 
absent -minded professor appears as an 
example of someone with no fears i.e. he 
doesn't care about survival, caring about 
survival can mean then being present rather 
than absent. For the absent -minded pro- 
fessor time simply passes, nothing seems 
to have any impact upon him, at least 
nothing other than that which totally 
absorbs him, whatever that might be. 
Perhaps though the worrier is much closer 
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originally appears, i.e. she is absorbed 
by her worries and recognizes little else, 
or better, her worries involve her in try- 
ing to recognize absolutely everything. 
The difference between the absent -minded 
professor, the worrier, and Socrates, 
could then be one of subject matter i.e. 
of what matters to them, or how things 
come to matter for them. Somehow the 
absent -minded professor seems to me to be 
a pretender (I don't trust him) so I'll 
forget him; the worrier and Socrates 
seem to differ greatly on their versions 
of the serious, for the worrier what 
matters is that which is causing trouble 
i.e. the bad, evil, whereas the only 
concern to be treated seriously by 
Socrates is the pursuit, in an active, 
productive sense, of the good." 
"The worrier sees taking something seriously 
as trusting, yet she seems to equate trust 
with knowledge, or to see knowledge as a 
prerequisite for trust. She thinks that 
being truthful (i.e. trustworthy) involves 
knowing whilst at the same time she feels/ 
knows that both others and herself do not 
know. The result of her confusion is that 
she sees taking other seriously as being a 
slip into laziness i.e. as being seduced. 
An example of this would be how she is 
unable to feel pleased or glad about 
another's acceptance of her work for more 
than a few moments, before she starts to 
worry again about whether she is right to 
allow her own opinion of her own work to 
be changed so easily." 
"For the worrier then, unserious becomes 
untruthful and she equates untruthful with 
dishonest, at the same time she sees the 
unserious as something you need not be 
afraid of, i.e. as something you can enjoy. 
We can see how in this way she comes to see 
enjoyment as bad." 
"Somehow now we must see whether worry 
could be serious, i.e. whether worry could 
have an impact, which would be like saying 
that it wasn't merely a failure to do, as 
it did do something. The point here is 
that if worry has no impact it is unserious 
given this version of serious as having an 
impact /.,. 
Para.10 
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impact. This sounds odd now though, for, 
having an impact really does sound like a 
worrier's negativistic version of action 
i.e. it has no sense of direction or pro- 
gress /purpose. This suggests then that 
the versions of serious i.e. re having an 
impact and being final are still too shallow, 
in the sense that talk of stopping and start- 
ing only really make sense in the context of 
a recognized direction. Indeed being too 
shallow is like coming to an end too quickly. 
Being serious still then means to the worrier 
something bad, also being unserious means 
something bad to the worrier, in this way 
the worrier shows us that her versions of 
serious and unserious activity still fail 
to provide any help in her choosing of what 
to do. The point here is that her version 
of herself as a tool requires her to deny 
her ability to choose, and given this 
denunciation she does need help about what 
to choose. She needs to be reminded that 
in seeing the bad she is in a way exercising 
her choice." 
"Somehow on re- reading what I have said it 
seems to me that the shallowness of this 
version of seriousness needs to be emphasized 
for it does seem as if whilst it does tell 
us more about the worrier, it still falls 
far short of telling us anything about a 
strong version of seriousness. Somehow 
this speech in spite of its remarks on 
finishing off as reifying still looks like 
fishing or searching for something complete, 
i.e. a good version of seriousness. Somehow 
the idea of fishing whether methodically or 
not seems lazy, whereas being serious seems 
to involve something much more like effort 
or work, even if because of the seductive 
nature of the serious it is bad work. It 
seems now that something which is serious 
is something which is unfinished i.e. some- 
thing that required work more like the future 
than the past. The worrier would then be 
right to see the unfinished nature of things 
but wrong to see this as being a fault, at 
least as a fault of the things, for she must 
see her own responsibility for what she pro- 
duces before she can see choosing as an 
activity she can take part in." 
- 237 - 
Response to Appendix C 
Your speech on this issue puts us in a whirl, 
and by doing so encourages us to deepen our understanding 
of the usage of the notion of seriousness, and enables us 
to proceed by raising questions about the grounds of our 
speech. One way we read our analysis here would be to 
orient to each response as a continuation of each of your 
paragraphs. The continuations or responses display how 
issues surface for us through your speech which would not 
have done so had we heard it as complete i.e. if it had 
been heard as complete that hearing would have covered 
over its grounds. The multiplicity and profundity of the 
issues you have helped raise for us in such a short space 
display the virtue of inquiry, but also display why we 
choose to continue working with increasing vigour to be 
continually remoulding our forms of speech /life. 
Of course each paragraph we write will also 
require deepening, but that is why we continue to write, 
to speak to, and with, each other. Our intention is not 
to speak as if from a platform which would prevent us from 
hearing others' questions, but to speak in such a way that 
others choose to question, and, by doing so, desire with 
us to be engaged in the deepening of our community through 
continuing questioning. 
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Analysis of Paragraph i 
"Perhaps a worrier conceives of a serious 
situation as one where worry is a reasonable 
response. Perhaps she perceives the situ- 
ation to be serious when she has some res- 
ponsibility to act in the situation which 
she imagines she may be perceived by herself 
and others to fail to fulfil. Also, the 
more the outcome is irreversible the more 
serious it appears. Thus the parents whose 
child dies in childbirth may for good or 
bad reasons tell themselves that they can 
try again later, or adopt, or whatever, and 
in this way make the outcome appear less 
final. Finality, then, can be treated as 
an important feature of seriousness. It 
is worth noting that the idea of finality 
seems to oscillate between the notion of 
limit as an idea of finiteness, and limit- 
lessness, in the sense that absolutely 
nothing can be done, hence its irreversibility 
is complete rather than incomplete. This 
idea of finality also has a bearing upon 
that of responsibility, for being responsible 
for something serious, i.e. final, is produc- 
ing something that cannot be responded to, 
(that is, if a response is seen to contribute 
to, or alter the original in some way) 
precisely because that which is final is 
that which cannot be changed. The worrier 
doesn't want to be serious because it would 
involve him in producing an outcome which 
he could not change. If a person is res- 
ponsible for a serious situation (e.g. a 
motor accident) her problem is that she 
cannot do it again and correct her mistake, 
it is final, past." 
Response: 
You remind us that situations are conceived, and 
then responded to, and that we choose to conceive all situ- 
ations in such a way that we continue responding thought- 
fully. When we theorize we uncover the response -ability 
we have to act in a thoughtful manner, we direct our 
attention towards the difference between a thoughtless res- 
ponse and a more thoughtful response, rather than upon the 
difference /... 
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difference between what we cannot even arrive at, i.e. 
think of, i.e. some perfect response beyond even our 
fantasies, and what we imagine we could most easily do. 
Also, by directing our attention towards our own intentions, 
our own responses, we remember that our responses are never 
irreversible, i.e. we can always change our mind for the 
better, we can always contradict our previous talk. Further- 
more, the instance you provide of the parents' response to 
the child's death in childbirth reveals how you overcome 
a preoccupation with issues of life and death by bringing 
to the forefront the issue which is worth conversing about, 
i.e. how to respond to tragedy, or how to decide to lead a 
good life. By focusing upon what they could do they do 
not merely 'appear' to make that less final, they do make 
it less final. 
But what of this issue of finality, which you 
quite rightly raise? Perhaps it reveals the extremism of 
a form of speech which tries to be all or nothing, for neither 
of these are human possibilities. Indeed the notion of 
'perhaps' itself reveals speech which allows itself to be 
trapped between unacceptable extremes rather than finding 
a way to moderate its extremism. So if we had formulated 
the preoccupation with life and death as being pre -occupation, 
i.e. that which precedes work and had denounced pre- occupation 
as being in opposition to work we would have been engaged 
in the same type of extremism. But if we formulate a pre- 
occupation as that which calls for work we release our- 
selves. 
- 240 
If it could, worry would subject those it tries to 
subject by reducing them to oscillating between the fantasy 
of doing everything, perhaps preparing for anything that 
might happen, and the fantasy that nothing can be done i.e. 
that everything is beyond those it subjects. These twin 
fantasies would have restricted the worrier to a love /hate 
relationship to death, but by doing so would deny her 
everything other than a fantasy life. We are saying that 
we formulate the thinker's life, the human life, as inter- 
mediate, as always doing something, i.e. as the active 
thoughtful effort to seek through friendship to live our 
specifically social condition. Human actions are profound 
as they are the effort to achieve a just society, and are 
not centred upon the actors continuing personal survival 
at any cost. 
It is said in this paragraph that the worrier does 
not wish to be responsible for something final because the 
final cannot be responded to, but we, by being thinkers, i.e. 
those that always respond can have no final products, nothing 
is final for us, we always have more to do. We want to be 
thoughtfully producing, i.e. to be involved, for if we were 
not we would be unchanging, we would have become outcomes 
rather than continuing to be continually coming out. We 
would rather have said that accidents are what selves were 
not responsible for, but that selves can learn from accidents. 
So we would hear you as saying that that motorist could do 
ït again if she refused to think about what occurred, if 
she refused to learn through her formulation of her past, 
i.e./... 
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i.e. if she refused to allow her past to befriend her. 
Our problem is not that of making mistakes like Skinnerian 
rats, but of reaching decisions about how we choose to live, 
and that is a good problem to continue to have. 
Analysis of Paragraph 2 
"Somehow worries have a sense of finality 
in that they are only replaced by other 
worries, in a very real sense then the 
worrier lives in the past, where the past 
is final i.e. persists. Finishing off, 
or finalizing now is like making something 
persist as it is. Finishing off is 
reifying, and yet the worrier treats that 
which is unfinished as something to worry 
about. The worrier treats thinking or 
worrying as a means to complete that which 
is incomplete, she sees worry as complement- 
ing and complimenting (in the sense of taking 
seriously) that which she is dealing with 
i.e. worrying about. The worrier then sees 
treating something seriously as adding to it 
whereas she sees treating something unseriously 
as detracting from it. Her version of work 
then is such that she sees taking other 
seriously as meaning that other cannot give, 
for to accept from other would be to take 
away from other which is to treat other 
unseriously." 
Response: 
This paragraph reminds us how worry is not a human 
possibility, for as thinkers, humans live very much in the 
present, and by formulating the present as unfinished and 
as always unfinished we do not give ourselves something to 
worry about, but actions to do. Perhaps we would have 
something to worry about if we ever finished something off, 
but that is beyond the limits of thought, and is not worthy 
of, or accessible to our thought. We consider thoughtful 
actions as those which display the incompleteness of that 
which /... 
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which might erroneously have been taken as complete. So 
our work compliments that about which it speaks by display- 
ing how the speech it topicalizes is deeper than it would 
have appeared if it had been read as feigning completion. 
We are instructed by unfinishedness for it allows us to 
continue engaging in worthwhile conversations, and we dis- 
play the possibility of improvement through them. We do 
not come to the worrier as Father Christmas comes to the 
child, nor are we simply waiting for a Father Christmas, e.g. 
a good theory, rather we engage in friendly conversations 
now. 
Analysis of Paragraph 3 
"Now I'm thinking that this talk about 
finality is a way of passing the time, and 
nothing more, i.e. I am not too sure how it 
helps except that it is saying something. 
Now I am thinking that it is this paragraph 
that is a way of passing the time, and I am 
unsure what it would be not to be merely 
passing the time This though is providing 
another way on for perhaps being serious is 
doing more than merely passing the time i.e. 
merely passing the time is being unserious 
e.g. chatter, jokes, greetings, all of these 
are ways of getting through i.e. rather like 
ways of avoiding awkwardness or embarrassment. 
Here then we can begin to see that the serious 
and the unserious are not opposites, rather, 
whilst the unserious doesn't do any more than 
merely pass the time, somehow the serious is 
seen as doing more. The unserious merely 
passes the time in the sense that it has no 
impact upon it, i.e. it leaves things as 
they were, whereas the serious has an impact 
i.e. the serious needs to be recognized. 
The serious then, like an impact is something 
you have to face up to i.e. it cannot, or 
should not be avoided. The worrier by 
taking everything seriously sees herself as 
being stoned, in the tough sense, and only 
acts in such a way as to avoid impacts. 
She takes the proverb that people who live 
in glass houses shouldn't throw stones too 
much /... 
- 243 - 
much to heart, and sees all others as being 
those at whom the proverb points. She sees 
herself as also living in a glass house but 
not as throwing stones. She treats others 
then as dopes who fail to see the foolishness 
of their ways, and she foolishly thinks she 
can differentiate herself from them by having 
no ways." 
Response: 
You say that speaking about finality is a way of 
passing the time, and we think you are on to something here, 
but that you could have taken your discussion further by 
saying what you think would be not merely passing the time. 
Whilst you try to still your unsureness by proposing that 
being serious is doing more than passing the time, we can 
now, through our reading of your speech, display how being 
serious is merely passing the time if it reveals an over- 
whelming interest in finality and /or survival, for we would 
say, and do say, that what you speak of as unserious, i.e. 
chatter, jokes and greetings all have a better conception 
of social relations than does seriousness as you formulate 
it. At least chatter, jokes and greetings have some rel- 
ation to others, and furthermore all relate to others in a 
friendly manner, though we would want to deepen their notions 
of friendship. At least they have some conception of their 
need of a relationship with other. The serious type seems 
limited to a tragically isolated life i.e. a dead life. 
Your reference to chatter, jokes and greetings as ways of 
getting through could have been a beginning, but instead of 
showing the good of getting through and how it can be 
deepened you choose to speak of getting through as avoiding 
awkwardness /... 
- 244 - 
awkwardness and embarrassment. Yet we, writers and readers, 
know that it is only through awkwardness and embarrassment 
that we learn deep lessons. We do not seek to avoid 
embarrassment but to be embarrassed so as we can remember 
all the better how to truly embrace. 
We say that you want to see the serious as doing 
more than passing the time because you want to compare your- 
self with those that chatter, joke and greet, in such a way 
that you imagine you are superior, but as we are showing 
your unthoughtful commitment to seriousness leaves you with- 
out friends for you imagine that nobody other than yourself 
is worth talking to. You say that the serious needs to be 
recognized, but you never cease to be amazed at the fact 
that you are not recognized, that your speech though it may 
have a momentary impact leaves others unmoved. 
We choose not to recognize the serious but to 
think about it. If the serious were formulated as an 
impact we would be forced to face up to it for we could not 
avoid it, but what we are showing is how the deeply serious 
issues for men and women are those they need to choose vol- 
untarily, those they can turn their backs upon. More deeply, 
that whatever we do we do voluntarily. We take every 
speaker seriously, but we do not take things, for instance 
words, seriously. By taking speakers seriously we respect 
them and do not differentiate between what we require of 
others and of ourselves. By not differentiating between 
selves in the manner you imagine the worrier does, we can 
be becoming less foolish, i.e. the worrier in your speech 
does /... 
- 245 - 
does not see the dopiness of not speaking to others. She 
does not see that she invites the stoning by her refusal to 
converse, which she rationalizes as passivity, i.e. by her 
refusal to engage in neighbourly, friendly relations. But 
we who are writing, and speaking about the human place, i.e. 
all of us, engage in conversations that reveal our own 
foolishness rather than pointing at the foolishness of 
others. But we are not revelling in this foolishness we 
are seeking,as our inquiry displays, to continue doing some- 
thing about it. 
Analysis of Paragraph 4 
"Ways here are analogous to methods or 
routes, and this raises another aspect of 
the serious, i.e. a serious person is 
methodical where method is following rules. 
This is necessary if all you require of 
yourself is that you do not make mistakes. 
By treating the serious as the methodical 
we can do a disservice to the former and 
too great a service to the latter. For 
one result of this is that the unserious 
comes to mean haphazard, chance or randomness, 
and this does resonate with comedy, and yet 
isn't this to reduce seriousness to monotony 
and comedy to slapstick? Whereas, by treat- 
ing the methodical as serious, we fail to 
see the haphazard, chance or random nature 
of methods. The worrier wants to feel 
secure, i.e. to have a method, but in 
some way wants this method to be a miracle 
i.e. not to be haphazard, chance or random. 
Being unserious, unmethodical comes to mean 
to the worrier acting in contempt, i.e. 
randomness comes to be seen as movement, 
i.e. lack of method, and is seen to be the 
result of a failure to resist temptation. 
Being unserious could then lead to a charge 
of disorderly conduct." 
Response: 
Unlike your hypothetical worrier we do not seek 
to/.., 
- 246 - 
to differentiate our selves from other selves, i.e. to be 
showing one way to be better than another, for we do not 
rest with shallow comparisons for we seek companions. It 
is not that we have no method and others have methods rather 
it is that our method is not the following of rules, but the 
ongoing production of our rules. To orient to rules as 
something to follow, rather than as something to think about, 
question, decide upon, would have been to deny our dialectical 
characters. But the thinker in seeking the truth i.e. in 
seeking to act more thoughtfully, is not limited by any 
terror of being found wanting,i.e. of being found to have 
made mistakes, for mistakes are inevitable in any genuine 
inquiry. To rely upon a method in order to avoid being 
seen to make a mistake is to display mere survival orientation, 
and it shows the slapstick nature of tragedy if tragedy is 
oriented to as merely recounting the body's mortal nature, 
rather than as displaying how we, as thinkers, raise our- 
selves above this morbidity and through continued consider- 
ation of the possibility of good lives, good society, are 
producing enjoyable thoughtful lives and are contributing 
to our ongoing dialogue. 
Whilst your imaginary worrier seeks the security 
of a miraculous method we come out against that search for 
security as the good, for we remember how secure prisons can 
be. Our security is social, it is friendship and it is 
displayed through our search, our inquiry, for we know that 
thoughtful interlocutors are joined with us in opposing and 
deepening forms of speech that reduce choice to randomness/ 
chance /.., 
- 247 - 
chance only then to outlaw and legislate against choice as 
unmethodical. We are, and continue to be disorderly if 
order is imposition i.e. if it reduces lives to taking 
exercise in a prison yard, for who would acquiesce to those 
orders'. 
Analysis of Paragraph 5 
"The point about orderly conduct, or serious 
conduct, is then that you know what will 
happen, and this comes to be one step worse 
than the worrier, for whereas the worrier 
lives in the past i.e. treats the present 
like history, the serious dope wants rules 
to be followed so that the future is known 
in the same way as he thinks he knows the 
past. The serious dope thinks whatever 
will be will be, in this way he is totally 
fatalistic and this is why he doesn't worry. 
But the worrier somehow wants fate, chance 
to intervene on her behalf. It is not then 
simply that the serious dope trusts everybody, 
and the worrier doesn't trust anybody, rather 
it is that the serious dope doesn't need trust. 
Now the worrier doesn't trust anybody, and that 
is why she needs fate to intervene on her 
behalf, and the 'reason' she doesn't trust 
others is because she thinks you could only 
trust perfection. Somehow she needs to 
remember that we can trust ourselves to 
do our best, and that this trust need not 
be seen as misplaced if success is not 
achieved. Whereas the naive person has 
a misplaced trust in himself i.e. he thinks 
he knows he will succeed, the worrier has a 
naive version of trust as a complete 
guarantee, when she sees that guarantees 
cannot, or have not been given she sees 
this as providing room for worry. She 
treats trust as an end or reward for work 
and as a result cannot work for trust is 
an ingredient of beginning to work. The 
worrier's version of trust as a guarantee 
of success is closely related to the 
manipulator's view that you can only trust 
that which you can control, the manipulator's 
version of trust is trussed up, tied up, 
only able to submit. Questioning is one 
tool the manipulator can use to force sub- 
mission, answering becomes answering to. 
However, whilst the worrier questions her 
ability /... 
- 248 - 
ability to answer she fails to question 
other's ie. the manipulator's right to 
ask, in this way she is submissive. The 
worrier adopts the manipulator's version 
of questioning as forcing submission but 
applies it more rigorously i.e. she in- 
cludes herself and her own ends as well, 
in this way we might wish to say that the 
worrier is more serious than the manipulator. 
Both the manipulator's and the worrier's 
versions of trust involve treating others 
as means i.e. as tools, and a trustworthy 
tool is one which does the job you use it 
for well, i.e. it does not break down, is 
not faulty. The difference between the 
manipulator and the worrier is that the 
latter applies this version of others also 
to herself and the result is that because 
she treats herself as a tool she needs to 
be submissive and told what to do. She 
treats her failure to do what she is told 
(i.e. to submit) as a further fault." 
Response: 
As an aside we would say that speeches which refer 
to 'the point of', 'the point about' etc. are lazy for they 
conceive of themselves as having reached a conclusion, and 
one worth speaking of at that, i.e. they orient to finishes 
rather than to continuing. Your differentiation between 
the worrier and the serious dope is interesting, and it 
reveals the depths to which a continuing emphasis on com- 
parison as a means to raise one's person can extend. Your 
discussion of the worrier's orientation to trust helps us a 
great deal, and helps us to console ourselves in our writing 
for it reminds us that we do not orient to success /finish 
and consequently cannot fail, for that orientation would have 
displayed the excesses of a survival orientation rather than 
the desire to continue working, collaborating together. We 
are able to differentiate ourselves from naivety which would 
have a misplaced trust in that it not only orients to success 
but /... 
- 249 - 
but also imagines it will succeed. Furthermore, we com- 
mend that the good of not being given the guarantees by 
others that you say the worrier seeks, and is distressed 
at not receiving, crystallizes in the freedom of choice/ 
action we draw out of this relation. 
We trust our friends and do not have to treat 
them as tools which we can control, or need to control, in- 
deed we want our friends to be uncontrollable, for tools, 
i.e. as controllable, can be used by anyone, and in this 
sense cannot be trusted. We treat our refusal to do as we 
are told if being told is being controlled, not as a sign 
of weakness but of strength. For those, if any, who do what 
they are told merely because they are told would be reducing 
themselves to the status of being tools. However, the notion 
of tool is not totally out of place, for man's place as a 
thinker, as a committed actor necessitates that he /she offers 
his /her person in the service of his /her commitment. We 
choose to use our persons in our search to be producing 
better notions of self and society. 
But by now you our reader will be waiting for us 
to address an issue of great importance which surfaces through 
that paragraph. We refer of course to the section on 
'questioning'. Here is where the hypothetical worrier's 
shallowness, as disintegrated man, is clearly visible, for 
by resting with apparent differences between self and other 
selves she refuses to hear how questions are not ways to 
differentiate but ways to display our sameness. Whilst 
the /... 
- 250 - 
the worrier produces a version of questions as tools of 
manipulation and then seeks both to avoid being questioned, 
and also seeks to avoid asking others questions, we seek 
to continue raising ourselves and other selves above un- 
thoughtful distinctions through and by our questioning. 
Our commitment to continued questioning, to continuing 
inquiry, i.e. to dialogue /speech is the antithesis of the 
hypothetical worrier's commitment to a version of questions 
as forcing submission. Questions do not force for they 
are liberating, i.e. they liberate those who hear them who 
could otherwise remain imprisoned by unthoughtful, and in 
that sense indefensible modes of speech. 
Analysis of Paragraph 6 
"The idea of submission here brings out 
the nature of the serious as that 
which has an impact, and reminds us that 
the serious is unlike the unserious in being 
something which can instil fear. The 
absent -minded professor appears as an 
example of someone with no fears, i.e. he 
doesn't care about survival, caring about 
survival can mean then being present rather 
than absent. For the absent -minded pro- 
fessor time simply passes, nothing seems 
to have any impact upon him, at least 
nothing other than that which totally 
absorbs him, whatever that might be. 
Perhaps though the worrier is much closer 
to the absent -minded professor than it 
originally appears, i.e. she is absorbed 
by her worries and recognizes little else, 
or better, her worries involve her in try- 
ing to recognize absolutely everything. 
The difference between the absent -minded 
professor, the worrier, and Socrates, 
could then be one of subject matter, i.e. 
of what matters to them, or how things 
come to matter for them. Somehow the 
absent -minded professor seems to me to be 
a pretender (I don't trust him) so I'll 
forget him; the worrier and Socrates 
seem /... 
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seem to differ greatly on their versions 
of the serious, for the worrier what 
matters is that which is causing trouble 
i.e. the bad, evil, whereas the only 
concern to be treated seriously by 
Socrates is the pursuit, in an active, 
productive sense, of the good." 
Response: 
We are reminded by this paragraph that if we had 
chosen to formulate the serious as having a forceful nature, 
i.e. as instilling fear, we would not also think of our 
activity as serious, for we are concerned to produce social 
action as liberating i.e. as that which frees actors from 
the force of thoughtlessness by facing up to fears. So 
where you speak of caring about survival as indicating 
presence we would have said that it was careless, for that 
interest absents those it engages from the truly social, 
hence careful) activity of friendly collaborative inquiry. 
The absent -minded professor might or might not be a good 
friend but the hypothetical worrier whose sole interest is 
in her own survival needs to do a great deal of thinking if 
she is to act in a friendly manner. 
Where your speech chose to concentrate on dif- 
ferences between those characters we would rather have con- 
centrated on what they share, and upon what we share with 
them, and you, i.e. upon our place as thinkers /speakers and 
the potential that accrues from it. You would do well to 
notice what the speech you were using allowed you to do with 
the absent -minded professor, i.e. the one you do not trust! 
This could indicate the terrifying answer to our earlier 
question /... 
- 252 - 
question about what the worrier would do with inventors 
(C.F. page 213), i.e. about what you would do with those 
you could not trust, i.e. ultimately with all if you con- 
tinue to resist questions. We choose not to forget any 
in our actions by orienting to that which speakers share. 
Your hypothetical worrier could have been absorbed by her 
fears and have become deformed by them, and yet we choose 
not to dismiss her, as she might us, but to trouble her to 
trouble her person. Where she seeks to be free of troubles, 
for she sees troubles to be the result of evil, we, like 
Socrates, trouble ourselves and other selves to think about 
what we do. For whilst we cannot get beyond good and evil 
i.e. whilst we always have to trouble ourselves, i.e. to 
remain uneasy, we know that good characters are not products 
of nature but of continuing trouble and effort. Whilst 
your hypothetical worrier is permanently pained by her 
failures to get beyond her worries, we can console ourselves 
by remembering our unnatural efforts, the troubles we go to, 
to act more thoughtfully. By not going to the trouble of 
actively pursuing the good because she cannot see it, the 
hypothetical worrier is forever closely pursued by her 
worries, for she fears the bad whether she can see it or not. 
The worrier thinks she is naturally good and ought not to 
be troubled by evil, yet we remember that good only arises 
in the effort to combat bad, and that is a situation peculiar 
to man's place, i.e. he /she is a thinker and would not reduce 
him /her self to the natural for to do so would be to brutalize 
him /her self, and no speaker would, or could choose that 
option /... 
253 - 
option without engaging in self destruction. 
Analysis of Paragraphs 7 and 8 
"The worrier sees taking something seriously 
as trusting, yet she seems to equate trust 
with knowledge, or to see knowledge as a 
prerequisite for trust. She thinks that 
being truthful (i.e. trustworthy) involves 
knowing whilst at the same time she feels/ 
knows that both others and herself do not 
know. The result of her confusion is that 
she sees taking other seriously as being a 
slip into laziness i.e. as being seduced. 
An example of this would be how she is 
unable to feel pleased or glad about 
another's acceptance of her work for more 
than a few moments, before she starts to 
worry again about whether she is right to 
allow her own opinion of her own work to 
be changed so easily." 
"For the worrier then, unserious becomes 
untruthful and she equates untruthful with 
dishonest, at the same time she sees the 
unserious as something you need not be 
afraid of, i.e. as something you can enjoy. 
We can see how in this way she comes to see 
enjoyment as bad." 
Response: 
With the help of your speech we achieve a version 
of trusting others such that we do not equate trust with 
knowledge, or see knowledge as a prerequisite for trust, for 
why should we? Rather we think of the trustworthy as those 
characters who continue to question, i.e. who refuse to be 
corrupted by apparently forceful conventional usage, i.e. 
as the characters who through their consciousness of their 
own ignorance about matters of good and evil come to desire 
knowledge and to make thoughtful decisions in the light of 
this desire. We think of trustworthy characters as honest 
characters and by doing so are better able to raise ourselves 
above /... 
- 254 - 
above the seductions of the 'knowledgeable'. 
As to your 'example', we do not choose to measure 
our opinion of our work upon such arbitrary scales as accept- 
ance or non acceptance by other for that is too contingent 
upon other. Rather we do what we think is for the good and 
trust other to engage in a dialogue with us and to provide 
arguments which progress beyond our speech and can instruct 
us. We have no desire to resist arguments, questions, i.e. 
to defend our speech as if it was complete. We do not want 
to be accepted as we are but to be engaging in relationships 
that call for, and display our continuing willingness and 
ability to be deepened, and in this way to become dependable. 
So, we do not set out with a low opinion of our work in the 
hope that other will be impressed by it, for that would be 
to have a low opinion of other. Rather we do as best we can, 
and through our doing make the effort to achieve a conver- 
sation that can be instructive, that does extend ourselves. 
The deeper, i.e. the more profound, the better, 
i.e. the more enjoyable, for thinkers /speakers in their 
search display their desire to move, to be becoming less 
superficial, and to be better able to hear the depths of 
others' speeches. For where the thinker seeks the truth 
the worrier imagines that escaping the truth provides a 
temporary expedient. The worrier, who imagines she is 
pursued by what she fears, cannot rest, she fights off fatigue 
so as to keep her guard up, so as to keep safe. Whereas, 
the thinker who is in pursuit of the good is always at rest 
for /... 
- 255 - 
for he knows that he has nothing to fear i.e. that he need 
not fear what might happen to him for he knows that only 
his intentions matter. The hypothetical worrier fears 
that she herself is dishonest, for she equates honesty with 
truthfulness and is aware that she is not full of the truth, 
but the thinker by thinking of the honest man not as one 
who is full of the truth, but as a character who seeks the 
truth need not hide himself, but can expose himself as a 
character who shares with others the profound place of the 
social actor. That is the place of a character who enjoys 
acting with integrity, i.e. who enjoys overcoming, rather 
than being overcome by, his fears, who risks openness rather 
than opting for a life behind bars wrought out of thoughtless 
fears of what might happen. 
Analysis of Paragraph 9 
"Somehow now we must see whether worry 
could be serious, i.e. whether worry could 
have an impact, which would be like saying 
that it wasn't merely a failure to do, as 
it did do something. The point here is 
that if worry has no impact it is unserious 
given this version of serious as having an 
impact. This sounds odd now though, for, 
having an impact really does sound like a 
worrier's negativistic version of action 
i.e. it has no sense of direction or pro- 
gress /purpose. This suggests then that 
the versions of serious i.e. re having an 
impact and being final are still too shallow, 
in the sense that talk of stopping and start- 
ing only really make sense in the context of 
a recognized direction. Indeed being too 
shallow is like coming to an end too quickly. 
Being serious still then means to the worrier 
something bad, also being unserious means 
something bad to the worrier, in this way 
the worrier shows us that her versions of 
serious and unserious activity still fail 
to provide any help in her choosing of what 
to /... 
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to do. The point here is that her version 
of herself as a tool requires her to deny 
her ability to choose, and given this 
denunciation she does need help about what 
to choose. She needs to be reminded that 
in seeing the bad she is in a way exercising 
her choice." 
Response: 
Through this paragraph you help us to remember that 
we would not allow the worrier's version of the serious to 
have an impact upon us as you appear to have done, i.e. we 
would not orient to it as given, but would seek to recognize 
our part in its production. Your speech reveals that you 
forget that it is you that are doing, you say "Somehow 
now ..." as if the work which preceded this paragraph was 
description that does not call for questions about how it 
is arrived at. We also think of an impact as having no 
sense of direction; and we think that worry stops speakers 
rather than starts them, for it imagines others have been 
seduced into going where they are going. The worrier wants 
to remain where she is and if possible to keep others with 
her. She seeks a direction she can recognize, where we 
seek not to recognize our direction, but to produce it, i.e. 
we want to collaborate, converse, and choose where we go not 
to be told where to go. We want to start talking together 
not to stop each other, but to seek signposts is to seek to 
be sheep and that is shallow. We collaborate and take 
responsibility for producing our direction out of direction - 
lessness, the myth of re- birth. Where the worrier denies 
her ability to choose because she imagines she needs know- 
ledge before she can choose, we display how by not knowing, 
and /... 
- 257 - 
and knowing we cannot know, we provide ourselves with room 
to collaborate and choose. It is through our willingness 
and ability to choose that we help ourselves and we do not 
need the sort of help to choose that would reduce our free- 
dom. And yet the worrier's denunciation is an achievement 
for it reveals the desire for social relationships by reject- 
ing the notion of disintegrated man as a human possibility, 
for choice involves thought and thought involves social 
relationships. However, we do not seek to remind others, 
but at most through our actions to encourage others to 
remind themselves,for we remember that we cannot be given 
more liberating relationships with our thought /speech by 
others, but have to be achieving them ourselves. The 
worrier's denunciation lacks passion, desire, for it asks 
too much of other and too little of its self. Thoughtful 
others would not offer her the help she imagines she wants, 
for they are aware that that help would be no help at all. 
Analysis of Paragraph 10 
"Somehow on re- reading what I have said it 
seems to me that the shallowness of this 
version of seriousness needs to be emphasized 
for it does seem as if whilst it does tell 
us more about the worrier, it still falls 
far short of telling us anything about a 
strong version of seriousness. Somehow 
this speech in spite of its remarks on 
finishing off as reifying still looks like 
fishing or searching for something complete, 
i.e. a good version of seriousness. Somehow 
the idea of fishing whether methodically or 
not seems lazy, whereas being serious seems 
to involve something much more like effort 
or work, even if because of the seductive 
nature of the serious it is bad work. It 
seems now that something which is serious 
is something which is unfinished i.e. some- 
thing that required work more like the future 
than /... 
- 258 - 
than the past. The worrier would then be 
right to see the unfinished nature of things 
but wrong to see this as being a fault, at 
least as a fault of the things, for she must 
see her own responsibility for what she pro- 
duces before she can see choosing as an 
activity she can take part in." 
Response: 
Here your speech reminds us of the weakness of 
our prior notion of caricature, for we have not merely been 
emphasizing shallowness, for we have been raising and 
emphasizing in our responses the good of human possibility, 
i.e. our speech no doubt does fall short, but we would say 
that not falling short, i.e. being perfect, is not a human 
possibility, and would not enhance our human character. We 
would emphasize that the good of falling short is that at 
least it has overcome the fear of starting, and once started, 
i.e. once we do expose ourselves, we can begin to engage in 
instructive dialogue. 
We are not fishing or searching for something com- 
plete, but are engaged in unending inquiry which requires 
commitment for its own sake and not for future rewards or 
approval. We would rather have said that things may or may 
not be finished, but that thinking /speaking, i.e. our ability 
to respond thoughtfully, never is, and that we are all the 
better for that. Your speech helps us remember that we 
would not treat our own or others' speeches as finished 
objects and then look for their faults, but that we allow 
our relationship to others' speeches to waken us up to our 
own limitations and to continue working to overcome them. 
However /... 
- 259 - 
However, whilst you speak of working as being better than 
laziness even if it is bad work, we would opt for enjoyment, 
and by doing so realize that our work is good for ourselves 
and other selves, and in this sense is profitable. 
- 260 - 
SECTION 7 
Original Speaker: 
"But aren't you afraid of making a fool of 
yourself? I imagine you must be as I think 
of those who aren't afraid as being fools." 
Response: 
But you seem to speak as if foolishness is some- 
thing men degenerate into, or fall into accidentally, as if 
it is a pitfall rather than something we all begin in. 
Original Speaker: 
"But there, you see how easy it is I made 
a fool of myself as soon as I opened my mouth. 
I wish I thought more before I spoke /acted, 
and I have a feeling that if I was left to 
myself to think I would not be diverted and 
could then speak less foolishly;" 
Response: 
Now this is interesting for you do speak and act 
as if you always want to think before you speak or act, but 
what you seem to be forgetting is that our speech is in- 
volved in our thoughts. We cannot think before we speak 
for our thought is speech. However, where you speak of 
opening your mouth as making a fool of yourself, i.e. where 
you commend silence, we propose that by opening our mouths, 
and our ears, we can converse in such a way as to make our 
actions more thoughtful. In your forgetfulness you come 
to imagine that you could remove bias /distortion by remov- 
ing other, rather than, as when bias is conventionally 
understood /... 
- 261 - 
understood, by removing your self. But we say that it is 
only through conversations with others that we can come to 
better understand how our thoughts could have been con- 
strained, but are being liberated by our modes of speech. 
We would not seek to separate ourselves from other selves 
as you appear to do, for we imagine that by doing so we 
could never be becoming less foolish. 
We imagine that you are afraid of appearing 
foolish for you fear it will lead to you being dismissed, 
for you produce other as an icon of yourself and anticipate 
that he will dismiss the unserious, i.e. the fool as being 
dispensible. Yet we have been reminded through Section 6 
that we would not dismiss the unserious but try to deepen 
it. 
Original Speaker: 
"But I would like to be able to speak in such 
a way as to show you that I can meet your 
demands. I would like to produce a finished 
article for I imagine it is lack of finish that 
makes room for rejection. I seek through my 
work /speech to display that I am competent, 
i.e. not foolish, and I would like to be 
remembered for the finished article I produce, 
I guess that is how I'd like to leave my mark." 
Response: 
Still you appear too ready to distinguish between 
self and other, for why treat our speech as demanding? Why 
subordinate yourself to it as if to an employer? By doing 
so you come to conceive of work as forced labour where we 
as thinkers /social actors see our work as the collaborative 
effort /... 
- 262 - 
effort of freeing ourselves from the force of thoughtlessness. 
You treat your hearing of our speech as a finished article 
and by doing so become engaged in an effort to compete with 
us, to free yourself from what you imagine encages you, 
i.e. our questions. But we are not interested in a com- 
petition with you, for that would be foolish. Your speech 
could be seen as revealing an effort to dispense with com- 
panionship in favour of differentiation, but we are seeking 
to display how that 'commitment' would have involved us in 
remaining superficial. You want your finished product to 
set you aside as special, perhaps as that which cannot be 
marked. You want to be left alone where we as thinkers/ 
speakers remind ourselves that we want and need to be with 
others, with other thoughtful interlocutors, for we see your 
wish to have nothing more to do as the urge to have a dead 
life. We want to continue extending and deepening our rel- 
ationships, and can only do so by seeking to collaborate and 
move beyond any impulse to use our speech to mark each 
other, and to be remarked upon for the differences these 
abilities to mark, and avoid marks, make. These efforts 
to differentiate between self and other selves do not 
attract our attention /our efforts for our analytic concern 
is to engage in friendly relations, and they do not rest in 
superficiality. We do not produce other's speech as making 
demands upon us, but think of ourselves as engaging in an 
activity with other selves in which, and through which, we 
choose what we do. By risking displaying our incompetence, 
and our uncompetitiveness, we encourage ourselves to continue 
with our collaborative work. By producing ourselves as 
unfinished /... 
- 263 - 
unfinished we do not seek to act in order to be remembered 
by others, for we remember that we are still acting to 
produce better versions of ourselves. We do not seek to 
be remarked upon, for we are not remarkable, and do not 
seek to be remarkable, for we understand dialogue to be 
more than a series of remarks. We seek to develop our com- 
munity not to raise ourselves in comparison with other 
selves. 
The thinker does not want an audience, i.e. he 
doesn't want applause, as perhaps the musician might, for 
clapping has no depth, i.e. it is simply the collision of 
different surfaces that are not changed by that collision, 
but revert to what they were. Thoughtful social inter- 
action is such that it is heard in a manner that makes the 
move to revert to what we previously were a conscious 
decision. And, through having become more thoughtful, more 
moral, social actors are aware of the foolishness of choos- 
ing to revert rather than to continue developing. Socrates' 
speech is engaging for it shows his interlocutors that it 
is they, as well as he, that must and do choose, 
We imagine that you; qua worrier, choose to worry 
because you conceive of worry as less banal, i.e. as more 
reflexive, than other forms of speech, and that by dif- 
ferentiating yourself in this way you come to imagine that 
it takes extra effort on your part to engage in ordinary 
social/... 
Left hand and right hand, audience and performer. 
- 264 - 
social interaction for you begin by placing yourself out- 
side. You imagine that worry is like stopping and think- 
ing and by doing so choose to prevent yourself from moving/ 
acting thoughtfully. Your speech is always stopping 
yourself and others from speaking for you imagine silence 
is safer. We imagine that you treat life /conversation as 
problematic /demanding, and death /silence as unproblematic, 
i.e. that whereas you could fear nothingness, you imagine 
nothingness as nothing to fear. But perhaps you would 
even worry about death, i.e. fantasize that even in death 
you will be called upon to respond thoughtfully? But we 
call upon you to speak now i.e. to respond, for by now you 
should hear that our intent is to appreciate and deepen our 
understanding of your speech, and by so doing, to raise our 
community by resisting lazy /shallow versions of our speech 
that depreciate /underestimate its possible value /virtue. 
Please go on, and whilst we will not take back what we have 
said we will work harder to offer formulations of your 
speech that display how it could be thoughtful. 
Original Speaker: 
"I will go on as you request, for perhaps 
I could better formulate my wish to produce 
a finished product as the desire to con- 
tribute to the conversation, and yet, my 
problem is that I don't know how to start; 
This is what worries me about stopping. 
Others act as if things start them off, 
e.g. good topics, good art, good music 
or whatever, and yet these leave me cold, 
and I only get going when problems arise. 
I treat good things as complete, i.e. as 
finished articles and whilst I wish that 
these could start me off I cannot see how 
I can add anything to them. I can't see 
appreciating as contributing, i.e. as 
adding anything. 
- 265 - 
It seems that worry is like stopping and 
thinking (yes -but), however, its version 
of thinking becomes a problem already 
because it is, or wants to be thinking 
when you have stopped about starting/ 
speaking. Movement is conceived of as 
the problem, for worry tries to see all 
the places you might go wrong before you 
begin, and this involves realizing that 
you need to know where you are and how 
you got there (i.e. which way you are 
facing) in order to begin. My inability 
to start, i.e. to become part of things 
places me outside and I see others, i.e. 
those who have started, as those who have 
been taken in." 
Response: 
But of course you must realize that you have 
already started. You say your problem is that you don't 
know how to start, but this reveals that you have started 
to inquire into what is worth doing /starting whereas those, 
if any, who imagine they know how to start are those who 
choose not to inquire, not to think. You say it is having 
to start that worries you about stopping, and by saying this 
remind us of the good of stopping, for stopping is alright 
if it isn't finishing. For instance, each section in this 
work has stopped, though like any conversation, each is 
far from finished, if that is, by finished is meant complete, 
rather than polished. They may or may not be finished in 
the latter sense. The good of stopping is that we can and 
always are, always re- continuing. 
You say others act as if things start them off, 
and you show your sameness with them by saying how problems 
are like good topics for you. Now we could have heard you 
as bringing yourself down to their level, but we choose to 
hear /... 
- 266 - 
hear your speech as raising yourself, as pointing to the 
fact that thinkers /speakers do what they choose /decide is 
good, and that this is what we, and all speakers share and 
this is why conversation /dialogue is always worthwhile. 
You go on to talk about good things but by doing so remind 
us that we would rather speak about good people, good in- 
tentions. So, precisely by not orienting to other people 
as things, or as themselves good, but as thinkers about the 
good we can appreciate their good intentions. But, by 
appreciating, we do not mean merely applauding, for the 
addition of applause adds to a performance in only the 
shallowest manner. Appreciation for us is the active 
effort to resist any temptation to underestimate other; it 
is the effort to offer a reading of others' actions /speeches 
as being those of thoughtful, social, moral actors. So 
you are right, appreciating is not merely adding to, for 
thoughtful formulations appreciate others' speeches by 
deepening them through dialectical development. 
Your second paragraph reminds us that our notion 
of appreciating could be spoken of as stopping and thinking, 
for what we are continuing to stop are thoughtless readings, 
that is, if thinking when you have stopped means being con- 
tinually prepared to question and in this way deepen. But, 
we would rather say that the thinker refuses to finish 
thinking. Your expressed wish to think before you start 
need not indicate that movement is your problem, but can 
direct us to seeing that thoughtless starts aren't real 
starts at all, i.e. that the movement they bring about is 
directionless /... 
- 267 - 
directionless. So you remind us that starting to move 
before inquiring about where you are and where or why you 
are going is thoughtless. But, we engage in conversations/ 
thought, we have started in such a way as to prevent our- 
selves being sucked into thoughtlessness. We are engaged 
in locating ourselves such that these questions are placed 
essentially in our actions and are not jettisoned like un- 
wanted ballast if we begin to move. They always remain 
with us. So, now we hear your speech as saying that the 
places where we might go wrong are precisely those situ- 
ations where we might have forgotten to think about what we 
are doing and why. What you refer to as your inability to 
start, i.e. to become part of things, is your ability to 
continue being more than a thing, i.e. to be continuing to 
free yourself. You, and we are outside things, and by be- 
ing outside, i.e. by being speakers we are able to hear how 
other speakers are also with us, how our dialogue enables 
us to stay outside the world of things. Our ability to 
read raises us above the world of things and places us in 
a social, thoughtful, moral community. 
Original Speaker: 
"But still I fear for you, perhaps for us, 
as I am also involved in the conversation, 
for whilst in the last section I was worried 
about falling short, it seems to me now that 
foolishness can also be going too far, over- 
stepping the mark. I fear that your speech 
will make fools of us; where making a fool 
of oneself is different from acting the fool, 
i.e where making a fool of yourself is seen 
as showing what you really are when you aren't 
intending to I suppose I don't want to 
appear foolish because I respect those who 
instil fear, and in some way those who feel 
fear /... 
- 268 - 
fear, but I cannot respect those who neither 
feel nor instil fear. So I take precautions 
against appearing foolish, and I have to admit 
this is no easy matter for I am perhaps too 
cautious about precautions, i.e. I don't trust 
them. Now you speak in the manner of those 
who take no precautions and it is in this 
sense that you seem to overstep the mark. 
I presume that you don't take precautions 
either because you feel so secure about 
dealing with problems, or because you don't 
really care what you do. So your behaviour 
seems analogous to that of the fool, and yet 
I am puzzled, for I cannot see how your speech 
sustains you? Perhaps I am wrong to imagine 
you are concerned with sustenance for perhaps 
your very ability to not care what you start 
with, consume, (i.e. to not take precautions) 
enables you to sustain yourself very well. 
Sustenance is much more of a problem for me 
as I am particular about my food (i.e. what 
I consume). I am concerned about what I 
digest for I see what I produce as dependent 
upon what I consume." 
Response: 
Thank you for your concern, i.e. that which you 
speak of as fearing for us, but whilst we could have heard 
your speech as revealing very quickly the shallowness of 
that interest, i.e. how it was a veneer that soon gave way 
to reveal your own self protectiveness, we will not do so. 
Rather we hear you as taking on responsibility for leading 
our conversation into danger, and by doing so as making the 
effort to get us out again. You need not fear that our 
speech will make fools of us (including you) for in a way 
that is our intention; for it is only when we are aware 
of our own foolishness (that which we referred to much 
earlier as being at a loss) that we can grasp the conceit 
of knowledge that fears rely upon. If by a fool you mean 
one who is ignorant of important matters but seeks to know, 
then /,.. 
- 269 - 
then we are fools, but it is only by acknowledging our 
foolishness that we can converse and decide upon, not sub- 
ordinate ourselves to, versions of the good. The fool is 
the philosopher, i.e. is the thoughtful social man, i.e. 
is the speaker /thinker, and it is only those, if any, who 
pretend to some higher status, i.e. who pretend to know, 
rather than collaborate and decide upon the difference 
between good and bad, just and unjust, who need to hide 
their ignorance. We are intending through our speech to 
display what we all already really are, i.e. that we are 
those who have no need to fear exposure. 
On first reading we heard your statement about 
respecting only those who instilled fear or those who felt 
(succumbed ?) to fear as illustrative of your failure to move 
beyond a restrictive notion of social relationships as com- 
prising merely of dominator and dominated, i.e. we could not 
grasp why you had no respect for friends, i.e. perhaps those 
who neither instil fear nor succumb to it. However, if we 
are to befriend your speech we must bring into question our 
impulsive reading for no thoughtful actor could deny the 
place of friendship. We imagine that you must by 'respect' 
be implying 'treat with deference', and be calling us to 
remember that deference has no part to play in true social 
relations. So you are not commending those who instil 
fear nor those who succumb to fear, but are commending that 
we remember how respect as deference is not worthy of friends. 
We, like you, do not trust precautions for we are 
aware /.., 
- 270 - 
aware how protectiveness can so easily encage. However, 
your speech differentiates here, i.e. you refer to yourself 
as being too cautious about precautions, and to us as taking 
no precautions, but that precaution, i.e. of differentiating 
between self and other selves, is one that we would do away 
with, for our interest is showing our deep sameness with 
other selves. Ironically it is at this point of different- 
iation that you appear to overstep the mark, for instead of 
speaking about yourself, you choose to make presumptions 
about why we do not take precautions, and neither of your 
accounts does our behaviour justice. If we appear not to 
take precautions we can say that this is neither because we 
feel secure about dealing with problems, in the sense of 
controlling what happens, nor because we do not care what 
we do. Far from it, it is our way of caring what we do 
and not merely about what may happen to us. We cannot con- 
trol what will happen, but we can be making an effort to free 
ourselves from thoughtlessness that could control us. We 
have no need to fear other's remarks for we act with good 
intentions and can be instructed by other's responses to 
our actions. For instance, we have no need to be angered 
by what we could read as your careless hesitant accusation 
of us, i.e. that we are fools. For through your speech, 
we help remind ourselves not to accuse others, but to make 
the effort to see how their speech could be a product of 
thoughtful good intentions: that you aren't accusing us but 
trying to help us. 
As to the issue of sustenance that you raise, this 
- 271 
is important for whilst we agree with you that you are 
wrong to imagine that it is our ability to not care what 
we start with (consume) that sustains us, you help us to 
remember that when we use something, i.e. start with some- 
thing we don't consume it but work with it to make more/ 
better out of our relationship to whatever it is. We form 
what we hear through our thoughtful work. So, we formulate 
your need to be particular not as being the result of a fear 
of poisoning, nor as being a result of fears of other's 
remarks if you made a weak choice, but as your desire to 
use, select from the possibilities around you in such a way 
as to act most humanly. You remind us to recognize the 
active part we play in our relationships, i.e. you remind 
us not to forget that we are all always theorizing, and 
that it is through our theorizing that we form our relation- 
ships with other, whether other is another person or a thing. 
By remembering this we are reconstituting ourselves as 
social /moral actors rather than as those who can only be 
acted upon. 
Original Speaker: 
"But the way you use my speech makes me 
feel that for you anything that fits will 
do, whereas I can't respect that which I 
feel comfortable with, i.e. that which fits 
(that which is easy /tempting), and can't be 
comfortable with what I respect. I need 
tension. I only trust my fears (i.e. my 
distrust) and I view fear as my strongest 
feeling, and respect the strong rather than 
the weak. I see weakness as succumbing to 
temptation, but I don't treat succumbing to 
temptation as the danger for I treat temp- 
tation as that which prevents you seeing the 
danger. I see fearful thought /worry as 
strong minded and see a lack of fear as in- 
dicating /... 
- 272 - 
dicating weak mindedness. In this way I 
come to see seriousness in the sense of 
awareness of dangers as the highest form 
of life. More than this though I have a 
specific version of dangers as pitfalls, 
i.e. as things that can be avoided if I 
keep my wits about me. I suppose I treat 
my life as Popper treats scientific theories, 
i.e. as being in danger of falsification." 
Response: 
Here you appear to try to take advantage of us, 
for you begin yet again by making a presupposition about 
what we are doing and then on the basis of that pre- 
supposition, i.e. that anything that fits will do, you in- 
dulge your worst impulses, and we note that we do not refer 
to this as self indulgence for you are much better than 
those impulses. So let us think through your speech. You 
say we use your speech and you say this as if it is your 
possession, and as if by using it we consume it (in your 
sense), and yet we would say that our effort to think about 
your speech' is our effort to contribute to it, and so it 
is not a question of whether it fits or not, whatever that 
might mean, but of whether our efforts can produce formulations 
that are harmonious (i.e. that fit) in social relations, i.e. 
in friendly relations. But, we, like you, perhaps, do not 
treat friends like easy chairs, i.e. there is tension in 
our friendships, but it is not the tension of fear or dis- 
trust, but of desire, and it arises in the continuing col- 
laborative effort to make these relationships more profound, 
more moral, more social, more free. We are reminded by 
your /.., 
T And what does it matteruhose speech it is? i.e. Perhaps 
we should remind ourselves that we are working upon /with 
forms of speech not particular embodied persons: 
- 273 - 
your speech that we distrust our fears; that we view our 
desires as our most trustworthy feelings, and befriend 
neither the strong, if by that is meant those who instil 
fear, nor the weak, if by that is meant those who succumb 
to fears, but those whose thoughtful desires enable them 
to act freely not fearfully. 
The tension we feel is enjoyable for it accom- 
panies thoughtful actions in the face of dangers. Avoid- 
ing dangers can at best only lead to momentary relief and 
this is why the worrier's life is stops and starts, whereas 
the thinker's life has rhythm and development as does dia- 
lectical development. The thinker's virtue lies neither 
in failing to see dangers nor in orienting to dangers as 
something to avoid but in seeing that the true danger is 
the difference between a principled committed thoughtful 
life, and what you refer to as the highest form of life, 
i.e. a strong awareness of dangers. Speeches which orient 
around the latter commitment would deform man, they would 
preclude social development, and the fact that we can engage 
in this conversation indicates that we all do do better 
* 
than that. 
You go on to speak of pitfalls and we will, no 
doubt, have more to say on that issue as we proceed, but 
before you speak again we would ask you to notice how you 
speak/. 
* N.B. The worrier is after all only a hypothetical 
construct which is being used to show the 
importance of our continuing speech /thought 
about how we can be improving our ways of 
speaking /thinking. 
- 274 - 
speak of using your wits, i.e. you speak of keeping your 
wits about you You use your thought /speech as a shield 
to protect yourself, but here is revealed the weakness of 
your notion of the relationship between self and speech, 
for they appear as separate, the one protected by the 
other, but for us as speakers /thinkers our selves cannot 
be separated from our speech. So whereas in an 'emergency' 
you would perhaps consider discarding /sacrificing your speech/ 
thought in favour of your person, we cannot understand what 
you think your person is. Perhaps you think of our speech 
as threatening to falsify your life, but we would say that 
it was a false life anyway. 
Our readers will be aware that though we may be 
using strong words our speech is not extremist but moderate. 
It is an effort to stretch ourselves beyond unthinking talk, 
and if it appears clumsy that is because moderation is not 
the same as restriction; the moderate man is not restricted 
by the weight of convention. 
Original Speaker: 
"Oh yes, that is all very well but everybody 
has limits, and this is why worriers fear 
falsification, failing or falling. The man 
you speak of seems complete, he is good 
alright, but the danger of speaking about 
him is that by doing so you demand too much 
of us. Perhaps this is what worriers' 
fears consist of, i.e. the awareness of 
the difference between your ideal and 
their reality." 
Response: 
Yes, bodies do have limits you are right, but it 
- 275 - 
is your surface commitment to the body, to life at the 
price of speech which tempts you to limit your self (i.e. 
you speak of everybody). You can offer no argument to 
support your commitment for you are aware that any argument 
reconstitutes you as a speaker /thinker and brings you back 
into our community. The difference you refer to between 
ideal and reality helps us, for the reality is that we are 
speakers /thinkers and as such do not need to invoke vague 
beliefs in some mysterious correlation or coincidence be- 
tween self and body which cannot even be spoken of without 
paradoxical results. 
The man we speak of is you, and us, and what we 
are doing with our speech is encouraging ourselves to act 
thoughtfully, and to resist the demands of silence, thought- 
lessness, which are, in any case beyond us. We don't need 
to be complete to act well, we only need to say what we 
think; where thinking is deciding what thoughtful men, 
i.e. what we would do, and then doing it. We have bodies 
yes, but have no way of thinking of ourselves as being our 
bodies, we use our bodies thoughtfully, and do not conceive 
of ourselves as used by our bodies. As thinkers, if we 
eat, run, make love, speak honestly, or whatever, these 
actions are matters of decision and as such can be enjoyed. 
We choose not to reduce our enjoyments to being the necessary 
inputs for the satisfaction of bodily needs, for if we did, 




- 276 - 
"Alright, for the moment we will forget the 
body, but don't you fear the ridicule that 
may be heaped upon you when this work is 
read? It is not writing or speaking that 
troubles us, but being heard, and what that 
can entail; Won't the laughter you hear 
when your speech is heard hit you in the 
same way that the ground would hit you at 
the end of a fall? I seek to avoid that 
pain by speaking more cautiously." 
Response: 
But did you laugh? Oh no, you choose to formulate 
other as less trustworthy than yourself, i.e. as more likely 
to laugh, as a way to hand over the blame for your silence 
to them. You begin by imagining the worst possibility 
and orienting your actions to that. But, whilst we cannot 
imagine a worse way of proceeding than yours, we can 
imagine plenty better. For instance, others may not laugh, 
but may show us how our arguments are faulty; if so we will 
have profited by speaking, as you can be doing. Alter- 
natively, we may find that we are not laughed at for others 
may think as we do, if so we can then continue to converse 
about how our society, our lives, should be built around 
our place as thinkers /speakers, and not as bodies /things. 
Even if we are laughed at that would not be the end of 
matters, for the analogy you draw upon, i.e. that of falling 
can be instructive. For, whilst it reveals your orientation 
towards prospects, versions of the future, as something to 
fear, couldn't we welcome hitting the ground as the point 
at which we may be able to begin to move of our own accord. 
We cannot stop ourselves if we formulate ourselves as fall- 
ing, but we can pick ourselves up by risking grounding our 
speech, i.e. by thinking about how we speak. 
We/... 
- 277 - 
We imagine that nothing could be more profoundly 
painful than for a thinker /speaker, i.e. a man/woman, to 
choose to live an unthoughtful life, i.e. to pretend he/ 
she wasn't free. 
We suspect that your fear of hitting the ground 
is not that you may be laughed at for falling but that you 
may be laughed at because of your pathetic efforts to get 
out. But we remember that it is you who begins by con- 
struing your future efforts as pathetic, not us, for we 
appreciate human efforts, i.e, true suffering. Speakers/ 
thinkers excite collaborative efforts not pity, for pity 
rests in difference, and perhaps reveals indifference. 
Your fear of having to get out, of having to raise yourself, 
bring yourself up, is closely intertwined with the fact that 
you have always avoided situations where you needed to learn 
to climb or jump precisely for fear of falling /failing and 
not being able to get out. You don't want your incompetence 
to be seen, and the manoeuvres in which you indulge in order 
to screen it from others could eventually have resulted in 
your own blindness. You never try to learn to climb, or 
live well, but instead learn how to avoid situations where 
it will be required. You have learnt how to be avoiding 
pitfalls, i.e, how to tip toe round with your talk, e.g. 
your 'perhapses' and 'yes buts', but you secretly view your 
tip toeing as grovelling, which is like acknowledging to 
yourself that you are in a hole. Grovelling is like 
appearing to walk in a hole and refusing to try to climb 
out. But, it is not your position in the hole that disturbs 
You/... 
- 278 - 
you, you would happily stay there but for the fact that 
you fear other's glance, for you fear that other can see 
through, or over your excuses to your fearfulness. 
What a pleasant surprise it must be for you when 
you relate to an other who looks through your speech in 
such a way as to uncover a thoughtful character whose 
dignity resides in the fact that she must always be choos- 
ing to act in such a way as to display a refusal to decline 
into thoughtlessness. And how much pleasanter a surprise 
still when you remember that that other is yourself; 
We do not begin by thinking we are perfect and 
have no need of other speakers, i.e. that we are remark- 
able, complete, for the inevitable result of this beginning, 
i.e. this conception of self is that it acts as a contraceptive, 
for it turns any reminders of our social character, i.e. of 
our dialectical relationships with others, into signs of 
imperfection. Whilst you construe needing other speakers 
as a weakness we construe it as our strength, i.e. as 
essential to our character. 
Original Speaker: 
"But now your speech reminds me that the 
notion of pitfalls I was using was too 
passive, for your ability to see through 
or over my excuses is far from being a 
pleasant surprise. On the contrary, if 
I might be permitted a metaphor, your 
speech is like the lion that sometimes 
sees through the zebra's stripes. But 
the metaphor is not adequate, for man's 
mental faculties are such that he can 
see invisible lions when they aren't there." 
Response /... 
- 279 - 
Response: 
Your metaphor is instructive for it displays an 
inability to concentrate, for your impulse to differentiate 
between self and other is such that you apparently do not 
notice the lion's camouflage. You imagine that the only 
form of camouflage is stripes in the same way that you 
imagined the only dangers were pitfalls. But we achieve 
an understanding of your metaphor as camouflage. 
Your worries prevent concentration, what they 
call for is a very wide range of vision, i.e. the zebra and 
the worrier are continually looking round and the effort 
involved tires them and places them in danger as a result 
of their fatigue. By reducing thinking to keeping your 
wits about you, i.e. by being constantly on the look -out 
for dangers, you can't concentrate in the manner that the 
climber needs to do. And yet perhaps it isn't that you 
can't concentrate, but that you see concentrating as 
dangerous, e.g. the zebra really getting into a piece of 
grass as the lion approaches. You are always stopping 
and starting in order to ensure that your activity is not 
that of a foolish zebra, i.e. your 'yes buts' are your 
reminders to keep looking round. 
But we are reminded by this that getting into 
the difference between a man and a zebra is different from 
the zebra getting into a piece of grass, for it is only 
inquiry grounded in this difference that can produce social 
action /moral action. 
Perhaps/... 
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Perhaps you see concentration, like rhythm, as 
being something you get into, carried away in, in a word 
as tempting? If this is so it can only be by having 
allowed your self to be reduced in such a way that you 
treat what you want as what you are tempted by. Deeply 
you know that the version of the good around which you 
organise your life, i.e. the good as your own personal 
safety, is not that which thinkers /speakers would want/ 
desire to commit themselves to: you know it isn't you. 
But the 'commitment' you rely upon prevents you from inquir- 
ing any further and displaying that safety for man rests 
in the decision not to treat self as natural /as animal. 
That is, the decision not to draw analogies, and rely upon 
analogies, between men and zebras for instance, but to choose 
to display through our speech /actions how we are all always 
seeking to be achieving social character as those who think 
about their relation to nature, and do not subordinate them- 
selves to what is, after all, only a conception of nature. 
We imagine that you treat life as a pit into which 
you have been dropped (borne), which is full of problems. 
We imagine you are fixated upon problems for they remind you 
that you were brought into life, i.e. forced into a situation 
where you are called upon to act, when you were absent. We 
imagine that you see birth as analogous to falling into a 
pit, i.e. it merely happened to you. Now if you persist 
in choosing to equate your life with that of the zebra every- 
thing fits naturally enough. But that is not a thoughtful 
choice, for the thinker's notion of birth is not restricted 
to/... 
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to the natural event, but is related to our continuing 
willingness and ability to be bringing ourselves up into 
thoughtful social relationships. Once birth is conceived 
in this way we have reason to carry on, and to bring our 
efforts, however clumsy, to bear on our situation. 
For instance, perhaps we can take what may appear 
to you as a liberty, and remind you of some notes you wrote 
earlier which began by making reference to the issue of 
making a fool of yourself. We will as in certain previous 
instances present the notes complete so as our readers can 
work upon them independent of our analyses, and we shall 
then proceed to make an effort to draw out of ourselves a 
thoughtful, social reading, i.e. we will work with your 
notes to deepen our understanding of our speech. Our in- 
terest is not in dismissing your notes in favour of some- 
thing we already know, but in working with your notes to be 
achieving more thoughtful conversation. 
Para .l 
Para.2 
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APPENDIX D 
"Earlier I began by suggesting that the 
worrier was afraid of making a fool of 
himself, and we found as we progressed 
that the worrier relied upon a version 
of foolishness as incompetence. Perhaps 
this could be deepened if we began to 
think about the fact that it might not 
be that the worrier is afraid of making 
a fool of himself, but that he can't make 
a fool of himself, i.e. he imagines that 
people treat him seriously even when he 
is being unserious. Initially it sounds 
here as if the worrier is merely being 
rigorous and extending the idea of his 
own incompetence to 'making a fool of 
himself', i.e. if he could make a fool of 
himself he could make something and would 
not be 'completely' incompetent. However 
the point is a stronger one, it is that 
nobody can make a fool of him /her self, 
i.e. others are involved in making fools 
of people, and so the worrier was afraid 
of something which could not happen. 
This can be strengthened even further in 
two ways (a) when we remember that the 
fool isn't taken as being responsible for 
his actions, and so the fool doesn't make 
or create anything other than by accident; 
and (b) when we see that this point doesn't 
only apply to fools, i.e. nobody can make 
anything of themselves without others 
(perhaps friends). To return to the first 
way (a) above) the fact that the fool is 
held not to be responsible for his actions 
(let alone himself) tells us why the fool 
can often have an impact, i.e. remark in 
a very pointed and stunning way. The 
reason is that the fool can be fearless, 
or is fearless, i.e. can do anything, 
because he isn't held to do anything; 
he is neither deserving of praise nor 
blame, i.e. he isn't responsible for 
his irresponsibility." 
"The worrier either worries about the fool 
because the fool doesn't worry, or dismisses 
the fool as unworthy of worry. In both in- 
stances worry is seen as good, however, the 
fool also acts as a reminder of our own 
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to point out what is bad about worry, i.e. 
its cautiousness or lack of action. The 
fool appears to treat caution as cowardice 
and the worrier knows that there is some- 
thing in what the fool says, for this 
reason the worrier as worrier is uncomfort- 
able in the presence of a fool. And yet 
when we remember the worrier's mode of 
discourse (i.e. his yes -buts) we find that 
the worrier could only make remarks followed 
by mumbling, or stuttering, i.e. that the 
worrier speaks like a fool. The point here 
is that the worrier treats speaking as sticking 
his neck out, and treats this as something 
you do quickly, i.e. i f you get away with it 
you sigh a sigh of relief and feel you need 
to relax until you try again. It is almost 
as if your neck needs time to stiffen again 
in order to stick out. Somehow the worrier's 
version of his own speech as a climax, i.e. as 
short and sweet, leaves him unable to speak 
again. His version of himself as working 
better under pressure treats his own speech 
as something which cannot be followed. (It 
is the idea of forced confession again;) The 
worrier doesn't really want to be spoken to 
once he has spoken, for he would see this as 
asking him to do more, and he had to use up 
all of his reserves to speak in the first 
place. He wants others to stop and start 
when he does, this is the closest he can 
get to rhythm. Before leaving this theme 
of speech as climax we can see how the 
worrier might develop a love /hate relation- 
ship to his own speech for perhaps it is 
precisely this tension which makes a sexual 
climax have such an edge. The idea of 
tension as an edge seems to take us back 
into the oscillation topic, i.e. life and 
death. Also perhaps it can account for 
why the worrier is always looking for 'good' 
topics, i.e. each occasion is different some- 
how, i.e. one is not in any straightforward 
way built upon the other because the other 
has been taken to a climax, i.e. as far as 
it can go." 
"The worrier's problem then is that he treats 
life or others as anticlimatic and hence treats 
life as a problem. He tries to excite other 
with his speech but doesn't see how his speech/ 
remarks finish both him and his listeners off." 
Para.4 
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"What I am trying to say here is that the 
worrier doesn't notice that his remarks 
can be tempting to others, i.e. they could 
provide easy ways out - stops. It is as 
if his remarks leave other with nothing to 
say, i.e. they strangle other by speaking 
for other, saying what other should have 
said. The worrier steps into silences, 
sticks his neck out in order to offer a 
sense of direction, but doesn't realize 
that from the silence nobody can be heard. 
He intends his remarks to be used as sign- 
posts but finds that they fall down and are 
used as road -blocks as soon as he has erected 
them. He wanted to help but was treated as 
a hindrance, and perhaps he was, or is, 
because remarks, like the remarkable, i.e. 
miracles, do not help because they too 
easily create lazy pointing. They can be 
entertaining but so can the fool and this 
was what the worrier was trying not to be. 
Miracles and remarks make an audience of 
man and this suggests the worrier's arrogance 
for it is as if he feels that observers (i.e. 
the audience), i.e. those who concentrate, are 
taken in by what they see /hear in a way that 
he manages to avoid. By not concentrating 
he could see what might pop out from behind 
the theatre. The place for the remarker 
then is outside, i.e. you can only remark 
if you are outside, i.e. unmarked, immaculate 
and one way to remain unmarked, or so the 
worrier thinks is to avoid contact. Avoid- 
ing is like putting yourself in a void, i.e. 
making yourself scarce, I can't say it clearly 
but perhaps the best way of doing this is by 
becoming a fool, i.e. empty headed, carrying 
your own void around with you. The fool is 
not held to be responsible for his actions 
because he is empty headed, has a diminished 
self. The worrier's conception of his own 
speech as a climax is the means by which he 
tries to reduce his own responsibility, i.e. 
his speech was forced by pressure, time 
limits or whatever, and anyway once he has 
spoken he is in the same situation as the 
fool, i.e. he is empty, and hence cannot be 
taken to account for what he said. So the 
worrier becomes a fool not when he speaks 
but when he has spoken. Perhaps the 
emptiness which the worrier feels once he 
has spoken can also be related to his sense 
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"The worrier's remarks are starts which seem 
to be designed to stop other, as if the 
worrier sees stopping and starting as helping 
other to keep awake. He seems to bang his 
head against a brick wall to let himself and 
others know what it is like, rather than to 
show them what a waste of time it is. He 
builds walls with his 'yes -buts' (i.e. they 
are like blocks) and he is still surprised 
that he doesn't get on, and that others try 
to discard the blocks he provides them with. 
Remarks stun in the same way as walls can, 
i.e, they can stop you going where you were 
going." 
"The worrier does increasingly start to sound 
like a martyr now, and funnily enough starts 
to sound even more tiresome the more martyr - 
like he sounds: The dilemma for the worrier 
or the martyr is that by their actions they 
point to what is bad about life, and given 
that life is bad their own deaths hardly seem 
so courageous. By sticking his neck out the 
worrier is seen to devalue his neck, and this 
is how other can come to view him as a fool: 
for the fool is one who doesn't know what is 
valuable, i.e. good or bad, and other in 
this instance is sure that necks are good: 
That this conception of the fool is foolish, 
i.e. that we were wrong to find the notion 
of the worrier as a martyr both funny and 
tiresome above, is what we now need to show. 
What is foolish about this conception of the 
fool is that it, or its holder, doesn't yet 
know whether fools or anything else are good 
or bad. This would be another way of saying 
that we are already sticking our necks out 
even if we pretend we don't know it. The 
point being that that which is tiresome need 
not be bad. Hence the fact that the worrier 
finds life tiring shouldn't lead him to think 
it is bad." 
"The fact that the worrier as a remarker 
needs to separate himself from others seems 
to contradict his own view of his actions as 
attempts to help other, however we can see 
more clearly that this is not so when we 
realize that the worrier thinks he must 
perfect himself before he can help others 
(or do anything good), and he treats 
separating himself from others as a means 
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responsibility as pressure and sees the 
taking on of responsibility as being 
irresponsible unless it is done by some- 
one who knows he can fulfill his obligations. 
He further thinks that nobody can know 
this and as a result tends to equate the 
acceptance of responsibility with arrogance, 
or a lack of humility. He justifies his 
own inaction by pointing at the lack of 
justification others have to act rather 
than by showing how a lack of action is 
just. He uses 'yes -buts' to try to 
produce inaction, i.e. if his 'yes -buts' 
were heeded everybody would be reduced 
to waiting for miracles. Perhaps this 
would get rid of arrogance but it would 
get rid of responsibility as well, i.e. 
it sounds like throwing the baby out with 
the bath water, or in another way like 
having a version of the highest form of 
life as the serious, i.e. as being 
watchful for imperfections. The worrier 
tends to treat interventions as imperfections, 
i.e. actions as bad, and this shows us how 
he prefers the serious, i.e. that which 
proceeds in a series." 
"The worrier treats actions, or inter- 
ventions, like viruses, i.e, whereas with 
children pain is normally taken as an in- 
dicator that something is wrong, the worrier 
sees a lack of pain as an indicator that 
something is going to be wrong, That is 
he sees lack of pain as producing ease or 
carelessness, i.e. as failing to produce 
the necessary precautions, and on the other 
hand as producing careless actions, and it 
is these that we need to take precautions 
against. He treats ease as a doctor would 
treat a contagious disease, i.e. as a danger 
and hence as something to be avoided. The 
worrier then can be treated as a sophisticated 
child, i.e. he sees not only that pain is an 
indicator that something is wrong, but also 
that things can go wrong as a result of a 
lack of pain, i.e. carelessness. Somehow 
both seem like functionalists in their 
failure to question the fact that the goal 
of the system is taken to be efficiency, 
i.e, a lack of pain, or of friction: Here 
we see then that the worrier doesn't really 
want tension in itself, as we earlier thought, 
but that he wants tension now as a sign that 
the future will lack tension;" 
Para.9 
Para_ 1Q 
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"Perhaps the medical analogy above can be 
carried a little further if for a moment 
we consider the 'yes but' as similar to 
immunization, i.e. the acceptance of just 
a small amount of the disease (not enough 
to have lasting effects, i.e. to leave a 
mark), but enough to prevent the disease 
occurring again. The worrier then 
accepts in a small way what other says 
only to know it and be able to reject it 
more forcibly as a result of this knowledge. 
The worrier then treats the person who 
doesn't use 'yes buts' as he would the 
person who doesn't get immunized, i.e. 
as a fool." 
"Somehow talking to yourself, or thinking 
before you act seems like the same sort 
of precaution as immunization, and the 
fool does seem like a person who never 
talks to him /her self. That is the fool 
is reckless, i.e. doesn't reckon. However 
the worrier is foolish in this way, in the 
sense that he fails to take account of 
(reckon) other's view that thinking out 
loud is foolish. What other's, the 
manipulator's, view here presupposes, is 
that our thinking is foolish, and as a 
result that it is something to hide with 
our speech. The fact that this is not 
possible escapes both the worrier and the 
manipulator here, who both try to separate 
speech and thought." 
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Response to Appendix D 
This appendix, like all speech, is stimulating 
for us, through our reading of it we help recreate con- 
ditions which enable us to further our thoughtful inquiry. 
Analysis of Paragraph 1 
"Earlier I began by suggesting that the 
worrier was afraid of making a fool of 
himself, and we found as we progressed 
that the worrier relied upon a version 
of foolishness as incompetence. Perhaps 
this could be deepened if we began to 
think about the fact that it might not 
be that the worrier is afraid of making 
a fool of himself, but that he can't make 
a fool of himself, i.e. he imagines that 
people treat him seriously even when he 
is being unserious. Initially it sounds 
here as if the worrier is merely being 
rigorous and extending the idea of his 
own incompetence to 'making a fool of 
himself', i.e. if he could make a fool of 
himself he could make something and would 
not be 'completely' incompetent. However 
the point is a stronger one, it is that 
nobody can make a fool of him /her self, 
i.e. others are involved in making fools 
of people, and so the worrier was afraid 
of something which could not happen. 
This can be strengthened even further in 
two ways (a) when we remember that the 
fool isn't taken as being responsible for 
his actions, and so the fool doesn't make 
or create anything other than by accident; 
and (b) when we see that this point doesn't 
only apply to fools, i.e. nobody can make 
anything of themselves without others 
(perhaps friends) . To return to the first 
way ((a) above) the fact that the fool is 
held not to be responsible for his actions 
(let alone himself) tells us why the fool 
can often have an impact, i.e. remark in 
a very pointed and stunning way. The 
reason is that the fool can be fearless, 
or is fearless, i.e. can do anything, 
because he isn't held to do anything; 
he is neither deserving of praise nor 
blame, i.e. he isn't responsible for 
his irresponsibility." 
Response /... 
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Response: 
You begin by speaking of "suggesting ", but you 
could not desire either to have a suggestible audience, 
i.e. you could not wish to talk in such a way as to bring 
others under the sway of your talk, or to be easily brought 
under the sway of another talker. A thoughtful formulation 
of suggestion could not mean the wish to produce unquestion- 
ing acceptance, rather our notion of suggestion would in- 
volve the hearer being stimulated to think, i.e. to doubt 
and question. 
You go on to say "Perhaps this could be deepened 
if we began to think about the fact that it might not be ... 
etc. ", but your "Perhaps ... if" cannot mean to display 
only a shallow commitment to deepen, i.e. as if you could 
choose to leave matters as they are: rather it displays 
the depths of your commitment even in the face of difficult 
odds. You decide to "... think about the fact that ... 
etc." and by doing so remind us that we can never deepen 
our activities by merely thinking about facts, in the sense 
of observing them, for facts as such are such that they 
become estranged from thought. By "think about..." you 
must mean think about, in the sense of turn about, switch 
around, rather than in the sense of observing, i.e. sub- 
ordinating your self to facts by pretending the facts are 
first. Indeed your speech proceeds to exemplify thinking 
about in the sense we are commending. We choose to con- 
template what it is good to do, and not think about what 
the facts merely are. 
When /... 
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When you say that the worrier can't make a fool 
of himself you cannot mean that he wants to but fails, for 
that you could never know. Rather you must mean that 
selves cannot be made fools of, i.e. that thoughtlessness 
is no longer self, i.e. it is the absence of self. (We 
are formulating the fool as the clown here, and not as the 
man who whilst recognizing his own lack of wisdom still 
seeks wisdom.) 
Your speech on the worrier "merely being rigorous 
and extending the idea of his own incompetence ... etc." 
reminds us of the thoughtlessness of that rigour, for what 
is the purpose of diligently extending the domain of an 
idea to draw in other items prior to contemplating the place 
of the idea? For thinkers /speakers ideas necessarily ex- 
ercise great power, and though this power 
in the service of the liberation of men /women, the thought- 
less usage of ideas must always encage for it is to be used 
by the ideas, it is to rule out dialectical development/ 
social development. 
When you say that "nobody can make a fool of him/ 
her self..." you must mean that no body can make a fool of 
a self and this is true if make is being used in a strong 
sense of design, for bodies cannot design without thought. 
Also when you say others are involved in making fools of 
people you cannot be referring by others to thoughtful in- 
terlocutors, for thoughtful interlocutors are aware that 
we can only have a better society, i.e. better lives, by 
working to make ourselves thinkers out of our foolishness. 
The /... 
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The thinker could be formulated as the social climber in 
the profound sense of one who seeks to elevate society. 
We imagine by others you must be referring to those who 
pretend to be already knowledgeable. 
You say "the worrier was afraid of something which 
could not happen" and we hear this as meaning not that it 
is impossible, but that it could not happen if the worrier 
prevents it, i.e. if he overcomes his irrational fears of 
others, other speakers, for these fears could force him to 
make a fool of his person unless he deepens his involvement 
with other speakers. 
Your speech reminds us that by the fool we mean 
all men, and not the clown, but perhaps the worrier seeks 
to be a fool in the latter sense, for he could formulate 
the clown as meaning no harm, and as such, as free from 
blame, i.e. as merely letting things happen. But we know 
that the circus audience's laughter at the clown is always 
half- hearted, for to laugh whole -heartedly would be to have 
made fools of ourselves. To laugh at the clown is to 
empathize with an attempt to become thoughtless, and deeply 
we all know that the clown cannot be thoughtless. The 
sadness which is conventionally postulated as underlying 
the clown's makeup displays the audience's discontent with 
its own response, i.e. with its laughter, and reveals the 
beginnings of its search to reach a more human notion of 
enjoyment. 
When you say the point is a stronger one you must 
mean /... 
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mean it directs us towards more profound questions, for 
the realization that men cannot make fools /clowns of them- 
selves is very important for it reveals that we can never 
be suited to be slaves, that we can never be thoughtless, 
for as speakers, i.e. as social, we always display thought- 
ful character. We choose not to remain as fools by claim- 
ing response -ability for our actions, i.e. by being willing 
to think about what we do, and only in this way can we be 
freeing ourselves from thoughtless lives. Unlike the fool 
your speech does not merely have an impact, i.e. remark in 
a pointed and stunning way, for it stimulates not stuns. 
You could not want to stun us, for what use would we be to 
you in your dialogue in a stunned condition? You seek to 
stimulate /to goad others into actions that deepen relation- 
ships/society with your speech. Thoughtful speakers never 
seek to stun others, for that is to produce silence rather 
than continuing conversation. If our speech is to stimu- 
late ourselves, or others, it must get beneath the surface, 
it must have penetration. Analytic speech incites selves, 
it does not deaden into submission in the manner that a 
systematic straight jacket might. Socrates' speech is not 
intended to stun others, but to play a part in stimulating 
dialogue. 
You speak of the fool's remarks as pointed and 
stunning, as we have intimated, this is to us, a misleading 
juxtaposition of concepts. However, perhaps the fool points 
in a stunning way because he is fearless. He has no sense 
of direction so his speech has no penetration, it can only 
bounce /... 
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bounce off the surface of speakers, for speakers have 
depths' which the fool's remarks cannot reach. The fool 
remarks in a random fashion, and if, now and then he hits 
a target he cannot claim or be offered any credit, for he 
is merely the vehicle of chance, rather than a thoughtful 
deliberate actor. And this is why any reduction of man 
to nature could have had tragic results.. 
We are, and desire to be, responsible for all 
that we do, and we did not say for 'everything' we do, for 
we want to resist forms of speech that reduce thoughtful, 
intentional, actions to the status of things. We are 
claiming responsibility for our reading of your speech and 
by doing so expose ourselves, and show our willingness to 
continue deepening our ability to respond. Your speech 
reminds us that we are not responsible for irresponsibility 
for our version of self is as response -able. 
Analysis of Paragraph 2 
"The worrier either worries about the fool 
because the fool doesn't worry, or dismisses 
the fool as unworthy of worry. In both in- 
stances worry is seen as good, however, the 
fool also acts as a reminder of our own 
cautiousness, i.e. he acts in such a way as 
to point out what is bad about worry, i.e. 
its cautiousness or lack of action. The 
fool appears to treat caution as cowardice 
and the worrier knows that there is some- 
thing in what the fool says, for this 
reason the worrier as worrier is uncomfort- 
able in the presence of a fool. And yet 
when we remember the worrier's mode of 
discourse (i.e. his yes -buts) we find that 
the worrier could only make remarks followed 
by mumbling, or stuttering, i.e. that the 
worrier speaks like a fool. The point here 
is that the worrier treats speaking as sticking 
his neck out, and treats this as something 
you do quickly, i.e. if you get away with it 
you sigh a sigh of relief and feel you need 
to /... 
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to relax until you try again. It is almost 
as if your neck needs time to stiffen again 
in order to stick out. Somehow the worrier' s 
version of his own speech as a climax, i.e. as 
short and sweet, leaves him unable to speak 
again. His version of himself as working 
better under pressure treats his own speech 
as something which cannot be followed. (It 
is the idea of forced confession again!) The 
worrier doesn't really want to be spoken to 
once he has spoken, for he would see this as 
asking him to do more, and he had to use up 
all of his reserves to speak in the first 
place. He wants others to stop and start 
when he does, this is the closest he can 
get to rhythm. Before leaving this theme 
of speech as climax we can see how the 
worrier might develop a love /hate relation- 
ship to his own speech for perhaps it is 
precisely this tension which makes a sexual 
climax have such an edge. The idea of 
tension as an edge seems to take us back 
into the oscillation topic, i.e. life and 
death. Also perhaps it can account for 
why the worrier is always looking for 'good' 
topics, i.e. each occasion is different some- 
how, i.e. one is not in any straightforward 
way built upon the other because the other 
has been taken to a climax, i.e. as far as 
it can go." 
Response: 
We begin by being reminded not to respond to your 
speech or to any speech as that of a fool or a worrier, and 
when you said that the worrier either does this or that, we 
were unsure whether to read this as an expression of doubt 
on your part as to your knowledge of the worrier, or whether 
you were asserting that the worrier does (i.e. that you 
know he does) either this or that. Now you are a thought- 
ful speaker, and we know that you are aware that you cannot 
know what one who is other than yourself, i.e. different, 
would do, so we assume that your either /or displays your 
own doubts. But our assumption is the expression of our 
attitude of doubt and not of feigned certitude, i.e. we are 
as /... 
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as you are. An assumption for us does not remove 
questions /doubts rather it is the effort to raise our- 
selves by continuing questioning. Our effort is to assume, 
to take upon ourselves thoughtful character, we do not 
orient to assumptions as being that which block inquiry. 
Had we heard you to have been commending the view 
that the worrier either does this, or that, we imagine you 
were trying to alert us to extremism, for either /or shows 
little grasp of moderation. 
You say that worry is seen as good, and then 
proceed to speak about how the fool points to the worrier's 
cautiousness, but, if the worrier were one who imagined he 
was good, we could understand his protectiveness. And yet 
what we want to commend is that thoughtful selves, i.e. 
friends, are those who seek the good and are not those who 
imagine they are good. So thoughtful characters recognize 
other's actions as displays of caution about the good but 
not about self. We imagine that the cowardly are those 
who have committed their persons to survival on the surface, 
and forget that we only truly protect our selves, our 
characters, by acting with character, i.e. by acting thought- 
fully. You speak of the worrier being uncomfortable in the 
presence of a fool, and remind us that we would welcome the 
fool's presence, for he could help us maintain our uncom- 
fortableness and maintain our ability not to degenerate into 
thoughtlessness /silence, Here is why we seek continuing 
conversations with thoughtful interlocutors, for they help 
us not to over value our persons, for the product of that 
presumption /... 
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presumption, if it is left unquestioned, is ultimately 
cowering characterlessness. The manner in which we hear 
you speak of the worrier being uncomfortable in the presence 
of the fool leads us to view the worrier as one who is un- 
comfortable in the presence of the truth, and that could 
only be a thoughtful response if uncomfortableness was 
being commended, for the truth need never be feared. 
The transition your speech makes now from the 
worrier's uncomfortableness in the presence of the fool, to 
the discussion of the worrier's discourse, is stimulating, 
for it reminds us that the usage of 'And yet' is thoughtful, 
for it indicates unease, continuing thought, i.e. un- 
settledness, uncomfortableness. It illustrates your com- 
mitment to the rigorous maintenance of unease, of thought- 
ful inquiry, and your continuing willingness to bring your 
own speech /thought into question. You remind us that we 
do not need to rely upon specific embodied others to remind 
us to be uneasy, for we need only listen to, rather than 
dismiss, our own thoughts. 
We hear the version you offer of the worrier's 
speech as stimulating, as calling for our thoughtful 
efforts, for it is only with effort that we can be becoming 
more than a suggestable audience, i.e. it is only with 
effort that we can contribute to the conversation /inquiry. 
We want to say that if we had accepted the version of the 
worrier's speech you describe we would have placed a wedge 
firmly between the worrier's speech and our own, i.e. we 
would have allowed ourselves to be reduced to silence. 
However/.. 
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However we attempt to offer a deeper reading of the 
thinker's /worrier's speech which is moulded from your 
speech, and should be regarded as a deeper version, and 
not as an alternative, for we would not have achieved it 
without hearing your speech. Dialectical development is 
deepening not dismissing, it is the exercise of friendship 
which is human freedom. 
When we remember the worrier's mode of discourse 
(i.e. his 'yes -buts') we remember that we heard him to be 
risking asking questions that he could not answer (the 
only questions worth asking), and this is why they were 
followed by mumbling and stuttering. Indeed perhaps it 
was not mumbling and stuttering, but responsible muteness, 
i.e. the non assertiveness that encourages other also to 
make the effort to respond. Unlike the version you offer 
we appreciate the worrier's effort as intended to stimulate 
and not to stun, and we hear his sigh not as a sigh of 
relief at having got away with it, but as a sigh of dis- 
appointment at his failure to stimulate other to respond 
thoughtfully. We hear the worrier as risking sticking his 
neck out so as to stir up a conversation that has become 
still /silent, and that in its stillness becomes brittle, 
fixed, and less likely to develop, bend and grow, and much 
more likely to snap. 
You speak of the worrier's speech as climax, and 
remind us that speech is a constant feature of our lives, 
not an exceptional feature. We are always speaking /think- 
ing except perhaps when we are not ourselves. 
not/,.. 
So we would 
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not hear speech as climax unless the notion of climax were 
stretched in such a way as to enable it to encompass 
duration. The thoughtful character is always moving /pro- 
ceeding never completing /accomplishing. Perhaps we do 
better to formulate speech as providing the climate for 
friendly relationships? 
You speak of the worrier working better under 
pressure but to have reduced stimulation to pressure would 
have been narrow minded, constrained, We heard the worrier 
as pressing for stimulating relationships and your reading 
displays how he wasn't forcing other. Likewise our speech 
cannot be followed by any who rest with force as the only 
form of stimulation. 
We do not use up all our reserves when we speak, 
for we formulate our readers as our reserves, i.e. we are 
not alone for we offer and seek other's help. You heard 
the worrier as trying to make the perfect speech, and this 
is why you imagined he would have had to have used up all 
of his reserves. But we hear his speech as asking us to 
be less isolated, more friendly. It is interesting that 
you even say "... he had to use up all his reserves to 
speak in the first place" for this reminds us that speakers 
are never first, we are always responding. 
We trust that you do not want us to stop and 
start when you do, for if you did you would be very dis- 
appointed with us: More seriously conversationalists, 
dialecticians encourage others to take up the argument when 
they /,.. 
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they fade, i.e. friends don't try to do everything them- 
selves but to collaborate, i.e. they enable others to start 
and stop when they stop and start, and that is closer to a 
sense of rhythm. 
When you spoke of the worrier "wanting" other to 
stop and start etc. you could not have meant merely wished 
other would stop and start etc. for that would have dis- 
played no awareness of how his speech relates to /with 
others, i.e. of how by speaking we alter alter. Self and 
other develop through conversation, they do not remain the 
same. 
You go on to say "Before leaving the theme of 
speech as climax" and we hear this as your acknowledgement 
of our place, i.e. it is you saying "before I leave the 
theme of climax for you to take up ". And we take it up by 
showing how we can take it further, how to have rested with 
an idea of the worrier as one who "develops" a love /hate 
relationship to his own speech is to rest on what you pro- 
duced as the edge. By refusing to rest there we display 
our commitment to continue seeking for a version of speech 
that is stronger, more profound, than the notion of climax 
we might have relied upon. 
So we hear deeper issues in your speech for you 
are using the notion of sexual climax as a metaphor for the 
edge between life and death, between thought and thought- 
lessness and by doing so are orienting our speech to the 
difference between free moral human lives and thoughtless/ 
enslaved/ 
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enslaved reactions. We imagine that eroding eroticism by 
ignoring all but the sexual climax would reduce pre- 
orgasmic activity to the status of a waste of time. 
Similarly we imagine that an impulse to spend life orienting 
towards the moment of death would reduce conversations /life 
to the status of a waste of time. But, by seeking to act 
more freely, more morally, we seek to be freeing our speech 
from such alienating notions and we recognize others as 
those who assist us in our active inquiry. 
We do not hear your concluding sentence on why 
we do not build in any straightforward way upon our past 
work, as if this was intended as an explanation of our 
failings, for we do not use the analogy of climax to ration- 
alize our failures, but seek to stretch ourselves beyond 
past achievements. For instance, whilst simply to move 
from one climax to another could express the shallowness of 
a repetitious journey, i.e. of one who uses all his resources 
every time he speaks such that he has no energy left to 
listen and develop; whilst one who speaks in order "to get 
away with it" is likely to see himself as having no need 
to learn /listen if he imagines he has escaped, you are in- 
tending to remind us that our future is not built upon our 
past in any straightforward fashion. That dialectical 
development is different from determinism as it involves 
selves, productive thinkers, and not merely things. 
Thinkers /speakers can and always do go further than the past 
would have allowed, for it is not us to stay the same. 
Analysis/... 
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Analysis of Paragraph 3 
"The worrier's problem then is that he treats 
life or others as anticlimatic and hence treats 
life as a problem. He tries to excite other 
with his speech but doesn't see how his speech/ 
remarks finish both him and his listeners off." 
Response: 
When you say the worrier's problem is that he 
treats life or others as anticlimatic you remind us to 
formulate the anticlimatic as that which does not allow us 
to end. Throughout our lives we generate occasion after 
occasion for social, thoughtful, activity none of which is 
oriented to finishing, whereas we imagine the version of 
life offered by a shallow worrier would be that life 
generates worries, that life is harder than death. 
By treating other as anticlimatic we recognize 
other's efforts, speech, as intending to keep our relation- 
ship moving, developing, i.e. to prevent our conversation 
from ending. We recognize that others could not be making 
remarks designed to strangle us. To rest with a version 
of speech as climax, is to reveal a wish to produce a 
silence out of which no further development can be achieved, 
and that wish could not be social. 
You say that the worrier tries to excite others, 
but some may imagine that the only reason to get excited is 
the presence of dangers. I f these are the worrier's 
listeners they reduce his speech to the sounding of an alarm 
rather than appreciating how it was intended to incite 
others to join in collaborative action. 
reduced /... 
Once a speech is 
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reduced to the status of an alarm it is only heard as a 
noise, for the desire to analyze, to befriend the speaker 
by thinking about the grounds of his speech, is lost. If 
we had heard your speech as a warning against worry we 
might have heeded it, but by doing so we would have failed 
to think about it, i.e. to develop our relationship through 
it. 
Analysis of Paragraph 4 
"What I am trying to say here is that the 
worrier doesn't notice that his remarks 
can be tempting to others, i.e. they could 
provide easy ways out - stops. I t is as 
if his remarks leave other with nothing to 
say, i.e. they strangle other by speaking 
for other, saying what other should have 
said. The worrier steps into silences, 
sticks his neck out in order to offer a 
sense of direction, but doesn't realize 
that from the silence nobody can be heard. 
He intends his remarks to be used as sign- 
posts but finds that they fall down and are 
used as road -blocks as soon as he has erected 
them. He wanted to help but was treated as 
a hindrance, and perhaps he was, or is, 
because remarks, like the remarkable, i.e. 
miracles, do not help because they too 
easily create lazy pointing. They can be 
entertaining but so can the fool and this 
was what the worrier was trying not to be. 
Miracles and remarks make an audience of 
man and this suggests the worrier's arrogance 
for it is as if he feels that observers (i.e. 
the audience), i.e. those who concentrate, are 
taken in by what they see /hear in a way that 
he manages to avoid. By not concentrating 
he could see what might pop out from behind 
the theatre. The place for the remarker 
then is outside, i.e. you can only remark 
if you are outside, i.e. unmarked, immaculate 
and one way to remain unmarked, or so the 
worrier thinks is to avoid contact. Avoid- 
ing is like putting yourself in a void, i.e. 
making yourself scarce, I can't say it clearly 
but perhaps the best way of doing this is by 
becoming a fool, i.e. empty headed, carrying 
your own void around with you. The fool is 
not held to be responsible for his actions 
because /... 
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because he is empty headed, has a diminished 
self. The worrier's conception of his own 
speech as a climax is the means by which he 
tries to reduce his own responsibility, i.e. 
his speech was forced by pressure, time 
limits or whatever, and anyway once he has 
spoken he is in the same situation as the 
fool, i.e. he is empty, and hence cannot be 
taken to account for what he said. So the 
worrier becomes a fool not when he speaks 
but when he has spoken. Perhaps the 
emptiness which the worrier feels once he 
has spoken can also be related to his sense 
of relief, i.e. he feels light headed." 
Response: 
You remind us that we do not stick our necks out 
in order to offer directions for others, but in order to 
join with others and be seeking better directions. We are 
re- routing our speech /action, and if this involves pulling 
down signposts, rewriting and re -using them, we will do so. 
Whilst you say the worrier finds his remarks when used as 
signposts fall down, we hear his speech, as we hear your 
speech, as occupied in pulling them down, i.e. as bringing 
our direction into question, as encouraging us to think 
about what we do. If he wanted to help then it is those 
who would reduce his questions to remarks, i.e. those who 
treat his speech as remarkable, who make him into a hindrance, 
for they treat his speech as a ready made signpost, and what 
a close analogy you provide for the authoritarian nature 
of ready made signposts with your notion of lazy pointing; 
Whilst you speak of the worrier as one who resists being 
taken in, we would radicalize that notion, and say that we, 
and our readers, are not taken in by what we read, but take 
it in and make what we say with it. So, when you say "The 
place for the remarker is outside, i.e. you can only remark 
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if you are outside ... ", we do not hear you as commending 
remaining outside but as commending that we get involved, 
for what you are saying is that if we remain outside, the 
most we can do is make remarks. Analytic work is the 
effort to bring self and other selves into friendly social 
relationships, it is the effort to go further than remarks, 
for remarks, like worries, appear to happen to us, i.e. 
they seem as if they can't be helped, and aren't related 
to our intentions. It is this appearance they have of 
being beyond our control, i.e. of coming from outside that 
can make them appear oppressive /weighty. 
Your discussion of the emptiness that follows the 
worrier's speech helps us to remember that we are all much 
better than the version you describe of the worrier, for we 
are not ourselves if we are empty- headed. We do not feel 
light-headed when we have spoken,for our interest is not in 
merely passing our burden, perhaps our worries, from our- 
self on to another, for that would be to rest with a weak 
version of society as consisting of discrete, separate, but 
similar, individuals who cannot progress through social 
relationships, and who remain essentially the same. Our 
interest is in speaking in such a way as to continue develop- 
ing our relationships. We enjoy speaking not because it 
gives us a sense of relief, but as our way of deepening our 
characters, and so of leading our lives more thoughtfully/ 
more enjoyably. 
Asis of Paragraph 5 
"The/... 
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"The worrier's remarks are starts which seem 
to be designed to stop other, as if the 
worrier sees stopping and starting as helping 
other to keep awake. He seems to bang his 
head against a brick wall to let himself and 
others know what it is like, rather than to 
show them what a waste of time it is. He 
builds walls with his 'yes -buts' (i.e. they 
are like blocks) and he is still surprised 
that he doesn't get on, and that others try 
to discard the blocks he provides them with. 
Remarks stun in the same way as walls can, 
i.e. they can stop you going where you were 
going." 
Response: 
You remind us not to orient to your speech as a 
brick wall, that is if a brick wall is oriented to as a con- 
straint. But perhaps we can still orient to it as a brick 
wall if we offer a formulation of a brick wall as a metaphor 
for man's constructive capability. By doing so we will 
lead ourselves not to concentrate our attention upon the 
surface of your speech which may appear impenetrable, but 
upon your intention in constructing your speech in that 
particular fashion. You cannot be speaking in the way you 
do in order to block our inquiry for such an action is out 
of character, so you must have written that paragraph to 
help us continue our inquiry, and you do help us for you 
remind us that we don't want to "get on" in the sense of 
climb on top of our wall (our speech), i.e. we are not 
orienting towards success as finishing, i.e. as reaching a 
climax, for we are committed to continuing. When you 
speak of the worrier as one who bangs his head against a 
brick wall, you remind us that our activity involves us in 
working at the limits, and in stretching those limits, and 
that whilst to some this may appear to be banging our heads 
against /... 
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against a brick wall, we are aware of the depths of the 
changes our work does bring about. I t is only those who 
risk extending themselves to their limits, who can proceed 
to extend their limits, and be becoming less constrained. 
To deformulate philosophy as banging your head against a 
brick wall, is to opt for an existence walled in, or 
sheltered by thoughtless /untouched constructions, i.e. it 
is to remain worried. By engaging in our activity we let 
ourselves and other selves see what we are, and we do com- 
mend what we do as other than a waste of time. We keep 
ourselves and others awake and do not do so merely in order 
to stay safe, but in order that we can continue conversing 
and developing our relationships, our society. Thoughtless, 
unreflexive, activities would take on the mantle of sleep, 
and by doing so, would reduce speakers to silence, i.e. in- 
dividuals to isolates. Perhaps we can talk in our sleep, 
but we can't hold conversations in our sleep,and this tells 
us something about what alienated talk would be, i.e. about 
what speakers who imagined they had no need of other, of 
friendship, would sound like. 
Friends stimulate each other, they do not speak 
in such a way as to stun as if from a position of superiority, 
for they speak to and for themselves, as well as to and for 
other selves. Friends are those who keep each other moving 
towards more thoughtful forms of speech /life by continuing 
to question current forms of speech /life. 
Analysis of Paragraph 6 
"The /... 
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"The worrier does increasingly start to sound 
like a martyr now, and funnily enough starts 
to sound even more tiresome the more martvr- 
like he sounds: The dilemma for the worrier 
or the martyr is that by their actions they 
point to what is bad about life, and given 
that life is bad their own deaths hardly seem 
so courageous. By sticking his neck out the 
worrier is seen to devalue his neck, and this 
is how other can come to view him as a fool: 
for the fool is one who doesn't know what is 
valuable, i.e. good or bad, and other in 
this instance is sure that necks are good: 
That this conception of the fool is foolish, 
i.e. that we were wrong to find the notion 
of the worrier as a martyr both funny and 
tiresome above, is what we now need to show. 
What is foolish about this conception of the 
fool is that it, or its holder, doesn't yet 
know whether fools or anything else are good 
or bad, This would be another way of saying 
that we are already sticking our necks out 
even if we pretend we don't know it. The 
point being that that which is tiresome need 
not be bad. Hence the fact that the worrier 
finds life tiring shouldn't lead him to think 
it is bad." 
Response: 
The effort to respond thoughtfully to this para- 
graph is perhaps more necessary for our task than all that 
has preceded it, for how we hear the paragraph reveals 
whether we are prepared to raise ourselves in such a way 
that we hear the martyr's speech, or whether we choose to 
fail to raise ourselves above the din of the audience, which 
is voluminous not because it consists of speakers who wish 
to be heard, but because many are involved in talking in 
such a way that they need not be heard, i.e. in such a way 
that they may on this occasion slip away and remain unnoticed. 
If this were not the case there would be no execution. 
We began by hearing your speech as that of a 
member of the audience, i.e. as miserably failing to achieve 
a /,.. 
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a hearing of the martyr's speech that did yourself credit. 
We heard your speech as the whispered rationalization of 
your own silence that each member of the audience has to 
whisper, if only to convince their own persons. We heard 
your speech as degrading the martyr's act by failing to 
empathize with it, for to hear the martyr as pointing to 
what is bad about life can hardly be called a hearing at 
all, for the martyr is one who has such a commitment about 
the good of a good life, i.e. about being honest and human, 
that he is prepared to sacrifice his own personal life for 
it. To hear this as pointing to what is bad about life is 
to be trapped in thoughtlessness that fails to hear the 
irony of the martyr's death, for the martyr provides a 
supreme example of the good of human life. 
However, no doubt our readers detect the irony 
here for the reading we have offered of your speech shows 
little effort, for it reveals an understanding /an empathy 
with the member of the audience that could have displayed 
our own failure to hear the martyr's speech. If we are to 
preserve your speech, and hence our own, as the speech of a 
thoughtful man, we can only assume that there is more than 
a touch of irony here, for how else in the same paragraph 
could /... 
* (N.B. of course we are not by martyr referring to the 
religious type who does devalue human life by an 
acceptance of a dogmatic belief in an afterlife, for 
by subordinating himself to myths in this way he does 
devalue his own act: rather we refer to the truly 
moral character who does not pretend to know about 
that which is beyond his life /speech. This is of 
course only a surface reading of the religious martyr 
which needs to be deepened but this is not the place 
to begin a different task.) 
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could you commend the worrier for finding life tiresome, 
and, at the same time, appear effectively to reduce the 
martyr's act to an accusation of life? 
So, if we are to be achieving a thoughtful read- 
ing of your speech, we must hear it as that of a martyr, 
and perhaps we are beginning to do so by seeing that what 
is tiresome for the martyr is not his recognition that his 
act can always be misunderstood, but that it so frequently 
is By reminding us that that which is tiresome is not 
bad, you do provide an opening for us to get back on track, 
for those who are prepared to do what might at first sight 
seem tiresome, are those who are prepared to make sacrifices, 
and though small they are a start, and do differentiate 
speakers from the laziness of talk that wishes to make no 
effort, i.e. from the audience's whispers, i.e. the whispers 
of those who only make an effort when they are forced. 
So, yours is a good speech for it really does 
enable its readers, i.e. us, to choose for ourselves. 
Perhaps our speech could be criticized as being too force- 
ful, i.e. as leaving readers little to do for themselves, 
but of course mere criticism is not an activity in which 
thoughtful interlocutors will engage. 
By speaking of humble beginnings, i.e. of making 
small sacrifices you show us how to begin to create our 
social context where martyrdom is not called for, where the 
many are those who speak honestly not knowingly. Indeed 
perhaps a readiness to perceive the situation as other than 
this /... 
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would reveal a failure to resist the temptation to paint 
others in the form of the most extra -ordinary, i.e. de- 
generate versions we have of ourselves. 
Analysis of Paragraph 7 
"The fact that the worrier as a remarker 
needs to separate himself from others seems 
to contradict his own view of his actions as 
attempts to help other, however we can see 
more clearly that this is not so when we 
realize that the worrier thinks he must 
perfect himself before he can help others 
(or do anything good), and he treats 
separating himself from others as a means 
of perfecting himself. He treats 
responsibility as pressure and sees the 
taking on of responsibility as being 
irresponsible unless it is done by some- 
one who knows he can fulfil his obligations. 
He further thinks that nobody can know 
this and as a result tends to equate the 
acceptance of responsibility with arrogance, 
or a lack of humility. He justifies his 
own inaction by pointing at the lack of 
justification others have to act rather 
than by showing how a lack of action is 
just. He uses 'yes -buts' to try to 
produce inaction, i.e. if his 'yes -buts' 
were heeded everybody would be reduced 
to waiting for miracles. Perhaps this 
would get rid of arrogance but it would 
get rid of responsibility as well, i.e. 
it sounds like throwing the baby out with 
the bath water, or in another way like 
having a version of the highest form of 
life as the serious, i.e. as being 
watchful for imperfections. The worrier 
tends to treat interventions as imperfections, 
i.e. actions as bad, and this shows us how 
he prefers the serious, i.e. that which 
proceeds in a series." 
Response: 
As always we choose to stir ourselves for only 
by doing so are we able to offer more than an indolent 
reading of your speech. Through our reading of your 
speech we have recognized the fertility of the soil you 
have /... 
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have provided but we have needed to plough it up and often 
to turn it right over to make use of it in our efforts to 
think through and extend our forms of speech /life. Indeed, 
our brows became so riddled with furrows that had we not 
paid close attention we might have mistakenly imagined your 
speech was already ploughed, i.e. ready. We are only able 
to repair that initial reading by saying how it has played 
a part in our work to overcome the impulse to differentiate 
between self and other selves, i.e. the impulse to offer 
indolent readings of other's speeches as thoughtless, i.e. 
as mere surface. That is the impulse to hear self as 
deeper than other speakers by only going so far as to 
acknowledge that self speaks uneasily, i.e. thoughtfully; 
that one's own speech requires effort, but not going far 
enough to extend this version of self to other speakers 
also. To settle in this way for lazy understandings of 
others' speeches would have been to begin to drift apart, 
i.e. to separate, and to settle for defectiveness which 
could have done no more than give voice to utopian wishes. 
Your speech in this paragraph calls for our ploughing, our 
effort to bring to the surface that which might have 
remained covered over. 
Through our work with the first sentence of 
para. 7 we have helped ourselves remember that by refusing 
to differentiate between selves we enable ourselves to 
speak and act in such a way as to be helping ourselves 
when, and as, we help other selves. We seek to continue 
improving our versions of self and by doing so hear your 
speech /... 
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speech as reminding us that separation from others, i.e. 
thoughtful interlocutors, can only leave behind defectives. 
We are social and continue to improve our characters, and 
our society, only as long as we engage in dialogues with 
others which display by their very being the defective 
nature of any separatist notion of self. We do not seek 
to perfect ourselves before we can help others but to col- 
laborate with others in such a way that we are together 
achieving more thoughtful notions of self. To seek to 
perfect oneself as if that was a prerequisite for helping 
others would have been thoughtless utopianism, it would 
have been to seek to be a leader or teacher rather than a 
companion or friend. To seek to be a leader or a teacher 
is, we imagine, to seek to differentiate between self and 
other selves as if good actions can only be done by those 
who are different, perhaps better than others. But we are 
all aware that our actions are neither good nor bad, but 
that we all decide how we want to live, and by acknowledging 
our place as makers of communal decisions we are becoming 
ourselves as companions /friends. Indeed we are reminded 
that one who was perfect could never act well for by know- 
ing everything that one would be denied the freedom that 
not knowing and yet still deciding requires. Social rel- 
ationships and moral action are inseparably intertwined. 
We choose to involve ourselves with others in such a way 
that we can reflect upon, and continue developing and 
deepening our relationships. 
Alternatively we could only hear your expressed 
desire /... 
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desire for self's separation from other as thoughtful/ 
social /moral by hearing the other you were referring to 
as weak anti- social notions of self. By working to 
improve our readings of others' speeches we provide the 
ways forward that utopian wishes of perfecting self alone 
could never do. 
In your second sentence you speak of responsibility 
as pressure, that is not new, but to speak of all who res- 
pond as being irresponsible surprised us a great deal. 
And yet as we work more closely with your speech we are 
able to achieve a more profound understanding of human 
action for you remind us to bring into question the relation- 
ship between obligation and responsibility, for we remember 
that actions designed to fulfil obligations are always 
irresponsible: they are acts of resignation, for by sub- 
ordinating self to other in that way an actor would relieve 
him /her self of response -ability. We are never obliged to 
do anything, if by obliged is meant bound, or rather if we 
conceive of ourselves as obliged that is our own choice. 
So, obligations are only binding if we choose to orient to 
them as binding. The thinker /social actor /free man does 
not do whatever he does because he is obliged to, for that 
would be a deeply tragic misreading of the moral "ought ". 
Those, if any, who hear what they ought to do as an imposition, 
a duty imposed by other, society or whatever, forget their 
true characters as producers of social relationships. 
Those who would only act when they know they can fulfil 
their obligations would irresponsibly throw away their 
ability /... 
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ability to act response -ably without obligation. Response - 
able actions are those which work to free men from thought- 
less adherence to rules that bind. 
But still we must listen more carefully for what 
you say is that actions are irresponsible unless they are 
done by someone who knows he can fulfil his obligations. 
We were too ready to hear "his obligations" as imposed 
duties. By reading in such a way as to emphasize that the 
obligations are "his ", ire, the actor's, we hear how he can 
know he can fulfil them and by doing so fulfil himself; the 
moral /social actor acts in such a way as to retain or regain 
his own self respect. The only obligations he would seek 
to fulfil are those oriented to maintaining his respect 
for self. 
Now those who hear obligations as imposed by 
other would also acknowledge that nobody can know they can 
fulfil obligations of that sort and would rightly see those 
who acted as if they could as claiming too much, i.e. as 
arrogant and lacking humility. But, by hearing our 
obligation as being to doing /deciding what we think is for 
the good we hear how truly response -able actions are humble, 
but by being so do not arrogate their being to others, e.g. 
employers, tradition, history or whatever. 
As to your fourth sentence, here your speech helps 
us to achieve a reading of the worrier's "inaction" as 
arrow -gant for this is what pointing or accusing always is 
How could an actor imagine that he justified his own inaction 
by/... 
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by pointing at the lack of justification others have to 
act rather than by showing how a lack of action is just? 
What we are saying is that those,if any who imagine that 
pointing is inaction are those who arrogantly refuse to 
reflect upon, think about, their own speech /action, and 
are constrained by thoughtless adherence to rules. By 
merely adhering to rules they would be denying their 
character as those who decide what is just. But your 
sentence is important to us, for it displays how those who 
used the knowledge they imagined they had to bolster up 
what they imagined were themselves, might retort to the 
speaker who risks reminding himself and others that our 
actions are free decisions, and are not knowledgeable re- 
actions. They might retort in this manner rather than 
openly acknowledge that they cannot justify their own 
actions. 
Thoughtful interlocutors do not hear speech which 
brings to the surface the lack of justification they had for 
their speech as pointing at them, i.e. as separating speaker 
and listener but as directing attention towards the direction 
in which their conversation can thoughtfully proceed. Our 
actions are not and very likely can never be justified, if 
by justified is meant secured within a perfect system of 
knowledge, but what we are saying is that an acceptance of 
that version of justification degrades men who are those 
who do not opt for closure /completion, but are taking a 
place in the production of their lives. Obedience is not 
the stuff out of which social /moral relationships are born. 
We/... 
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We are not disposed to obey friends. We befriend your 
speech by showing our character as those who hear it as 
other than commanding submission: as those who hear it 
as requesting a thoughtful friendly response. 
As to sentences five and six, right: As we have 
said if speeches are treated as warnings and merely heeded 
those who hear them in this way do reduce themselves to 
waiting for miracles, but we hear the speaker who uses 
'yes -buts' as helping us to direct our dialogue and not as 
claiming prior knowledge about dangers that he is ahead of 
us in observing. 
Yes -buts, i.e. questions, do play a part in reduc- 
ing arrogance if they are situated in the context of 
friendly relationships, i.e. of relationships between selves 
who recognize what they have in common. To speak of throw- 
ing the baby out with the bath water, as you do, is to pro- 
vide an extremely illuminating, though here inappropriate, 
analogy for worry, for it is to invoke an extremely unlikely 
outcome in order to "justify" a specified decision not to 
act. Imagine never bathing a baby for fear of that happen. 
ing; How absurd, and yet this is the immobilizing tendency 
of the worrier's form of speech /life. 
We said the analogy was inappropriately placed 
for as we have said we wish to encourage yes -buts, i.e, the 
effort to question and deepen and in this way to act more 
response-ably and less arrogantly. 
The analogy of the baby and the bath water 
provides /... 
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provides an acute illustration of alienated "thinking" as 
the impulse to be watchful for imperfections. An intimate 
and comfortable scenario is transformed by an orientation 
towards imagining what might happen into a tragedy, when 
it could have been used to display the profundity of human 
action by concentrating upon the thoughtful good intentions 
chosen by the character doing the bathing. The analogy 
orients to bathing the baby as an intervention and seeks to 
point out the imperfect nature of that action. It forgets 
that not bathing the baby would be more dangerous. 
You conclude this paragraph by proposing that 
the worrier prefers the serious, i.e. that which proceeds 
in a series. The unbathed baby would presumably be an 
instance of proceeding in a series, but to prefer that 
would be to resist response -ability without acknowledging 
that that resistance, that that preference, was itself a 
response. To prefer the serious is to exercise a pre- 
ference and to intervene, we always intervene, we cannot do 
otherwise, and by acknowledging and grasping this we can 
come to live more thoughtfully. Perhaps the unbathed baby 
could be read by us as representing forms of speech /life 
which have not been reflected upon; We have to risk 
active intervention if we are to prevent the onset of decay. 
We could only merely leave things as they are and hope we 
wouldn't be brought to light if we were thoughtless, i.e. 
if we did not reflect upon what we ourselves do. But, as 
we have said that is not a human possibility, it is not a 
course of action which is either desirable or open to us. 
We /.. 
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We proceed by conversing, and as a result of our conver- 
sations deciding not to turn back, but to commit ourselves 
to going on. 
Analysis of Paragraph 8 
"The worrier treats actions, or inter- 
ventions, like viruses, i.e. whereas with 
children pain is normally taken as an in- 
dicator that something is wrong, the worrier 
sees a lack of pain as an indicator that 
something is going to be wrong. That is 
he sees lack of pain as producing ease or 
carelessness, i.e. as failing to produce 
the necessary precautions, and on the other 
hand as producing careless actions, and it 
is these that we need to take precautions 
against. He treats ease as a doctor would 
treat a contagious disease, i.e. as a danger 
and hence as something to be avoided. The 
worrier then can be treated as a sophisticated 
child, i.e. he sees not only that pain is an 
indicator that something is wrong, but also 
that things can go wrong as a result of a 
lack of pain, i.e. carelessness. Somehow 
both seem like functionalists in their 
failure to question the fact that the goal 
of the system is taken to be efficiency, 
i.e. a lack of pain, or of friction: Here 
we see then that the worrier doesn't really 
want tension in itself, as we earlier thought, 
but that he wants tension now as a sign that 
the future will lack tension:" 
Response: 
Again you adopt the form of speech of the worrier 
and we can only maintain our version of you as a thoughtful 
interlocutor by hearing your speech as the exercise of irony, 
for you could not be commending worry by your speech, but 
are encouraging us to think about our own actions. 
By refusing to be turned upside down, i.e. by 
resisting the persuasiveness of your speech we display how 
to make progress through it. 
and/... 
Let us rewrite your paragraph 
- 319 - 
and substitute ourselves for the worrier and in this manner 
expose what we do, i.e. what we choose to do and not rest 
with pointing at a hypothetical other. 
We treat inaction /thoughtlessness /silence as an 
intervention, or better as an interruption to our mode of 
action /life. That is inaction /thoughtlessness /silence is 
the virus, it is painful to us. As thinkers /speakers a lack 
of pain is thoughtful for us, and a lack of thought is pain- 
ful. The thinker /speaker recognizes that a lack of thought 
not only indicates that something is going to be wrong, but 
always brings it about. We see a lack of thought not as 
producing carelessness but as carelessness, but not as easy, 
for we are at ease in our thoughts /speech, for we orient to 
our thought /speech as caring for selves, (i.e. both our own 
selves and other selves). Our interest is not limited to 
protecting our persons from careless actions by taking pre- 
cautions, but in thinking about what we do so that we do 
not act carelessly. If any imagine that being easy is 
being thoughtless /carefree, we would say that they cannot 
do any good for their actions are products of either care- 
lessness/accident, or are tinged by their efforts to avoid 
their own pains. If we settled for a formulation of ease 
as thoughtlessness we would treat ease as would the doctor 
you mention, i.e. as a contagious disease, as a danger, but 
we are pleased your worrier is not your doctor for the good 
doctor is better formulated not as avoiding disease, but as 
seeking a cure, and to do this involves contact with the 
disease, and the risk of contracting the disease in order 
to /.., 
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to produce remedies. So the doctor would want to separate 
the uninfected from the infected but by doing so places 
himself precariously in the middle. Similarly the analyst/ 
speaker has to risk considerable contact if he is to come 
to grips with and help to remould social practices, indeed 
as we are showing he must always be working from and on 
the inside. From the outside the worrier appears as one 
who avoids social contact as your doctor avoids contagious 
diseases for he imagines others put him at risk. 
The worrier's conception of the child that you 
offer, i.e. as less sophisticated, i.e. as only treating 
pain as an indicator that something is wrong and not yet 
realizing that a lack of pain indicates that something is 
going to be wrong, reminds us that if our children treat 
pain as an indicator that something is wrong this would have 
been because we had taught them to do so. But we would 
rather encourage our children and our selves to remember 
that we must continue to take pains with ourselves, i.e. 
make an effort, for that is the only way that speakers, 
social actors can lead better /more thoughtful and more 
enjoyable lives, and that this effort is always necessary 
for all. By formulating a lack of pain as thoughtfulness, 
i.e. as carefulness we show how we are moving so as to 
deepen the shallow version of worry as conceiving of think- 
ing as unpleasant, i.e. as something to be stopped. What 
we are uncovering is that thoughtlessness, i.e. the refusal 
to bring our own forms of speech into our inquiry would 
have left us paying a very heavy penalty, i.e. the penalty 
of /... 
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of a dead life, and that would be deeply painful to any 
who thought /spoke, i.e. to all. But, we need none of us 
suffer that penalty if only we think about, converse about 
what we do. We are pro lack of pain, i.e. pro thought, 
but we remind ourselves not to treat this as a goal, but as 
a condition we are maintaining by making the effort to con- 
tinue thinking about how we act, i.e. to continue producing 
more thoughtful versions of self and society. We do not 
reduce tension /our desires /our liveliness to the status of 
friction for to do so is to set out upon a search for 
lubricants (funny, perhaps that is why solutions could 
sound so comforting to some!). We seek to sustain our 
desires by thinking /conversing about them and, by doing so, 
making them more thoughtful. We will have more to say 
about the future later, but we are reminded by your final 
sentence in this paragraph that we do not know what we want, 
we have to decide, and we do decide more thoughtfully by 
conversing with thoughtful interlocutors. To refuse to 
engage in conversations of this type would be to settle 
for thoughtless wants, and as we are thinkers /speakers, to 
settle for thoughtless wants could, we imagine, be one way 
of speaking about alienation. 
Analysis of Paragraph 9 
"Perhaps the medical analogy above can be 
carried a little further if for a moment 
we consider the 'yes but' as similar to 
immunization, i.e. the acceptance of just 
a small amount of the disease (not enough 
to have lasting effects, i.e. to leave a 
mark), but enough to prevent the disease 
occurring again. The worrier then 
accepts /... 
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accepts in a small way what other says 
only to know it and be able to reject it 
more forcibly as a result of this knowledge. 
The worrier then treats the person who 
doesn't use 'yes buts' as he would the 
person who doesn't get immunized, i.e. 
as a fool." 
Response: 
What a testing but instructive time we are pro- 
viding for ourselves with the help of your speech: 
You speak of the analogy being carried a little 
further as if you recognize its weakness, and ask your reader 
to join with you in carrying it, as if on a stretcher. But 
we want analogies that stretch and strengthen our selves, 
our relationships, i.e. we want friendly speech, for unless 
we keep ourselves fit we will not be able to help others or 
ourselves to move. So when you speak of carrying that 
analogy further you are asking us for more effort, but as 
we move so we bring it into more light. "Yes but" as like 
immunization; It no longer sounds that way to us. We 
hear it as closer to the beckoning of a researcher who is 
daringly entering into unmapped and possibly dangerous 
territory. Not to join him, i.e. not to raise questions 
and try to stretch ourselves beyond conventional boundaries 
is to succumb to the virus of silence /thoughtlessness that 
we are exposing as we also expose ourselves. Had we kept 
both hidden. the former would work to corrupt the latter. 
The inquirer listens to what others say and weighs how far 
he can stretch the conversation without being the one to 
break it down. He listens and speaks so as to play a part 
in extending understanding for self and other selves. He 
has /... 
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has no interest in rejecting other, for an interest in 
rejection is the voice of silence /thoughtlessness. The 
inquirer cannot accept in a small way what other says only 
to know it and be able to reject it etc. for the inquirer 
isn't able to begin by understanding other or himself. 
The unmapped territory of which we speak is self and self's 
relationship with other selves. Your speech reminds us 
that our effort is to hear other's speech as "yes- buts ", 
i.e. as questioning that stretches us, we don't seek 
immunity but community. 
Analysis of Paragraph 10 
"Somehow talking to yourself, or thinking 
before you act seems like the same sort 
of precaution as immunization, and the 
fool does seem like a person who never 
talks to him /her self. That is the fool 
is reckless, i.e. doesn't reckon. However 
the worrier is foolish in this way, in the 
sense that he fails to take account of 
(reckon) other's view that thinking out 
loud is foolish. What other's, the 
manipulator's, view here presupposes, is 
that our thinking is foolish, and as a 
result that it is something to hide with 
our speech. The fact that this is not 
possible escapes both the worrier and the 
manipulator here, who both try to separate 
speech and thought." 
Intervention b Ori mal S.eaker: 
"Perhaps I can display my commitment to 
community rather than immunity here by 
responding to the final paragraph of those 
earlier notes myself in the light of what 
I have heard you to be saying, for I am 
disturbed and unsettled by my reading of 
your responses, but with their help I will 
make the effort to think about what I said, 
for I am aware that not to do so is a 
possibility no longer. 
By responding to what I previously said 
1 /... 
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I will be displaying how talking to, or 
with, our selves which is not limited to 
observing our imagined beginnings, is our 
way to be achieving society. So I would 
now speak of talking to myself not as 
immunization but as communization; not as 
thinking before I act but as acting thought- 
fully; not as a precaution but as social 
development. By talking to myself I mean 
engaging in dialectical development, question- 
ing, deepening and not mere repetition for 
I produce a version of myself as developing 
not as static. I do not and cannot reify 
myself for I recognize the freedom I have 
to extend myself through thought /conversation. 
When I spoke of the fool as reckless, i.e. 
as not reckoning, I was stretching myself 
in such a way that we could understand how 
the reduction of thought to reckoning would 
deformulate men /women. It was too mathe- 
matical a notion, and would if left un- 
analyzed have reduced us to numbers. 
When I spoke of the worrier as failing to 
take account of (reckon) other's view that 
thinking out loud is foolish I was providing 
a way for us to achieve a reading of the 
worrier's speech that does us credit, for it 
is not that the worrier fails to take account 
of other's view, it is that through his speech 
he displays how he achieves social character 
by refusing to be oppressed by silence, If 
any other did view thinking out loud as 
foolish that other needs to remember to 
reflect upon his view and perhaps the 
worrier's speech could have helped him 
to remember to do that. 
What could be more absurd /more destructive of 
speakers /thinkers, i.e. of human potential 
for social development, than an oppressive 
idea that thinking out loud, talking to our- 
selves is foolish: I begin to detect, in 
what I imagined was my disturbed and un- 
settled condition, that something is going 
on here and I want to continue to be part 
of it. So we hear the conventional 
expression that talking to yourself is the 
first sign of madness as itself an expression 
of the dangerously alienating tendency 
oppressive forms of speech /life have to 
reduce speakers /thinkers to the status of 
automatons, clean machines, and we need 
to /... 
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to fight that tendency if we are to preserve 
our sanity; if we are to continue developing 
socially. Yet even the notion of sanity 
has been re- rooted by conventional usage 
in a notion of bodily health, and hence 
bodily survival, and needs to be rooted 
in the realm of decision making if we 
are to develop social practices which 
truly recognize the freedom we have to 
decide whether and how we continue to 
live. So, if we are to preserve our 
sanity, i.e. our place as thinkers, as 
producers of our society, we must resist 
practices which persuade men /women that 
their behaviour is acceptable /justified 
because it is natural, for it cannot be 
justified on those grounds. We choose 
how we act and must continue questioning 
and deepening our manner of choosing if 
we are to pursue thoughtful /social /moral 
response -able lives. 
But I am weary now for I feel I am being 
turned upside down, so perhaps I can now 
take a liberty and rest a while before 
we proceed." 
Response: 
You say that it is time you need, and whilst we 
have doubts about this we have no desire to force you to 
continue, but will for the present merely remind you that 
you are not being turned but are yourself doing the turning, 
as are we with ourselves, i.e. we are not ahead of you but 
are collaborating with you, so do not imagine you are alone 
in your efforts for that would be to ground our relation- 
ship in a difference your work, and ours, seeks to be out- 
growing. When you say "I want to continue to be part of 
it" you must intend to include others. One means of pro- 
ceeding might be for us to think of the worrier as seeing 
things upside down because he is falling? 
- 326 - 
SECTION 8 
Original Speaker: 
I have written the notes that are here 
presented in Appendix E as my way of 
taking issue with your notion that the 
worrier sees things upside down because 
he is falling." 
APPENDIX E 
"For some reason writing is proving even 
more difficult than before (this is the 
eighth first page:) and yet far from this 
being because I have nothing to say it is 
because I feel I have made progress from 
our recent discussion on several different 
issues. Perhaps it is because I think it 
is progress that I am hesitant to write 
about it - now I begin to see a more easy 
way to write which would be to treat this 
progress as merely being seeing what was 
wrong with what we said before, or better 
what was missing or hadn't yet been said. 
I shall take this easy way to begin with 
for perhaps all beginnings are merely ways 
of easing ourselves into good work. To 
begin then I will offer work I have done 
on the following issues in the endeavour 
to produce the material for some better 
work to follow: 
(A) Haste 
(B) Complaining 
(C) Falling - (1) regarding upside down and 
better as downside up. 
(D) Falling - (2) and its relationship to 
manipulation 
Section (A) 
"Perhaps it is no coincidence that haste 
comes first; however, we have seen in our 
previous/... 
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previous work that the worrier has fre- 
quently seen hasty actions as being those 
which can inflict pain, e.g. the angry man's 
actions, the careless action, or the foolish 
action. Even the worrier's own actions, 
i.e. sticking her neck out, seem to be 
characterized by haste where haste would 
mean a lack of preparation, a lack of 
thought; The worrier's view is that 
you should think before you act or speak 
and that hasty actions are simply those 
which do not allow time for thought. 
She tries to stop others being hasty, or 
at least going on being hasty with her 
yes -buts. She always thinks you should 
think more before you act or speak, and 
her yes -but is there even if she thinks 
better than (i.e. yes butsit) to say it 
for any reason. She sees an action 
beginning or perhaps a beginning as a 
sign that problems have not been remarked 
upon, and that there are consequently 
either matters of which the actor is 
ignorant or matters he is choosing to 
ignore. Either way the worrier feels 
obliged to speak even in her somewhat 
hasty manner. None of this seems to 
sound new but what will perhaps be new 
will be the realization that the worrier, 
who on the face of it would seem to be 
the last person we would suspect of or 
charge with being hasty, is indeed hasty, 
and hasty in a way, and on an issue which 
is crucial in understanding how she comes 
to act (or not act:) as she does. The 
worrier is hasty in her definition of 
hasty, i.e. she starts with a definition 
and works from it. (I have a feeling 
that I ought to say this more slowly 
rather than simply repeating it in dif- 
ferent ways but perhaps the outcome will 
be the same.) The worrier is hasty 
because she chooses not to talk or think 
about whether her decision that inaction 
(for her thought) is better than action 
(for her speech) has any foundation. To 
say this in one other way the worrier is 
hasty because she starts by thinking that 
you should think before you speak (act), 
and she doesn't see how this is a bad 
start: That this issue is crucial can 
be emphasized if it can't be already seen 
by saying that it is this unconsidered 
beginning (i.e. finish;) which makes the 
worrier see all actions as inconsiderate. 
Indeed it may be this that forces her to 
see /... 
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see life, i.e. actions (whether her own 





"A hasty decision is a suitable subject for 
a complaint; and the worrier's version of 
speech could be treated as a one -sided version 
of remarking - in the sense that it merely 
points out the marks, i.e. the worrier's 
remarks can (and often are) treated as com- 
plaints. Given this, some consideration 
of the grammar of complaints may help us 
understand the situation within which the 
worrier speaks. There is something about 
complaints which suggests they are a last 
resort (perhaps this is the worrier's version 
of any action,) i.e. you don't complain if 
you can act in any other way. The worrier 
however, as we have seen, tries to restrain 
herself from acting in any way, and the 
result is that when she does act /speak, 
her actions /speech share similar charac- 
teristics to complaining. The point 
about a complaint is that it asks others 
to act to correct their own error, i.e. 
it suggests that all the responsibility 
lies with other, and that the complainer 
after complaining need only wait for action. 
The complainer then is relieved of.respons- 
ibility and it is this that suggests the 
complainer's superiority - or feeling of 
superiority. What I am saying is then 
that complaints issue forth from complacency, 
(perhaps that is why the elderly complain 
so much, i.e. they feel they have fulfilled 
their responsibilities). The person who 
complains is satisfied that she has done 
all she could do. Now I feel that this 
view of the worrier as a complainer under- 
lies hints in your remarks both about the 
worrier unloading her burden on another 
and about the worrier stunning from a 
position of superiority; I also feel that 
the worrier may be being misjudged here and 
this I should show in my discussions on 
falling - more specifically in (C) falling 
regarding upside down. 
"But before leaving complaining it seems 
worth saying that this version of a com- 
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you complain when you can't take any more 
(pressure for example) i.e. you complain 
when you reach what you perceive to be 
breaking point. 
Also somehow the difference between a com- 
plaints box and a suggestions box seems to 
suggest (? complain) that whilst complaints 
do seem arrogant (i.e. as if from a pseudo - 
superior) suggestions seem humble (i.e. as 
if from an underling). 
I have a feeling that the worrier thinks 
you can or should only complain if you are 
suffering whereas the complainer feels you 
should complain whenever you see there is 
something wrong. But now I have a feeling 
that it is precisely when there are things 
wrong that the worrier suffers: 
"Yes but" does sound like a complaint unless 
the but becomes a suggestion:" 
Section C 
"On falling, regarding your suggestion about 
the worrier seeing things upside down because 
he is falling. What I am trying to say is 
that this is upside down, i.e. because the 
worrier is falling he sees downside up: up 
in the sense of above like a ceiling. With- 
out being too fanciful it is as if the pro- 
blems which underlie others apparently solid 
surfaces only come into view as you drop 
beneath them. (It sounds too neat to be 
true but perhaps that is why we talk about 
understanding (under -standing) things.) 
This then could begin to show us why the 
worrier is miscast as a complainer, it is 
as if the worrier needs to be falling 
beneath others in order to point at the 
weaknesses which he feels they should be 
aware of. The worrier doesn't look down 
from above then as a superior or judge 
would, but looks up from below, and per- 
haps this also fits with the idea of the 
worrier as a groveller which has previously 
been suggested. The problem for the worrier 
(and perhaps for the others:) is that he 
doesn't really know why he is falling and 
this fact combined with the very fact that 
he is falling provides others with a reason 
to shelve his advice until a later date. 
(Again /... 
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"On falling, and its relationship to man- 
ipulation. Now this seemed like news to 
me at the time and seemed worth reporting 
as a result, but is beginning to sound less 
interesting as I try to say it again. 
(Perhaps that is what is interesting about 
strangers and is usually uninteresting 
about the news, i.e. its newness. This 
is odd, for the worrier was always wanting 
to start with what she knew and risked 
losing interest even if she succeeded, 
whereas the quality of the new is that 
it is what you didn't know,) 
The point here is that though we seem to 
have been occupied with the idea of falling 
our attention, or mine at least, has been 
drawn away from what would seem to be a very 
important consideration. This is that the 
notion of a fall presupposes that the falling 
object is totally dependent upon the environ- 
ment within which the fall takes place, e.g. 
for its length, duration, direction and, 
perhaps because it isn't a jump even for its 
beginning. The fall then is outside its 
object's control. The reason why this 
seemingly obvious consideration is important 
is because it can bring home to us the way 
the worrier produces his environment as 
manipulative. In a fall then you are 
totally at the mercy of your environment, 
there is nothing you can do. To produce 
yourself as falling is then to produce your- 
self not as a fool, i.e. one who isn't res- 
ponsible for his own irresponsibility but as 
a responsible person who is unable to exercise 
his responsibility because he is falling, 
i.e. if only he could stop he could get 
started. 
Somehow the worrier thinks you must be out- 
side to avoid being taken in but feels that 
if you are outside you must be falling, he 
has no conception of weightlessness. 
When you are falling you have no way to 
resist /... 
Para.5 
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resist the pressures which act upon you, 
and at most can only work on different 
ways of succumbing to them. A fall now 
sounds very much like the idea of climax 
we spoke of earlier, and yet perhaps 
this will be because we had a worrier's 
version of climax, i.e. as a fall - as 
being unable to go on - as falling by 
the wayside - i.e. as being an end. 
Which reminds me that perhaps to treat 
life as anticlimatic is precisely to 
treat it as a fall, i.e. as an anti - 
climb, whereas a climb is up and in 
control a fall is down and out of 
control. 
Now this is the stage at which I should 
try to draw together the different issues 
so as to reach a clear conclusion, however 
I have no desire to try to tie things to- 
gether here (perhaps strangle) i.e. I have 
no desire to finish it off. Perhaps this 
is because I feel a bit like the king's 
horses and the king's men when they were 
faced with Humpty Dumpty, i.e. tired. 
Alternatively perhaps it is because we 
all too readily see a new order as chaos 
because we haven't yet got beneath it, 
i.e. perhaps it doesn't need to be tied 
together." 
Response: 
Your speech reminds us that we do not take issue 
with what others say rather we choose to work with what we 
hear, we are not taking issue with you /against you, for we 
are not interested in argument /accusation, but in dialogue/ 
movement /development. So what do we hear /remember as we 
read this Appendix? 
Prior to working on /with specific sections of it 
we can say that our work upon it has led us to deepen our 
understanding of the notion of "praxis ". Up until now when 
we have heard this notion being invoked it has been as a 
method /... 
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method to encourage apparently non practical theorists to 
relate to the "real world ", to try out, test their theories, 
or whatever, as if ordinary conventional social practices 
were first, and were untheoretical. But that was an in- 
dolent reading, for now we hear praxis as reminding us 
that all social practices are necessarily theoretical, and 
that it is only when we ground them by exposing their 
theoretical foundation, their place as possibilities, that 
we provide ourselves with the means for preserving or alter- 
ing them without force. So the loud belch we heard on the 
platform at Slough station was the expression of a theoretical 
orientation, and as such is in need of the same analytic 
exposition as is Parsons General Theory, both are social 
practices which call out for analysis, and we mean neither 
any disrespect by the juxtaposition. Analysis is a process 
through which we continue to liberate our social practices 
by hearing how they /we were, and are, grounded in theory/ 
possibility about which we can converse and decide in a 
friendly manner. A commitment to analysis is a commitment 
to continuing exposure which helps us to grasp how deeply 
impractical "theories" are, which are designed to bring con- 
versations to an end. Analysis is always possible, and 
is always desirable, and our readers will exercise its 
practice on our speech by making the effort necessary to 
deepen and liberate their hearing of this speech. In this 
way our readers move ahead of us and we will need to listen 
hard to their responses if we are to continue together. 
However we continue to expose ourselves by our reading of 
your /.,. 
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your speech for through our reading of it we are uncover- 
ing much that we had almost forgotten, such is our need 
for continuing conversation. Your speech helps us to 
stimulate so many formulations now that the format of our 
writing seemed to be bursting at the seams, not from over 
indulgence, from exercise /development. By our writing we 
display our intention to be promoting a social situation in 
which seams are stretched and moved rather than burst. 
For whilst the urge to end rather than to continue conver- 
sation/thought will always remain, threatening to burst in 
upon us and interrupt, we need not listen to it. We turn 
to your speech and this is what we hear, this is what your 
speech helps remind us to say: 
Analysis of Paragraph 1 
"For some reason writing is proving even 
more difficult than before (this is the 
eighth first page:) and yet far from this 
being because I have nothing to say it is 
because I feel I have made progress from 
our recent discussion on several different 
issues. Perhaps it is because I think it 
is progress that I am hesitant to write 
about it - now I begin to see a more easy 
way to write which would be to treat this 
progress as merely being seeing what was 
wrong with what we said before, or better 
what was missing or hadn't yet been said. 
I shall take this easy way to begin with 
for perhaps all beginnings are merely ways 
of easing ourselves into good work. To 
begin then I will offer work I have done 
on the following issues in the endeavour 
to produce the material for some better 
work to follow: 
(A) Haste 
(B) Complaining 
(C) Falling - (1) regarding upside down and 
better as downside up. 
(.'j) /.. . 
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(D) Falling - (2) and its relationship to 
manipulation 
Response: 
Having something to say would be oppressive to us 
for we do not have to say anything, perhaps those who imagine 
they must have something to say before they speak display a 
possessiveness which prevents speech. They display an 
orientation to speech as statements like bank statements 
that reveal what they own, but forget how they can only con- 
tinue to develop by involving their speech in conversation/ 
action rather than trying to save it /protect it. We, none 
of us, have to say anything, we always choose what we say, 
so having nothing that we have to say is the only way for 
dialogue to proceed. So, we do not write or speak because 
we have made progress, that would have been bragging which 
treats listeners with disrespect. We are writing /speaking 
as our way of continuing to make progress possible. In- 
deed how could we make progress /become more thoughtful 
before we speak /think? That would have been to commit our- 
selves to the deeply anti -social notion of inspiration which 
underlies the restrictive view of art as being the prerogative 
of the gifted few. We make progress possible through speech/ 
thought and we all of us speak. Our discussions bring us 
up, perhaps they whirl us forward as if on a discus. We 
have not made progress from them, we don't have to leave 
them behind, but we make progress on them, and can only con- 
tinue to do so by continuing to discuss /to engage in conver- 
sations. 
You /... 
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You say that was your eighth first page and we 
do not hear you as asking for our pity, or admiration, but 
as reminding us that reworking /thinking about what we write/ 
say is what social action is about; you are not saying you 
have rejected /dismissed the previous seven first pages, but 
that you learnt from writing them, they helped you rather 
than hindered you, as your writing is helping us. 
Writing about things whether progress or what- 
ever, i.e. description, can be boring, for it seeks to 
secure a special place for the writer as privileged, and 
by doing so disengages the reader. Description treats the 
reader like a conscript. It can leave the reader with 
nothing to do but listen, or at best later to decide to 
step in the writer's footprints, and to try to re -live his 
experiences. We do not write about things in that des- 
criptive way, we write for our friends, for our selves. 
You remind us that we are at ease in our writing, 
that we do not seek an easy way to write, for our writing 
is our effort to deepen our selves through what we hear. 
We formulate our efforts as uncovering what we missed, not 
what was missing. We do not add to what was said as if 
from our own mysteriously inherited private store, but 
stretch ourselves by admitting how thoughtless indolent 
readings are. We do not seek the easiest way to overcome 
our hesitation, our doubts, but proceed in the most honest/ 
friendly way available to us, and by doing so may well in- 
crease our doubts, but we do not deny our characters in 
such a way that we leave ourselves unemployed: i.e. with 
nothing /... 
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nothing to do. 
You remind us that we do not ease ourselves into 
good work as if it is already there waiting, we ease our- 
selves out of bad work, i.e. out of oppressed /constrained 
modes of speech /thought. 
You remind us that our current work uncovers/ 
reveals and instructs us as to the depths of past speeches 
or other's speeches. Progress for us is a deepening of 
understanding, of the ability to understand. It is not a 
product of time or travel for our future work is not neces- 
sarily an improvement on our past work for we can make 
mistakes, take wrong turns. If our work is to improve 
it is we that do the improving. The material we work with 
is immaterial for it is the condition of the worker that 
matters. So, when you speak of producing the material 
for some better work to follow, by material, you must mean 
workers /thinkers, for these are the stuff from which better 
work is derived. 
Analysis of Section (A) 
"Perhaps it is no coincidence that haste 
comes first; however, we have seen in our 
previous work that the worrier has fre- 
quently seen hasty actions as being those 
which can inflict pain, e.g. the angry man's 
actions, the careless action, or the foolish 
action. Even the worrier's own actions, 
i.e. sticking her neck out, seem to be 
characterized by haste where haste would 
mean a lack of preparation, a lack of 
thought: The worrier's view is that 
you should think before you act or speak 
and that hasty actions are simply those 
which do not allow time for thought. 
She /... 
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She tries to stop others being hasty, or 
at least going on being hasty with her 
yes -buts. She always thinks you should 
think more before you act or speak, and 
her yes -but is there even if she thinks 
better than (i.e. yes butsit) to say it 
for any reason. She sees an action 
beginning or perhaps a beginning as a 
sign that problems have not been remarked 
upon, and that there are consequently 
either matters of which the actor is 
ignorant or matters he is choosing to 
ignore. Either way the worrier feels 
obliged to speak even in her somewhat 
hasty manner. None of this seems to 
sound new but what will perhaps be new 
will be the realization that the worrier, 
who on the face of it would seem to be 
the last person we would suspect of or 
charge with being hasty, is indeed hasty, 
and hasty in a way, and on an issue which 
is crucial in understanding how she comes 
to act (or not act:) as she does. The 
worrier is hasty in her definition of 
hasty, i.e. she starts with a definition 
and works from it. (I have a feeling 
that I ought to say this more slowly 
rather than simply repeating it in dif- 
ferent ways but perhaps the outcome will 
be the same.) The worrier is hasty 
because she chooses not to talk or think 
about whether her decision that inaction 
(for her thought) is better than action 
(for her speech) has any foundation. To 
say this in one other way the worrier is 
hasty because she starts by thinking that 
you should think before you speak (act), 
and she doesn't see how this is a bad 
start; That this issue is crucial can 
be emphasized if it can't be already seen 
by saying that it is this unconsidered 
beginning (i.e. finish:) which makes the 
worrier see all actions as inconsiderate. 
Indeed it may be this that forces him to 
see life, i.e. actions (whether her own 
or others) as falling short: i.e. as 
falling /failing." 
Response: 
Your speech helps remind us that we do not take 
Ordinary Language Philosophy at its word if it claims its 
authority arises from its decision to restrict itself within 
the confines of usage. For ordinary usage is not confined. 
Analysis /... 
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Analysis seeks to hear ordinary language as philosophy, and 
by doing so frees speech from the constraints of pedantry 
by making room for continuing dialogue; by treating 
speakers with the respect social /moral actors, i.e. thinkers, 
deserve. But how has this reminder been drawn from your 
speech? Well, listen to part of what you said. 
"The worrier is hasty in his definition 
of hasty, i.e. he starts with a definition 
and works from it." 
Initially we heard this as criticism of the 
particular definition but we were confused by the fact that 
you appeared to rely upon the same meaning of hasty in your 
description of the worrier, for you offer no alternative. 
But now we hear that it is the notion of definition which 
requires thought, for those, if any, who hear definitions 
as decisive, i.e. as closing discussions, and yet still 
rely upon definitions as starting points, deny themselves 
the possibility of dialectical development, in effect they 
would deny the possibility of social change. So, we choose 
to formulate definitions not as means of closure, but as 
possible ways forward, we formulate definition as against/ 
opposed to finishing, and by doing so remind ourselves not 
to treat definitions as starting points or finishing points, 
indeed not to treat them as points at all, but at most as 
pointers. The step from your speech to the preceding 
paragraph was then only a short one and without your speech 
as stimulus might not have been taken. So let us turn to 
listen more closely to your speech. 
You /... 
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You say "Perhaps it is no coincidence that haste 
comes first" and remind us that we achieve readings of 
human actions /social actions that elevate: that begin to 
do them justice, by not allowing them to be reduced to 
happenings, to coincidences, to being first in the sense 
of prior to thought. It was no coincidence that haste 
came first, for you decided to place it first. And our 
way of reading your speech is our decision, we are not 
forced by your speech to read it in a certain way, for 
that would be to hear speech rather than silence as violent, 
that would be to forget the possibility of friendship. 
You speak of haste as_a lack of preparation, a 
lack of thought, and by doing so must mean to remind us to 
formulate preparation as concern about what we are intending, 
and will intend, to do, and not as fantasizing what may, or 
is likely to happen and preparing ourselves for it. Such 
a notion of preparation as the latter reveals a lack of 
thought for it forgets how involving ourselves in preparation 
is acting, it is producing, we are always acting rather than 
subjecting our selves to happenings. So we would formulate 
the actions of the angry man, the careless man, and the fool 
as thoughtful, i.e. as theoretical, not as lacking thought, 
for to reduce them in that way to products of thoughtlessness 
would be to subject our selves to happenings, coincidences, 
i.e. to force. But when you spoke of those actors as lack- 
ing thought you could not have meant they were thoughtless 
for that would have been to deny those actions theoreticity: 
that would have been to dehumanize, i.e. to differentiate 
in /... 
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in such a way as to rule out conversation. You must be 
seeking to help us remember for ourselves that all social 
actions are incomplete, i.e, can be becoming, and always 
will be able to be becoming,more thoughtful. 
As we proceed we hear your speech as reminding 
us that we cannot act or speak without having thought for 
we are thinkers. So, by saying that we should think 
before we act /speak, you remind us that we could not do 
otherwise without denying our characters. But, we must 
resist the inclination to hear your notion of before in too 
concrete a fashion for the thoughtful action might require 
speed, i.e. thinkers act thoughtfully, but it does not 
follow from this that they need to be presented with time, 
i.e. that they can be deprived of it; that their actions 
are contingent upon it. Rather it is that thinkers /speakers 
make time for thought and it is in this sense that we spoke 
of Socrates as having a full life. So we do not hear your 
speech as commending actions that allow time for thought, 
for that would be to leave thought contingent upon things, 
it would be to deny the possibility of liberating social 
action, we hear you as commending thoughtful action, i.e. 
that which does not begin by being allowed, but by freely 
deciding. 
Where you speak of the worrier as trying to stop 
others being hasty we hear her as stopping others stopping, 
i.e. as keeping others and herself moving in the same manner 
that our reading of your speech keeps us moving. She wants 
t o / s 
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to stop them in order to engage with them in conversation 
which would be productive for both, and for others, rather 
than letting each remain unknown /superficial to the other. 
Conversations of this sort require commitment which, if it 
is present, provides time. They do not require uncom- 
mitted time for they bring apparent commitments into 
question. Dialogue is not hasty for it is not oriented 
to accomplishing. 
You remind us that the worrier's "Yes but" does 
encourage us to "think better than" for it chooses not to 
let speakers, whether self or other, settle in the quicksand 
of conceit of knowledge. When you say "she thinks better 
than to say it for any reason" you remind us that we do not 
speak for "any reason" for that would be to reduce the sere- 
nity of social life, of moral action, of continuing dialogue, 
to serendipity, and what would be the virtue of that reduction? 
You remind us that our problem is never that of 
starting for we have all already started, but of finishing 
too soon, our problem is not that of awareness of ignorance, 
but of a too ready wish to ignore the benefits that ignorance, 
as a knowledge of that which we cannot know, can bring, i.e. 
the freedom to decide. So you are commending continuing 
inquiry as a form of action /research, for you could not be 
commending non -action for you are aware that we are all 
always acting. 
You remind us that the worrier, and each of us, 
would have been acting with conceit of knowledge if we 
settled /... 
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settled for versions of others' actions as thoughtless, 
for how could we know that they were? Indeed the thought - 
filled character of our own action is enough to remind us 
of the absurdity of settling for indolent readings of 
others in that way. So, when you say "... the worrier 
feels obliged to speak even in her somewhat hasty manner" 
you have not forgotten already what we said about obligation, 
you are saying that the worrier is a thinker, i.e. she does/ 
says what she wants to say, and risks the accusations of 
hastiness that might be hurled by those, if any, who con- 
tinue to restrict themselves to the weak notion of prepar- 
ation we have moved from. 
Your remark that "None of this seems to sound new..." 
can only be read by us as an expression of fatigue, for as 
we will show when we come to analyze your Section (D) (i.e. 
where you speak of an interest in news) we do not rely upon 
happenings for our news. But more of this later. 
You go on to speak of suspecting or charging the 
worrier with being hasty, and in doing so remind us not to 
settle with suspecting, or charging other's speeches for how 
could that be the exercise of friendship? But we misunder- 
stood you for by speaking of the last person we would suspect 
or charge, you sought to remind us to think of ourselves, 
i.e. to reflect upon what we ourselves are doing, and not 
to be so ready to speak of those who may appear before us, 
i.e. superficial versions of self as taking the place of 
other. 
Your/... 
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Your parenthetic comment about speaking more 
slowly reveals to us how speed has little to do with the 
matter, for if your speech was oriented around the idea that 
'perhaps the outcome will be the same' and you were relying 
upon a version of outcome as mere happening, your speech 
would have been hasty whatever the speed of delivery. How- 
ever, we hear your speech as revealing a commitment to a 
dialectical notion of conversation in which outcome might 
mean drawn out by analysis. Furthermore, our notion of 
self as developing dialectically displays how repetition is 
no longer a possibility for us, for we do not remain the 
same. 
You say "The worrier is hasty because he chooses 
not to talk or think about etc. etc. ", but what we are say- 
ing is that she would not choose not to commit herself if 
she had remembered that inaction is not necessarily to be 
preferred to action. She could only not talk or think 
about her decision for as long as its character as a decision 
evaded her. Once we remember that that division is grounded 
in a surface commitment to thought as safer than speech, 
that surface itself becomes as safe a place as the sun's 
surface. We would not turn back, we would not opt for 
silence rather than conversation. 
You go on to speak of the worrier's start; and 
perhaps you will permit us to say that we imagine you can 
only propose that she starts in this way for you have 
imagined you have started this way yourself, as have we; 
and you speak of that start as a bad start, but how could 
it /.,. 
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it be bad if it helped us to begin? We imagine that only 
one who continues to fear action would speak in such a way 
as to find fault with starts rather than to deepen them, to 
be moved by involvement with them. 
You emphasize that this is crucial as if you do 
not trust your reader to read well, but we must misunder- 
stand for you are a thoughtful interlocutor, and would not 
orient to your reader as being less thoughtful than your- 
self, i.e. you must be reminding yourself that unconsidered 
beginnings, i.e. finishes could finish you off. Also you 
remind us to address the unexplicated notion of crucial, for 
we would say that analysis of speech is always necessary if 
they are to be formulated as considerate actions. So what 
we are saying is that if we began by imagining we needed to 
know what was crucial before we began we would never begin 
for we decide,but do not know, what is crucial for us. We 
could have decided to treat as crucial issues of life and 
death, or of happiness and unhappiness, or of honesty and 
dishonesty, or of originality and traditionality, and so 
on, but what we are deciding to make crucial is remembering 
that it is we that decide. So, we would not speak of an 
unconsidered beginning making the worrier see all actions 
as inconsiderate, but we might say that thinkers, by con- 
sidering their own beginnings seek to act more thoughtfully, 
seek to develop. Our reading of your speech encourages us 
to lay stress upon our possibilities so as to subvert 
oppressive forms of speech. You speak of unconsidered 
beginnings as forcing the worrier to see life, i.e. actions 
(whether /... 
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(whether her own or others) as falling short, and by doing 
so you remind us that it is we who subvert oppressive forms 
of speech /life by remembering /by considering our beginnings 
and not by refusing to reflect upon them. 
Analysis of Section (B) 
Para.l 
Para.2/... 
"A hasty decision is a suitable subject for 
a complaint; and the worrier's version of 
speech could be treated as a one -sided version 
of remarking - in the sense that it merely 
points out the marks, i.e. the worrier's 
remarks can (and often are) treated as com- 
plaints. Given this, some consideration 
of the grammar of complaints may help us 
understand the situation within which the 
worrier speaks. There is something about 
complaints which suggests they are a last 
resort (perhaps this is the worrier's version 
of any action;) i.e. you don't complain if 
you can act in any other way. The worrier 
however, as we have seen, tries to restrain 
herself from acting in any way, and the 
result is that when she does act /speak, 
her actions /speech share similar charac- 
teristics to complaining. The point 
about a complaint is that it asks others 
to act to correct their own error, i.e. 
it suggests that all the responsibility 
lies with other, and that the complainer 
after complaining need only wait for action. 
The complainer then is relieved of respons- 
ibility and it is this that suggests the 
complainer's superiority - or feeling of 
superiority. What I am saying is then 
that complaints issue forth from complacency, 
(perhaps that is why the elderly complain 
so much, i.e. they feel they have fulfilled 
their responsibilities). The person who 
complains is satisfied that she has done 
all she could do. Now I feel that this 
view of the worrier as a complainer under- 
lies hints in your remarks both about the 
worrier unloading her burden on another 
and about the worrier stunning from a 
position of superiority; I also feel that 
the worrier may be being misjudged here and 
this I should show in my discussions on 
falling - more specifically in (C) falling 
regarding upside down. 
Para.2 
Para,3 
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"But before leaving complaining it seems 
worth saying that this version of a com- 
plaint makes it sound like a climax, i.e. 
you complain when you can't take any more 
(pressure for example) i.e. you complain 
when you reach what you perceive to be 
breaking point. 
Also somehow the difference between a com- 
plaints box and a suggestions box seems to 
suggest (? complain) that whilst complaints 
do seem arrogant (i.e. as if from a pseudo - 
superior) suggestions seem humble (i.e. as 
if from an underling). 
Para.4 I have a feeling that the worrier thinks 
you can or should only complain if you are 
suffering whereas the complainer feels you 
should complain whenever you see there is 
something wrong. But now I have a feeling 
that it is precisely when there are things 
wrong that the worrier suffers'. 
"Yes but" does sound like a complaint unless 
the but becomes a suggestion;" 
Response: 
You say "... i.e. you complain when you reach what 
you perceive to be breaking point" but our reading of your 
speech reminds us that we are always speaking at the break - 
in point. To complain in the manner of Ivan Illyich Pralinsky, 
i.e. to sink into our chairs saying "we were not able to 
stand it" is not the way of genuine inquiry which does not 
settle for what it imagines it already knows it can stand, 
but which chooses to seek to extend itself. 
So, we cannot read this speech or any speech whilst 
we rely upon a conventional notion of complaint, for that 
would lead us either to accept what you say, i.e. to have 
no complaints, as if we imagined your speech was perfect, 
or to reject your speech as if we imagined its imperfections 
meant /,.. 
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meant it wasn't worth hearing. But you could not be rest- 
ing with a notion of complaint as accusation, for accusation 
has no place in friendly relationships. So by complaint 
you must mean the taking up of our place with /beside the 
defendants. We say this, for the plaintiff, by resting 
in accusation, reveals how he settles for social difference, 
how he imagines he needs no companions for he seeks to free 
himself from other by imprisoning other, rather than by 
liberating other and providing himself with a colleague. 
So, we seek to read your speech as in the service of liber- 
ation, for by doing so we will be revealing how those, if 
any, who continue to rest with indolent readings allow their 
pliability to be placed in the service of oppression /of 
silence: how the compliant can only complain when it is too 
late, and are then not heard. So, let us read your speech 
closely and seek to uncover how we can instruct ourselves 
through it. 
"The hasty decision to which you refer is the 
decision to accuse other, ... ". The hasty decision to 
which you refer is the decision to accuse other, and an act 
of accusation always places the thinker over with the def- 
endant/the oppressed. "... and the worrier's version of 
speech could be treated as a one -sided version of remarking - 
in the sense that it merely points out the marks, i.e. the 
worrier's remarks can (and often are) treated as complaints." 
So the worrier is heard as advocate for the oppressed by the 
accuser for he points to the weaknesses in the accusation's 
argument. 
of/.,. 
"... Given this some consideration of the grammar 
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of complaints may help us understand the situation within 
which the worrier speaks. There is something about com- 
plaints which suggests they are a last resort (perhaps this 
is the worrier's version of any action,) i.e. you don't com- 
plain if you can act in any other way." The worrier is 
speaking not only for herself then, but for all who are 
accused, and as the advocate of the oppressed she does act 
as the oppressed's last resort, for we don't need advocates 
if we can speak for ourselves. "... The worrier however, 
as we have seen, tries to restrain herself from acting in 
any way, and the result is that when she does act /speak, 
her actions /speech share similar characteristics to complain- 
ing." Yes, the worrier /thinker does restrain herself from 
acting in any way, for she seeks to act well, and acting 
well for her is speaking with /for the oppressed. No wonder 
Nietzsche sees Socrates as spokesman for the rabble: "The 
point about a complaint is that it asks other to act to 
correct their own error, i.e. it suggests that all the res- 
ponsibility lies with other, and that the complainer, after 
complaining, need only wait for action." Right again, for 
all the responsibility for an accusation does lie with the 
accuser, and the complainer need only wait after complaining 
for she has nothing to fear from an accusation and by waiting 
allows the accuser to decide. "The complainer then, is 
relieved of responsibility ". The complainer in our sense 
is relieved of responsibility for she has shown the thought/ 
lessness /the conceit of knowledge from which accusation 
derives, i.e. she is relieved of any responsibility for a 
thoughtless act by her own claiming of response -ability, 
for /.., 
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for thoughtful actions are those that raise themselves 
above /out of the thoughtlessness of accusation. ".., and 
it is this that suggests the complainer's superiority, or 
feeling of superiority." We, the complainers, are superior 
if you wish, but our superiority rests in our refusal to 
degenerate and settle for /with dehumanizing differences, and 
it ought not to need saying that there is room for all who 
choose to sit and converse at a table grounded in friendship. 
u... What I am saying is then that complaints issue forth 
from complacency, (perhaps that is why the elderly complain 
so much, i.e. they feel they have fulfilled their respons- 
ibilities)." Yes, if complacency means being aware of our 
place, our speech on behalf of, or with the oppressed does 
issue forth from complacency, but, as this work displays, 
complacency of this sort is not self satisfied, but is in- 
tent upon achieving social character. It is never satisfied 
with itself, for it always has more to do. "The person who 
complains is satisfied that she has done all she could do. 
Now I feel that this view of the worrier as a complainer 
underlies hints in your remarks both about the worrier un- 
loading her burden on another..." So now the worrier is 
not unloading a burden upon another but choosing to share 
other's burden. ".., and about the worrier stunning from 
a position of superiority;" and her remarks are not intent 
upon stunning from a position of superiority but upon shar- 
ing in the task of elevating /liberating social life. "I 
also feel that the worrier may be being misjudged here, and 
this I should show in my discussions on falling - more 
specifically in (C) falling regarding upside down." So 
when /... 
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when you speak of the worrier as being misjudged you remind 
us to say that we are not judging your speech or any speech 
as if it is not our own, we are making the effort to im- 
prove social relationships by improving our means of relat- 
ing, our speech /thought. Your speech cannot be read as a 
complaint, in the conventional sense, about our earlier res- 
ponse to your earlier speech, for that would have been for 
us the readers to have misjudged you. 
So now, when you say in para. 2 "... you complain 
when you can't take any more (pressure for example)..." you 
are reminding us not that we should allow ourselves to be 
pushed and pulled and only begin to make a fuss when we 
break, but that free men /women /social actors /thinkers are 
those who formulate the very slightest amount of pressure/ 
oppression as too much to take, and so you are reminding us 
to be joined together thoughtfully against oppressive con- 
ventions so as to deal with them as soon as they begin to 
be heard, and not to have to start when we cannot hear our- 
selves for the din. 
Re para. 3, the skilful way in which this speech 
upon suggestion and complaint boxes conjures up the image 
of the partition between the factory floor, and the office, 
almost persuaded us that you would be content to remain ser- 
vile, i.e. to act as an underling to the forceful man but 
we know you better than that. You must be using under- 
statement in such a way as to allow us, your readers, to 
detect the emptiness of the social situation your speech 
purveys /... 
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purveys. There is no friendship to be found, no conver- 
sation, no room for social development, only at most for 
corrections /practical suggestions (sic) and all they can 
do is keep the silence tidy. 
As to para. 4, and more specifically its last 
sentence, we can see how you could not be intending 'com- 
plaint' and 'wrong' to be read in an indolent fashion for 
if they were the worrier would be one who always suffers, 
for there is and always will be something wrong. This 
would be to have heard the worrier as one who has no sense 
of the good of imperfection, the good of liveliness, the 
good of not knowing but deciding. This hypothetical 
worrier would be led to grumble about her life by noticing 
things like: she has to die, she can't have everything, she 
can't do everything, and that would be to fail to see that 
grumbling doesn't do any good, that it merely mirrors the 
hypothetical worrier's image of the world as being that 
which fails, that which is faulty. Instead of repairing 
faults she restricts herself to finding faults, for she 
faults her ability to do repairs. She doesn't see (in her 
restricted /blinkered vision) that she is responsible for 
faults, that by worrying about imperfection, e.g. death 
perhaps, she allows herself to be strangled by her form of 
speech /life. If this was worry it would always be counter- 
productive, for by seeking protection rather than understand- 
ing that hypothetical worrier would be discarding her pro- 
ductive potential, when she could, as we are showing, be 
working to discard the blinkers. 
However /e.. 
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However, as we were saying you could not be in- 
tending complaint and wrong to be read in that fashion. 
We have already offered a formulation of complaint, and 
as to wrong it is oppression of whatever kind, for instance, 
a version of the good life as free from imperfection is 
oppressive for its very inconceivability could lead those 
committed to it to objectify themselves as failures that 
nothing /anything can be done with. 
Furthermore, you remind us that those, if any, who 
hear 'yes buts' as complaints in the weak sense, would be 
those who sought suggestions, i.e. would be those who did 
not want to have to think for themselves. They would avoid 
questions they could not answer, and would also look for 
others to rely upon rather than choose to think. 
Perhaps you hear our speech as extremism, as shout- 
ing, but our readers know that if you do, this is because 
your hearing has become accustomed to the oppressive silence 
that can surround us if we start to forget to think. 
Analysis of Section (C) 
"On falling, regarding your suggestion about 
the worrier seeing things upside down because 
he is falling. What I am trying to say is 
that this is upside down, i.e. because the 
worrier is falling he sees downside up: up 
in the sense of above like a ceiling. With- 
out being too fanciful it is as if the pro- 
blems which underlie others' apparently solid 
surfaces only come into view as you drop 
beneath them. (It sounds too neat to be 
true but perhaps that is why we talk about 
understanding (under -standing) things.) 
This then could begin to show us why the 
worrier is miscast as a complainer, it is 
as if the worrier needs to be falling 
beneath /... 
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beneath others in order to point at the 
weaknesses which he feels they should be 
aware of. The worrier doesn't look down 
from above then as a superior or judge 
would, but looks up from below, and per- 
haps this also fits with the idea of the 
worrier as a groveller which has previously 
been suggested. The problem for the worrier 
(and perhaps for the others,) is that he 
doesn't really know why he is falling and 
this fact combined with the very fact that 
he is falling provides others with a reason 
to shelve his advice until a later date. 
(Again I feel as if I should make more of 
this section.)" 
Response: 
You speak of the worrier as having been miscast as 
a complainer and by doing so remind us to cast our speech 
into deeper /more profound water. You remind us that we 
need to, and do, cast ourselves into our versions of other. 
You remind us to take a step further back and to re -cast and 
this time to cast the worrier as a thinker /speaker for only 
in this way can her speech come to life for us. 
Your speech reminds us that we are lifting our- 
selves by our speech by hearing deepening not as dropping 
down, for to deepen our understanding is to elevate social 
action, it is to make our selves less shallow, to give our- 
selves depth. So whilst your speech may have been an 
attempt to defend the worrier as she appears, i.e. whilst 
your speech seemed to befriend the worrier as she appears, 
it would have been restricting yourself to a superficial 
reading: it would have displayed a lack of understanding, 
for you would have been claiming to know more than you knew. 
We have no need to be fanciful for we are talking about 
what we can be getting to know better, i.e. about our forms 
of /,,, 
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of speech /life, and by making this effort we raise ourselves 
above the apparently solid surfaces of our beginnings by 
choosing not to treat our selves as things. By our decision 
not to be redirected by usage we provide ourselves with room 
to continue moving, our environment is no longer heard as 
merely a limitation /a ceiling. Not only do we not drop 
beneath surfaces but we decide not to be kept down by them. 
We help ourselves to proceed more thoughtfully by 
calling into question the worrier's decision to claim to know 
she is falling, i.e. to treat that as a fact which calls for 
explanation: it is not a fact but a possibility which she 
decides upon. So, if this hypothetical speaker is falling 
it is because she too readily settles for a version of her- 
self as a worrier rather than a thinker, and we imagine she 
is too ready to clutch at this straw because she takes her 
stand /position from danger rather than from doing what she 
decides is good to do. So, once having adopted this position, 
i.e. this stance, the worrier formulates questions as designed 
to dislodge, upset, damage, rather than befriend. No wonder 
she imagines she is fragile, for she imagines her surface 
is brittle, thin, and that these aspects of it are trans- 
parent, but also essentially her. However, by beginning 
to see how self is not adoptable but is adaptable we are 
displaying how we all do better to formulate our selves as 
developing through friendly social interaction, and not as 
standing still, for that can only lead to stagnation. 
Our readers will doubtless orient to our speech 
as advice for they will formulate advice not as grounded in 
superior /... 
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superior knowledge but in friendly good intentions. They 
will join with us in calling into question the grounds of 
speech and in doing so will not seek to shelve questionable 
advice, for that would be to care only for their own persons 
and to reveal a failure to hear how thoughtful actions care 
for self and other selves. So with our speech we are seek- 
ing to do what you say you feel you should have done, i.e. 
to make more of that section, and by doing so to achieve a 
more thoughtful notion of productivity than more of the 
same. 
Analysis of Section (D) 
Para.l 
Para.2 
"On falling, and its relationship to man- 
ipulation. Now this seemed like news to 
me at the time and seemed worth reporting 
as a result, but is beginning to sound less 
interesting as I try to say it again. 
(Perhaps that is what is interesting about 
strangers and is usually uninteresting 
about the news, i.e. its newness. This 
is odd, for the worrier was always wanting 
to start with what she knew and risked 
losing interest even if she succeeded, 
whereas the quality of the new is that 
it is what you didn't know!) 
The point here is that though we seem to 
have been occupied with the idea of falling 
our attention, or mine at least, has been 
drawn away from what would seem to be a very 
important consideration. This is that the 
notion of a fall presupposes that the falling 
object is totally dependent upon the environ- 
ment within which the fall takes place, e.g. 
for its length, duration, direction and, 
perhaps because it isn't a jump even for its 
beginning. The fall then is outside its 
object's control. The reason why this 
seemingly obvious consideration is important 
is because it can bring home to us the way 
the worrier produces his environment as 
manipulative. In a fall then you are 
totally at the mercy of your environment, 
there is nothing you can do. To produce 
yourself as falling is then to produce your- 
self not as a fool, i.e. one who isn't res- 
ponsible/... 
Para.3 
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ponsible for his own irresponsibility but as 
a responsible person who is unable to exercise 
his responsibility because he is falling, 
i.e. if only he could stop he could get 
started. 
Somehow the worrier thinks you must be out- 
side to avoid being taken in but feels that 
if you are outside you must be falling, he 
has no conception of weightlessness. 
Para.4 When you are falling you have no way to 
resist the pressures which act upon you, 
and at most can only work on different 
ways of succumbing to them. A fall now 
sounds very much like the idea of climax 
we spoke of earlier, and yet perhaps 
this will be because we had a worrier's 
version of climax, i.e. as a fall - as 
being unable to go on - as falling by 
the way side - i.e. as being an end. 
Which reminds me that perhaps to treat 
life as anticlimatic is precisely to 
treat it as a fall, i.e. as an anti - 
climb, whereas a climb is up and in 
control a fall is down and out of 
control. 
Para. 5 Now this is the stage at which I should 
try to draw together the different issues 
so as to reach a clear conclusion, however 
I have no desire to try to tie things to- 
gether here (perhaps strangle) i.e. I have 
no desire to finish it off. Perhaps this 
is because I feel a bit like the king's 
horses and the king's men when they were 
faced with Humpty Dumpty, i.e. tired. 
Alternatively perhaps it is because we 
all too readily see a new order as chaos 
because we haven't yet got beneath it, 
i.e. perhaps it doesn't need to be tied 
together." 
Response to Para.l 
Here is where we raise the issue of news, as we 
earlier intimated we would; your first paragraph of this 
section ends with you saying that "... the quality of the 
new is that it is what you didn't know." But we remember 
with the help of our reading of your speech that we need 
not /.moo 
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not restrict what we didn't know to what happens to us for 
such a restriction would deny our productive character. 
So, if conventionally the media relies upon a version of 
news as happenings, e.g. plane crashes, falls in the value 
of currency, etc. etc., and the media's interest both 
reflects and regenerates this superficial version of news 
in which its public may ground itself, and yes we do here 
mean ground down in the sense of reduce; we, as thinkers/ 
speakers /inquirers say that there is a far more important 
sort of news and this is production /development. Only by 
grasping this can we grasp our potential to develop and 
resist oppressive forms of speech /life, i.e. the silence, 
that seeks to persuade us that thoughts occur to us, that 
ideas come from out of the blue. We seek to remind any 
who have come to believe that ideas occur to them that they 
need not allow themselves to be oppressed by forms of speech 
such as that. By remembering that our ideas are products 
of our activity as thinkers /speakers we are beginning to 
pull ourselves together, to understand how convincingly the 
ideas we have, if we rely upon them, and take up a position 
from them can leave us disjointed and merely subject to con- 
tingency. Whilst chance does play a part in the production 
of our social relations those relations only truly develop 
when we grasp their non -contingent character; when we grasp 
that they are dialectical developments. So now we hear why 
news as happenings is only worth reporting /repeating, when 
news as development is worth reporting in the sense of bring- 
ing back into our lives, into how we proceed. Reporting 
of the latter sort is deeply interesting, i.e. it is 
engaging /... 
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engaging. 
So here we are liberating ourselves from forms 
of speech /life that would have us forget that we produce 
ideas, that they do not happen to us. This writing is a 
product of our work and it displays how dignified labour 
does not subordinate itself to current conventions, it 
has to risk doing more than career. 
Response to Para.2. 
When you speak here of being occupied with the 
idea of falling you remind us not to treat ideas as secure 
permanent homes. If we occupy an idea it is with a view 
to liberating its use, and not with a view to domesticating 
ourselves, i.e. we are not interested in orienting our 
actions to becoming merely house trained, that would be 
boring. 
Now what you say about the falling object all 
sounds very correct but for all its correctness it is hollow, 
and of little other than marginal interest to us, for we are 
not objects. And yet, perhaps your speech can help remind 
those, if any, who are tempted to worry that if they orient 
to their environment as that which might befall them, as 
that which might cause them pain, they are bringing "it" 
upon themselves in the profound sense of objectifying them- 
selves. 
Furthermore by saying that "In a fall (then) you 
are /0400 
* N.B. (That is a constant feature of correctness.) 
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are totally at the mercy of your environment there is nothing 
you can do ", you not only remind us of the weakness of anthro- 
pomorphism, but you remind us that we might be able to do 
nothing only if doing something is limited to saving our 
persons. Yet we might shout to warn others of the hole, 
we might sing to cheer ourselves up, or we might feel sorry 
for ourselves. So you remind us that whatever we choose 
to do we do do something not nothing. So now we hear how 
even one who is falling can and does act response -ably. 
How the hypothetical worrier of whom you speak would strangle 
her life, if she were a possibility, which fortunately she 
is not, by settling herself within this limbo like state 
of wanting to stop in order to get started, without noticing 
that whilst she can perhaps choose to stop, she does not 
need to stop in order to get started for she is, as we are 
all of us, already moving. 
Response to Paragraph 3 
What you say about weightlessness is interesting 
and we presume that by saying that the worrier has no con- 
ception of weightlessness you direct us towards the ambiguous 
notion of gravity which can perhaps draw together the notions 
of falling and seriousness, i.e. as heaviness. However how 
do we think of being outside as being weightlessness for 
our movement is towards stretching ourselves out of oppres- 
sive usage? As theorists /inquirers, i.e. as speakers 
oriented to reflecting upon, rather than habitually repeat- 
ing, superficial versions of self, we have no need to let 
ourselves settle /solidify, so ourselves are not heavy. 
Our /.., 
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Our commitment to our inquiry is such that we do not 
fantasize versions of our selves that hold us back, that 
drag us down, why should we? Perhaps the hypothetical 
worrier would imagine that her outsideness, i.e. the fact 
that she is outside nature means that she is worse than 
nature. She might even fantasize that she alone was in 
this condition, i.e. that other persons had no problem 
acting "naturally ", i.e. that others were inside. We 
however choose to view our unnaturalness /our deliberateness, 
i.e. our social achieving of thoughtful character, as rais- 
ing us above, rather than lowering us below nature. We 
cannot be natural but we do seek to be social, i.e. to act 
thoughtfully. 
Response to Para.4 
How can we hear this paragraph such that our 
method of hearing improves? Well, we hear how it directs 
us not to settle for what something may sound like, i.e. 
it reminds us that to hook our attention upon sounds/ 
appearances could be to clutch for the first 'thing' to 
come to hand as if we were falling, i.e. that would be to 
settle for the first thing that stands out rather than to 
make the effort to act more deliberately. Your speech 
reminds us not to hang our place in the present upon the 
most apparently convincing idea from our recent past, for 
that would have been to display a version of good ideas as 
finished, i.e. as means to secure, rather than as ways to 
release, ourselves. So when you say "perhaps this will 
be because we had a worrier's version of climax etc." you 
are not relating an old idea to a new topic, i.e. a fall, 
but /... 
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but you are bringing the idea of ideas as climaxes into 
question, i.e. you are reminding us to think about how we 
think. If we do hang our persons from past ideas some- 
thing has to give /collapse, either the ideas or our per- 
sons. So, your speech helps us to remember not to treat 
our ideas as hooks, unless by hooks are meant those we 
might carry with us and manipulate to aid our climb. So, 
when we spoke of life as anticlimatic we intended that what 
would be heard was that it does not let us end, but your 
speech reminds us that it could have been heard otherwise, 
but by doing so you show us how life does not let us end/ 
complete: how we will always have more to do. 
Yes, our work /life can be heard as a climb, i.e. 
as up and in control but if it is heard in this way "up" 
must be being formulated as upbringing, as elevating our 
society /our lives and control must be being formulated not 
as restricting but as against merely rolling, i.e. as 
deliberate movement, for merely to roll along with the tide, 
of convention for instance, is to do no more than fall, it 
is to be restricted /subject to force. Also, we must be 
extending the conventional notion of climb so as to release 
it from a connection with the notion of summit or end, for 
ends are not essential to us. Our work is rewarding in 
itself, as is all true labour, we do not degrade our 
activity by orienting to its end as being desirable, for we 
desire to continue. 
Response to Para.5 
You say you have no desire to tie things together 
here /.., 
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here, no desire to finish it off, and yet you say it is 
the stage at which you should try to reach a clear con- 
clusion. You are seeking to remind us not to orient to 
conclusion as the stage at which to tie things together, as 
the stage at which to finish things off, but as clearing 
the way for us to proceed with our inquiry. You speak of 
all the king's horses and all the king's men being tired 
when faced with Humpty Dumpty and remind us that Humpty 
Dumpty's fate is the fate of the soldiers, unless they 
refuse to be treated like chattels, i.e. unless they dif- 
ferentiate themselves from the horses. Perhaps the king 
was behind the wall from which Humpty Dumpty fell? He 
is certainly not in evidence where the work needs to be 
done: The soldiers' problem is not Humpty it is their 
refusal to think about their relationship to the king. If 
any orient to their work as something they have to do, i.e. 
something they are forced to do, then they also are likely 
to be tired rather than stimulated by it. 
Your last sentence reminds us that current chaos 
could all too readily be seen as order unless we seek to 
rise above it, to be hearing how social order does not rest 
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SECTION 9 
APPENDIX F 
"I have reread Appendix E which was a 
forgetful piece of work for I forgot that 
I was in the main only worrying about worry, 
i.e. producing worry's faults rather than 
trying to do better than just worry and to 
see some good as well (in this instance the 
good of worry). The result is that the 
somewhat more confident appearance of the 
paper was like an ill chosen turn of phrase, 
i.e. it was hasty, because it could have led 
us to think that the worrying had been re- 
placed by confidence. In fact I think it 
did. 
The point here then is that if producing 
faults is not enough, it is not enough to 
say this; or better it is foolish to merely 
find fault with fault finding. The set of 
notes was full of itself then in more ways 
than one. But now this is starting to 
sound like an encore and we are hardly 
likely to be impressed by that if we 
weren't impressed by the performance 
itself. 
My forgetfulness in the last set of notes 
could be treated as merely one example of 
the worrier's hurry to get out (i.e. it is 
when you are in a hurry that you forget 
things) . In an odd way this factor in the 
worrier's make -up shows us how she can be- 
come the non -worrier, for she can forget 
anything, even on occasions her worries, 
(i.e. like the drunk, or when she is drunk). 
I think this may be why she sticks her neck 
out, though later she forgets that it was 
through forgetfulness, and may even be 
tempted to think it was courage;.. 
One reason amongst others why this movement 
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is that she may later stumble into them, 
the worries again, and this is what might 
have been expected as she didn't know where 
she left them or why'. 
Hurrying, like worrying degrades the present, 
i.e. you hurry what you are doing because you 
want to do something else, or because other 
exerts pressure upon you to move on to some- 
thing else, and you treat other's approval as 
more valuable than what you were doing. In 
both cases what you are doing at present takes 
on a secondary role as something to be rid of 
or finished off. Hurrying becomes what you 
are doing and it is this that causes forget- 
fulness for knowing how to hurry is knowing 
how to forget things, e.g. worries. When 
the worrier acts her actions are hurried be- 
cause she wants to get what she is doing over 
with, because she doesn't think it is worth 
doing, and this can make her appear unworried. 
Whereas, perhaps all hurry should be taken as 
a sign of worry, i.e. if you think what you 
are doing is worth doing why hurry it? 
The worrier has a version of herself as hurry- 
ing, she has to hurry because her action is 
always a last resort. By doing this she 
gives herself a holiday from responsibility 
by seeing the environment as producing the 
limits, i.e. as exerting the pressure. For 
example, these notes aren't as good as they 
could have been because I haven't had time 
to re -read Candide or whatever. The worrier 
thinks she needs to hurry, and she does, but 
not for the reason she gives, for she forgets 
that she produces her own time limits. She 
hurries to get away from her own products, 
i.e. it is blame or guilt that she seeks to 
escape from. The worrier wants to think 
that accidents can happen when you are 
hurrying, and that because accidents 'happen' 
she need not feel responsible. The worrier 
lacks self- control, i.e. hurries, because 
she produces herself as lacking self, i.e. 
as acting accidentally, not deliberately, 
i.e. as not knowing what she is doing, e.g. 
not knowingly worrying. The fact that she 
sees herself as not acting deliberately 
when she does act shows us why the worrier 
is very close to the angry man; for it 
shows us that worry produces unthoughtful 
actions, i.e. precisely those it is critical 
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that they produce in the worrier is the 
feeling that the best she can do is not 
act in the future, for she doesn't see 
that she could act deliberately. Perhaps, 
more strongly, she is critical of deliber- 
ation on other's part for she treats it 
as tacticalness, i.e. as mere usage. She 
reduces deliberation to tacticalness and 
sees tacticalness as the exercise of self 
control in the interest of self -protection, 
and, because she has a bad version of her 
own self she doesn't see self as worthy of 
protection /preservation. 
The worrier tires herself by hurrying and 
then thinks and says that she can't work well 
because she is tired. Tired work is yet 
another version of the last resort, i.e. all 
you can do when tiredness really takes a grip 
is nothing, and this is what the worrier 
wants to do, but she also wants to guard 
against it because she sees it as full of 
dangers, (e.g. like drinking after arranging 
a business deal and messing it up!). By 
hurrying the worrier produces her situation 
as dangerous, but she needs to remember that 
perhaps she and others work best when they 
are tired, i.e. off guard (forgetful of their 
self -protection) . When she is tired she can 
no longer use her speech to protect herself. 
In this way we can see that good work reveals 
self and doesn't call for a version of self - 
control as self- protection. (Revealing 
self need not be revelling in self.) 
The hurrier sees what she is doing as a waste 
of time, i.e. she has, like the revolutionary, 
a version of pre -history - if I could get this 
finished I could get started. Perhaps both 
the hurrier and the revolutionary come to 
waste time because they see the present as 
something which has in effect to be thrown 
away, i.e. wasted. So the worrier, like 
the manipulator, could at best only leave 
dead bodies behind with her yes -buts, her 
stopping of starts. Your speech suggests 
that the challenge is to stay alive, i.e. 
lively, i.e. not to become dull, without 
worrying. In the manner of speaking of 
this paragraph this would seem to be to 
be now, i.e. not to consider the present 
as a waste of time. Which, whilst it says 
other things as well, still shows us that 
worrying about now isn't enough. That 
sentence even made me yawn, i.e. dullness 
can /... 
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can be the present, and this seems to be 
the problem raised by forms of anti- 
philosophical realism which say that 
things are as they appear to be. Some- 
how being now must involve a conception 
of possible presents rather than that of 
alternative futures which rely upon a 
version of the present as a waste of 
time. To see the present as waste in 
terms of the future, or the past, or 
vice versa, is merely another version 
of stopping and starting, and the problem 
this raises is one of routine, i.e. it 
sounds like clocking in and out. The 
problem with mere routines is they both 
are dull and produce dullness. To just 
go on talking as a matter of routine 
would both be dull and produce dullness. 
In the same way to just go on worrying 
is to settle for routine, i.e. to be- 
come dull, thus to see worrying as 
enough is to allow worry to produce 
ease. To be satisfied with merely 
satisfactory performances is to be 
dull, i.e. it resonates with playing 
safe, and this resonates with the 
worrier's version of the good life as 
staying on the ground. To settle for 
usage seems like just going on for the 
sake of going on, and seems like a 
rather pointless exercise, or perhaps 
as mere exercise as a result. Routine 
then, like usage or worry has no sense 
of the good of anything. Acceptance 
of routine is the refusal to acknowledge 
other possibilities; to go on worrying 
is the refusal to acknowledge other 
possibilities than worry. Somehow 
teasing or cajoling seem to make more 
of these possibilities than worry. 
The worrier tends to stop other's 
starts whereas we can get people 
started by teasing or cajoling but 
even this involves openness or some 
revealing of self by the one being 
teased. If the worrier could come 
to treat problems as teasing and not 
merely as faults she might arrive at 
a different version of the good from 
the good as safety. 
Para The worrier uses her yes -buts to dis- 
arm others, i.e. they are like safety 
catches but she seems to resist all 
efforts to get her to face up to what 
she does know: which is that not 
facing /... . 
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facing up to things can be a very unsafe 
practice. Staying alive without worry- 
ing is produced by the worrier as being 
beyond her, i.e. worrying produces life 
as routine and provides room for worry 
in this way. My problem is that I 
can't help (says I:) feeling that the 
last set of notes is better than this, 
which is perhaps saying that I am 
easily taken in by usage, which might 
be just another version of the worrier 
refusing to see that what she tries to 
escape is the fact that escaping does 
rely upon some notion of the good, i.e. 
as safety." 
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ANALYSIS OF APPENDIX E 
Our readers will no doubt be making the effort, 
as we are doing, to be achieving a reading of this one of 
your speeches that does our communal commitment to continuing 
conversation justice, but our efforts, whilst increasing 
our desire to attend carefully to what you are saying, are 
also increasing our awareness of the limited level of 
ability we have to hear. However we know, as our readers 
know, that we are only able to stretch these limits if we 
are aware of them. So our continuing committed engagement 
with your speech is as necessary for us as ever. 
Analysis of Paragraph 1 
"I have reread Appendix E which was a 
forgetful piece of work for I forgot that 
I was in the main only worrying about worry, 
i.e. producing worry's faults rather than 
trying to do better than just worry and to 
see some good as well (in this instance the 
good of worry). The result is that the 
somewhat more confident appearance of the 
paper was like an ill chosen turn of phrase, 
i.e. it was hasty, because it could have led 
us to think that the worrying had been re- 
placed by confidence. In fact I think it 
did." 
Response: 
Your speech reminds us that we are thinkers/ 
speakers not worriers, and by remembering this we are able, 
through our conversations, to reflect upon worry and to dis- 
play how it could only be a possibility for us if it was 
formulated as a thoughtful activity, for if it is not a 
thoughtful /... 
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thoughtful activity it is beyond /beneath us. Our reading 
of this paragraph reminds us to think about what we are 
doing now, for this is what you are doing when you think 
about what you were doing, i.e. it is not merely an ex- 
ercise in history but your way to improve your current 
mode of speech /action. Your speech also reminds us that 
our speech is more confident, for we are able to confide 
in others, for we have no wish to orient our choice of turns 
of phrase with a view to how we appear, for we are well 
aware that as thoughtful interlocutors we spend only as 
little time and effort as is necessary on the surface, i.e. 
with appearances. As thoughtful interlocutors we seek to 
rapidly cut through superficial make -up in our efforts to 
be achieving and displaying true human character. For us, 
confident speech displays its awareness of its place in 
dialogue, in friendly relationships, it displays, through 
its openness, its awareness of its need and respect for 
other speakers. 
Analysis of Paragraph 2 
The point here then is that if producing 
faults is not enough, it is not enough to 
say this; or better it is foolish to merely 
find fault with fault finding. The set of 
notes was full of itself then in more ways 
than one. But now this is starting to 
sound like an encore and we are hardly 
likely to be impressed by that if we 
weren't impressed by the performance 
itself. 
Response: 
We begin by hearing how quickly you perceive that 
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a shallow reading of our speech in Section 8 could have 
heard it as commending mere disobedience and unruliness. 
When you speak of finding fault with fault finding you 
are reminding us how we are in our speech /action, doing 
more than accusing the law /the state of being oppressive: 
i.e. as in the main restricting its energies, or concentrat- 
ing its resources upon seeking out those at fault, rather 
than hearing how it could do better by seeking out and 
extolling those qualities that help lead us towards more 
social lives. So, when we spoke of obedience and orders 
as anti -social we were referring to their place in oppression, 
disorder, silence, and not to our formulation of obeying 
which is as being open to listen to, i.e. to converse with, 
others. True social order is always understood as con- 
tinuing engagement in conversation. So the law as con- 
tinuing conversation elevates social life for being its 
producers we can willingly submit to it or change it, we 
cannot be oppressed by what we submit as being the way we 
choose to live. But, what if the notion of law has de- 
generated, and become so closely identified with oppression 
by those, if any, who are tempted to worry? Then we do 
better to speak of the lawless state as desirable, i.e. as 
being the condition in which free men /thinkers /all men abide, 
and proceed to decide upon how they desire to live rather 
than to let the indolent rest content to settle for a version 
of continuing oppression as an evil but a necessary evil. 
Your speech reminds us that our commitment is to a version 
of law as liberating, i.e. as the expression of a communal 
commitment, to prevent our society stagnating within the 
confines/... 
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confines of thoughtlessness. Whether that thoughtlessness 
takes the form of (1) a commitment(;) to law as that about 
which we need not think, i.e. question, or (2) a commitment(:) 
to lawlessness as that about which we need not think. Both 
of these extremes seek to deny our character as speakers, 
i.e. as those who can choose /decide how we want to live. 
Perhaps you, our original speaker, will invoke your 
notion of not enough here, and say it is not enough to say 
this. Of course in a sense you are right /correct, but the 
notion of not enough could be grounded in the idea of an 
imaginary goal that has to be accomplished, and this could 
distract its users in such a way that they never do any- 
thing. We, as speakers, are concerned with engaging in the 
ongoing work of improving our conceptions of self and 
society, i.e. of intending to do good, and the fact that we 
can never do enough always leaves us more to do, and where 
is the harm in that? It is only a problem for those 
oriented to completion, to finishing, rather than to con- 
tinuing development. 
We seek to be liberating our selves through our 
speech by displaying how it does not contain us, i.e. we 
seek to be filling it out by hearing how we can continue to 
be instructed by it. So our speech is not full of itself, 
but it is full of the desire to continue deepening and extend- 
ing our versions of self and society. Your speech reminds 
us not to merely repeat what we have heard for we are aware 
that thoughtful interlocutors are those who do not set out 
seeking to be impressed, or to impress, but set out to 
increase /... 
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increase understanding, and increased understanding can 
only be being achieved in the context of friendly relation- 
ships. 
So, when you speak of it being foolish to merely 
find fault with fault finding you are not commending that 
we dismiss fault finding, but that we befriend it by seek- 
ing to understand it as an instance of that speaker's effort 
to do what she thinks is good. So, whilst revenge, as con- 
ventionally understood, is not an activity in which we would 
engage, we call upon ourselves to offer a formulation of the 
possibility of revenge so as not to limit ourselves to a 
speechless opposition to an apparently thoughtless activity. 
Perhaps revenge could be formulated as our efforts, as those 
who could have been accused /oppressed, to lay claim to what 
is ours, i.e. our freedom to decide how we live, how we 
speak. If revenge is formulated as an instance of moder- 
ation in this way, i.e. as grounded in friendship, not in 
continuing abuse, this can perhaps help to encourage us to 
think more about our responses, for then extremism is less 
likely. 
So, we do not orient to your speech as something 
to complain about in the conventional sense, indeed we do 
not orient to it as a thing at all, for our efforts are 
intent upon elevating our readings of others' speeches, for 
we seek to be rising above contingency /mere thingness, and 
not to be dragged down into it by settling in versions of 
our selves as being limited by others' speeches as if they 
were happenings: as if we did not play a part in the 
readings /... 
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readings we achieve of them; 
Analysis of Paragraph 3 
My forgetfulness in the last set of notes 
could be treated as merely one example of 
the worrier's hurry to get out (i.e. it is 
when you are in a hurry that you forget 
things). In an odd way this factor in the 
worrier's make -up shows us how she can be- 
come the non -worrier, for she can forget 
anything, even on occasions her worries, 
(i.e. like the drunk, or when she is drunk). 
I think this may be why she sticks her neck 
out, though later she forgets that it was 
through forgetfulness, and may even be 
tempted to think it was courage! 
Response: 
By listening carefully to your speech we hear how 
you are commending your forgetfulness, for what you are 
referring us to is that we do not begin by already knowing, 
but by seeking to extend our inquiry, and we cannot proceed 
in this way unless we are able to forget what we imagined 
we knew, i.e. unless we let loose what we may have imagined 
were our secure moorings. This is especially necessary 
for any who seek to call themselves sociologists, i.e. who 
seek to speak about our social condition. So, we hear 
remembering as the active awareness of our ignorance /our 
lack of knowledge that frees us in such a way that we can 
choose to converse and achieve communal decisions as to 
what we want to do /to be. 
So now the worrier's hurry to get out is not 
heard as commending escapism but as desiring /risking less 
unreflexive, less blinkered modes of inquiry. We admit 
that /... 
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that we do not know what we are doing, so our inquiry is 
genuine, and yes, we do seek to hurry to forget 'things' 
for we seek to increase our awareness of the productive 
part we each of us play in constituting what we may refer 
to as things. 
Your speech reminds us that we do seek to forget 
our worries, i.e. we seek not to treat them as secure moor- 
ings, but to treat them as products of our own activity, 
and as such as forms of speech /action that we can think 
about and alter. So, by thinking more deeply about what 
we are doing we uncover that we have no desire, or need to 
drink to forget, for we hear our liveliness to consist in 
thoughtful activity, and not in the movement towards mind- 
lessness. But, we are aware that our enthusiasm and the 
freedom of our speech /thought might be heard as drunkenness 
by listeners who could not yet conceive of any other way to 
be liberating their own activities than a stock of bottles. 
The last sentence of this paragraph of yours seeks 
to tell us how you are aware that courage is less thought- 
ful than forgetfulness, for the latter is more encompassing, 
i.e. it involves risking speaking /acting in a committed way 
that does not rest in the impulsiveness of apparently secure 
feelings, e.g. rage, but in continuing doubt, i.e. in a 
continuing commitment to conversation /inquiry. 
Analysis of Paragraph 4 
One reason amongst others why this movement 
(if such it can be called) is no real help 
is that she may later stumble into them, 
the /,.. 
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the worries again, and this is what might 
have been expected as she didn't know where 
she left them or why; 
Response: 
Here your speech is heard as the exercise of irony, 
for it appears to offer us an almost irresistible invitation 
to worry, i.e. "One reason amongst others ..." seems to warn 
us that even if we grasp what you mean here, in an instant 
we will be confronted by numerous further reasons which lie 
in wait, though they are better hidden than the one you 
offer. So if we rested with this reading of your speech 
we should come to a halt here, and spend ourselves hypo- 
thesizing about what, and where, the other "reasons" to 
which you refer are and might be. But, we will resist that 
temptation to immobilize ourselves, by choosing not to rest 
the of your speech. We proceed by hearing 
the movement to which you refer as our continuing inquiry. 
So, our mode of inquiry lets loose worries, i.e. makes them 
less secure, but as you correctly point out this is no real 
help. Here you are reminding us not to seek help for 
worries are always and always will be readily available and 
there is no help for it but to deal with them if they seem 
to threaten to invade our conversations. True, we may 
very well stumble into them again, for our inquiry con- 
tinues to lead us into uncharted territory, but if we con- 
centrate upon the virtue of what we are doing rather than 
upon what may or may not happen to us, worries will be kept 
at the periphery of our thought and conversation, where, if 
anywhere, they belong. 
worries /,.. 
I f we did know where we left our 
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worries, and why, we would have reduced our freedom of 
action by reducing the room we have for thoughtful good 
intention; which is that effort to continue acting in the 
face of our worries, i.e. without needing the confinement 
of a completely integrated, closed, finished environment. 
Philosophy as thoughtful action is only a continuing pos- 
sibility for us whilst worry remains a probability with us. 
Analysis of Paragraph 5 
Hurrying, like worrying degrades the present, 
i.e. you hurry what you are doing because you 
want to do something else, or because other 
exerts pressure upon you to move on to some- 
thing else, and you treat other's approval as 
more valuable than what you were doing. In 
both cases what you are doing at present takes 
on a secondary role as something to be rid of 
or finished off. Hurrying becomes what you 
are doing and it is this that causes forget- 
fulness for knowing how to hurry is knowing 
how to forget things, e.g. worries. When 
the worrier acts her actions are hurried be- 
cause she wants to get what she is doing over 
with, because she doesn't think it is worth 
doing, and this can make her appear unworried. 
Whereas, perhaps all hurry should be taken as 
a sign of worry, i.e. if you think what you 
are doing is worth doing why hurry it? 
Response: 
Here you remind us that we also degrade the present 
if, by the present is meant mere contingency. So, we make 
the present the servant of our good intentions. The free- 
dom provided by our relationship with the present is such 
that our pasts and futures become pliable. By deliberating 
we increase our efforts to use our potential to do what we 
desire to do rather than to restrict ourselves to merely 
having things happen to us. 
the /... 
We are engaged in resisting 
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the persuasiveness of speech which seems to call us to 
submit to nature: to contingency, for speech of that 
kind contradicts itself and would, if it could, deny the 
possibility of a version of our relationship to the present 
as liberating. Our desire is to play a part in producing 
more enjoyable, more liberated lives, for that part is both 
enjoyable and liberating. We are aware that speech of this 
kind will sound odd to those who imagine they are committed 
to nature, for they, if any, may hear it as unnatural. But, 
through our speech we are seeking to emphasize that as 
social actors we are not and cannot be natural, and that 
it is through our unnaturalness that we seek more liberated/ 
more thoughtful forms of speech /life. But, our readers 
are well aware of this already, and we remember that our 
speech needs to continue to be stretching us, perhaps by 
sounding unnatural, if it is to continue to engage their 
thoughtful efforts. 
Your speech reminds us that we do not hurry what 
we are doing because we want to do something else. If we 
appear hurried it is only to those who imagine that all seek 
to finish. In that way our commitment to proceed with the 
deepening of our speech, i.e. our enthusiasm to continue, 
may be misheard. Similarly your speech about other exert- 
ing pressure seeks to remind us that by producing good 
formulations of others' speeches we call upon ourselves to 
continue improving our work /lives. So pressure from other 
is self induced and is not oppressive but liberating. 
Other's approval does become more valuable than what we are 
doing /... 
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doing for by orienting to other as a thoughtful inter - 
locutor/as a friend we hear other as trying to get the 
best out of us, and this involves us in re- evaluating and 
perhaps no longer doing what we imagined we were doing. 
So, when you speak of what we are doing at 
present taking on a secondary role you are reminding us to 
think about what we are doing, i.e. you are reminding us 
that as we are thinking about it we are not allowing what 
we do to be reduced to what we happen to be doing, for that 
is allowing our actions to be reduced to accidents, con- 
tingencies. But, by getting rid of, or finishing off 
what we are doing you do not mean dismissing, completing 
it, but continuing extending /deepening our actions, i.e. 
acting more thoughtfully, more socially. 
Yes, hurrying as we are formulating it, i.e. as 
enthusiasm /confidence, does become us, and it enables us 
to continue by not imagining we know things. I t displays 
our continuing movement rather than the immobility of a 
strategy grounded in the stubborn defence of what a talker 
might pretend to know. We hear superficiality/stubborn- 
ness as that which gives birth to stubs, i.e. as that which 
rules out development. 
Yes, when we act we want to get what we are doing 
over with, in the sense of turned over, thought about, for 
unless we are reflecting upon what we are doing in this 
active way what we are doing is not worth doing, i.e. it 
is only what we happen to be doing, it is not deliberate. 
If /... 
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if our speech appears unworried /unthoughtful this is be- 
cause it is being heard by those who refuse to bring the 
ends of their own actions into question, i.e. it is being 
heard by those who assume they know what is good. Whilst 
they perhaps imagine that the good is what may happen to 
them, and are disappointed when it doesn't, we remember to 
think of the good as the standard for our actions and not 
as a reward. An orientation to rewards degrades labour/ 
human action by encouraging the worker to treat his labour 
as a means to an end, rather than as a continuing process 
which is its own reward. Our work is not rewarding in the 
conventional sense, but through it we are able to bring the 
conventional notion of rewards into a light that reveals its 
alienating force. Rewards are the stuff out of which 
heavens come to be fantasized and lives that are lived around 
the base of these fantasies are conceptualized by those 
living them as ways of wasting /using time and effort. 
Rewards of that kind even if they did satisfy momentarily 
cannot sustain us, for as thoughtful actors we cannot settle 
in a condition that seeks to ward off our desire to con- 
tinue thoughtful production. 
But those, if any, who have been swayed by that 
alienating notion of ends /goals as the good will perhaps 
reduce their reading of this work to a happening, to at 
most good fortune, and by doing so will continue to 
stubbornly persist in treating themselves as things to 
which other things happen; rather than as thinkers who 
are collaborating with others in such a way as to act rather 
than merely be acted upon. 
speaker /... 
What, and how you, our original 
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speaker hear, displays what you imagine you are, and it is 
what we each of us imagines we are that we must be proceed- 
ing to bring into question. What we imagine we are can 
limit or extend our conception of what we do produce, i.e. 
our conceptions of good and bad. Whilst we are not res- 
ponsible for nature, the conceptions we use of good and bad 
are our responses, and we are becoming more social by con- 
templating and stretching the limits within which these 
usages could have confined us. 
Analysis of Paragraph 6 
The worrier has a version of herself as hurry- 
ing, she has to hurry because her action is 
always a last resort. By doing this she 
gives herself a holiday from responsibility 
by seeing the environment as producing the 
limits, i.e. as exerting the pressure. For 
example, these notes aren't as good as they 
could have been because I haven't had time 
to re -read Candide or whatever. The worrier 
thinks she needs to hurry, and she does, but 
not for the reason she gives, for she forgets 
that she produces her own time limits. She 
hurries to get away from her own products, 
i.e. it is blame or guilt that she seeks to 
escape from. The worrier wants to think 
that accidents can happen when you are 
hurrying, and that because accidents 'happen' 
she need not feel responsible. The worrier 
lacks self -control, i.e. hurries, because 
she produces herself as lacking self, i.e. 
as acting accidentally, not deliberately, 
i.e. as not knowing what she is doing, e.g. 
not knowingly worrying. The fact that she 
sees herself as not acting deliberately 
when she does act shows us why the worrier 
is very close to the angry man; for it 
shows us that worry produces unthoughtful 
actions, i.e. precisely those it is critical 
of. When these accidents do occur all 
that they produce in the worrier is the 
feeling that the best she can do is not 
act in the future, for she doesn't see 
that she could act deliberately. Perhaps, 
more strongly, she is critical of deliber- 
ation on other's part for she treats it 
as /... 
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as tacticalness, i.e. as mere usage. She 
reduces deliberation to tacticalness and 
sees tacticalness as the exercise of self 
control in the interest of self -protection, 
and, because she has a bad version of her 
own self she doesn't see self as worthy of 
protection /preservation. 
Response: 
The best we are able to do here with this para- 
graph of your speech is to hear it as a piece of vicious 
and biting satire which would be all the more pernicious 
if it were not that its superficiality calls out for us, 
its readers, to be continuing to display how we can be 
continuing to deepen our commitment. And yet, as always 
our way of hearing your speech involves us in stretching 
and remoulding the modes of hearing with which we might 
have rested. So, we hear your speech not as a vindictive 
attack upon another, the sole intention of which is to draw 
attention away from yourself, but as a controlled piece of 
writing which allows us to be achieving a version of self 
that is worthy of preservation. So, we will do our best 
to unravel our reading of this paragraph for it is only by 
doing so that we can proceed to deepen and extend our in- 
quiry. 
You begin by speaking of the worrier as having 
a version of herself, now this manner of speaking creates 
difficulties for we would rather consider worry as an 
activity than as a character, for unless we do so we bind 
ourselves to /in a version of the character as a worrier and 
prevent any movement. However, perhaps we could hear that 
character's acceptance of the version of herself as a 
worrier /... 
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worrier as a last resort, i.e. it sounds better than nothing, 
i.e. than saying we don't know who we are, but we emphasize 
sounds. For us, the decision is always to remember that 
we do not know who we are, and the desperateness of this 
decision, though it remains always with us can make it 
sound like a last resort. Indeed for those, if any, who 
decide to claim that they know who they are the conversation 
is over, they are at their last resort and can move no more 
unless they are later prepared to question their decision. 
Yes, those who decide to claim to know what they are do 
give themselves a holiday from response -ability, but what 
a thoughtless notion of holiday it is That is,it rests 
in the confusion created by speech which hears freedom to 
decide, to act response -ably, as oppressive. 
Of course we could always have done more reading 
before we began to speak /write, but we know that it is only 
by listening to, and having others listen to, what we write 
that we can be learning how better to read. Do we choose 
to do more reading before we decide to remain silent? Con- 
ventionally that is not the norm, but wouldn't it make more 
sense? i.e. conventionally, or so it sometimes seems, people 
remain silent if they aren't sure of what they are thinking, 
but we hear how this prevents development. We speak in 
order that we might continue instructing ourselves, learn- 
ing. So, re- reading Candide could have been good, but only 
if we were better readers when we came to it again. 
You speak of the worrier hurrying to get away 
from her own products (one instance which you offer is that 
of /... 
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of time limits) i.e. of trying to escape blame or guilt. 
Now blame and guilt are foreign to us, for by recognizing 
that we all always act with good intentions we further 
recognize that if we are dissatisfied with what we have 
done in the past, the action in question must have been, 
or be being formulated as unintentional. We "escape" 
blame and guilt by recognizing that we are all always doing 
what we think it is good to do. If we make what we later 
acknowledge was a mistake this was a product of conceit 
of knowledge /silence for which lack of self /silence can 
be blamed, but we cannot be blamed or feel guilty, but of 
course by listening to others we can deepen our version of 
self such that we do not make similar mistakes again. Con- 
tinuing conversation with thoughtful interlocutors, and not 
remaining silent, is the way in which we seek to achieve 
less oppressive modes of action. Our continuing engage- 
ment with others is such that we no longer need the cloak 
of silence to hide private anti -social disintegrating 
fantasies, for hiding our desires is being oppressed. 
You go on to say that the worrier wants to think 
accidents can happen when you are hurrying, and we confess 
that we began by hearing your speech as an instance of this, 
i.e. as you hurrying to get away from the version of self/ 
other that you had produced and for which you felt to blame. 
But, this would have been a less thoughtful reading for it 
would have reduced your efforts to improve your version of 
self, your manner of hearing other speakers, to fearful 
directionless scurrying, and your continuing presence in 
this /... 
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this conversation tells us that your actions are more than 
that. Of course accidents can happen, and we are not 
responsible for them, but we are reducing their place in 
our lives by making our actions more thoughtful, less like 
mere happenings. 
We seek control by self not control of self, i.e. 
self control for us is continuing liberation from con- 
tingency, and we continue to increase the amount of our con- 
trol, i.e. the extent of our liberation by hearing other's 
speech as reminding us that we have more to do. Liberation/ 
the increase of control by self /thought is a process that 
need not be conceived of in terms of achieving a goal, an 
end. We imagine that some, perhaps worriers, may wish they 
were natural, i.e. seek to act accidentally, i.e. wish to 
be things rather than thinkers. We imagine that they might 
treat the fact that they decide what they think is good or 
bad as a problem that they would be without if they were 
natural. At most, these, we imagine, would seek to be 
good natured, but that fantasy leaves them uneasy for they 
anthropomorphize nature and see it as containing good and 
bad, perhaps hunters and hunted, or whatever. But event- 
ually if they pursue that path they must degenerate and 
become anti-social for they can neither have, nor see, any 
reasons for what they or others do, they seek to silence 
thought. Perhaps they imagine that if they are good 
natured no harm will come to them, but we know it already 
has, for they are losing their ability to decide for them- 
selves. 
You /... 
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You speak of the worrier as seeing "herself as 
acting accidentally, not deliberately, i.e. as not knowing 
what she is doing, as not knowingly worrying ". Now this 
reminds us that by seeing we were acting accidentally we 
would be increasing our potential to act more deliberately, 
i.e. unless we begin by seeing the accidental nature of non 
deliberate actions we cannot be beginning to make them more 
deliberate. But you speak as if by not knowing what she 
is doing, she is not deliberating, and here you are engag- 
ing in satire, for it is only when we do not already imagine 
that we know what we are doing that we can deliberate and 
choose. So we hear not knowing as grounds for deliberation 
where from your speech it could appear that you ground 
deliberation in knowledge. That would be oppressive, it 
is the movement to completion, the urge to eliminate free- 
dom, to extinguish desire. Furthermore, you speak of the 
"worrier" as not knowingly worrying, now this in a small 
way is the crux of the matter, for by being thinkers /speakers 
if we worry it is unknowingly, in a deep sense we don't do 
it, for when it happens we aren't ourselves. 
OP 
* (N.B. The conventional psychological distinction between con- 
sciousness and unconsciousness, we dare say, is topsy 
turvy. For now we hear how those, if any, whose thoughts 
are oriented towards happenings, are not conscious of 
their consciousness, i.e. they reduce their thought to 
contingency by treating it as natural. The notion of 
stream of consciousness is instructive here for movement 
is conceived of as mere repetition of different units of 
the same substance, there is no notion of real development 
or increasing control. By reflecting /intervening upon our 
modes of thought /speech we insist upon bringing our forms 
of consciousness into consideration, we resist the indolence 
of an I'm alright jack attitude towards our own thought, 
for that can only leave us drifting, and far from alright. 
Could it be that the potency attributed to the psycho- 
logical notion of the unconscious is deeply an awareness 
of the way in which we can increase the social potency of 
our thought, i.e. liberate ourselves, by thinking about 
how we think /speak, rather than resting with a version 
of it as natural ?) 
- 386 - 
You speak of 'The fact that she sees herself, 
etc.' and remind us by doing so that you are engaging in 
satire for if the worrier herself cannot know she is worry- 
ing how could another know? By choosing not to treat 
others as things, i.e. by choosing not to reduce their 
speech to a fact we hear that we seek to show how actions 
could be more thoughtful, and by doing so to increase the 
possibility of what might otherwise have remained impossible. 
So, as thoughtful interlocutors we produce versions of 
actions as thoughtful, and by doing so we always rise 
above mere criticism. And, by rising above mere crit- 
icism we are always showing ourselves better ways to act/ 
speak in the future, for we see that we cannot act, and do 
not desire to act, accidentally. That is, as social actors, 
as theorists, our actions are always thoughtful /deliberate, 
it is not that we could act deliberately, but that we do. 
We seek to continue developing our modes of deliberation, 
and not to perform some miraculous transformation of our- 
selves from accident to non accident, we seek only to 
develop what we already are. We are not critical of 
deliberation on other's part; we hear how our version of 
other does display our version of self. We seek to elevate 
that tacticalness which disguises and hides bad versions of 
self in silence, by showing how versions of self are social 
achievements that develop through deliberation /conversation. 
By seeking to produce versions of self that are worthy of 
thoughtful /moral /social actors we are showing why we need 
not restrict ourselves to bad versions of self, for self 
is /,., 
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is not a thing that can only be changed by force, it is a 
dialectical development that flows from increasing liber- 
ation out of /from force /thoughtlessness. 
By hearing that paragraph as satire we hear how 
it allows us to develop through our relationship with it, 
rather than to submit to it, and our work with it reminds 
us that if we had imagined that our selves were natural, 
perhaps even that it was natural to have a bad version of 
ourselves, we would have heard no need to work at develop- 
ing, for we would not have understood what self can do by 
way of developing. If we restrict our thought /speech to 
a version of self as natural we reduce our actions to the 
status of accident /contingency and by doing so rule out 
any form of liberation by restricting our speech to that 
of cause and effect. 
Analysis of Paragraph 7 
The worrier tires herself by hurrying and 
then thinks and says that she can't work well 
because she is tired. Tired work is yet 
another version of the last resort, i.e. all 
you can do when tiredness really takes a grip 
is nothing, and this is what the worrier 
wants to do, but she also wants to guard 
against it because she sees it as full of 
dangers, (e.g. like drinking after arranging 
a business deal and messing it up;) By 
hurrying the worrier produces her situation 
as dangerous, but she needs to remember that 
perhaps she and others work best when they 
are tired, i.e. off guard (forgetful of their 
self- protection). When she is tired she can 
no longer use her speech to protect herself. 
In this way we can see that good work reveals 
self and doesn't call for a version of self - 
control as self -protection. (Revealing 
self need not be revelling in self.) 
Response /... 
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Response: 
Whilst your speech in Para. 6 could have per- 
suaded us to submit to a weak version of self, here you 
speak in such a way as to appear to entice us to discard 
our commitment to friendship, and to attack, for the sur- 
face of your speech seems to reveal your weaknesses. And 
yet, that degenerate reading of your speech does not detain 
us for long for we know that your speech seeks to help us 
to remember not to attack but to befriend. Your speech 
calls upon us to display how friendship /thought liberates 
us from any thoughtless urge to protect our persons by 
attacking and killing or capturing other, i.e. from the 
urge to differentiate and dominate. 
If in the analysis that follows, or has preceded, 
our speech takes on an aggressive tone, that aggression is 
not directed at you, but with and for you against an op- 
pressive and constricting version of self. Your speech 
helps us to remember that as thinkers /speakers we do extend 
our inquiry by tiring deformed notions of self that might 
have been heard as secure moorings, but are now revealed 
as what they are, i.e. shackles. We are bringing our- 
selves to see and display how the work of liberation con- 
sists in the weakening of those shackles and in preventing 
the din of their clanging from drowning out our conversation. 
So, we are saying that speakers who remain tied 
by /or within conceptions of self (and hence of all selves) 
as being a worrier can never work well, and can only be 
beginning to work by wearing that conception of self down. 
We /.., 
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We do not seek to do nothing, indeed we recognise that we 
can never be doing nothing, we seek to act as thoughtful 
interlocutors act, i.e. as what we are, i.e. as social/ 
moral /free actors. We do not formulate resting as doing 
nothing, as you imagine the worrier does, why should we? 
However, lifting oppression, liberating ourselves 
is heavy work, but the penetration of the lessons learnt 
is such, that after resting our resolve to continue is 
greater than ever. And, though our work is heavy, by 
being freely chosen, i.e. by being in line with our com- 
mitment it is engaged in willingly, we are not forced to 
do it, and, we can share it with others. The danger that 
wanting to do nothing brings for the worrier is a sneaking 
awareness that her talk is little more than a paper thin 
mask that hides a death wish, for the urge to stop thinking 
is the call of silence, and this can only issue forth from 
a throat already tightly in the grip of a form of speech 
that is forgetting it is conversation. 
But, what of your speech, let us read it and be 
reminding ourselves through our reading how we befriend 
other by hearing other's speech as the exercise of friend- 
ship. We reveal how conceptions of self are continuing 
social achievements which display our sameness with other 
speakers, i.e. which display what we have in common. 
Whereas, talk which seeks to continue differentiating 
between self and other selves so as to protect one person 
from another is always limited to grovelling, for by seek- 
ing to speak in a way that will not offend the other's 
person /... 
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person it degenerates into obsequious bletherings that do 
none of us any good. Separatist versions of self that seek 
to deny their need of other selves could degenerate into 
that sort of noise if it were not that by denying their 
denial acceptance we encourage them to bring their super- 
ficiality into question. 
But, what of your speech; You say "The worrier 
tires herself by hurrying and then thinks and says that 
she can't work well because she is tired ". Now as we have 
said we view any person who chains her speech to /in a con- 
ception of self as a worrier as unable to work at all for 
as yet she does not know what work is. Perhaps she imagines 
it as speaking to other, her jailer1in such a way that he 
tortures her no longer and provides sustenance or whatever, 
i.e. she speaks in order to impress or persuade other. 
So working well is, for her, gaining other's acceptance and 
not extending her own and other's version of self and social 
relationships in such a way that superficial differences are 
dissolved. So, work designed to impress other where other 
is formulated as different is alienated work and can never 
change the relationship between self and other selves such 
that conversation is elevating and not merely the tiring 
work of clinching a deal to which neither is deeply com- 
mitted. Talk which is intent upon clinching deals of that 
sort is guarded and this is why it is not eloquent, it does 
not flow. The effort of guarding one's person against 
other persons is, we imagine, tiring, but that in itself 
could remind those, if any, who talk in this way, that 
they /... 
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they need to, and can, find better versions of speech than 
the effort to maintain difference between self and other 
selves. 
So, you remind us that our best work is when we 
are off guard, but this is not when we are tired, on the 
contrary it is when we are most active, i.e. when we are 
with friends. By speaking openly we are guarding against 
degenerating into a form of speech that reduces other to 
worthless objects, or worse to the status of enemies. So, 
talk which orients to personal protection provides an in- 
stance for us of the tiredness that is forced upon those 
weighed down by oppressive versions of self. You are 
right when you say that good work reveals self and doesn't 
call for a version of self -control as self -protection, pro- 
vided you are referring to the weak notion of self as known. 
But, of course, we protect our self (i.e. our version of 
self as good thoughtful character) by committing our persons 
to continuing conversations /inquiry, and not by shying away 
from other for fear of injury to our persons, for the latter 
course of action detracts from our character. 
But, perhaps as earlier you will express fears 
for us, for you may hear our speech as leaving us defenceless. 
Now whilst on the last count you may be correct you ought 
not to fear for us, but if anything to speak in our defence 
for you will by now be aware that any who would attack us 
need to engage in conversation for their own good. If 
what we are saying is mistaken then a thoughtful response 
from our listeners will help to instruct us, but an attack 
would /... 
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would be self defeating, for our interest is not in 
defensiveness but in continuing collaborative inquiry. 
Analysis of Paragraph 8 
The hurrier sees what she is doing as a waste 
of time, i.e. she has, like the revolutionary, 
a version of pre- history - if I could get this 
finished I could get started. Perhaps both 
the hurrier and the revolutionary come to 
waste time because they see the present as 
something which has in effect to be thrown 
away, i.e. wasted. So the worrier, like 
the manipulator, could at best only leave 
dead bodies behind with her yes -buts, her 
stopping of starts. Your speech suggests 
that the challenge is to stay alive, i.e. 
lively, i.e. not to become dull, without 
worrying. In the manner of speaking of 
this paragraph this would seem to be to 
be now, i.e. not to consider the present 
as a waste of time. Which, whilst it says 
other things as well, still shows us that 
worrying about now isn't enough. That 
sentence even made me yawn, i.e. dullness 
can be the present, and this seems to be 
the problem raised by forms of anti - 
philosophical realism which say that 
things are as they appear to be. Some- 
how being now must involve a conception 
of possible presents rather than that of 
alternative futures which rely upon a 
version of the present as a waste of 
time. To see the present as waste in 
terms of the future, or the past, or 
vice versa, is merely another version 
of stopping and starting, and the problem 
this raises is one of routine, i.e. it 
sounds like clocking in and out. The 
problem with mere routines is they both 
are dull and produce dullness. To just 
go on talking as a matter of routine 
would both be dull and produce dullness. 
In the same way to just go on worrying 
is to settle for routine, i.e. to be- 
come dull, thus to see worrying as 
enough is to allow worry to produce 
ease. To be satisfied with merely 
satisfactory performances is to be 
dull, i.e. it resonates with playing 
safe, and this resonates with the 
worrier's version of the good life as 
staying on the ground. To settle for 
usage seems like just going on for the 
sake /... 
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sake of going on, and seems like a 
rather pointless exercise, or perhaps 
as mere exercise as a result. Routine 
then, like usage or worry has no sense 
of the good of anything. Acceptance 
of routine is the refusal to acknowledge 
other possibilities; to go on worrying 
is the refusal to acknowledge other 
possibilities than worry. Somehow 
teasing or cajoling seem to make more 
of these possibilities than worry. 
The worrier tends to stop other's 
starts whereas we can get people 
started by teasing or cajoling but 
even this involves openness or some 
revealing of self by the one being 
teased. If the worrier could come 
to treat problems as teasing and not 
merely as faults she might arrive at 
a different version of the good from 
the good as safety. 
Response: 
We do not need to be shaken to remember our moral/ 
social response -ability not to orient to this paragraph of 
your speech, or to any speech, as children might orient to 
a day excursion, i.e. as something to return from basically 
unchanged, except perhaps for some sand in their shoes which, 
sure enough can soon be shaken out. We are working to be 
shaking ourselves out of indolent oppressive usages. So 
our work is not designed to move us from one version of the 
good (e.g. as safety) only on to another, as if that latter 
was the station platform that signals the end of our journey. 
Rather we are engaged in a continuing inquiry, a journey if 
you wish, that carries us out away from our beginnings which 
could always have become oppressive if we had oriented to 
them as ends and had not used them as means of departure. 
So, we hear settling for usage as a day trip, 
and yet by listening more closely to your speech we are 
helped /... 
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helped to remember that settling with usage is not pointless 
for its point is safety. All of the instances you provide, 
e.g. routine, usage, exercise, can be heard as playing safe, 
but by playing safe they would be allowing self to be 
restricted and dulled by continuing oppression, until the 
abilities of those, if any, enmeshed in these activities, 
to think /speak for themselves, i.e. incisively, i.e. to 
penetrate the surfaces of superficial versions of social 
relationships, and to be liberating themselves had been 
dulled. So your speech in this paragraph goads us to 
speak for if we do not we may be ourselves lulled by its 
surface into the complacency that could lead to us being 
without a place. 
No doubt our readers are aware, as we are becom- 
ing aware that the routine you speak of is not merely that 
of the factory floor, which is perhaps a form of oppression 
so obvious that we need not here dwell upon it, but the 
reduction of all of man's activities to cause and effect. 
So, those, if any, who would reduce the social such that 
it could be understood as one further topic for natural 
science would (unwittingly no doubt) be playing a part in 
the construction of a form of speech /life that could extend 
the factory floor beyond the factory gates in such a way 
that clocking out would mean little more than a move to 
another part of the line. 
How we live is a question of how we choose /decide 
to live, and liberation is oriented to respecting men's/ 
women's/... 
- 395 - 
women's freedom to reach communal decisions upon how we 
desire to live, and our contention is that this involves 
recognition of other as a thinker /speaker, as a philosopher. 
To consider men as merely subjects for science is to deny 
us our possibility as thinkers /moral actors, i.e. as those 
who are developing and changing in a deliberate rather than 
accidental manner, as those who choose what we want to do. 
So, we choose how we read your speech, our reading 
is our response, and by responding as we do we are exemplify- 
ing our commitment to social relationships as other than 
cause and effect, as other than routine, i.e. as dialectical 
developments that respect our special place as speakers/ 
thinkers, i.e. as those who cannot and would not orient to 
our selves as natural, but as on going social achievements. 
We do not treat what we are doing, i.e. our work 
with your speech as a waste of time, we formulate the present 
as an opportunity, i.e. as the time for us to leave seemingly 
secure moorings, as the only time in which we are acting/ 
deciding. Perhaps those, if any, who wish to deny their 
response -ability would seek ways to avoid the present, for 
that reason they might deformulate it as pre -sent, i.e. as 
determined by the past. 
In your speech the hurrier and the revolutionary 
are heard as having versions of pre -history, but your 
speech helps us remember how as social /moral actors, i.e. 
as free men we are pre -history, i.e. what we do does become 
history when we have done it, but to orient to it as history 
before /... 
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before doing it, i.e. to deny ourselves choice, and lie 
uneasily in that talk of cause and effect could not be 
becoming for it is to throw away the possibility of deliber- 
ate action by not hearing how throwing away is, or could be, 
a worrier's notion. The present is neither good nor bad, 
but, by recognizing only its lack of goodness and by not 
realizing that she can use it to make a better future the 
worrier does as she always will do, unless and until she 
develops her understanding of self, she throws it away. 
Your speech reminds us that we have no reason to 
carry dead bodies with us, indeed we cannot do so for our 
speech plays a part in enlivening those who continue with 
us. Our speech is challenging /lively by not being merely 
worried, by continuing speaking /thinking we are keeping the 
dullness /the oppressiveness of thoughtlessness /silence at 
bay. 
Our formulation of the present provides us with 
the opportunity to act, so whilst you speak of being now in 
the language of that paragraph, you remind us that we are 
always becoming by stretching the language we are using, by 
not allowing it to become languid, inert, a thing. Your 
mention of yawning helps to re- invigorate us by reminding 
us how it is through recognizing the limits of our speech 
that we resist restricting ourselves to pedantry, to speech 
as being no more than a yawn which reveals a gap but chooses 
to do nothing more about it than conceal it. 
Your speech on the issue of alternative futures 
assists /... 
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assists us by reminding us that our present actions can 
always, and do always allow us to go further than past 
fantasies of the future would have allowed, for fantasizing 
the future, i.e. as what may happen, constrains us; whereas 
deliberating about what we are doing liberates us from the 
impotency inducing world of fantasy. We don't need to be 
other than what we are, i.e. fantastic, to be improving our 
selves and our society, we need only continue thinking /con- 
versing about what we desire to be becoming. We do not 
agree that those who engage in usage have no sense of the 
good of anything, for that would be to dehumanize, but we 
do hear routines as oppressive, and yet that we hear this 
displays how they have not completed their task, that the 
opportunity to be liberating our forms of speech /life, our 
social relationships remains with us as long as we can speak/ 
think. 
A day trip could be a liberating experience, but 
not for those, if any, who have decided to return the same 
as they set out; by orienting to our reading of your speech 
as an engagement which is not a waste of time for us we are 
able to learn with it. 
Analysis of Paragraph 9 
The worrier uses her yes -buts to dis- 
arm others, i.e. they are like safety 
catches but she seems to resist all 
efforts to get her to face up to what 
she does know: which is that not 
facing up to things can be a very unsafe 
practice. Staying alive without worry- 
ing is produced by the worrier as being 
beyond her, i.e. worrying produces life 
as/... 
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as routine and provides room for worry 
in this way. My problem is that I 
can't help (says I;) feeling that the 
last set of notes is better than this, 
which is perhaps saying that I am 
easily taken in by usage, which might 
be just another version of the worrier 
refusing to see that what she tries to 
escape is the fact that escaping does 
rely upon some notion of the good, i.e. 
as safety, 
Response: 
Yes, our speech may dis -arm other, but if it does 
so it is by seeking to make the effort to be continuing to 
remind ourselves that we do not know, but must always be 
deciding what are safe or unsafe social practices. We seek 
to continue intervening, and to be remoulding degenerate 
routines that would otherwise leave us deadly dull. Whilst 
we could have indolently read the concluding remarks you 
make as simply an instance of worry's wish to avoid the in- 
security of the present by speaking either of the past or 
the future, instead we choose to hear your concluding remarks 
as seeking to help remind us that we always have more to do 
if we are not to be satisfied with satisfactory performances. 
That by hearing our orientation to the present as developing 
through dialogue we display how not to be taken in by usage, 
i.e. how not to be taken for a ride,by choosing to act 
deliberately, by collaborating with others in such a way as 
to be working against oppression. That is, liberating our- 
selves by not seeking to escape, but to be facing up to, 
and to be changing oppressive practices, practices which 
seek to deny us our places as speakers /thinkers /social actors. 
So, liberation is more than escapism, indeed escapists need 
liberating /... 
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liberating but by saying this we do not, of course, intend to 
deny that escaping might be the right thing to do in certain 
circumstances, it might be, but we are saying that escaping 
is never enough. 
- 400 - 
SECTION 10 
Original Speaker: 
"Well, I'm intrigued by much that you are 
saying, and whilst I don't pretend to have 
understood all that you have said I have 
no desire to escape, i.e. to leave this 
conversation, so I will risk offering 
some more notes. Your reference to 
childhood (C.F. sand in shoe) and your 
references to nature in the responses 
you offered to Appendix F are taken 






"For the worrier doing good (or bad) 
is you doing nothing and good (or bad) 
doing, i.e. she sees good work as good's 
work (or bad work as bad's), and hence 
sees man as only a vehicle for good or 
bad. She sees all men /women as a- 
responsible for she reduces man to 
nature, and has a version of nature 
as child (we will see this more clearly 
as we go on;). However the worrier 
draws back at a certain point on this 
reductionist path for she does not draw 
the necessary consequence from this, 
which is that as a result she has 
nothing to worry about for nothing 
matters, on the contrary she carries 
on worrying about this consequence. 
What do I mean by suggesting that the 
worrier treats nature as a child? The 
question suggests that the reader should 
now slump back and wait for my answer, 
much in the way that children do when 
they are asked if they are sitting com- 
fortably before their story begins. Now 
the reason why the reader might make a 
mistake if he did that is because he 
should hardly expect a child to answer 
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help), and the worrier does tend to treat 
herself like a child. Unfortunately the 
worrier seems to be what is left of the 
child when Peter Pan has gone; However, 
on to children. 
When we respond to a child's naughtiness 
by asking or telling the child to be good 
we are misled by the worrier's reified con- 
ception of good as some 'thing' the child 
could be, and also we forget what naughtiness 
is. Naughtiness presumably means doing 
nought, perhaps doing no good, but when 
we respond by asking the child to be good 
we are not asking him to do anything, i.e. 
we only ask him not to do harm, and so in 
effect we ask him to do nothing which is 
what by being naughty he was doing. Now 
this discussion of children's behaviour may 
seem strangely out of place until we 
remember that we normally only use the 
term naughty in the context of children's, 
or perhaps pet animals' behaviour, so the 
cat that craps on the mat is naughty, as 
is this example, i.e. childish. We only 
use the term naughty then in the context 
of children because children are not held 
to be fully responsible for what they do, 
they are seen as not yet knowing the 
difference between good and bad. So 
now this distinction between good and 
bad is seen to be an achievement of 
only those with an 'adult' social status. 
Thus the truly social unlike the natural 
would have notions of good and bad. This 
begins to sound O.K. until we remember that 
(a) throughout our previous work the worrier 
has either not held, or not wanted to hold, 
herself or others as fully responsible for 
their actions, and (b) the worrier has 
this conception of good (the reified con- 
ception referred to above) as something 
that you are or can be, or that can 
happen to you. The worrier reduces 
human behaviour, whether adult or not, 
to the behaviour of a child and this is 
a way of reducing responsibility - this 
also resonates with the idea of pre- 
history previously mentioned. The point 
is that the child is dependent upon his 
environment in much the same way as the 
worrier was when conceived of as falling, 
i.e. in both situations they are dependent 
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Now we can begin to see how the worrier 
produces worries by treating nature as 
a child, i.e. she seems to view nature 
as being dependent upon its environment. 
Underlying my speech has been an argument 
that if the analyst was suggesting that 
he both could and did do good he was 
treating himself as supernatural. The 
first point to be raised from the para- 
graphs above is that perhaps this is 
the analyst's way of saying no more 
than that he is social: that he trans- 
cends nature. But, to return to the 
perhaps more contentious version of 
the supernatural what I want to suggest 
now is that perhaps it makes far more 
sense to treat the worrier as a super- 
naturalist. In the first instance, 
by treating nature as a child she shows 
that she has no real faith in nature, 
i.e. she seemingly subordinates nature 
to contingency, and by doing so makes 
room for religion. In the second in- 
stance by placing herself within nature, 
i.e. by refusing to allow man's social 
place to be seen as transcending nature 
she places herself within nature, and 
hence places nature above (super) her, 
and makes herself its subject, makes 
room for social science, the study of 
natural man. Neither of these pos- 
sibilities leave a place for deliber- 
ation, and perhaps both create plenty 
of space for worry. Perhaps to show 
how the worrier treats nature as like 
a child is interesting, but for the 
moment I feel very doubtful about this 
unless we can see why a child is treated 
like a child. 
I want to write now about the worrier's 
reified conception of good as either 
something you can be, or something you 
can get as a reward, but this is proving 
very difficult, perhaps precisely because 
the reified conception of good underlies 
my writing and cannot easily be pulled 
out. What I am trying to say is that 
the worrier can pull out the faults that 
underlie hers and others' writing but 
this is because she sees good as some- 
thing to be, she treats good as correct/ 
faultless, and so by finding faults she 
thinks she is improving. 
Pará.6 
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This reified conception of good creates 
many problems for the worrier because it 
leads her into the apparently naturalistic 
position of the survival of the fittest. 
The worrier's version of good is best, 
where best takes the form of most complete, 
and here we can see how the worrier can be 
pushed into a competitive situation, i.e. 
she thinks she needs to be better than 
others to be good, i.e. if others are 
better than her how can she be good? 
The result of this is that her 'yes buts' 
take on the rather more unsavoury flavour 
of put downs on others, i.e. perhaps this 
is the only way the worrier can lift her- 
self up. (If such it can be called.) It 
is worth noticing that this idea of being 
good could also underlie the worrier's 
version of the fool as incompetent, i.e. 
not a good competitor. 
lara.7 So now we see that the worrier's conception 
of good brings out the worst in her, and 
perhaps it is because she knows that she 
isn't doing good that she tries to cover 
herself with being good natured, child 
like, i.e. not meaning any harm; The 
point here is that the worrier doesn't 
think she owns the worst in her either 
for she treats succumbing to temptations 
as natural. This is the way she feels 
pulled down, i.e. she feels she has enough 
on her hands trying to be good without 
getting as far as doing good. Also, 
because temptation is natural she sees 
it as ever present. The point is then 
that being good natured isn't enough to 
stop you doing harm, it is only denying 
you are responsible for it, e.g. I didn't 
mean any harm. 
Para.B 'I didn't mean any harm' suggests very 
strongly how she uses this naturalistic 
reduction in such a way as to make her 
action unintentional and hence from her 
viewpoint, neither to be punished nor 
praised. But now what do we find? It 
is that the worrier doesn't decide that 
because nothing matters you can do any- 
thing, she thinks that you /she can't 
decide anything and that as a consequence 
you /she are doing anything. The worrier 
wants /. 
Para. 9 
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wants to be natural because then you can 
do anything in the sense that anything 
you do is natural. 
To put it bluntly the worrier seems to treat 
intentions as unnatural and perhaps in a sense 
they are, but she goes on to feel that this 
must mean they are bad. We saw how she made 
a similar move when she reduced deliberation 
to tacticalness, and yet this all starts to 
sound very confused, for it was precisely 
those acts which would be seen as unin- 
tentional or not deliberate, i.e. hasty 
acts which she wanted to avoid. Now we 
really do begin to see how deeply this 
opposition to action underlies her thinking; 
that is, she is opposed to intentional and 
to unintentional action, or she reduces the 
former to the latter. In a way this is 
just a louder echo of the view expressed 
earlier that the worrier's conception of 
good brings out the worst in her, i.e. 
perhaps it makes her naughty in the sense 
of making nothing out of everything. Why 
can't the worrier come to see that her 
production of this reified version of good 
is also unintentional? Or why can't she 
see that she hasn't yet produced even this 
for she can't produce anything because that 
would be action? 
Para.10 The idea of the difference between being 
good and doing good certainly seems to have 
shown some of the more unpleasant facets of 
the worrier, and one of these as far as these 
notes go still seems to be its failure to get 
to any sort of grips with doing good, or to 
put it another way, I still feel totally un- 
able to uplift /climb myself. Somehow the 
child analogy is still present and suggests 
the small child who has to be lifted to see 
his image in the mirror; the worrier's 
problem is that by reducing us all to 
children she effectively removes the 
mirror from view. 
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ANALYSIS OF APPENDIX G 
Analysis of Paragraph 1 
For the worrier doing good (or bad) 
is you doing nothing and good (or bad) 
doing, i.e. she sees good work as good's 
work (or bad work as bad's), and hence 
sees man as only a vehicle for good or 
bad. She sees all men /women as a- 
responsible for she reduces man to 
nature, and has a version of nature 
as child (we will see this more clearly 
as we go on:). However the worrier 
draws back at a certain point on this 
reductionist path for she does not draw 
the necessary consequence from this, 
which is that as a result she has 
nothing to worry about for nothing 
matters, on the contrary she carries 
on worrying about this consequence. 
Response: 
We hear how your speech draws back from the 
reductionist path and how by doing so it helps us to do so 
also. Through making the effort to hear your speech in 
this way, we come to hear how the reductionist path is 
itself a means of drawing back from response -ability, from 
freedom to decide, and the decision the worrier /thinker makes 
to halt this decline is heard as an expression of social 
response -ability, of the desire to act thoughtfully. C.F. 
your decision to risk collaborating with us /your listeners 
when you still do not know, rather than to fall into that 
silence that might have led to isolation and the disinte- 
gration of self's possibility as friend /collaborator. 
To see all men as a- responsible is to recognize 
that /,.. 
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that restricting our selves to visible appearances is neglect- 
ing man's essential place as a theorist /a thinker. So, if 
we could have begun by seeing man as a- responsible we would 
have ended there, but that was not a possibility open to us, 
so we do not end there, for our efforts are to do the desir- 
able work of showing how those visible appearances are res- 
ponse-able social actions, and how by being such they can 
be extended and deepened. 
Your speech reminds us that we do have no thing 
to worry about for no thing matters to us, i.e. by refusing 
to rest with superficial appearances, i.e. by choosing to 
think of men /women as thinkers /speakers we hear how conver- 
sation is restless with facts as things; whilst things 
may need to be talked about dialogue is about possibilities; 
about what we could do. It does not constrain self by 
tying us in a fruitless and absurd effort to collect all 
the facts before beginning, but seeks to release self by 
encouraging selves to be asking why they are doing what 
they are doing. When you say that the worrier sees man 
as only a vehicle of good or bad you help remind us that 
man /woman is the only vehicle for good, for social /moral 
decisions are man's distinctive capability, by making them 
we distinguish ourselves from nature and display our place 
as thinkers, and enable ourselves not to need to draw the 
necessary consequence, as you put it, in such a way that 
it strangles us, i.e. not to need to restrict ourselves to 
cause and effect, but to be raising our selves, our society 
out of contingency by deliberating, by continuing social 
collaboration /... 
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collaboration. 
Not to have drawn back on that reductionist path 
would have been unintentional self destruction, a course of 
action none of us could commend. 
Analysis of Paragraph 2 
What do I mean by suggesting that the 
worrier treats nature as a child? The 
question suggests that the reader should 
now slump back and wait for my answer, 
much in the way that children do when 
they are asked if they are sitting com- 
fortably before their story begins. Now 
the reason why the reader might make a 
mistake if he did that is because he 
should hardly expect a child to answer 
a question like that alone (i.e. without 
help), and the worrier does tend to treat 
herself like a child. Unfortunately the 
worrier seems to be what is left of the 
child when Peter Pan has gone: However, 
on to children. 
Response: 
When we hear you say "What do I mean by ... etc." 
we don't hear you as asking us to listen to your elucidation 
of what it is you are saying, i.e. as requiring us to con- 
strain ourselves whilst you engage in expansion, but as 
asking us to play a part in grounding how you have come, 
and are coming, to say what you are saying. So, to whom 
would a question of that sort suggest that they ought to 
slump back and wait for an answer? Only to one who wished 
to differentiate between self and other selves. That is, only 
to one who didn't hear the question as directed at her also. 
We wait to hear what you say, but do not hear your speech as 
an answer, for to hear it as such is to deny your status as 
an inquirer, as one who seeks to continue engaging in 
conversation /... 
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conversation and not to bring about silence. It would be 
to restrict ourselves to merely agreeing or merely disagree- 
ing where the latter consists in offering a competitive 
alternative, and the former offers nothing. So hearing a 
speech as an answer could rule out continuing collaborative 
effort. 
We did not ask you if you were sitting comfort- 
ably before we began for to do so would be to begin by 
worrying about whether our speech would engage you or be 
drowned out by distractions. However, we are aware that 
merely sitting is not comfortable for us, and that it is 
not comfortable for children either, unless it is being 
measured against the discomfort that punishment for dis- 
obeying could bring. "Are you sitting comfortably then 
I'll begin" could be a warning to keep silent; not to 
express yourself until you have heard all of the story, it 
could be authoritarian talk that chooses not to listen to 
what it does, but to ask us to restrict ourselves to listen- 
ing to what it appears to be. It could be asking us to 
restrict ourselves to becoming part of the furniture, to 
staying where we appear to be. We say could for it need 
not be, i.e. "Are you sitting comfortably then I'll begin" 
could mean let's get ready to move together. 
Your speech helps us to remember to be uncomfort- 
able with beginnings of the former sort, for to seek to sit 
comfortably before our story begins is reminiscent of slump- 
ing; it is reminiscent of the apparent end of Ivan Illyich 
Pra l in sky. 
As/... 
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As to the final sentence of this paragraph of 
yours you remind us that we formulate the unfortunate as 
good for we can see no good in fortunateness /chance, we do 
hear actions as good, intentions as good, but by doing so 
hear how deeply tragic certain superficial orientations to- 
wards good fortune could be, for they seek only to mesmerize. 
We formulate fortune as the effort to be continuing creating 
more harmonious social relationships. Your "However, on 
to children" is the expression of your continuing commitment 
not to simply wait and see what befalls you, i.e. whether 
you are fortunate (in the weak sense) or not. Furthermore 
this helps us to remember that we would not have heard your 
introduction to this appendix as escapism, i.e. you are not 
saying I don't pretend to understand all that you say and 
then offering the notes as a way to cover over your lack of 
understanding, but you offer your notes as your way to be 
trying all the better to understand. 
Analysis of Paragraph 3 
When we respond to a child's naughtiness 
by asking or telling the child to be good 
we are misled by the worrier's reified con- 
ception of good as some 'thing' the child 
could be, and also we forget what naughtiness 
is. Naughtiness presumably means doing 
nought, perhaps doing no good, but when 
we respond by asking the child to be good 
we are not asking him to do anything, i.e. 
we only ask him not to do harm, and so in 
effect we ask him to do nothing which is 
what by being naughty he was doing. Now 
this discussion of children's behaviour may 
seem strangely out of place until we 
remember that we normally only use the 
term naughty in the context of children's, 
or perhaps pet animals' behaviour, so the 
cat that craps on the mat is naughty, as 
is this example, i.e. childish. We only 
use the term naughty then in the context 
of children because children are not held 
to /... 
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to be fully responsible for what they do, 
they are seen as not yet knowing the 
difference between good and bad. So 
now this distinction between good and 
bad is seen to be an achievement of 
only those with an 'adult' social status. 
Thus the truly social unlike the natural 
would have notions of good and bad. This 
begins to sound O.K. until we remember that 
(a) throughout our previous work the worrier 
has either not held, or not wanted to hold, 
herself or others as fully responsible for 
their actions, and (b) the worrier has 
this conception of good (the reified con- 
ception referred to above) as something 
that you are or can be, or that can 
happen to you. The worrier reduces 
human behaviour, whether adult or not, 
to the behaviour of a child and this is 
a way of reducing responsibility - this 
also resonates with the idea of pre- 
history previously mentioned. The point 
is that the child is dependent upon his 
environment in much the same way as the 
worrier was when conceived of as falling, 
i.e. in both situations they are dependent 
upon their environment for their safety/ 
survival. 
Response: 
We will not be impatient with you here, i.e. we 
will not respond to your speech as if it were naughty for 
to do so would be to deny our commitment to hearing other's 
speech as intentional. So, you are seeking to help us 
remember not to rest with the beginning you invent, i.e. 
that of responding to the child's naughtiness, for that 
would have been to settle in differentiation between self 
and another self. We need to collaborate with the child 
in achieving an understanding of the behaviour in question. 
To proceed with a thoughtless commitment to a version of 
the behaviour as naughty is to deny ourselves the possibility 
of movement, of social change. 
status /... 
It is to rest in the adult 
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status which your speech helps us to remember is authoritarian, 
i.e. claims to know too much. So, whilst we could have dis- 
missed this paragraph as merely an effort on your part to 
escape, using childhood as a disguise, we toy with it /play 
with it so as to display how whilst such a reading would do 
neither us nor you credit, we can do better. Both the cat's 
act and this paragraph of yours help to stimulate our actions, 
but we are seeking to show how to have settled with shovell- 
ing away your speech would have been to dehumanize it, a 
practice that we see our speech as raising us above. 
We have said many times that we do not know the 
difference between good and bad, but that we have to decide, 
so you are not commending the adult status, i.e. that which 
might be held to be fully responsible, in the sense of know- 
ing that difference. Any, if any, who talk in such a way 
as to lead their listeners to believe that they have achieved 
that status are engaging in a dangerous sort of mischief 
which we all do need to guard against. 
We hear the truly social as having notions of 
good and bad and most importantly as recognizing that these 
are social products /members decisions, and are not based 
upon knowledge that is only open to those of a specific 
social status. So, your speech is not commending adult- 
hood which may sound O.K., but which precisely for this 
reason, i.e. because it is mere rhetoric, needs deepening. 
Your honesty in not claiming to be fully responsible is 
commendable for through it you express your desire to work 
to /.,. 
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to act more response -ably and not to relieve yourself of 
response -ability by claiming mysterious powers that are 
products of experience or whatever. Response -able social 
actions /moral decisions do not hide behind authority but 
are dialectical developments. 
So, you remind us that the adult who insists that 
he knows the difference between good and bad is a product 
of an authoritarian upbringing and remains blinkered by its 
forcefulness. That adult remains a child, though one that 
can perpetrate actions that would shovel us away if they 
could. We seek to elevate our actions to that of the child 
if the child is heard as one who collaborates in such a way 
as to decide. This is our way of increasing our response - 
ability, of improving our means of speech /thought, and it 
does indeed resonate with the formulations of pre- history 
we have offered. 
Oh yes, we are dependent upon our environment for 
our survival, if, that is, survival is deformulated into the 
mere prolonging of life, but if as we would have it survival 
is formulated as the effort to elevate our lives, our 
society, i.e. if survival is heard as the process of liberat- 
ing ourselves from contingency then for that we depend and 
can only depend upon ourselves. To refuse to be continuing 
to exhibit our response -ability for our actions would be to 
come to rest with a version of our history, our future as 
an instance of chronic incontinence. 
Analysis of Paragraph 4/... 
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Analysis of Paragraph 4 
Now we can begin to see how the worrier 
produces worries by treating nature as 
a child, i.e. she seems to view nature 
as being dependent upon its environment. 
Underlying my speech has been an argument 
that if the analyst was suggesting that 
he both could and did do good he was 
treating himself as supernatural. The 
first point to be raised from the para- 
graphs above is that perhaps this is 
the analyst's way of saying no more 
than that he is social: that he trans- 
cends nature. But, to return to the 
perhaps more contentious version of 
the supernatural what I want to suggest 
now is that perhaps it makes far more 
sense to treat the worrier as a super- 
naturalist. In the first instance, 
by treating nature as a child she shows 
that she has no real faith in nature, 
i.e. she seemingly subordinates nature 
to contingency, and by doing so makes 
room for religion. In the second in- 
stance by placing herself within nature, 
i.e. by refusing to allow man's social 
place to be seen as transcending nature 
she places herself within nature, and 
hence places nature above (super) her, 
and makes herself its subject, makes 
room for social science, the study of 
natural man. Neither of these pos- 
sibilities leave a place for deliber- 
ation, and perhaps both create plenty 
of space for worry. Perhaps to show 
how the worrier treats nature as like 
a child is interesting, but for the 
moment I feel very doubtful about this 
unless we can see why a child is treated 
like a child. 
Response: 
Now this paragraph does help us provided we do 
not allow the notion of transcends to mislead us, i.e. we 
are instructed by our reading of your speech provided we 
formulate transcending as stretching the limits and not as 
jumping outside them. But, we hear that you are not propos- 
ing the latter version of transcends, for, by writing the 
first /... 
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first sentence of that paragraph you display your awareness 
of the absurdities that could follow, i.e. your usage of 
'seems' in that sentence displays how you thoughtfully 
distance yourself from that extremist position. 
But what of the concluding sentence? This is 
not the expression of a loss of nerve, but an effort to 
help us to remember not to hear your speech as merely 
pointing at the limitations of the speech of worry, i.e. 
not as putting worry down, but as displaying how, by col- 
laborating with worry you are bringing your self up. So, 
you help us to stretch and deepen worry and not to treat it 
as the limit, i.e. the end, i.e. you help us to transcend 
it and not to jump above it, not to leave it behind. Social 
action is not that of the adult looking down upon the child, 
it is the action of speakers /thinkers collaborating in 
such a way as to be raising themselves out of their begin- 
nings. By making the effort to engage in an analytic 
relationship with other speakers through their speeches, 
i.e. to hear how they are social, how they transcend the 
natural we are collecting human actions and removing them 
from an arena in which superficiality seeks to silence 
thought. 
Analysis of Paragraph 5 
I want to write now about the worrier's 
reified conception of good as either 
something you can be, or something you 
can get as a reward, but this is proving 
very difficult, perhaps precisely because 
the reified conception of good underlies 
my writing and cannot easily be pulled 
out. What I am trying to say is that 
the /... 
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the worrier can pull out the faults that 
underlie hers and others' writing but 
this is because she sees good as some- 
thing to be, she treats good as correct/ 
faultless, and so by finding faults she 
thinks she is improving. 
Response: 
Your efforts to pull out the reified notion of 
the good from under the worrier' s speech might have been 
read as resulting here, as they might have been read else- 
where, in you being sucked into worry. But that is not 
the reading we offer for that would be to undermine our 
selves. We are reminded by your speech that subtraction, 
i.e. pulling out, is too lazy, too forceful, and shows no 
effort to be stretching /elevating our notion of self, i.e. 
it shows no commitment to traction. You are reminding us 
not to seek to minimize our efforts, but to be maximizing 
them. Merely to pull out the faults in another's speech, 
even if it were possible, i.e. to have restricted our 
actions to correcting would have been to have restricted 
ourselves to force for it would have been to fail to under- 
stand how collaborative effort is a liberating process. The 
idea of correction relies upon a prior commitment to a 
notion of what is perfect /faultless, and that commitment 
vis -a -vis social action is always authoritarian and pre- 
mature, those committed to it, if any, seek to prove them- 
selves, i.e. to reach a pre -conceived standard, rather than 
to improve their notions of self, i.e. their standards. 
An orientation to correction detains rather than releases 
human potential, 
Analysis /... 
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Analysis of Paragraph 6 
This reified conception of good creates 
many problems for the worrier because it 
leads her into the apparently naturalistic 
position of the survival of the fittest. 
The worrier's version of good is best, 
where best takes the form of most complete, 
and here we can see how the worrier can be 
pushed into a competitive situation, i.e. 
she thinks she needs to be better than 
others to be good, i.e, if others are 
better than her how can she be good; 
The result of this is that her 'yes buts' 
take on the rather more unsavoury flavour 
of put downs on others, i.e. perhaps this 
is the only way the worrier can lift her- 
self up. (If such it can be called.) It 
is worth noticing that this idea of being 
good could also underlie the worrier's 
version of the fool as incompetent, i.e. 
not a good competitor. 
Response: 
Your speech helps us to remember that the work 
we are collaboratively in is that of raising selves 
out of oppressive forms of speech, i.e. forms of speech which 
seek to increase, or rely upon the differences between men, 
e.g. I.Q. tests, sexism, racism, etc., rather than to be 
increasing man's difference from nature /contingency. What 
type of ridiculous and wasteful social relationships would 
result if our mode of orienting to others was in terms of 
whether each was better than the other, or other was better 
than each, or other was improving, catching up, etc. etc., 
indeed could that even be called social relationships? 
Such an orientation could hardly engage thoughtful inter- 
locutors, social /moral actors, for we are those who recognize 
our need for friends /collaborators, and are aware that 
resting with superficial differences between men is no way 
to /.., 
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to be improving our ways of living. Our efforts are 
directed by our commitment to the continuing liberating of 
our selves from oppressive forms of speech /life. Perhaps 
at times our speech may sound offensive, but it will only 
do so if our hearing has again become contorted by the very 
forms of speech from which we seek to play our part in 
releasing selves. Forms of speech inform our hearing, 
and perhaps by referring to them as forms of hearing we 
can be reminding ourselves that it is we who always have 
desirable work to do. 
Perhaps you will allow us to digress a little, 
indeed perhaps you will not hear this as a digression for 
we imagine that the description you offer of the worrier's 
speech as constrained within a competitive form is intended 
to remind us of a wider application. We dare say that all 
who conceive of their selves as oppressed might be con- 
strained in this way. Now how are these people likely to 
respond to the speech of liberators /radicals who present 
themselves as solid shining examples of the virtues of 
strength /solidarity etc., i.e. as instances of how to fight 
the system, how to gain your rights, how not to put up with 
any of that shit etc., i.e. as shining examples of how to 
be together. What we are saying is that we imagine that 
the competitive mode of thought destroys the usefulness of 
others as examples to follow, for it transforms them into 
enemies and far from encouraging depresses even further. 
No doubt liberation movements are well aware of 
thi s/ . . . 
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this problem, and are working hard to prevent their speech 
sounding like that of those who imagine they have achieved 
adult status (C.F. earlier remarks) for speech of that sort 
loses many potential and thoughtful allies by allowing for 
the divisive differentiation between liberated and un- 
liberated to occur such that only the speech of the liberated 
is heard as worth listening to Earlier in this response 
we spoke of continuing liberating and this unusual usage 
may have been noticed by readers, it was no typing error. 
By speaking of liberation the movements to which we refer 
might be reducing their much needed possibilities by allow- 
ing listeners to rest in competitive rather than collaborative 
speech, e.g. before and after liberation, liberated un- 
liberated, leaders followers etc. We hear liberation 
movements as liberating movements, and we hear liberating 
as an ongoing process which calls upon those engaged to be 
continuing to be working to achieve better versions of self 
and not to engage in the business of managing impressions, 
i.e. of appearing to be together in the hope that this will 
increase effectiveness, we imagine that it doesn't for the 
reasons we have offered. It is not a question of liberated, 
i.e. those in the know (and we remember the case of the 
adults again:) assisting /instructing those who need to be 
liberated, work of that sort, i.e. which orients to the 
oppressed as not very good competitors, as fools (C.F. your 
last sentence), listens only in the shallowest sense to what 
the oppressed say, (i.e. it humours us) for it conceives of 
the oppressed as thoughtless and needing to be led, it fails 
to recognize the theoreticity of the oppressed. Competitive 
thought /... 
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thought /speech is a malignant cancerous growth and it cannot 
be removed by efforts which rest in superficial sameness, 
it cannot be pulled out and discarded but needs to be 
deepened by continuing collaborative efforts. 
This speech will not be heard by those committed 
to liberating as being competitive for they hear how all 
speech is the effort to collaborate. They like we, seek 
to deepen, not to distort what they hear. They are improv- 
ing their selves by displaying their ability to offer 
versions of others as better than, not as worse than their 
own persons, for by doing so they continue working upon 
their social relationships. 
Analysis of Paragraph 7 
So now we see that the worrier's conception 
of good brings out the worst in her, and 
perhaps it is because she knows that she 
isn't doing good that she tries to cover 
herself with being good natured, child 
like, i.e. not meaning any harm; The 
point here is that the worrier doesn't 
think she owns the worst in her either 
for she treats succumbing to temptations 
as natural. This is the way she feels 
pulled down, i.e. she feels she has enough 
on her hands trying to be good without 
getting as far as doing good. Also, 
because temptation is natural she sees 
it as ever present. The point is then 
that being good natured isn't enough to 
stop you doing harm, it is only denying 
you are responsible for it, e.g. I didn't 
mean any harm. 
Response: 
If we settled for an easy /effortless reading of 
this paragraph, and merely agreed with what it seems at 
first glance to say the conception of good that we would be 
operating /... 
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operating with would be bringing the worst out of us. 
But that is not our way, and it could not be what you 
desire of us. So we read and try to listen more carefully, 
we respect you as a speaker /thinker as your speech respects 
us by leaving us plenty to do. Perhaps we could begin by 
rewriting the paragraph. 
So now we hear how the thinker's/speaker's con- 
tinuing inquiry into the 'nature' of the good draws the 
best out of herself and others, it is by not knowing whether 
what she is doing is good or is not that she can continue 
to be uncovering how by acting thoughtfully we not only do 
not mean any harm, but always intend to do good. The 
thinker does know that she does not own the worst in her, 
it is out of character, and she is able to disown it by 
working to understand how our actions, all of our actions 
are social, i.e. unnatural, and how viewing any of them as 
natural is a temptation in the sense that it makes them a 
waste of time, it leads towards thoughtless observance, and 
reduces the degree of deliberating, the degree of freedom 
we exercise over our lives. We raise /elevate our selves 
by at least intending to do good, and by being instructed 
by the conversations our actions so frequently bring about, 
and we are glad to have been responsible for these actions, 
they do not rest uncomfortably in our memories, we do not 
seek to have them off our hands. True, we never know 
whether we are doing good or not, but we all of us do in- 
tend it and need only converse with others to be achieving 
more thoughtful /more social lives. Whilst we could always 
have /.., 
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have tried to hide behind a notion of cause and effect, 
nature, we have no desire to for we enjoy acting intention- 
ally. Silence does not become us. But somehow even if we 
had tried to hide we know that a part of us would always 
remain visible to any thoughtful interlocutor. Whilst 
we can still speak /think we are not lost causes. Being 
good natured isn't enough to stop you doing harm, that also 
is true, indeed if it were possible for us to be good 
natured whatever that might mean, it would not still be 
possible for us to do anything for we would then be a- 
responsible. Perhaps we can formulate ourselves as being 
good natured if by this is meant those who intend to do 
good, i.e. those who are not merely natural, for by formulat- 
ing our good naturedness in this way we do deny that we are 
responsible for any harm, for harm results from thoughtless/ 
selfless occurrences for which we cannot be to blame; which 
is not of course to deny that we can be instructed by owning 
up to and considering mistakes we have previously personally 
made. 
So, we use other's speech as an occasion to draw 
the best out of ourselves, and by saying best we are not 
indulging in comparisons with /against other men /women, but 
we are saying that we are doing all that we can do, i.e. 
that intending to do good is all we can do. Whilst your 
hypothetical worrier, you say, has enough on her hands 
trying to be good without getting as far as doing good, we 
recognize that the only way we can try to be good is by 
trying /intending to do good. We do not need to engage in 
comparisons/... 
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comparisons with /against others to do this, but to engage 
in open conversations through which we can at least continue 
to bring into question what we do, and can stop pretending 
it is natural, stop being so superficial. But, perhaps 
your hypothetical worrier has for so long been facing in 
the wrong direction and restricting her attention to the 
surface that she can no longer hear speech about good and 
bad. Perhaps she is beginning to forget what speech and 
social relationships are about, and is settling for the 
disintegrated notion of persons as each being mere com- 
petitors in a fight for survival. Your speech helps us 
to remember that we need not and would not turn away in 
that fashion. Perhaps the worrier could be one who has 
become so involved in competitiveness, i.e. in showing her- 
self to be better than others that she no longer allows her- 
self the -time or energy to consider whether worry is a good 
form of action; perhaps she imagines that if she stopped 
to think she would be overtaken. We imagine that a lack 
of consideration of this kind could result in uncontrol- 
ability much like that of nature, and this is why we are 
working to be freeing that form of speech /life by deliberat- 
ing/conversing analytically. 
Easy, as effortless, readings would leave our- 
selves totally dependent upon other, and would be reducing 
reading, conversation, all of human life for that matter, 
to incontinence; to things that merely happen to us, and 
that would not make life easy for us, for speakers /thinkers. 
It is no wonder then that those, if any, who allow this to 
happen /... 
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happen are worried for we imagine that they correctly 
recognize that anything could happen at any time. They 
imagine, or so we surmise for the sake of this conversation, 
that the best they can hope for is that they will be 
fortunate. 
Analysis of Paragraph 8 
'I didn't mean any harm' suggests very 
strongly how she uses this naturalistic 
reduction in such a way as to make her 
action unintentional and hence from her 
viewpoint, neither to be punished nor 
praised. But now what do we find? It 
is that the worrier doesn't decide that 
because nothing matters you can do any- 
thing, she thinks that you /she can't 
decide anything and that as a consequence 
you /she are doing anything. The worrier 
wants to be natural because then you can 
do anything in the sense that anything you 
do is natural. 
Response: 
So as to collaborate with your speech we choose 
to begin by hearing your speech as a product of good in- 
tention, i.e. we choose to hear you as meaning us no harm. 
Now this might have been no easy matter and perhaps in part 
that is what you hoped we would say. The reason it might 
not have been easy is that your speech could all too easily 
do our persons harm if we chose to treat it as natural, i.e. 
as something we could do nothing about other than observe, 
understand in the scientific sense. 
But your speech helps us remember that we are not, 
and do not desire to be natural, we desire to be acting 
thoughtfully /socially /morally to be acting deliberately, 
and /..o 
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and that is not a fantasy, it is not, as we have said, 
seeking to be something that we are not. 
You say, "But now what do we find;" and remind 
us that what we find reveals a good deal about what we 
choose to hear as being of value, so your statement is not 
the exclamation of a natural scientist or an archaeologist 
who has dug up or uncovered a new /old fact. Our inquiry, 
your speech, is the activity of stretching ourselves and 
discovering how as we extend ourselves our possible character 
is beginning to be achieved. We resist strong suggestions 
and by doing so choose to act deliberately not naturally, 
we choose to display how if we had heard your speech as 
natural we would have done you a disservice for we would 
have offered you nothing at all. We do not seek to punish 
or praise your speech, i.e. perhaps to disagree or agree 
with it for we know that superficially rewarding or sanction- 
ing in that manner does neither you nor us any good. We 
seek to think about and in this way, deepen our hearing of 
your speech for this serves to help us all. 
Your speech appears indecisive, e.g. you /she it 
seems as if you are unsure whether you are speaking about 
us, the worrier, or yourself, but there we would be doing 
you an injustice for this is not indecision but is a manner 
of writing intended to help us remember that self as thinker/ 
speaker is what we each of us have in common, you /she, we/ 
them are deeply the same, deeply human selves, and only 
appear to be significantly different if we are constrained 
by /... 
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by oppressive, forceful, forms of speech. So your speech 
is helping direct us towards the notion of genus man and 
by doing so seeks to remind us of our true place as speakers, 
and to help us to be releasing ourselves from that historical 
specificity which limits our vision and restricts us to 
small talk when we each of us knows that to talk in that 
way degrades by maintaining superficial personas which con- 
ceal characters capable of so much more. 
It is no wonder if at times our speech takes on 
an aggressive tone, why would we allow the potentially 
profound /moral /free and friendly characters each and all of 
us has to be stifled by chatter /silence? Because we want 
to be natural: None of us finds that answer satisfactory 
but it is the answer that chatter provides, it is "leave 
me be ", "leave me alone" and that is just what it would do: 
We want to get to know each other not to leave each other 
alone, for that would be boring. Being left alone is 
perhaps a fair way of speaking of alienation, but to comply 
with that request is surely to reveal a bizarre notion of 
friendship? We want silence /oppression to leave us alone, 
but we do not desire to be left alone by other thoughtful 
interlocutors; we do desire to have friends. 
We also remember that much much earlier we spoke 
of not knowing whether we were in the city or the country, 
could it be that our confusion was grounded in the talk of 
certain city dwellers who sought to pretend that we still 
lived in the country, i.e. to pretend that our form of 
speech /... 
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speech /way of life was natural? 
Analysis of Paragraph 9 
To put it bluntly the worrier seems to treat 
intentions as unnatural and perhaps in a sense 
they are, but she goes on to feel that this 
must mean they are bad. We saw how she made 
a similar move when she reduced deliberation 
to tacticalness, and yet this all starts to 
sound very confused, for it was precisely 
those acts which would be seen as unin- 
tentional or not deliberate, i.e. hasty 
acts which she wanted to avoid. Now we 
really do begin to see how deeply this 
opposition to action underlies her thinking; 
that is, she is opposed to intentional and 
to unintentional action, or she reduces the 
former to the latter. In a way this is 
just a louder echo of the view expressed 
earlier that the worrier's conception of 
good brings out the worst in her, i.e. 
perhaps it makes her naughty in the sense 
of making nothing out of everything. Why 
can't the worrier come to see that her 
production of this reified version of good 
is also unintentional? Or why can't she 
see that she hasn't yet produced even this 
for she can't produce anything because that 
would be action? 
Response: 
But to whom would "this" start to sound very con- 
fused? Here we are reminded that it would only sound con- 
fused to those who orient their thought to cleaning surfaces, 
keeping things in order, to those who sought not to uncover 
how their own intentions need to be brought into account. 
We choose to inquire beneath the surface and this 
is what you are commending we do do, for you would not com- 
mend that we rest with a blunt statement about how things 
'seem'. We display how the worrier's speech could have, 
and /... 
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and should have, been formulated in a far more friendly 
manner, our more friendly /thoughtful formulation would 
run like this: 
The worrier treats intentions as unnatural as do 
we, and whilst she is concerned about intentions, i.e. 
whilst they occupy her thoughts and her speech, she reveals 
that she knows intentions as such are not good, but we are 
not hasty here and do not assume that it follows from this 
that she imagines they are bad, for such is not the case. 
By saying intentions as such are not good the worrier seeks 
to remind us that intentions intend good, i.e. seek to do 
good, and that if we heard them as being good in themselves 
their place in action would have been deformed. Further- 
more intentions can always be improved by more thought by 
those who recognize that they are not good as such, so the 
worrier's speech is helpful to us in this regard also. 
If the worrier's speech seems to reduce a deliber- 
ate act to the exercise of tacticalness, i.e. personal pro- 
tection, this does reveal that acts unthinkingness, i.e. 
that it was only apparently deliberate, and provides pointers 
as to how the act could be preserved, made more thoughtful/ 
more social. The speech of worry is intent not upon 
reduction but upon making possible the elevating of unin- 
tentional actions to intentional actions by stimulating/ 
goading the actors to think about what they do. By bring- 
ing the worst out of actions, by showing how if they were 
not deliberate they were nothing, the worrier raises the 
possibility /... 
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possibility of making something out of nothing. 
So what we are uncovering is that if the 
worrier's speech is itself heard as deliberate /thoughtful, 
i.e. as the exercise of friendship, it does play a part in 
the improvement of social relationships, but if the speech 
of worry is heard as unintentional, mindless, personal 
protection, i.e. as you put it as an opposition to action, 
then its possibility is lost for it will not be listened 
to: its depths would not be heard for it would be heard 
as merely naughty. Those, if any, who listen in this way 
would deform Socrates' speech from being the exercise of 
friendship into mere naughtiness and they would remain 
oppressed, isolated and constrained within the ways of 
thinking /forms of speech which they refused to bring into 
question. This is why they (the unreflexive worrier in 
your speech,) cannot see how they have chosen the version 
of good that they imagine constrains them. 
Analysis of Paragraph 10 
"The idea of the difference between 
being good and doing good certainly 
seems to have shown some of the more 
unpleasant facets of the worrier, and 
one of these as far as these notes go 
still seems to be its failure to get 
to any sort of grips with doing good, 
or to put it another way I still feel 
totally unable to uplift /climb myself. 
Somehow the child analogy is still 
present and suggests the small child 
who has to be lifted to see his image 
in the mirror; the worrier's problem 
is that by reducing us all to children 
she effectively removes the mirror 
from view." 
Response: 
Here you help us to remember that we would never 
be able to uplift /elevate our version of self if we chose 
not /... 
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not to hear that it is we that act. By listening thought- 
fully to your speech, e.g. - of the idea of difference 
seeming to show, and of - one of the more unpleasant facets 
of the worrier seeming to be the notes failure to get to 
any sort of grips with doing good - we help to remind our- 
selves that we are choosing to recognize our place as 
speakers /thinkers, for only by doing so can we uplift our 
selves /our society, and not rest content to pretend that it 
is ideas and notes, for instance, that do what we are 
response -able for, as if we don't produce them: 
As to your concluding analogy this is stimulating 
for as thinkers /speakers, by recognizing our deep sameness 
with others, we have no need for things like mirrors for re- 
assurance, for we have no wish to restrict ourselves to what 
we may appear to be as a consequence of historically specific 
cosmetics. But we do desire to be conversing with others/ 
friends in such a way as to be improving our version of 
self. If the worrier is heard as one who removes the 
mirror from view by undermining authoritarion talk, i.e. 
by undermining the talk of those who claim special status; 
of those who claim to know, so much the better, for it is 
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SECTION 11 
APPENDIX H 
"Worrying is only natural. Worrying 
is like a conditioned reflex, but it 
isn't related to specific conditions, 
i.e. it is a reaction to any conditions. 
Man becomes a hyper -animal then by his 
ability to abstract; more specifically 
in this context to abstract conditionality 
from specific conditions, i.e. any 
conditions become a cause of worry. 
This process produces worry as the 
condition within which the worrier's 
time is spent." 
"The worrier is right to see that con- 
ditions are only conditional (i.e. not 
necessarily necessary) but wrong to see 
conditionality itself as conditional 
(i.e. as not necessarily necessary). To 
say this another way each set of specific 
conditions is only conditional and as a 
result worry is a natural and appropriate 
reaction to each specific set. Hence 
the absurdity of trying to remove worry - 
e.g. "Don't worry everything will be 
alright"!!" 
"This might suggest that it is specificity 
rather than conditionality which fixes the 
worrier in her slot. However specificity 
is really only another version of condition - 
ality (limits), i.e. specification is 
speaking of limits (conditions), it treats 
speaking as defining (i.e. setting out the 
set limits). But it seems from the pre- 
ceding paragraphs that man rises above 
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offers a way for the worrier to remove 
her condition, i.e. if she could be more 
abstract about conditions she could stop 
worrying about those that confronted her, 
or that she tries to avoid. However, 
this also would be misleading for far 
from abstracting being a solution to the 
problem of specificity (if problem it ist) 
it is merely a refinement or sophisticated 
form of it." 
"To think the replacement of worry by 
abstracting is changing anything is to 
fail to be abstract enough about abstraction, 
i.e. it is to fail to see that abstraction 
can be subsumed within the category of 
methods of avoidance available to the 
worrier. Even this isn't enough for it 
forgets that worry isn't everything, and 
this is one of the problems with the 
method of abstraction, i.e. that it can 
all too easily forget what it has left 
out. Furthermore the very idea of 
replacing is, in this context, merely 
another way of talking about avoiding/ 
placing out of the way, and this brings 
to mind the earlier idea of stumbling into 
the problem again at another time or level." 
"Imagine if I went through the preceding 
page and crossed out all the is in an 
attempt to show how abstracting forgets 
what it is doing it for, and then forgot 
myself what I was crossing out the is 
for, and we get some idea of how abstract- 
ing is a stretching of the imagination 
but is merely imaginative, i.e. it does 
forget what it is doing it for:" 
'ara,6 "We have seen earlier how the worrier 
produces the future as something she has 
merely to wait for, e.g. her method of 
hoping things will work out, as the best 
way of using her time. Perhaps this 
can suggest to us the dreamlike nature 
of her mode of thought. A dream whether 
good or bad is always something we are in 
as if against our will, i.e. as if we 
hadn't chosen to be in it, and somehow 
the only way we can bring ourselves to 
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it. This resonates with the religious 
idea of an afterlife from which this life 
would presumably have only a dream -like 
status: But, the point about dreams is 
that once we realize we have produced them 
they no longer retain their fearful or 
pleasurable nature. In both cases we 
treat produced as made up, that is as 
fake, and we tend to think that once we 
know something is a fake there is nothing 
to worry about. However the realization 
that fakes are something we can produce is 
what we should be worried about:" 
" "Yes but" makes reference to the con - 
ditionality of the present where the 
worrier somehow sees conditionality as 
reducing the present's status to that of 
being hypothetical (it is worth noting 
that she speaks of this as a reduction!). 
The present is, only if you ignore the 
"yes but ". The "yes but" comes to mean 
then that things could be or are other- 
wise, and we can see how this produces 
the present as being dreamlike, i.e. 
hypothetical situations are dreamed up, 
and the worrier even situates the present 
as a hypothetical situation in the context 
of other hypothetical situations. But why 
does she do this? or why does she write 
paragraphs like this? It seems that by 
using the "yes but" she expresses her wish 
to avoid or ignore the present. (Initially 
this doesn't seem to tell us anything, but 
perhaps when we see that the worrier equates 
the present with the natural we will learn 
something!) An instance of this effort to 
avoid the present can be pointed to earlier 
in this set of notes when it was suggested 
that worry was a natural reaction without 
it further being suggested that it wasn't 
the only natural reaction. Choice was 
eliminated by treating the indefinite 
article as a definite article whereas it 
is only the natural reaction for the worrier." 
"The worrier's constant usage of 'perhaps' 
suggests that making choices is something 
the worrier will do her utmost to avoid 
(it also suggests the shallowness of her 
avoidance, i.e. as if she doesn't see that 
she chooses the usage of 'perhaps'). This 




- 433 - 
the present for the present is a prerequisite 
for choice, and hence its elimination or 
avoidance would be tantamount to removing 
the possibility of choice. So, the worrier 
seems to avoid making a choice or decision 
in two ways (a) by suggesting that the time 
to make the choice hasn't yet come, (this 
is her usage of "yes but" and /or "perhaps") 
and perhaps will never come. Or (b) by 
suggesting that what seemed like a choice wasn't 
really a choice at all, i.e. generally by 
her reduction of herself and /or the present 
to nature. We can see now that given her 
version of nature as a child (b) collapses 
into (a) or is only an example of it." 
"The worrier would go about doing (b) above, 
i.e. showing that a choice wasn't really a 
choice by saying either that given that it 
is natural for the best alternative to be 
chosen, if there is a difference between 
the two alternatives the weaker alternative 
had no real chance, and hence there was no 
real choice. Or, in the other case if there 
was no difference between the alternatives 
she would say that the choice between them 
is necessarily arbitrary and that again 
there has still been no choice. If some 
alternative proposal about the alternatives 
in a choice were offered, i.e. where they 
were neither the same, nor different, she 
would probably resort to showing how the 
chooser isn't really choosing anyway because 
of her social grouping or whatever, i.e. 
she would treat the chooser as the subject 
for natural science." 
"We begin to see here how the idea of 
intentions or more specifically good 
intentions would sound unnatural for the 
worrier because it seems to assume the 
possibility of choice which she seems intent 
upon removing. By treating worrying as 
only natural the worrier is in effect simply 
re- echoing her claim that she isn't res- 
ponsible for anything either good or bad; 
but why does she want to make this claim? 
This shows us how disclaiming is the 
closest she wants to get to responsibility, 
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"The worrier's version of responsibility 
is being protective, i.e. looking after 
something or one, i.e. of keeping some- 
thing or one (e.g. herself) safe. To 
say it once again of trying to prevent 
things falling. This can show us how 
she uses a version of good as something 
things or people are, such that they need 
protection. Whereas the idea of doing 
good would not begin with an idea of 
looking after it might begin with an idea 
of improving. We see here how the worrier 
gets drawn into a static analysis of things 
being either good or bad, i.e. to be pro- 
tected or avoided (where avoided is merely 
deciding not to protect), and how she can 
come to see herself as only being account- 
able for failing as a result. To say 
this in another way if she conceives of 
good as something she needs to protect, 
and she sees this as her sole task then 
she can never do good for she is always 
separate from it, she can only do her job 
which is analogous to not letting anything 
happen, or she can fail to do her job which 
is like 'etting things happen, and it is 
the latter that does happen and that is 
perhaps why she feels she fails and wants 
somehow to claim mitigating circumstances, 
e.g, she was distracted, or whatever." 
"Somehow protection doesn't seem like a 
good intention, its best possibility is 
for it to allow good intentions to be 
seen. That is, protection subordinates 
itself to other's intentions in one way 
or another. This idea of protection 
subordinating itself can also suggest 
how it can become lazy, for it could 
mean much less work if the good were 
seen to be able to protect themselves, 
i.e. if the survival of the fittest meant 
the survival of the good. The protector 
here would be as useful /as needed as the 
teacher who felt he had only one lesson 
to teach and that he had taught it 
successfully;" 
Para.13 "Much earlier in our work we spoke of the 
worrier having a utopian image of herself 
as not wanting ideal conditions, but as 
wanting /... 
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wanting a self that could deal with any 
conditions. We can see from these notes 
firstly why the idea of ideal conditions 
would not appeal to her, and secondly 
how her utopian image of herself seems 
to be grounded in the need for protection." 
- 436 - 
You would not be sympathizing with the worrier 
here, and asking us to join with you, for given that you 
are a thoughtful interlocutor, you are aware that the place 
for sympathy is where there is nothing else to be done, and 
our relationship with worry is one in which we have plenty 
still to do. To settle for sympathy would have been to 
settle for a nodding acquaintanceship which would have 
revealed the resistance of each of those involved to engag- 
ing in social change /development, it would have been to 
settle for the dullness of superficiality, of the status quo, 
of description. There is no need to converse with a 
nodding acquaintance for the silence would symbolize a 
shared wish to remain on the surface, i.e. a wish to remain 
isolated from each other, a wish to remain settled /the same, 
and not to risk growing /developing /getting closer. That 
wish as we are seeking to remind ourselves shows little 
sense of man's social /thoughtful place and the possibilities 
open to us. 
So, this general introduction to our specific 
responses to this appendix can perhaps help you to prepare 
yourself, i.e. not to set up your personal defences, but 
to help you remove them, for whilst we seek to be achieving 
more thoughtful versions of self through our conversation 
with you, we do not of course, content ourselves to sympathize 
and/... 
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and to be understanding, for you know that in this context 
that would not be a good course of action. 
Analysis of Paragraph 1 
"Worrying is only natural. Worrying 
is like a conditioned reflex, but it 
isn't related to specific conditions, 
i.e. it is a reaction to any conditions. 
Man becomes a hyper -animal then by his 
ability to abstract; more specifically 
in this context to abstract conditionality 
from specific conditions, i.e. any 
conditions become a cause of worry. 
This process produces worry as the 
condition within which the worrier's 
time is spent." 
Response: 
"Worrying is only natural ". Who, if anyone 
would say this? The answer indicates to us that here you 
are attempting to do as we asked at the end of Section 10, 
i.e. to work on the inside, i.e. to hear how the worrier's 
acts are products of good intentions. However, as we will 
show, you do not intend your speech to stand alone, for 
alone it could be read as limited to description, perhaps 
as a sympathetic epitaph; whereas your efforts are, like 
the efforts of all thoughtful interlocutors, concerned to 
preserve our liveliness, our response -ability to be con- 
tinuing developing through inquiry. Your speech encourages 
others, i.e. us, to participate with it and not to submit 
to it for the self we speak of is not yet dead. 
When you say worrying is only natural you seek to 
remind us that we do more than worry for we are not natural. 
As you are no doubt well aware we consider all 
social /... 
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social action as unnatural, i.e. as thoughtful /deliberate, 
so when you say that worrying is only natural, your speech 
reveals how the worrier wishes to maintain the pretence of 
treating worry as a thing, for she imagines that only in 
this way can we prevent ourselves degenerating into it. 
Now, if that had been your intention, you might have 
expected us to be grateful for your help, but the surface 
of your speech is to us no more than the tentative beckon- 
ing of one who imagines she is on the outside looking in 
and who seeks others with whom she can collaborate in such 
a way as to indulge in audience participation, i.e. in 
merely settling for becoming part of an audience. But we 
are not grateful for the surface of your speech, for your 
manner of speaking as if from the outside reveals how we 
could already have been in much deeper than we had imagined. 
An effort to cling to the surface, e.g. an effort to treat 
worry as a thing, is only called for by those who are already 
imagining they are falling. You seem to be describing the 
condition that some may imagine that we are, each and all 
of us, in, but we are seeking to display that social actions/ 
speeches, including that of those who are tempted by worry, 
are more thoughtful than appearances might have led us to 
believe. But you are well aware of this, for you know that 
we would not hear the surface of your speech in preference 
to its depths, you are aware that we would not merely nod 
in agreement. 
When you say that worrying is like a conditioned 
reflex, you are seeking to stimulate us in such a way that 
we /... 
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we bring to the fore the issue of justice, and perhaps 
punishment, in social life, for if actions which are 
visualized by members as natural are no more than con- 
ditioned reflexes, then aren't these very acts instances 
of oppression by a form of speech which denies speakers 
an awareness of their true condition as moral /social/ 
response -able actors, i.e. as those who are deciding how 
we live. Those, if any, who consider their own actions/ 
speech /thoughts to be natural are those who stand, and 
without reason, in the way of social development, of friend- 
ship, whether they be for or against the concrete laws in 
a specific society, for they are denying their own social 
character, and by doing so deny their place in social 
relationships for they pretend they do not act deliberately. 
We seek to reflect upon our conditions in such a way that 
we are not limited to conditioned reflexes. So where 
worry could be seen as a constant but specific reaction to 
any conditions, we hear thoughtful /social actions as those 
which work to produce better conditions by speaking response - 
ably. 
So you are reminding us that men /women are becom- 
ing social /moral actors not through any abilities that 
merely extend animal traits, not for instance by an 
expanded ability to abstract, i.e. pull out, but by decid- 
ing not to be natural, by deciding to be becoming thoughtful/ 
social /deliberate and response -able. Man as hyper -animal 
to use your term will spend most of his time worrying for 
he leaves himself and views his condition as that of an 
isolated /... 
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isolated body within or against the rest of the universe. 
What a depressing picture, what a hopeless task, if it 
can be called a task, and its hopelessness is correctly 
perceived by the worrier who then seeks distractions, who 
wants his mind taken off things. No sense of friendship 
for this creature, only of stark futility, of certain 
defeat. But we seek to collaborate in such a way as to 
be creating social conditions such that we are remoulding 
that version of human life, rather than hiding it behind 
superficial chatter. 
So, as thinkers we are playing a part in creating 
forms of speech /life, i.e. social conditions, of friendship, 
for we choose not to settle in a process that produces worry 
as the condition in which social actors' time is spent except 
when we mindlessly forget what we are letting happen. 
Analysis of Paragraph 2 
"The worrier is right to see that con- 
ditions are only conditional (i.e. not 
necessarily necessary) but wrong to see 
conditionality itself as conditional 
(i.e. as not necessarily necessary). To 
say this another way each set of specific 
conditions is only conditional and as a 
result worry is a natural and appropriate 
reaction to each specific set. Hence 
the absurdity of trying to remove worry - 
e.g. "Don't worry everything will be 
alright "::" 
Response: 
We choose to work hard to be hearing what you 
are saying as stimulating here for its surface seemed very 
dry and arid, and hardly the place for us at all, and yet 
what you are saying can help us to be remembering not to 
set /... 
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set off ourselves on absurd ventures, i.e. not to seek 
unconditionality as your hypothetical worrier seems to do, 
for no venture could be more fruitless. Conditions are 
necessary for any action, for any speech, so to seek a 
state without conditions is to seek silence, thoughtlessness. 
When you speak of worry as an appropriate reaction, you seek 
to remind us that worry can be heard as a form of speech 
that seeks to appropriate speakers. So worry apparently 
merely wishes everything would be alright, and in this way 
could reduce those it subjects to inertness, but we are re- 
appropriating our speech /thought, so as to make it work for/ 
with us, we are collaborating in such a way as to be produc- 
ing desirable conditions through our dialogue. So whilst 
worry does appear to object to chance, we are seeking to be 
taking our chance, our opportunity. Whilst we recognize 
that our work cannot make everything alright we are also 
recognizing the absurdity of subjecting our speech /our 
lives to such a bizarre and extreme commitment, for such a 
commitment could have reduced us to silence. We are seek- 
ing to continue improving our lives, our ways of speaking/ 
thinking, to be making them more enjoyable by continuing 
conversation. When in that paragraph you use the notions 
right and wrong, your speech is not constrained by a notion 
of right and wrong as correct and incorrect, but as liberat- 
ing and oppressing, deliberate and thoughtless. 
Analysis of Paragraph 3 
"This might suggest that it is specificity 
rather than conditionality which fixes the 
worrier in her slot. However specificity 
is /... 
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is really only another version of condition - 
ality (limits), i.e. specification is 
speaking of limits (conditions), it treats 
speaking as defining (i.e. setting out the 
set limits) . But it seems from the pre- 
ceding paragraphs that man rises above 
specificity by abstracting, and that this 
offers a way for the worrier to remove 
her condition, i.e. if she could be more 
abstract about conditions she could stop 
worrying about those that confronted her 
or that she tries to avoid. However, 
this also would be misleading for far 
from abstracting being a solution to the 
problem of specificity (if problem it is:) 
it is merely a refinement or sophisticated 
form of it." 
Response: 
Here you ironize our speech in Section 10 concern- 
ing historical specificity and draw out how that speech could 
have been heard as an instance of worry, as an effort to avoid 
specific conditions by concentrating on something less 
specific, more abstract, but such could not, and you know 
this well enough, have been our intent. We were seeking 
to uncover a practical /friendly reading of social situations 
not by avoiding them, for how could that be thoughtful? 
No, we were seeking to display how all too frequently supposedly 
practical solutions are mere avoidance, it is they that 
would restrict us to superficiality, it is they that would 
restrict conversation to banter and by doing so deny pro- 
fundity, i.e. human character, its place. So, whilst 
welcoming your reminder we doubt that our readers will have 
read what we said in the manner you imagine. Our speech 
is oriented to unsettling those who worry by showing how 
the form of speech which they may hear as akin to glue that 
has /... 
* (For would we be befriending them by leaving them ?) 
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has set /solidified around them, is far from set; indeed 
how speech, by being speech, need never set. Our intent 
is not to leave the worrier homeless, but to be collaborat- 
ing with her in developing a form of speech /life that does 
not wall us in, that can continue moving us along, helping 
us develop. Sophisticated, refined speech is boring, for 
it orients to neatness /completeness, it is unnecessarily 
restrictive and seeks to close rather than open minds, it 
is defensive, undialectical, anti -social. 
Analysis of Paragraphs 4 and 5 
"To think the replacement of worry by 
abstracting is changing anything is to 
fail to be abstract enough about abstraction, 
i.e. it is to fail to see that abstraction 
can be subsumed within the category of 
methods of avoidance available to the 
worrier. Even this isn't enough for it 
forgets that worry isn't everything, and 
this is one of the problems with the 
method of abstraction, i.e. that it can 
all too easily forget what it has left 
out. Furthermore the very idea of 
replacing is, in this context, merely 
another way of talking about avoiding/ 
placing out of the way, and this brings 
to mind the earlier idea of stumbling into 
the problem again at another time or level." 
"Imagine if I went through the preceding 
page and crossed out all the is in an 
attempt to show how abstracting forgets 
what it is doing it for, and then forget 
myself what I was crossing out the is 
for, and we get some idea of how abstract- 
ing is a stretching of the imagination 
but is merely imaginative, i.e. it does 
forget what it is doing it fort" 
Response: 
Here you are seeking to help us to remind our- 
selves to consider why we are doing what we are doing. 
Your /... 
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Your speech helps evoke resonances of the practices of 
bureaucracy, technology, professionalism and the like, and 
reveals very nicely how, by drawing and restricting our 
attention to superficial details, these practices would 
consume and restrict the energy we have for thoughtful 
social action. But they will not do so if we orient to 
their members not as masters but as those who are enslaved, 
i.e. as friends with whom we can collaborate in such a way 
as to foster our communal commitment to deepening and 
liberating our selves from shallow, oppressive, forgetful 
practices /usages. The bureaucrat does provide a very 
graphic instance of the worried man, i.e. the man who has 
come to imagine that some thing, e.g. a book of rules, or 
a superior in the structure, will relieve him of response - 
ability for his actions. That man is oppressed by a form 
of speech through which he is denying himself, i.e. denying 
his free moral /social character. Bureaucracy is a stretch- 
ing of the imagination that could all too easily lead some 
to forget what we are for. Perhaps it leads some so far 
that they pretend they no longer want to remember: If 
sociologists, for instance, were led in this way, they 
could hardly expect to relate to others in a social/ 
thoughtful way, for their work would be intent upon con- 
cealing, rather than seeking to reveal, human character. 
However, we, as thoughtful interlocutors, hear sociology 
as committed to the latter rather than the former enter- 
prise, we hear sociology as an instance of social action, 
i.e. as an effort to prise open social relationships. 
- 445 
Analysis of Paragraph 6 
"We have seen earlier how the worrier 
produces the future as something she has 
merely to wait for, e.g. her method of 
hoping things will work out, as the best 
way of using her time. Perhaps this 
can suggest to us the dreamlike nature 
of her mode of thought. A dream whether 
good or bad is always something we are in 
as if against our will, i.e. as if we 
hadn't chosen to be in it, and somehow 
the only way we can bring ourselves to 
see that we have produced it is by ending 
it. This resonates with the religious 
idea of an afterlife from which this life 
would presumably have only a dream -like 
status'. But, the point about dreams is 
that once we realize we have produced them 
they no longer retain their fearful or 
pleasurable nature. In both cases we 
treat produced as made up, that is as 
fake, and we tend to think that once we 
know something is a fake there is nothing 
to worry about. However the realization 
that fakes are something we can produce is 
what we should be worried about:" 
Response: 
Ve take this paragraph further by saying that all 
social actions are fake, if by fake is meant made up, for 
none are natural; and it is by increasing our awareness of 
the fakeness, the made -upness, of all social actions that 
we are beginning our deliberations. So, the dreamlike 
nature of the worrier's mode of thought rests in its forceful 
manner of persuading those it subjects that it is natural, 
i.e. that it represents /replicates the way things (including 
selves) are, However, nothing we do is natural, for our 
place as thinkers /speakers is such that we are all always 
choosing /deciding, i.e. always acting unnaturally /socially. 
We all as thinkers /speakers are making our social relation- 
ships, and yet to be saying this is to be drawing out the 
limitations /... 
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limitations of your notion of fakeness, for whilst it does 
act as a sharp reminder that we do not slip into speaking 
or listening as if our way of speaking or listening were 
natural, it could also lead us to imagine that in our 
social relationships we have some thing to replicate. 
Perhaps the bureaucrats rule book will suffice to provide 
an instance. So, our particular place as speakers/ 
thinkers is such that we are free to choose with others 
how we construct our social relationships. As we have 
said there is nothing that we are forced to replicate. 
Now whilst we are beginning to hear how our profound social 
and moral character rests in this freedom to deliberate and 
decide, we are aware that some, i.e. those who hear freedom 
to be a burden; those who have been reduced to hearing 
their own speech as natural, if there are any, will be 
shocked by our manner of speaking. Whilst they will stead- 
fastly refuse to question the character of their own speech, 
they will, perhaps publicly, but if not publicly privately, 
hear the deliberate; the social; the intentional; the 
unnatural; the lively; the moral all as fakes that fail 
to replicate nature. Speakers of that sort are constrained 
to hearing the moral as the natural and whilst they are 
always disappointed with themselves for not quite making 
it, they are repulsed by the notion of deliberation. 
Our efforts are oriented to formulating this 
feeling of repulsion at the idea of deliberation in such a 
way that our social relationships can pulse again in a 
thoughtful and not an accidental manner. We hear any 
talk /... 
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talk that relies upon a notion of man as natural as being 
superficial; as being anti -social; a- sociological, self 
destructive and self contradictory, and we would not be 
befriending those, if any, who spoke in this way by remain- 
ing silent, for to remain silent is to choose to seek to 
replicate nature, it is to deny the possibility of friend- 
ship, of social development. 
So, the last sentence of your paragraph 6 is 
heard as calling upon us to show the fakeness of that 
paragraph and by doing so to collaborate wi th you in such 
a way as to be liberating our social relationships from 
the pretence that there is an original pattern to which 
they /we should seek to subordinate ourselves. (Incidentally, 
we have for long been awaiting an opportunity to deal with 
any discontent you may feel for our references to you as 
the original speaker, for you may have heard the juxta- 
position of those two notions as accidental, however, by now 
few, if any, of our readers will be satisfied with readings 
of social actions as accidental.) 
What is the dream to which you are referring us? 
We hear it as the lives of those committed to a notion of 
self as natural, i.e. as not deliberate, i.e. as not 
thinking, for these, all consciousness is like an aberration, 
an interruption of the silence that is nature, and the 
sooner the thinking, the conversation, the social relation- 
ships, are over the better. That movement is very clearly 
the opposite of that which we are commending. What we 
are saying is that we are only beginning to grasp our 
social /... 
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social possibilities by reversing that movement, by 
hearing that the notions of good and bad only have 
relevance to us if we decide to be unnatural, and if we 
do decide, and we all do by speaking, then we are already 
choosing the social relationships we place ourselves and 
other selves in. And far from needing to end /finish what 
we are doing before we can begin, we need only to continue 
what we are already doing, i.e. acting thoughtfully/in - 
tentionally. Our lives would only take on a dreamlike 
status if we began to pretend that we do not decide what we 
do. Even the version of dreaming that you offer shows how 
deeply that oppressive, self destructive notion of self, as 
unable to choose, could penetrate into the apparently non- 
social private world of dreaming. 
The point about dreams or any other forms of 
social action is that we are beginning to be producing them 
by releasing ourselves, our society, from oppressive forms 
of speech which would have us believe that we cannot act 
deliberately, thoughtfully, that we cannot be freeing our- 
selves from contingency. So, when we spoke in our res- 
ponse to paragraph 5 of bureaucracy, technology and pro- 
fessionalism, we were not commending back -to- nature, what 
we were saying is that bureaucracy, technology and pro- 
fessionalism are social developments which could or can be 
oppressive if they are heard as natural developments and 
therefore as necessary. 
Analysis of Paragraph 7 
" "Yes but" makes reference to the con - 
ditionality of the present where the 
worrier /... 
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worrier somehow sees conditionality as 
reducing the present's status to that of 
being hypothetical (it is worth noting 
that she speaks of this as a reduction:). 
The present is, only if you ignore the 
"yes but ". The "yes but" comes to mean 
then that things could be or are other- 
wise, and we can see how this produces 
the present as being dreamlike, i.e. 
hypothetical situations are dreamed up, 
and the worrier even situates the present 
as a hypothetical situation in the context 
of other hypothetical situations. But why 
does she do this? or why does she write 
paragraphs like this? It seems that by 
using the "yes but" she expresses her wish 
to avoid or ignore the present. (Initially 
this doesn't seem to tell us anything, but 
perhaps when we see that the worrier equates 
the present with the natural we will learn 
something:) An instance of this effort to 
avoid the present can be pointed to earlier 
in this set of notes when it was suggested 
that worry was a natural reaction without 
it further being suggested that it wasn't 
the only natural reaction. Choice was 
eliminated by treating the indefinite 
article as a definite article whereas it 
is only the natural reaction for the worrier." 
Response: 
We are reminded by this paragraph of yours that 
"Yes -but" by making reference to the conditionality of the 
present reminds us, as speakers, how we need to be acknowledg- 
ing the theoreticity of our own speech if we are to be 
achieving versions of the present that move us on from mere 
hypothesis, i.e. from a version of speech as being restricted 
to the pre -theoretical. Speakers, if any, who hear their 
own speech as natural, i.e. who oppose deliberation as 
unnatural, would be reducing their own speech /lives to 
thoughtlessness, i.e. to being nothing more than a series 
of disconnected, disparate happenings /events. Perhaps 
they would hear this happenstance appearance as liberty, 
but /... 
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but by doing so they would not hear how it is no more than 
haphazard. You say in parenthesis that it is worth noting 
that etc. and by doing so could have provided us with an 
instance of how speech can be haphazard for if it was worth 
noting, couldn't you have interrupted the seemingly natural 
flow of what you were saying to expand why or how it was 
worth noting. However, we do you an injustice for now we 
hear how you are noting this for yourself, i.e. you are not 
talking down to your reader, on the contrary you are con- 
trolling your writing for you know that your readers will 
not be behind, but will, if anything, be ahead of you. 
You say the present is, only if you ignore the 
"yes but ", but you are not commending that we do ignore it, 
for to do so would be to restrict ourselves to the hypo- 
thetical, to that dreamlike wish to be natural, to be non - 
thinkers, non- theorists. The "Yes -but" does remind us 
that things (including here ourselves and our ways of 
speaking) could be otherwise, and by doing so it helps us 
to hear how our apparently unthoughtful, apparently pre - 
theoretical versions of the present are merely hypothetical 
until we bring them into question. You remind us that we 
are not restricted to dreaming up hypothetical situations 
for we are not social isolates, we collaborate with others 
in our efforts to produce versions of the present, or what- 
ever, that can help us to be improving our lives, our modes 
of thought /speech. If it seems to some that by using the 
"yes but" we express a wish to avoid or ignore the present, 
we might agree, provided the present was being heard as 
contingency /... 
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contingency, as thoughtlessness, as you say as natural; 
and also provided that avoiding and ignoring were not 
being used in a pejorative fashion, for by ignoring and 
avoiding the present's contingent aspect, we are dealing 
thoughtfully with the social possibilities it opens up 
for us, and this is why we do as we do. The instance you 
offer is such that it goads us to speak of a less restricted 
response. You speak of choice being eliminated by treating 
the indefinite article as a definite article, and you are 
quite correct. But by being merely correct you remind us 
how if we had subordinated ourselves to your speech, (which 
could not have been what you desired) we would have eliminated 
a choice of far greater import, and this is the choice of 
not pretending to be natural, i.e. the decision to act 
thoughtfully /socially /freely and to think about how we 
speak rather than limiting ourselves to one of a restricted 
number of supposedly natural reactions, for to do the latter 
is to be working with a degenerate notion of the social. 
Analysis of Paragraphs 8 and 9 
"The worrier's constant usage of 'perhaps' 
suggests that making choices is something 
the worrier will do her utmost to avoid 
(it also suggests the shallowness of her 
avoidance, i.e. as if she doesn't see that 
she chooses the usage of 'perhaps'). This 
would certainly account for her avoidance of 
the present for the present is a prerequisite 
for choice, and hence its elimination or 
avoidance would be tantamount to removing 
the possibility of choice. So, the worrier 
seems to avoid making a choice or decision 
in two ways (a) by suggesting that the time 
to make the choice hasn't yet come, (this 
is her usage of "yes but" and /or "perhaps ") 
and perhaps will never come. Or (b) by 
suggesting that what seemed like a choice wasn't 
really a choice at all, i.e. generally by 
her /... 
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her reduction of herself and /or the present 
to nature. We can see now that given her 
version of nature as a child (b) collapses 
into (a) or is only an example of it." 
"The worrier would go about doing (b) above, 
i.e. showing that a choice wasn't really a 
choice by saying either that given that it 
is natural for the best alternative to be 
chosen, if there is a difference between 
the two alternatives the weaker alternative 
had no real chance, and hence there was no 
real choice. Or, in the other case if there 
was no difference between the alternatives 
she would say that the choice between them 
is necessarily arbitrary and that again 
there has still been no choice. If some 
alternative proposal about the alternatives 
in a choice were offered, i.e. where they 
were neither the same, nor different, she 
would probably resort to showing how the 
chooser isn't really choosing anyway because 
of her social grouping or whatever, i.e. 
she would treat the chooser as the subject 
for natural science." 
Response: 
If the version of choice that you talk of in these 
paragraphs was that to which we were committed, the writing 
of this response would require no more thought than does the 
choice between one brand of washing powder and another. 
But as we all, as thoughtful interlocutors, are well aware, 
such is not the case. The decision to speak response -ably, 
rather than to restrict ourselves to reacting supposedly 
naturally, is the decision for social change, for social 
development, i.e. it is the decision in favour of active 
inquiry into more social social relationships, rather than 
the indecision that settles for the superficiality of 
appearances, i.e. of the status quo. The difference 
between these courses of action is analogous to that 
between waking and sleeping, it is that between thoughtful 
and /... 
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and thoughtless, between just and unjust, i.e. no difference 
could be greater, and yet the choice always, and not 
surprisingly, requires thought /effort /character, indeed the 
choice is only open to speakers /thinkers, i.e. to we who are 
choosing to be freeing ourselves, i.e. to we who are choos- 
ing to act morally rather than naturally. So, whilst the 
surface of your speech in these two paragraphs appears to 
be moving in such a way as to reveal that you are seeking 
to show how choice can always be reduced so as to be heard 
as no real choice; we know that, as a thoughtful inter- 
locutor, you could not intend that to be the outcome. We 
hear your speech as calling upon us to display through our 
response how such a restrictive version of choice, as is 
that which you seem to be offering, could never be accepted, 
or adhered to, by thinkers /speakers, for it is miserly and 
degrading, and in no way seeks to be raising us out of the 
supermarket mentality that would reduce genuine social 
inquiry to bargain hunting. And whilst the former activity 
does profit us in the profound sense of stretching and 
improving our conceptions of self and society, the latter 
is an activity that does indeed bar any real gains. 
The version of choice you seem to offer is an in- 
stance of the pre -theoretical, i.e. the hypothetical talk 
to which we have made reference in our response to paragraph 
7 for it nowhere raises the real choice, the desirable choice, 
i.e. the possibility of bringing the conception of self 
that is being relied upon into question. Social groupings 
are products of how we decide to speak and think about our 
society /... 
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society, they are not natural developments, i.e. they are 
not necessary, and by deciding to be speaking of the social 
as the realm of the possible, we are displaying how we can 
eschew the constraints that restricting ourselves to easily 
available alternatives would entail. We are choosing to 
treat you, and all other speakers, with respect by hearing 
your speech as the product of good intentions. We place 
your speech in the context of a relationship of friendship, 
for to have treated your speech, or any speech, as the 
subject matter for natural science would have been to decon- 
textualize it through a restrictive practice which reduces 
rather than enhances the prospects of genuine social develop- 
ment. 
Analysis of Paragraph 10 
"1e begin to see here how the idea of 
intentions or more specifically good 
intentions would sound unnatural, for the 
worrier because it seems to assume the 
possibility of choice which she seems intent 
upon removing. By treating worrying as 
only natural the worrier is in effect simply 
re- echoing her claim that she isn't res- 
ponsible for anything either good or bad; 
but why does she want to make this claim? 
this shows us how disclaiming is the 
closest she wants to get to responsibility, 
again it shows us how close she is to the angry man;" 
Response: 
Yes, we are remembering that we have good in- 
tentions in a sense in spite of, rather than because of, 
the surface of the preceding paragraphs, for we do not 
restrict ourselves to re- echoing. To have done so would 
have been to have ruled out that possibility that is a 
thoughtful /... 
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thoughtful response. Good intentions not only seem to 
assume the possibility of choice, they actively risist 
being cut down by that forceful and degenerate version of 
speech as being no more than an echo of nature, and as a 
weak and distorted one at that. So whilst we are claiming 
to be becoming thoughtful /social /moral rather than natural, 
those speakers, if any, who pretend they are not us, i.e. 
those who pretend that they aren't responsible for their 
own speech rely upon an understanding of speech /thought as 
being no more than a degenerate version of nature, and by 
doing so they come to hear all conversation as being a waste 
of time. Their way of talking /listening would generate 
only silence for they seek to decontextualize and in this 
way they would seek to hear our speech as empty. 
Analysis of Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 
"The worrier's version of responsibility 
is being protective, i.e. looking after 
something or one, i.e. of keeping some- 
thing or one (e.g. herself) safe. To 
say it once again of trying to prevent 
things falling. This can show us how 
she uses a version of good as something 
things or people are, such that they need 
protection. Whereas the idea of doing 
good would not begin with an idea of 
looking after it might begin with an idea 
of improving. We see here how the worrier 
gets drawn into a static analysis of things 
being either good or bad, i.e. to be pro- 
tected or avoided (where avoided is merely 
deciding not to protect), and how she can 
come to see herself as only being account- 
able for failing as a result. To say 
this in another way if she conceives of 
good as something she needs to protect, 
and she sees this as her sole task then 
she can never do good for she is always 
separate from it, she can only do her job 
which is analogous to not letting anything 
happen, or she can fail to do her job which 
is /... 
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is like letting things happen, and it is 
the latter that does happen and that is 
perhaps why she feels she fails and wants 
somehow to claim mitigating circumstances, 
e.g. she was distracted, or whatever." 
"Somehow protection doesn't seem like a 
good intention, its best possibility is 
for it to allow good intentions to be 
seen. That is, protection subordinates 
itself to other's intentions in one way 
or another. This idea of protection 
subordinating itself can also suggest 
how it can become lazy, for it could 
mean much less work if the good were 
seen to be able to protect themselves, 
i.e. if the survival of the fittest meant 
the survival of the good. The protector 
here would be as useful /as needed as the 
teacher who felt he had only one lesson 
to teach and that he had taught it 
successfully;" 
"Much earlier in our work we spoke of the 
worrier having a utopian image of herself 
as not wanting ideal conditions, but as 
wanting a self that could deal with any 
conditions. We can see from these notes 
firstly why the idea of ideal conditions 
would not appeal to her, and secondly 
how her utopian image of herself seems 
to be grounded in the need for protection." 
Response: 
But we are becoming exasperated for whilst we have 
consistently been making the effort to appreciate what you 
are saying, i.e. whilst we have for a long while been seek- 
ing to offer readings of your speech as the exercise of 
friendship, your speech does seem to be settling too easily 
in the task of describing this hypothetical worrier, rather 
than in making the effort to inquire more deeply, and more 
actively, into ways of improving social relationships. 
Perhaps you imagine you can leave that work for others, 
e.g./..o 
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e.g. us, to do; Perhaps you are using this descriptive 
enterprise as a shield with which to protect your person, 
or as a smokescreen behind which you can sustain a policy 
of splendid isolation: Perhaps you have been, and are, 
still, committed to protecting your person, what you imagine 
is your self'. If this has been and is the case, our 
exasperation is in order, for all that our conversation 
with you has done, has been to accelerate the movement 
away from conversation, away from friendship, the very 
movement we so desperately desire to reverse. Now whether 
your speech is mere personal protection, or whether it is 
the exercise of irony, the intention of which is to allow 
us to draw out of our selves an honest and thoughtful res- 
ponse, we cannot know, but whichever, our conversation can 
only be improving through our efforts to say how the type 
of protection about which you seem to speak would do us 
harm not good. So this response will take the form of an 
effort to be differentiating ourselves from what we imagine 
is the usage of worry in order that we can be getting to 
know you better, and by doing so, be getting better to 
know ourselves. 
"The worrier's version of responsibility is being 
protective, i.e. looking after something or one, i.e. of 
keeping something or one (e.g. herself) safe ..." What 
is presupposed here ?: 
(1) That the thing (:) being looked after 
is known. 
(2) /... 
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(2) That it is known to be valuable. 
(3) The notion of looking after presupposes 
the thing is already valuable, it does 
not require work /thought. 
(4) That the thing is in danger, i.e. others 
are deformulated as enemies. 
So, your speech reminds us that we do not act 
response -ably /thoughtfully by settling for personal pro- 
tection of that sort, for on each count we hear how the 
opposite orientation would lead to less superficial con- 
versation, to more social /thoughtful /friendly relation- 
ships. But this is why your speech is becoming exasperat- 
ing, for after all we have been saying in our conversation 
can you still be commending such forgetfulness? It is as 
if you want us to go, with you, over old ground again: 
But perhaps we can display to you how uninterested we are 
in mere personal protection by doing precisely as you ask, 
for if we were interested in personal protection, we would 
very likely fear our readers. So we might fear that our 
readers could hear this particular response as disrespectful, 
i.e. as disregarding their presence. However we have no 
reason to fear our readers for we orient to them as thought- 
ful interlocutors, as friends who may desire to work with 
us over old ground, for they are aware that it is not so 
much by considering the ground, but by considering our way 
of working that we can always be instructing ourselves. 
Your /... 
* (N.B. What of the labour theory of value here? 
Perhaps a labour theory of virtue!) 
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Your speech reminds us that we are not intent 
upon treating our selves as things and then preventing 
our selves from falling. Indeed perhaps treating selves 
as things could be heard as a version of the myth of the 
original sin as that which precipitates the fall. We 
are continuing improving and elevating our conception of 
self by thinking /conversing /deliberating, i.e. by not 
reducing selves to things. 
"... This can show us how she uses a version of 
good as something things or people are such that they need 
protection ... ". We can almost hear the armed forces here, 
and it is fitting that they are referred to as forces, for 
weapons can do no more than force, i.e. they do rest in 
thoughtlessness, in superficiality, in the refusal to con- 
tinue conversing. The degenerate orientation of personal 
protection can very quickly be put to use in the service of 
thoughtless commitments to the protection of the nation or 
whatever. Protection in that mode of thought has got 
caught up with the notion of possessions, good is heard as 
value rather than virtue, and as virtue is being forgotten 
so also is the possibly continuing movement towards achiev- 
ing more thoughtful versions of self /society being abandoned. 
We do not seek to settle in protecting our persons, or what 
we might have mistakenly treated as our personal possessions, 
e.g. families, nations or whatever, (perhaps even disciplines:) 
from others, but to be working in such a way as to be pro- 
ducing social conditions in which protection no longer is 
the first thought that comes into, and from then on rules, 
our /... 
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our speech /our lives. For such forms of speech are 
oppressive. For, as you say, they begin with an idea of 
looking- after, where we begin with an idea of active in- 
quiry/looking for /improving. So whilst our inquiry /con- 
versation is only beginning theirs is finished, they wish 
only to chat with others who are the same as themselves 
for they imagine that is safer. And yes, we are hearing 
how this results in chatter, i.e. in what you call a static 
analysis, we would prefer not to speak of that as an analysis 
at all however as we hear analysis as dialectical, i.e. as 
movement. But we will proceed to think about the restricted 
options that mode of speech /life leaves as available. Pro- 
tection of the thing as it is, or avoidance, no wonder those 
constrained by this mode of speech are worried, there is no 
possibility of social change, for neither protection nor 
avoidance provides any room for improvement /for increasing 
intimacy. The description you offer of the worrier's con- 
ception of her life /her work resonates with the work of one 
on a production line where there is no possibility of creat- 
ing, only of protecting one's earning capacity by not allow- 
ing anything to go wrong; by not allowing anything untoward 
to happen. 
Whilst the production line worker can with a great 
deal of justification claim mitigating circumstances, are 
we to allow sociologists to reduce their response -ability 
in this way;:? After all, don't they frequently have 
security of tenure, together with a commitment to free 
speech, so what are their mitigating circumstances? But 
our /... 
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our exasperation with your speech is leading us astray, 
and leading us to do our readers a disservice for they are 
thoughtful interlocutors, and as such do not need to be 
reminded of their responsibilities. 
As to paragraph 12, yes protection does begin 
to sound more suspect for we become suspicious when that 
which is being protected is that which the protectors refuse 
to bring into question. For in what does its supposed 
value lie? Certainly not in its humanness for that is 
always a product of thoughtful inquiry. Paternalism can 
have no place in our movement towards more thoughtful, more 
liberating social relationships for the subordination it 
entails is contrary to the relationships of friendship 
which we desire. Paternalism /protection is lazy, you are 
right, but we would say it results in more rather than less 
work, where work is being heard as alienated and alienating, 
and though you speak strangely and perhaps dangerously, we 
do hear how thoughtful characters do not desire to have 
protectors /bodyguards but seek to have collaborators 
thoughtful interlocutors. There is even a sense in which 
by seeking to achieve thoughtful character we could be 
heard as seeking to be fittest, but it is not in a com- 
parative sense, for our work /our lives are grounded in a 
commitment to improving social relationships /social con- 
ditions, and a lack of fit is the absence of good social 
conditions, the absence of thought. Thinkers /speakers 
by continuing our committed inquiry into what it is good 
to do, do provide for the survival of thoughtful social 
relationships, and by doing so also provide for committed 
inquiry /... 
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inquiry. Your remarksabout the utility of the protector 
and the very limited teacher are correct, but of course 
you did not merely want us to be learning that You are 
directing us to hear how thinkers /speakers are those who 
always have, and always desire to have, deeper lessons to 
learn, for only in this way can we continue to develop 
socially /dialectically. Whilst the lessons we are learn- 
ing do continue to lessen the likelihood of our actions 
being thoughtless they do not lessen the need and desire 
we have to continue instructing ourselves. 
As to the final paragraph we are reminded by it 
that the split between self and conditions leaves the worrier 
merely wanting /wishing. However our collaborative efforts 
to be achieving more thoughtful, more social notions of 
self and society are such that the continuing achieving of 
the one is the continuing achieving of the other, i.e. ideal 
conditions are continuing and deepening friendship, and 
ideal selves are thoughtful friends. Nothing utopian here, 
but everything to do. We don't desire personal protection, 
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SECTION 12 
APPENDIX J 
"Your pressing request seems to be that 
I produce a version of my own speech as 
being something other than, or more than, 
worry, i.e. as being good intentioned 
rather than merely good natured, i.e. as 
being an attempt to do good rather than 
merely trying not to do harm. But, when 
your request seems to be ignored, or for- 
gotten, you become exasperated; which 
suggests that you imagine you have done 
everything you could, and the result is 
that you begin to lose trust in your 
version of my work as being good in- 
tentioned, and then you need me to 
show my good intention, or commitment 
in part in order that you can regain 
the trust you had in your version of 
my work. You need to regain this 
trust for otherwise you feel you will 
have succumbed to the thoughtless urge 
to treat others as lost causes, and 
you know that this would reduce you to 
a lost cause because you would have 
lost your cause. You presuppose the 
existence of good intentions for with- 
out them you can see no good. You 
know you become safe if you can produce 
others as always acting with good in- 
tentions." 
"Your exasperation is then a forerunner 
of the exasperation I should feel when 
I find that our work on worry does 
nothing, i.e. that others go on worrying, 
and /or doing nothing. Perhaps I am 
being polite here, your point is that 
if our work on worry cannot enable me 
to do more than merely worry, i.e. 
cannot enable me to produce a version 
of it, or anything else, as doing good 
then there is no reason to suppose it 
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involvement in it to do more than merely 
worry either. In which case it would, 
like worrying, have done no good." 
"The moment of decision is approaching 
far too rapidly for the worrier, (N.B. 
as would be expected she sees it as 
approaching her rather than her approach- 
ing it:) i.e. if she doesn't take up the 
challenge she is reduced to a life(!) of 
worry (grovelling) if she does she knows 
she has a fight on her hands. Perhaps 
the analogy sounds fanciful but I feel 
it is instructive for the worrier does 
try to avoid conflict situations, i.e. 
she is evasive, perhaps analogies them- 
selves are used by her to evade; But 
at the same time, if she does accept 
the challenge too readily she is aware 
that others could (as could she) doubt 
her sincerity. But she also knows 
that she can only go on seeing the 
possible decision as premature by con- 
tinuing to worry, for hasn't she deliberated 
for long enough ?" 
"So now the worrier is faced with her 
first real problem, i.e. how can she 
produce a good version of something 
rather than carrying on her old routine, 
i.e. rather than merely carrying on. 
Or, how can she realize that she is 
something more than a worrier? But, 
how can she be so dumb::: Once again 
she produces the situation as one in 
which pressure is exerted upon her, and 
surely she should be able to see by now 
that it is this beginning that leads 
her astray. It leads her astray 
because it makes her forget that if 
she was not already working with a 
good intention she wouldn't be under 
any pressure at all. If she had not 
already decided that good intentions 
are good she would not be worried about 
not having them. I think this is very 
important though I may not have expressed 
it well, and also in the face of the fact 
that experience would lead me to see 
that it is when I see something to be 
important that I am often making my 
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"Now, before I forget, I must say that 
this is not a way of removing pressure 
but at most of replacing it. The 
point is that when I produce your exas- 
peration as being a pressing request 
(a demand) upon me I give a reading 
of your exasperation than can do no 
good." 
"By choosing to read the situation as 
one in which you exert pressure upon 
me for my good, I continue to be in- 
terested in how good or bad might 
happen to me. For this reason I 
begin to feel that any response I 
make will be rightly seen as interested 
in personal protection, for I produce 
you as perceiving me as being in danger. 
An alternative reading of your exas- 
peration is as the expression of your 
loss of hope, i.e. it could be read 
as a request from you asking me to 
relieve you of the strangling pressure 
that lost causes exert upon you." 
"At first sight the latter reading 
suggests that my response need not be 
one that acts in the interests of 
personal protection, but this is not 
so, for whilst it might remove the 
pressure temporarily it would only be 
like prolonging the agony. For it 
assumes that you are only interested 
in personal protection, i.e. it con- 
verts you into a worrier." 
"So there is no point in simply lifting 
the pressure from me to you. What I 
need to do is to see that this pressure 
is that which makes life worth living, 
it is not something to be removed, it 
is something that must be lived with. 
But what is it? It is the pressure 
resulting from our desire to attribute 
intentions to others and in so doing 
to have intentions ourselves. I have 
an idea that I should be more specific 
here and refer only to good intentions 
for the notion of a bad intention is 
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for bad ought to be heard as the result 
of unintentionality /thoughtlessness over- 
coming intention /thought, rather than as 
the result of a bad intention. That is, 
bad is always the result of the unin- 
tentional rather than the intentional. 
Forgetfulness is unintentional rather 
than intentional." 
"Now having said this we can see how the 
worrier is misleading herself when she 
produces herself as being afraid that 
she has bad intentions, i.e. that it is 
better for her to act unintentionally 
than risk having bad intentions. For 
as we have seen the idea of bad intention 
is the result of a forgetful reading of 
the idea of intention and if the worrier 
could remember that intentions are always 
good she would come to see that not acting 
intentionally is merely another way to 
succumb to thoughtlessness. That is she 
could derive no solace from her view of 
herself as not being responsible for what 
goes wrong, for nobody ever is. Lest 
she thinks this is an even more comforting 
situation we need to point out to her that 
it is a waste of time, i.e. that it doesn't 
do any good, for good can only be done 
response -ably, i.e. intentionally. Worry- 
ing can never do any good then because it 
is a conditioned reflex, i.e. it occurs 
unintentionally." 
"The worrier accepts the possibility of 
bad intentions and is drawn into seeing 
all intentions as bad because she has a 
version of intention as premeditation. 
She thinks (!) that to intend something 
you have to think about it before you 
act, i.e. that you shouldn't be hasty, 
and she sees this to be premeditation, 
i.e. thinking before. But this version 
of premeditation leads us into thinking 
that what we need to know is what will 
happen rather than what we want. That 
is, it loses the possibility of desire 
when it replaces what we want to do with 
what we need to do. So, for instance, 
to treat a Socratic dialogue as pre- 
meditated in this sense is to make the 
outcome the cause of what came before, 
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a waste of time. None of this is a bad 
thing for the worrier except for the fact 
that she thinks premeditation cannot be 
done, i.e. she wishes it could! However 
she thinks that premeditation must always 
fail because we cannot know everything, 
including for example what will happen, 
but, to say it again she wishes that we 
could; So the worrier produces intention 
as premeditation and premeditation as 
necessarily failing; this is why the 
worrier sees her own work as unorganized, 
i.e. as coming from confusion. This is 
why she feels a need to think about what 
she says before she says it, and this is 
why she always finds dialogue too much 
of a strain, i.e. because she thinks 
she never has time to think. (She wants 
to think before she thinks:)" 
"What we need now then is a strong sense 
of premeditation which would allow the 
worrier to see that whilst this work is 
not premeditated in the weak sense this 
is not bad but good. She must remember 
that simply because she didn't know every- 
thing that she was going to say before 
she said it this doesn't mean that she 
is acting unintentionally." 
"To suggest that we shouldn't premeditate 
(in the above weak sense) , i.e. to suggest 
that we shouldn't produce a version of 
what will happen and orient to that, isn't 
to suggest that you shouldn't care about 
the future, for not caring about the 
future is to be unintentional, it is 
merely to hope that the future will care 
for you. More strongly, premeditation 
is to not care about the future in any 
other sense than wanting to be able to 
control it, i.e. it is an attempt to 
protect one's person by limiting the 
future's possibilities." 
"Now perhaps I should look more closely 
at the writing of these notes in the 
terms of the notes for your exasperation 
suggests that I should be very thoughtful 
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thoughtful (or perhaps better how have I 
been thoughtful) without getting drawn 
into premeditation (weak variety), i.e. 
perhaps, how am I to meditate rather 
than premeditate where premeditation 
is alienated for it either subordinates 
thought to some unthoughtful task or 
to the wishes of other." 
"How can I maintain our conversation 
without subordinating my work to the 
removing of exasperation. The crucial 
point here is the realization that nothing 
I could do could (or should) remove your 
exasperation for exasperation is nothing 
more than one way of terminating worry. 
(This is another way of saying that good 
intentions cannot be seen in anything 
anyone does.) The result is then that 
even if I were to subordinate my work to 
the task of the removal of your exas- 
peration it would necessarily fail, and 
its failure might be all the more exas- 
perating for you The point is that 
it isn't your exasperation which suggests 
that I should be thoughtful, even though 
it may have appeared to it my 
good intention. One other way of saying 
this that needs to be said is that the 
desire to maintain a conversation is good 
intention, for conversation is finished 
by the domination of ego or alter - 
domination reduces the space for intention 
and produces premeditation, where pre- 
meditation is the earlier idea of tacticalness. 
We cannot have conversations without good 
intentions. Conversation /good intention 
is then the way to avoid talking about 
things that aren't worth speaking about, 
e.g. natural limits. But still I could 
be read as talking about the worrier, 
i.e. one version of natural -man, and as 
a result we can see how all of the work 
so far could be treated as alienated if 
it is heard as worry. For if it is 
treated in this way we can see how it 
is itself subordinated to the unthoughtful 
task of talking about worry, as if we 
didn't already know what it is!" 
"If I really was the worrier, i.e. if all 
this work really was still worry, only 
worry, I would be really worried about 
the /... 
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the worrier, and being really worried 
here would be treating the worrier as 
a lost cause, i.e. it would be saying 
there is nothing more I can do, and 
yet I know that this isn't the case 
for the very fact that it is work tells 
me it isn't worry. This is a way of 
saying that perhaps I am a worker not 
a worrier where work is the having of 
intentions, i.e. it is the having of 
something you desire to do, and this 
is a way of saying, if we can remember 
what has gone before, that good work 
is not premeditated; Perhaps this 
tells us why it is never finished for 
being finished is like reaching a 
previously thought about goal or end, 
i.e. it relies upon premeditation. 
Good work then doesn't satisfy ex- 
pectations for it doesn't orient itself 
either to expectations or satisfaction 
(finishing), and this is good because 
satisfaction like domination leaves 
no room for intention. The worrier 
is satisfied that there is nothing 
she ought to do, and that is why she 
i sn.' t me, and also why there is so 
much more to be done;" 
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You are right when you say there is so much more 
to be done, and by formulating forms of speech as forms of 
hearing, as we have done earlier, we are better remember- 
ing that we seek to hear our own speech /thought as we hear 
the speech of others. By remembering this the super- 
ficiality of versions of conversations that could have 
restricted us to maintaining thoughtless barriers between 
concrete people is revealed. Earlier we spoke of our 
work straining the seams of its own format, here our 
efforts are oriented to some unpicking of the seams con- 
ventional usage could appear to sew between self and other 
selves, ego and alter. I /you talk could have been heard 
as epitomising the alienating effects of a form of speech 
which leads speakers to forget that that is what we all 
are. But we are remembering that we need not settle with 
a reading of I /you talk as being grounded in a dogmatic 
acceptance of social stratification, i.e. as being speech 
reduced to communicating superficial differences and 
similarities between specific discrete speakers. By 
hearing speeches as expressions of a communal commitment 
to active, collaborative, social inquiry we seek to 
elevate our conception of self by risking questioning how 
we are choosing to hear /to live. For instance, by bring- 
ing into question what could be apparent differences in 
status between speakers and listeners, between writers and 
readers. 
So/... 
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So, whereas much earlier in this work we brought 
into question the notion of 'I', here we are remembering 
that the notion of 'you' also cannot be taken for granted. 
We choose to hear and 'I' as instances of the same, 
i.e. as instances of thoughtful interlocutors, i.e. as 
deliberate social actors. And, by hearing in this way 
we do resist that persuasive version of I /you talk which 
rests in a difference which denies the possibility of 
friendship by being thoughtlessly, and forcefully, com- 
mitted to a form of social stratification which seeks to 
offer self a differential status to that of other selves, 
rather than to discriminate between the thoughtful, free, 
moral, deliberate, intentional, social actor and oppressive, 
unthoughtful, unfree, amoral, accidental, unintentional, 
anti -social happenings. 
We are remembering that by seeking to stretch 
ourselves, and by seeking to act more thoughtfully, we 
become more not less humble, for the urge for differential 
social status, i.e. to be thought better of than other 
selves, can only be heard as the humbug it is, if super- 
ficial versions of self are brought into question. 
There is no dignity in speech which lacks humility, 
and by remembering this we hear how by raising questions 
which humiliate us by reminding us how easily we can 
imagine we know what we don't know, other's speech helps us 
to proceed in a more rather than a less dignified manner. 
But, so persuasive is the predominant conventional form 
of hearing that we had almost settled with a notion of 
dignity /... 
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dignity as correlated not with humility, i.e. not with 
true worth, but with high rank on one or another dimension 
of social stratification. No wonder we, who do have a 
low estimate of our own personal worth, too readily could 
have mistaken what is a noble sentiment for an inexplicable, 
but pervasive deformity which we could have sought to hide 
and /or excuse. 
Analysis is a humiliating experience, and so much 
the better, for those, if any, who seek to be other than 
humble, overstep their place, and by doing so deny them- 
selves the possibility of true social relationships. 
Dialectical development, social development involves in- 
creasing humility, which in turn opens the possibility for 
true conversation by enabling speakers to exchange and 
develop ideas in a non -possessive way. But none of this 
is easy for many of the prevailing conventions of the 
specific language we have used could have led us away in 
the opposite direction. Neither is it easy to bring this 
specific piece of work to a close, but that is what I need 
to risk doing and am risking doing. 
This is the longest letter I have ever written 
Stan, and perhaps it is the longest I shall ever write, but 
even so it is, as you and other readers will appreciate, 
the exercise of understatement. I will allow myself to 
mention one small fantasy which relates to Ivan Illyich 
Pralinsky, which is that if he had found this thesis in the 
side /... 
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side of the chair he was slumped in, and had read it 
thoughtfully, his story might not have ended where and 
when it did. 
Now I know this work does not cohere to the con- 
ventional notion of a thesis but I say so much the better, 
for I remember that we choose to orient to others as 
friends not as judges. My hope is that readers will not 
call upon me to defend this work but will raise questions 
which help us move on from it, and if this radicalizes the 
whole issue of the submission of sociology theses so much 
the better, for what worse way is there to have thinkers 
begin than to force them into submission: 
Mick 
Postscript: 
Perhaps some readers are still wondering about the dangerous 
paper that was mentioned in the first section, an extract 
follows: 
APPENDIX K 
"We begin by offering an analysis of the 
initial section of Socrates' opening 
speech in the 'Apology' which commences 
as follows: 
"How you have felt, O men of Athens, at 
hearing the speeches of my accusers, I 
cannot tell; but I know that their 
persuasive words almost made me forget 
who I was - such was the effect of them; 
and yet they have hardly spoken a word 
of truth ..." 
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In this passage Socrates commences by 
telling us that he has become, or is 
becoming, worried about the feelings 
of others present in the courtroom 
vis -a -vis the speeches of his accusers. 
He begins by being afraid about what is 
going to happen to him. The 'reasons' 
he provides for feeling worried sound 
convincing, and this is why he begins 
by feeling convinced by them and worried. 
He remarks that he noticed his own feelings 
were being affected by the speeches of 
his accusers. We assume that he intends 
to generalize from his own experience, 
thereby expecting that others would have 
reacted as he reacted. The fact that 
he begins by making reference to the 
feelings of others, rather than to their 
thoughts, indicates that initially he was 
being forgetful about who he was, and 
hence that he was saying what had happened. 
This is important for as this work proceeds 
we will be reminded that orienting to the 
feelings of self or others as something 
to know and take into account, rather than 
as something to think about, and perhaps 
change, could never be considered a thoughtful 
form of action. Furthermore, Socrates was 
forgetting himself when he conceived of 
persuasive words as making him do something, 
for this suggests a passive, unthoughtful, 
undialectical version of the listener or 
reader, whereas Socrates by his own speech 
frequently displays for us a model of 
thoughtful listening. But, we must notice 
that Socrates' display, as all displays, 
requires an alter. The listener plays a 
part in the production of the version he 
holds of Socrates' speech, or any speech. 
Socrates says that he cannot tell how the 
others felt, but the very fact that he 
speaks about it in this way and at this 
time, indicates that he is worried about 
what they feel. He begins by treating 
others (other listeners) as analytically 
the same as himself, i.e. as liable to 
be persuaded by the accusers' speeches. 
So, when Socrates is worried about what 
is going to happen to him, a difference 
arises between what he says and what he 
thinks. If he had begun by allowing 
what he thought (i.e. that he did not 
know how others felt) to discipline what 
he said, he would not have begun his 
speech in the way he did. Perhaps 
Socrates /... 
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Socrates' usage of the phrase 'I cannot 
tell' is itself more telling than he 
realized. Socrates begins by being 
worried not about what he says he doesn't 
know, but about what he thinks he does 
know, which is that others are like him, 
and that as he knows what he feels, he 
knows what they feel. But here he 
checks his speech. He questions him- 
self by recalling that he doesn't always 
know how he feels. He takes his own 
speech seriously and allows it to remind 
him that he can forget who he is. He 
remembers that he can be corrupted, and 
so rather than speaking about his feelings, 
which is what could have been expected, 
he gives voice to the proposal that the 
feelings he had were not really his but 
were the feelings of someone who had almost 
forgotten himself. He makes the dis- 
cussion less concrete by depersonalizing 
it and treats himself (the one he was 
talking /thinking about) as a type, rather 
than as an individual. In this way the 
problem and his overcoming of it is trans- 
formed from being his to being potentially 
ours. That is, it becomes something we 
need to think about for our own as well 
as for his sake. 
The forgetful, i.e. the feelings he felt 
he had as a result of the speeches of his 
accusers, almost interrupted his own 
speech. However, by thinking about who 
he was, i.e. not one who had the feelings 
of someone who had almost forgotten himself, 
he begins to discipline himself and redirect 
his speech from worrying about persuasiveness 
towards the issue of truthfulness. 
The fact that he, and we, can begin by being 
worried in this way can act as a warning 
about the power of eloquence, for he in- 
dicates that he in no way under -estimates 
the power of his accusers' speech to in- 
fluence others, or indeed himself. But, 
whilst not under- estimating the power of 
his accusers' speech, he proceeds to speak 
in the face of it. He is not dominated 
or suppressed by it. He does more than 
warn himself and others about it, he helps 
to provide himself and others with the 
tools to overcome it." 
Though /... 
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Though this is sophisticated and persuasive 
reading of the beginnings of Socrates' speech, thoughtful 
readers of this thesis will not now be taken in by it; 
they will grasp the profundity of the issue at stake. 
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